Heirs of Malaggay v. Heirs of Eway

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 228033. * September 14, 2021.]

HEIRS OF ALEJO MALAGGAY, NAMELY: INOCENCIA ** MALAGGAY-LAPITAN, CLEOFE MALAGGAY-PASCUAL, FIDELA MALAGGAY-BETAO, SHIRLEY MALAGGAY-BONDAD and LEE MALAGGAY, petitioners, vs.HEIRS OFTULAY EWAY, NAMELY: FELIZA EWAY-GADDON, JUANITA EWAY THOMAS, *** AMMAYO EWAY-BAQUIRAN, BENITA EWAY, represented by ZENAIDA EWAY BATO, respondents.

HEIRS OF ALEJO MALAGGAY, NAMELY: INOCENCIA MALAGGAY-LAPITAN, CLEOFE MALAGGAY-PASCUAL, FIDELA MALAGGAY-BETAO, SHIRLEY MALAGGAY-BONDAD and LEE MALAGGAY, petitioners, vs.FORTUNATOMEDINA and LILIBETH MEDINA BALACANAO, respondents.

HEIRS OF ALEJO MALAGGAY, NAMELY: INOCENCIA MALAGGAY-LAPITAN, CLEOFE MALAGGAY-PASCUAL, FIDELA MALAGGAY-BETAO, SHIRLEY MALAGGAY-BONDAD and LEE MALAGGAY, petitioners, vs.FRANCISCORAMOS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 14, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 228033 (Heirs of Alejo Malaggay, namely: Inocencia Malaggay-Lapitan, Cleofe Malaggay-Pascual, Fidela Malaggay-Betao, Shirley Malaggay-Bondad and Lee Malaggay, petitioners v. Heirs of Tulay Eway, namely: Feliza Eway-Gaddon, Juanita Eway Thomas, Ammayo Eway-Baquiran, Benita Eway, represented by Zenaida Eway Bato, respondents)

(Heirs of Alejo Malaggay, namely: Inocencia Malaggay-Lapitan, Cleofe Malaggay-Pascual, Fidela Malaggay-Betao, Shirley Malaggay-Bondad and Lee Malaggay, petitioners v. Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina Balacanao, respondents)

(Heirs of Alejo Malaggay, namely: Inocencia Malaggay-Lapitan, Cleofe Malaggay-Pascual, Fidela Malaggay-Betao, Shirley Malaggay-Bondad and Lee Malaggay, petitioners v. Francisco Ramos, respondent)

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the September 29, 2016 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102984, which affirmed with modification the June 6, 2014 Consolidated Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36 (RTC) in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26.

It all began with the institution of four civil cases on June 7, 2010 before the RTC, all denominated as Complaints for Quieting of Title/Recovery of Possession and Damages with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, viz.:

(a) Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24: Filed by plaintiffs Heirs of Tulay Eway, namely, Feliza Eway-Gaddon, Juanita Eway Thomas, Ammayo Eway-Baquiran, and Benita Eway, represented by Zenaida Eway Bato;

(b) Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25: Filed by plaintiffs Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao, represented by Raul Medina;

(c) Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-26: Filed by plaintiff Francisco Ramos; and

(d) Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-27: Filed by plaintiffs Artemio Gaddon, Delicia Gaddon, Fe Vivian Gaddon, Fidel Gaddon, Marcelina Gaddon-Mitra, Pacita Gaddon-Bacwadang, Reminia Gaddon Pascua, Reynaldo Gaddon, Roland Gaddon, and Simona Gaddon, represented by Arthur Bacwadang. 4

Named defendants in the complaints were the Heirs of Alejo Malaggay, namely, Inocencia Malaggay-Lapitan, Cleofe Malaggay-Pascual, Fidela Malaggay-Betao, Shirley Malaggay-Bondad, and Lee Malaggay.

Plaintiffs all alleged that they owned parcels of land in Bananao, 5 Paracelis, Mountain Province, and that defendants encroached on certain portions thereof (disputed properties) by building a fence to enclose the disputed properties. Defendants were laying claim to the disputed properties based on a Pasture Lease Agreement executed in their father's favor, but according to plaintiffs, said Pasture Lease Agreement covered an entirely different property located in another area, that is at Masablang, Bantay, Paracelis, Mountain Province.

During the hearing on the application for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC on June 22, 2010, the parties agreed on terms and conditions 6 to maintain the statusquo and to preserve peace and order. In view of this agreement, the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was dispensed with. 7

On July 20, 2010, Atty. Sergio SJ Milan (Atty. Milan), as counsel for defendants, filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Extension of Time to Submit Answer. 8 In its Order 9 dated July 28, 2010, the RTC noted Atty. Milan's entry of appearance and gave defendants until August 5, 2010, to file their answer. When no answer was filed, plaintiffs filed on August 10, 2010, a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default. 10 It appears that defendants filed their Answer 11via registered mail on August 10, 2010, but did not proffer any explanation as to why their answer was filed beyond the extended period.

On August 18, 2010, plaintiffs filed a Second Motion to Declare Defendants in Default with Prayer to Expunge Answer from the Records of the Case. Plaintiffs averred that although defendants' Answer was dated August 5, 2010, it was only considered filed on the date it was mailed, which was August 10, 2010. Plaintiffs pointed out that defendants clearly filed their answer beyond the extension of time they prayed for without even offering an explanation for the delay. Also, defendants' answer, which alleged negative defenses and claims for damages, lacked verification and should be treated as a mere scrap of paper.

The RTC set the plaintiffs' motions to declare defendants in default for hearing on October 15, 2010, and the counsel were given the opportunity to argue orally their positions in open court. 12 In an Order 13 dated November 19, 2010, the RTC declared defendants in default and directed the plaintiffs to present their evidence exparte before the Branch Clerk of Court.

The joint reception of plaintiffs' evidence exparte started on December 10, 2010, while defendants filed on the same day a Motion for Reconsideration 14 of the RTC Order dated November 19, 2010. During the scheduled hearing of defendants' motion for reconsideration on December 17, 2010, the parties submitted a joint motion to reset said hearing in order to give them sufficient time for the amicable settlement of the cases. In an Order 15 of even date, the RTC granted the parties' joint motion and, for the meantime, suspended the presentation of plaintiffs' evidence exparte. Pursuant to their efforts to reach a compromise agreement, the parties agreed on the conduct of a verification survey of their properties with the assistance of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), based on the cadastral survey for the Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province. After plaintiffs' counsel manifested during the hearing on June 13, 2012, that the relocation survey had already been completed, the RTC issued a Joint Order 16 giving the parties 30 days within which to submit their compromise agreement based on the results of the said survey.

However, on July 18, 2012, the RTC received a copy of defendants' Letter, 17 dated July 12, 2012, to Atty. Milan terminating the latter's services as counsel in the civil cases. Next, on July 23, 2012, the RTC received a Letter 18 dated July 21, 2012, from Geodetic Engineer Noel K. Tuguinay stating his wish to withdraw his signature on the relocation survey reports submitted in the civil cases because: (a) he discovered, after the reports were already submitted, that the points of references were not in conformity or failed to meet those prescribed by the Revised Manual of Land Surveys in the Philippines (RMLSP); (b) defendants' Original Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) Title No. C-7280C, portion of Lot 1520, CAD 540-D, was not delineated/reflected/recognized in the conduct of the relocation survey reports; and (c) the Geodetic Engineer as DENR representative was not present during the conduct of the survey in violation of the RMLSP and since the relocation survey reports were not signed by a DENR representative, these could be questioned by concerned persons.

Then, on July 31, 2012, a Motion to Enter Appearance with Motion to Stay Further Proceedings and to Dismiss the Cases 19 was filed by defendants' new counsel, Atty. Jose N. Co (Atty. Co). In support of their motion to dismiss, defendants contended that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the cases because the disputed properties were covered by CLOAs issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to the parties, thus, making them agrarian disputes which fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). In its Joint Order 20 dated July 31, 2012, the RTC noted the termination of Atty. Milan's services and Atty. Co's entry of appearance as defendants' counsel, and set for hearing the defendants' motion to stay further proceedings and to dismiss the cases. During the hearing set on August 10, 2012, the parties' counsels presented oral arguments on defendants' motion to dismiss. The parties also subsequently submitted their position papers on the same motion.

In an Omnibus Resolution 21 dated January 14, 2013, the RTC acted on defendants' pending Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 19, 2010 declaring them in default. The RTC found no compelling reason to lift the order of default because defendants' motion for reconsideration failed to comply with the basic requirements of Section 3 (b), 22 Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the motion to lift an order of default must be made under oath; (b) it must allege that the failure to file an Answer was due to fraud, mistake, or excusable negligence; and (c) it must show the existence of meritorious defense.

As to the matter of jurisdiction, the RTC held in the same Omnibus Resolution that it had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-27 because the disputed property therein was covered by a CLOA issued by the DAR under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and was, therefore, cognizable by the DARAB. Yet, the RTC sustained its jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26 because there was no showing that the parcels of land in these cases were placed under the operation of the CARL. According to the RTC, mere inclusion of the parcels of land for cadastral survey, with the end in view of distributing them to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), did not ipsofacto place said parcels of land within the coverage of CARP.

At the end of its Omnibus Resolution, the RTC resolved as follows:

1. The Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 December 2010 is denied for lack of Merit;

2. Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-27 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; and

3. The court's jurisdiction over Civil [Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25] and 2010-6-7-26 is sustained. As such, the continuation of the [ex parte] presentation of evidence for the plaintiffs is hereby set on February 28, 2013 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. 23

Refusing to give up, defendants filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration 24 on the Order of Default as Included in the Omnibus Resolution dated January 14, 2013. In said Motion, defendants claimed to have trusted their former counsel to protect their rights, but regrettably, he failed to file the answer on time and filed a motion to lift order of default which did not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Defendants begged the indulgence of the RTC considering their meritorious defense as stated in the attached affidavits of merit. They likewise asserted that the belated filing of their answer was due to excusable negligence. They were not able to communicate with their previous counsel on vital matters necessary for the preparation of their answer owing to the great distance and lack of regular rides between Bontoc, Mountain Province and Paracelis, Mountain Province, plus, the difficult modes of communication.

The RTC issued its April 1, 2013 Joint Order 25 denying defendants' second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It justified the denial on procedural and substantive grounds. A second motion for reconsideration is specifically prohibited under Sec. 56, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. In addition, defendants offered no extraordinary persuasive or compelling reason to excuse their noncompliance with the Rules. The RTC reasoned that in preparing the answer, defendants need not be in the physical presence of their counsel because advancements in communication technology already allowed telecommunication and teleconferencing. Also, defendants could have simply informed their counsel of their predicament and their counsel could have filed another motion for extension of time to file an answer. The RTC lastly observed that defendant Inocencia Malaggay-Lapitan was able to attend the raffle and summary hearing of the civil cases on June 22, 2010, even though when she received notice of the same only three days prior; which demonstrated that she could have likewise readily visited their counsel for the preparation of their answer.

Thereafter, the ex parte reception of evidence resumed. In all, plaintiffs presented the testimonies of 10 witnesses, namely, Zenaida Eway Bato, Francisco Ramos, and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao, plaintiffs; Melecio Tomas and Raul Medina, plaintiffs' family members; Eugenio Sullay, Felix Kenept, and Pacita Gaddon-Bacwadang, farmer-residents of Bananao, Mountain Province, and owners of lots adjoining those of plaintiffs; Ceasar Corcha, former Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bananao, Mountain Province; and Geodetic Engineer Primo Habiling, Jr. They also submitted documentary evidence, which included the relocation survey report, tax declarations, certifications from the Municipal Assessor and Municipal Treasurer of Paracelis, and cadastral map of the Municipality of Paracelis.

Before the civil cases could be submitted for decision, however, defendants filed another Motion to Dismiss. 26 In their latest motion, defendants identified the main or principal issue in the civil cases to be: "who is entitled to the ownership over the unregistered lands in dispute." They then argued that questions of ownership involving unregistered lands are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts as primary jurisdiction over such questions is vested in the Bureau of Lands, citing and quoting in full the case of People v. Pareja (Pareja). 27 They insisted that the disputed properties were public lands as plaintiffs themselves admitted in their complaints that the disputed properties were the subjects of a survey conducted a long time ago by the DAR, which then meant that the parcels of land were declared alienable and disposable by the Government. They called attention to the fact that many persons from the same place where the disputed properties are located had been granted CLOAs by the DAR. Once again, defendants prayed for the dismissal of the civil cases for lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling of the RTC

On June 6, 2014, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Decision in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26, which favored plaintiffs.

The RTC first addressed the issue of jurisdiction raised in defendants' latest motion to dismiss. It held that the factual backdrop of Pareja was not on all fours with that of the three civil cases pending before it. The subject property in Pareja was part of the public land which was declared alienable and disposable only seven months prior to the filing of the case therein; while the disputed properties in these cases were already reflected and identified in the Paracelis Cadastre accomplished on June 7, 1979, making them available for private ownership more than 30 years ago. That the parcels of land claimed by plaintiffs were assigned lot numbers in the cadastral survey could very well be recognition by the State that the lots had been under private individuals' possession at the time of the accomplishment of the survey. It was clear to the RTC that while the lands in Pareja were once part of the public land declared alienable and disposable seven months prior to the filing of the case, the disputed properties herein had long been considered private lands. Moreover, Pareja was decided in 1990. The RTC cited the more recent cases of Pasi v. Salapong, 28Gapacan v. Omipet, 29Spouses Imbat v. Spouses Soliven, 30 and Spouses Sabitsana v. Muertegui31(Sabitsana), wherein the Court sustained the jurisdiction of the RTC over cases for quieting of title involving unregistered parcels of land. Hence, the RTC sustained its jurisdiction over the three civil cases.

The RTC then proceeded to uphold plaintiffs' title to the subject property, finding sufficient evidence to grant their prayer for quieting of title through the issuance of injunctive reliefs. Considering the evidence presented by plaintiffs during the ex parte trial, the RTC adjudged:

In these cases, plaintiffs' titles over the disputed parcels of land are undisputed. Per testimony of their disinterested witnesses namely Eugenio Sullay and Felix Kenept, plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of their parcel of land even prior to 1956. Some of their improvements are still visible in the area while some were destroyed when defendants encroached on large portions of the plaintiffs' possession and converted the same into pastureland for grazing animals under defendants' claim that the area is part of their pasture lease grant from the DENR. Moreover, the Arbitration Award dismissing the complaint filed by one of the [defendants] Cleofe M. Pascual against plaintiffs indubitably supports plaintiffs' claim that they are the owners and possessors of the disputed properties.

For the Heirs of Tulay Eway whose claim is apparently embraced in Lot 266, CAD 540-D, their ownership and possession since 1945 is bolstered by the Approval of Application and Issuance of Patent granted to their predecessor-in-interest Tulay Eway indicating that per investigation conducted by the land investigator, Tulay Eway had been in possession of his other landholdings in the area since 1945.

The possession and ownership of the plaintiffs are further supported by other documentary evidences. For the Heirs of Tulay Eway, their claim is evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 9698 in the name of Tulay Eway and certification of tax payments. As to plaintiffs Fortunato Medina and Elizabeth Medina Balacanao, claimants of Lot Nos. 1529 and 1518, CAD 540-D, their possession and ownership are also supported by their tax declarations. With respect to plaintiff Francisco [Ramos'] claim, he presented his tax declarations over his property embraced in Lot No. 266, CAD 540-D. Admittedly, while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are manifestation of [one's] claim of ownership and possession for "no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession." On the other hand, it was convincingly shown by the certification issued by the municipal assessor that defendants have no tax declaration covering the contested parcels of land.

In addition to the afore-cited tax declarations, plaintiff Fortunato Medina presented the Notice of Account Payable dated 6 June 1983 emanating from Bureau of Lands clearly signifying that the DENR has recognized his ownership and possession over Lot No. 1529.

With respect to the presence of an instrument, claim or proceedings beclouding plaintiffs' titles over their landholdings, the plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that defendants have been asserting their claim over the plaintiffs' properties alleging that the disputed lands are covered by their father's pasture lease grant. [Defendants] even went to the extent of erecting barbed-wire fence enclosing almost the area of the contested lands eventually converting the same into pastureland manifesting their resolve to enforce their illegitimate claim. Further, defendants attempted to have the lands surveyed with the purpose of placing the properties under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. Defendants' encroachments on the portions of plaintiffs' properties are illustrated in the relocation survey reports and their attachments prepared and submitted by the geodetic engineers hired by the parties and identified in open court by plaintiffs' witnesses. The invalidity of defendants' claim [was] established when a verification with the DENR shows that the disputed lands are not part of defendants' pasture lease grant. In fact, defendants have no pasture lease award over any property in Bananao, Paracelis, Mountain Province. What they have is a Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement covering 260 hectares located in Bantay, Paracelis, Mountain Province which is about 20 kilometers away from the disputed area.

The foregoing discussions evidently demonstrate that plaintiffs have shown their legal or equitable title to or interest in the real properties subject of these cases. Further, plaintiffs have sufficiently established the claim of the defendants beclouding their (plaintiffs) titles over the contested parcels of land. Having demonstrated, too, that defendants' claim is not valid, the reliefs being sought by the plaintiffs should perforce be granted. 32

Lastly, the RTC held that the plaintiffs failed to present testimonial or documentary evidence to prove their claim for actual or compensatory damages, but still allowed plaintiffs to recover P10,000.00 from defendants for their litigation expenses as it was readily apparent that plaintiffs had to hire a counsel to represent them in the court proceedings.

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Plaintiffs Heirs of Tulay Eway are declared the owners and rightful possessors of portion of Lot 266, CAD 540-D, Paracelis Cadastre, which portion is described in their complaint in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24;

2. Plaintiffs Fortunato Medina and Elizabeth Medina Balacanao in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25 are declared the owners and rightful possessors of Lot Nos. 1529 and 1518, CAD 540-D, Paracelis Cadastre, respectively;

3. Plaintiff Francisco Ramos is declared the owner and rightful possessor of portion of Lot 266, CAD 540-D, Paracelis Cadastre, which portion is described in his complaint in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-26;

4. Ordering defendants to vacate the portions of the afore-cited parcels of land they have encroached on and deliver possession thereof to the plaintiffs;

5. Setting aside the Order dated 22 June 2010 directing the maintenance of statusquo;

6. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs [P10,000.00] in each of the cases as reimbursement of plaintiffs' litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED. 33

Ruling of the CA

Defendants filed their Appeal before the CA, assigning as errors the refusal of the RTC to dismiss the civil cases for lack of jurisdiction and its award of litigation expenses or attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. In its September 29, 2016 Decision, the appellate court sustained the jurisdiction of the RTC over the civil cases. However, it deleted the award of litigation expenses in favor of the plaintiffs based on Article 2208 34 of the Civil Code, which provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered in the absence of stipulation, subject only to certain exceptions, none of which was present in the civil cases. In the end, the CA decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTIALLYGRANTED. The Consolidated Decision dated 06 June 2014 of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25 and 2010-6-7-26 is AFFIRMEDwithMODIFICATION that the award of P10,000.00 as litigation expenses for each case is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.35

ISSUE

Defendants, now herein petitioners, seek recourse from this Court via the instant petition for review with a sole assignment of error, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, BONTOC, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE HAS JURISDICTION OVER THESE CASES. 36

Petitioners maintain that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the civil cases because said cases involved "title to, interest therein, or possession of real property," the jurisdiction over which has been divided between first and second level courts depending on the assessed value of the property. Petitioners assert that plaintiffs in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26, now herein respondents, failed to establish that the assessed values of their respective properties exceed P20,000.00 so as to fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Petitioners additionally argue that the main or principal issue in the civil cases was ownership over unregistered lands which fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands, citing Pareja and Heirs of Pacifico Pocdo v. Avila37(Pocdo). They assert that the disputed properties remain as public lands which have been declared alienable and disposable. Other persons have been awarded parcels of land in the same area through CLOAs issued by the DAR, but respondents do not have such CLOAs. Respondents could not have acquired possessory rights over the disputed properties without CLOAs.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has partial merit.

Sufficient allegations in the

It is well settled that the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for determine the nature of the action and the court which has jurisdiction over the matter. As the Court pronounced in Heirs of Tunged v. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.: 38

In determining which body or court has jurisdiction in this case, Our pronouncement in the recent case of Unduran, et al. v. Aberasturi, et al., is instructive, viz.:

[J]urisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 39

xxx xxx xxx

Second. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

As can be gleaned from the aforecited allegations in the Complaint, the case at bar is not an action for the claim of ownership, much less, an application for the issuance of CALTs/CADTs, contrary to the court a quo's findings. In fact, petitioners categorically stated in the said Complaint that their Petition for the Identification, Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Claim and Issuance of CALTs is already pending before the NCIP.

Ultimately, petitioners' cause of action is grounded upon the alleged earthmoving activities and operations of the respondents within petitioners' ancestral land, which violated and continue to violate petitioners' environmental rights under the IPRA and PD 1586 as the said activities were averred to have grave and/or irreparable danger to the environment, life, and property. Clearly, such cause of action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a special environmental court, pursuant to AO No. 23-2008 in relation to BP 129 and A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their claim is irrelevant in the preliminary issue of jurisdiction. Again, once jurisdiction is vested by the allegations in the complaint, it remains vested regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 40 (emphases supplied)

Guided accordingly by the aforecited jurisprudence, the Court looks into whether respondents' Complaints in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26 contained material allegations for an action for quieting of title within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24, 2010-6-7-25, and 2010-6-7-26 for quieting of title were instituted before the RTC pursuant to the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.

Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

In Green Acres Holdings, Inc. v. Cabral, 41 the Court expounded on the action for quieting of title, thus:

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon, doubt, or uncertainty affecting title to real property. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. In such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.

For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its primafacie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 42

It is worthy to note that at this point, the Court is initially looking into the sufficiency of the allegations and the prayers in respondents' Complaints as to constitute an action to quiet title within the jurisdiction of the courts. The Court reiterates that whether or not respondents are entitled to their claims is irrelevant in the preliminary issue of jurisdiction.

The relevant portions of respondents' complaints are reproduced below for reference:

In Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24:

xxx xxx xxx

3] Plaintiffs' father [owned] a property situated in Sadag, Bananao[,] Mountain Province which is more particularly described as follows:

TD #9698

A parcel of a cornland/[r]iceland/upland situated at Sadag[,] Bananao, Paracelis, Mountain Province bounded on the North [by] Francisco Ramos; East by Juan Macadangdang and Sifu River; South by the Siffu River; West by Nabugnayan; with an area of Five Hectares with an assess value of [twenty-five] thousand seven hundred pesos (Php25,700.00). x x x

4] In the year 1975, the late Alejo Malaggay, the father of herein [defendants], enclosed his claimed land with a fence. However, his fence encroached into the property owned by herein [plaintiffs] and other adjoining owners.

5] Worst, in November 3, 1997, [plaintiffs] learned that defendants, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, surveyed the land which was enclosed by their fence. Some of the adjoining owners verbally aired their protest at the office of the Department of Agrarian Reform to the survey conducted. Thus, no Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) was given to the defendants.

6] On January 10, 2005, herein [plaintiffs], together with [x x x] adjoining owners, learned that the defendants surveyed again the property enclosed by their fence.

7] Upon learning that a survey was conducted, [plaintiffs] and other adjoining owners whose lands were enclosed by the fence of the defendants, lost no time in lodging a complaint at the Office of the late Mayor Ceasar Rafael. The late Mayor summoned both parties but no settlement was reached since herein defendants did not appear.

8] On January 24, 2005, affected adjoining owners including herein [plaintiffs] filed a petition addressed to the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform through Mr. Avelino Matib asking them not to issue any Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the defendants on the ground that [plaintiffs] have Titles and Tax Declaration over the property which is claimed by the defendants. x x x

9] Defendants claim that the property subject of this case is covered by a Pasture Lease Contract of their late father Alejo Malaggay. However, upon further verification, it was found out that the Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement of the [defendants'] father covered a property in Masablang, Bantay, Paracelis, Mountain Province and not in Bananao, Paracelis. x x x

10] Recently, defendants, without asking for permission, cut the trees growing on the subject land which is owned by herein plaintiffs;

11] Up to date, herein defendants continued to sit on their baseless claim over the property subject of this case as manifested by their refusal to give up the possession of the disputed portion of the property.

12] The baseless claim of ownership by the defendants casts a cloud and doubt over the title of plaintiffs over the subject property. 43

In Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25:

xxx xxx xxx

3] Plaintiff Fortunato Medina owns a real property located in Madalapang, Palitod, Paracelis[,] Mountain Province which is more specifically described as follows:

A parcel of [riceland] situated at Madalapang, Palitod, Paracelis, Mountain Province bounded on the North by a brook; East by a brook; South by Public Land and West by Public Land, containing an approximate area of 3.0000 [hectares] with an assessed value of Four Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos (P4,760.00) covered by Tax Declaration No. 6678.

xxx xxx xxx

4] Plaintiff Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao likewise own a real property situated in Madalapang, Bananao, Paracelis, Mountain Province. She likewise declared the property for taxation purposes as follows:

A parcel of [cornland] and [riceland] situated at Madalapang, Bananao, Paracelis, Mountain Province bounded on the North by Fred Saludo; East by Amelia Medina; South by Public Land and West by Raul Medina, containing an approximate area of 5.3662 [hectares] with an assessed value of [Twenty-Eight] Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety Pesos (P28,990.00) covered by Tax Declaration No. 10156.

xxx xxx xxx

5] Sometime in March 2001 or prior thereto, the above named-defendant entered surreptitiously into the subject property by enclosing the Southern portion of the property with a fence.

6] That upon discovery of the illegal act herein plaintiffs requested the defendants to stop but they persisted. Hence, [plaintiffs] filed a case against the defendants at the office of the Barangay for the first time.

7] Due to the failure to reach an amicable settlement, both parties agreed to submit their grievance to Arbitration. On June 18, 2001, the Lupong Tagapamayapa headed by the former Punong Barangay Cesar Corcha issued an arbitration award, based on documents submitted, in favor of herein [plaintiffs].

8] Despite the arbitration award issued by the Lupong Tagapamayapa in favor of the [plaintiffs], herein defendants disregarded and continued disregarding the Arbitration Award.

9] On January 10, 2005, herein plaintiffs, together with other adjoining owners, learned that the defendants surveyed the land enclosed by the fence for the second time with the aid of some personnel from the Department of Agrarian Reform.

10] Upon learning that a survey was conducted, [plaintiffs] and other adjoining owners whose lands were enclosed by the fence of the defendants, lost no time in lodging a complaint at the Office of the late Mayor Ceasar Rafael. The late Mayor summoned both parties but no settlement was reached since herein defendants did not appear.

11] Thereafter, [plaintiffs] and the other adjoining land owners made a petition on January 24, 2005 to the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform through Avelino Matib not to issue any Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the defendants on the ground that petitioners have Titles and Tax Declaration over the property. x x x

[12] Just to make sure that the disputed portion of the [plaintiffs'] property is within the alleged Pasture Lease Agreement, [they] asked for the assistance of the Office of the Municipal Assessor. The Tax Mapper issued a certification that [plaintiffs'] property is within the property claimed by the defendants to be covered by their father's Pasture Land Contract.

[13] Upon further verification, it was found out that [there] was only one Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement granted to the late Alejo Malaggay and it covered a property in Masablang, Bantay, Paracelis, Mountain Province and not in Bananao, Paracelis. x x x

[14] Sometime prior to the year 2007, plaintiffs installed perimeter barbwire fence on the property subject of this case but defendants destroyed and removed the same on July 23 and 24, 2007. The [plaintiffs] reported said incident at the Police Station.

[15] Despite all the [ill behaviors] shown by the [defendants], [plaintiffs], together with Mr. Melecio Thomas, reached out to [defendants in] December 2007 and asked him to stop possessing the land so that they could at least plant crops for one cropping but [defendants] fervently refused.

[16] This baseless claim of ownership by the defendants casts a cloud and doubt over the title of plaintiffs over the subject property. 44 (emphases in the original)

As to the Complaint in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-26, it generally contained the same averments as in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24 except for the following paragraphs:

In Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-26:

xxx xxx xxx

3] Plaintiff Francisco Ramos owns a real property located in Mantabog, Bananao, Paracelis[,] Mountain Province which is more specifically described as follows:

A parcel of [riceland] situated at Mantabog, Bananao, Paracelis, Mountain Province bounded on the North by a Public Land; East by a Public Land; South by Ambrocio Alzadon and West by Alejo Malaggay, containing an approximate area of 7.0000 hectares with an assessed value of [Thirty-Six] Thousand Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php36,650.00) covered by Tax Declaration No. 7207.

xxx xxx xxx

10] One proof that the herein [plaintiff] is the real owner of the property is the fact that he was able to mortgage the subject land on July 15, 2005 before a Notary Public[.] 45

The prayers in the three Complaints all identically read:

WHEREFORE[,] it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court:

1] To issue a Restraining Order immediately upon the filing of this complaint;

2] After notice and hearing

a. To issue a writ of preliminary injunction and to render judgment in favor of the plaintiffs awarding the ownership of the subject property to plaintiffs and to make the injunction against the [defendants] permanent;

b. To condemn the [defendants] to reimburse acceptance fee in the amount of Ten Thousand (Php10,000.00) plus accumulated appearance fees; [and]

c. To order the [defendants] to pay damages in the amount of Ten Thousand (Php10,000.00) and litigation expenses not less than the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (Php15,000.00)[.]

We pray for other relief just and equitable in the premises. 46

A perusal of respondents' complaints would readily show that they had sufficiently alleged the required elements for an action to quiet title.

First, respondents asserted ownership of the disputed properties in Bananao, Mountain Province, which they had been declaring in their respective names for taxation purposes. Sec. 477 of the Civil Code requires that the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the subject real property. It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title to the property is the registered owner of the property in question. "Title" to property does not necessarily mean the certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. 47

Second, as a cloud on their title, respondents referred to a Pasture Lease Agreement in favor of petitioners' father, on the strength of which petitioners encroached on the disputed properties by enclosing the same with a fence. Respondents contended that upon verification, they discovered that petitioners' Pasture Lease Agreement covered another property located in Masablang, Bantay, Paracelis, Mountain Province. Respondents prayed that the RTC award them ownership of the disputed property and grant a permanent injunction against petitioners, as well as order petitioners to pay respondents damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

Having settled that the allegations and prayers in respondents' complaints sufficiently constituted an action to quiet title, the next question for consideration of the Court is which trial court has jurisdiction over the action, i.e., a first or a second level court?

Jurisdiction over real actions

Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 provides for the creation and jurisdiction of the CA, second level courts (RTCs), and first level courts [i.e., Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs)]. Secs. 19 and 33 of BP Blg. 129, as amended, specifically enumerate the civil cases over which second and first level courts, respectively, shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction, to wit:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts[.]

xxx xxx xxx

Section 33. JurisdictionofMetropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (emphases supplied)

Respondents cite Sabitsana, wherein the Court declared, "On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC." 48 Sec. 1, Rule 63 referred to in the case reads:

Section 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (emphases supplied)

Notably, no further justification was given in Sabitsana for its declaration on RTC jurisdiction other than the simple reference to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In contrast to Sabitsana, there are jurisprudence that precisely discussed the provisions of BP Blg. 129 vis-à-vis Rule 63 of the Rules of Court and explicitly adjudged that the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions to quiet title is determined by the assessed value of the real property.

In Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso49 the Court categorically pronounced that an action to quiet title involves "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein," jurisdiction over which is dependent on the assessed value of the real property:

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."

The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296, as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance) exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2).The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice.50 (emphases supplied)

The Court further stressed in Salvador v. Patricia, Inc.51 that the provisions of BP Blg. 129, as amended, which delineate the exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts over real actions depending on the assessed value of the property, take precedence over Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which states that petitions for declaratory relief and similar remedies, including an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds thereon, may be filed before the RTC:

For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the trial court must interpret and apply the law on jurisdiction in relation to the averments or allegations of ultimate facts in the complaint regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. Based on the foregoing provision of law, therefore, the RTC had jurisdiction over the cause of action for injunction because it was one in which the subject of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation. But the same was not true in the case of the cause of action for the quieting of title, which had the nature of a real action — that is, an action that involves the issue of ownership or possession of real property, or any interest in real property — in view of the expansion of the jurisdiction of the first level courts under Republic Act No. 7691, which amended Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 effective on April 15, 1994[.] x x x 52

xxx xxx xxx

As such, the determination of which trial court had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the real action is dependent on the assessed value of the property in dispute.

An action to quiet title is to be brought as a special civil action under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. Although Section 1 of Rule 63 specifies the forum to be "the appropriate Regional Trial Court," the specification does not override the statutory provision on jurisdiction. This the Court has pointed out in Malana v. Tappa, to wit:

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" x x x that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. 53 (emphases supplied, citation omitted)

As alleged in respondents' Complaints, the assessed values of their real properties are as follows:

 

Case No.	Respondents (Plaintiffs)	Assessed Value
Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24	Heirs of Tulay Eway	P25,700.00
Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25	Fortunato Medina	P4,760.00
Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao	P28,990.00
Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-26	Francisco Ramos	P36,650.00

 

Clearly, the alleged assessed values of the real properties of respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-24 and 2010-6-7-26, respectively, exceeded the P20,000.00 threshold. Evidence subsequently submitted by respondents consisting of Tax Declarations 54 and Certifications of the Municipal Treasurer 55 established the truth of said assessed values. Hence, the RTC properly exercised jurisdiction over Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said for Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25. Even though therein respondents Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao filed their claims together in one action before the RTC, their claims are distinct and distinguishable from one another as they involved different properties. The values of their respective real properties are taken into consideration for determining the question of jurisdiction. 56

The alleged assessed value of respondent Fortunato Medina's real property in the complaint in Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25 was only P4,760.00. The submitted Tax Declarations 57 and Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer 58 showed that the actual assessed value of said real property was P15,710.00. Either way, both values were below P20,000.00.

As for respondent Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao's real property, it was initially alleged in the Complaint that its assessed value was P28,990.00. Yet, a cursory review of the Tax Declarations 59 and Certification of the Municipal Treasurer 60 on record reveals that such amount was the market value and not the assessed value of the real property; and that the actual assessed value of said property at the time of filing of the complaint was only P8,180.00.

Since the assessed values of the respective real properties of respondents Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao did not exceed P20,000.00, the exclusive original jurisdiction over actions to quiet title to the same rightfully belonged to a first level court (i.e., MTC/MCTC), and not the RTC. It was incumbent upon the RTC to dismiss outright Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25 the moment it became apparent with the evidence which respondents Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao themselves proffered that the assessed values of their properties were below P20,000.00. Without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25, the portions of the RTC judgment pertaining to the said civil case are consequently null and void.

The different factual contexts of

Based on Pareja and Pocdo, petitioners insist that questions of ownership involving unregistered lands of the public domain are beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. However, their reliance on these two cases are misplaced and ignore the relevant factual contexts which differentiate said cases from the one at bar.

The Court highlights that the relevant fact in Pareja and Pocdo is not that the subject real properties therein were unregistered, but that said properties were clearly still part of the public domain, so that their disposition and administration belonged to the Director of Lands and not the courts.

In Pareja, the Court took into consideration that the subject real property was public land, declared alienable and disposable only seven months before the plaintiffs' filing of the action to quiet title with the Court of First Instance (CFI). There was already an administrative investigation being conducted by the Director of Lands simultaneous with the action to quiet title; and after being belatedly informed of the same, the CFI still proceeded with acting on the case for quieting of title before it. The CFI rendered judgment in the plaintiffs' favor, but the Director of Lands eventually awarded certificates of title covering the subject property to the defendants, on the strength of which defendants re-entered the subject property to gather fruits therein. The Court reversed the CFI Resolution declaring defendants in contempt of court for re-entering the subject property and deemed the CFI judgment awarding the subject property to plaintiffs null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.

It was similarly an established and undisputed fact in Pocdo that the subject real property therein was included in the Baguio Townsite Reservation, as held in the Decision of the Secretary of the DENR, which was affirmed by the Office of the President. The subject property was part of the public domain which could not be registered under the Land Registration Act; and could only be disposed of in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure for the disposition of alienable public lands under Chapter X on Townsite Reservations of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, and other applicable rules. Hence, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the action to quiet title by the RTC therein.

Now, in the case at bar, respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos had alleged from the outset in their complaints, their private ownership of the disputed properties in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26, respectively, and presented proof in support thereof during the ex parte trial before the RTC. The RTC found, and the CA subsequently affirmed, that said respondents were able to establish their titles to their respective disputed properties, even when most of the said properties were unregistered.

As the Court has previously pronounced herein, actions to quiet title may involve unregistered lands. Under Art. 477 of the Civil Code, persons having legal, as well as equitable title to or interest in a real property may bring such action, and "title" does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit. 61 The Court more extensively explained in Spouses Mamadsual v. Moson62 that:

It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in question.

In Chacon, this Court considered the action to be one for quieting of title where the plaintiffs alleged ownership and actual possession since time immemorial of the property in question by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, while defendants secured a certificate of title over said property through fraud, misrepresentation and deceit.

Thus, "title" to property does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. Indeed, one who has an equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet title under the law.

Since the action in this case is one to quiet title to property whereby petitioners claim to have acquired title to the same by prescription, the property was thereby effectively withdrawn from the public domain and became property of private ownership. Thus, the ruling of the trial court that the action being one for reversion only the Solicitor General can institute the same has no cogent basis. 63

In the petition at bar, only respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway were able to present a certificate of title and it merely covered 1.7 of the five hectares of real property they were claiming. Nevertheless, the RTC held that respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos had titles to the disputed properties, having established with their evidence that they had possessed the disputed properties by themselves and/or their predecessors-in-interest, as far back as 1945 and 1953, respectively. Their disputed properties were accordingly identified in the cadastral survey of Paracelis, Mountain Province, completed in 1979; they had planted mango trees, guava trees, bamboo, gemelina trees, and banana plants thereon. They had been declaring the said properties for real property tax (RPT) purposes and religiously paying the yearly RPT due thereon; and their ownership of the disputed properties was acknowledged by disinterested witnesses such as community leaders and neighbors.

The RTC ruling recognizing the titles of respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos to the disputed properties is consistent with jurisprudence that open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of an unregistered property segregate the same from the public domain. 64 Lands cease to be public in character and pass to private ownership when there is a primafacie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous occupants. 65

Since the question of whether or not respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos have sufficiently proved their claim of ownership or equitable title is substantially a factual issue, it is generally improper for the Court to delve into. 66 It bears emphasizing that presently before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which shall raise only questions of law. The following discourse in Spouses Pico v. Spouses Salcedo67 is particularly instructive herein:

In a petition for review on certiorari, we are limited to reviewing errors of law absent any showing that the findings of fact of the appellate court are not supported by the records.

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

In asking us to declare them as the lawful owners of the second lot, the Picos are in effect praying that we overturn the factual findings made by the RTC, which findings have already been affirmed by the CA. In other words, we are asked to substitute our own judgment for those of the trial court and the appellate court by conducting another evaluation of the evidence.

We have consistently declared that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal as this Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, subject to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this case. As we said in Zaragoza v. Nobleza:

Whether the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by an adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing, whether certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side, whether inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of fact which may not be passed upon in a petition for review on [certiorari] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 68 (citation omitted)

Petitioners, in fact, have raised only one issue in the instant petition and that is whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over respondents' actions to quiet title. However, the resolution of such question of law ultimately depends on the determination of the question of fact of whether the disputed properties in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26 are already private or still publicly owned land.

There is no compelling reason for the Court to disturb the factual findings of the RTC that respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos had acquired titles to their disputed properties in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26, respectively, and thus, said properties had already passed to private ownership. As the CA sustained said finding, it is binding and conclusive on the Court. Although this rule accepts certain exceptions, 69 the petitioners have failed to convince the Court that the case at bar falls within any of them.

Even if the Court relaxes the rule and reviews the evidence on record, petitioners fail to persuade the Court that the disputed properties in Civil Cases No. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26 are still public land. There is no clear and convincing proof to substantiate petitioners' allegation. At most, petitioners attempt to raise doubts as to respondents' titles by pointing out that: (a) other parcels of land in the area had been awarded to individuals through CLOAs issued by the DAR and respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos have not been issued such CLOAs for the disputed properties; and (b) as indicated in the Tax Declarations, some of the disputed properties were bordered or surrounded by "public lands." Proceeding from these observations, petitioners surmise that the disputed properties must also be public lands.

The surmises and conjectures of petitioners cannot overcome the evidence of respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos. It can be said that petitioners were at a disadvantage as they were unable to present countervailing evidence during trial, but this was the necessary consequence of the order of default issued against them by the RTC due to their failure to file their answer on time.

Since the disputed properties in Civil Case Nos. 2010-6-7-24 and 2010-6-7-26 were deemed effectively withdrawn from the public domain and had become privately owned by respondents Heirs of Tulay Eway and Francisco Ramos, then the RTC, instead of the Director of Lands, had properly exercised exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases involving title to or possession of said properties or of any interest in the same.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLYGRANTED. Portions of the September 29, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102984, as well as the June 6, 2014 Consolidated Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bontoc, Mountain Province, Branch 36, pertaining to Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-25 instituted by respondents Fortunato Medina and Lilibeth Medina-Balacanao are declared NULL and VOID because the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the said case as the assessed value of the real properties involved therein was below P20,000.00. The same Decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED in all other aspects.

The letter dated February 16, 2021 of Ms. Jane G. Sabido, Chief Archives Section, Judicial Records Division, Court of Appeals, Manila, in compliance with the Resolution dated January 25, 2021, transmitting the rollo of CA-G.R. CV No. 102984 with 254 pages, three (3) folders of original records, one (1) folder of original transcript of stenographic notes, two (2) folders of duplicate copies of the transcript of stenographic notes, and three (3) folders of minutes, is NOTED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Part of the Supreme Court Decongestion Program.

** Also referred to as "Inosencia Malaggay-Lapitan" in some parts of the rollo.

*** Also referred to as "Juanita Eway-Tomas" in some parts of the rollo.

1.Rollo, pp. 4-22.

2.Id. at 125-140; penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Francisco with Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Danton Q. Bueser, concurring.

3.Id. at 80-94; penned by Judge Sergio T. Angnganay, Jr.

4.Rollo, p. 97.

5. Also referred to as "Bananano" in some parts of the rollo.

6. The parties agreed that: (a) defendants could maintain their animals in the contested area and repair the old fence but would not install a new fence or introduce any improvement thereon; (b) the barangay road in the area would remain open; and (c) plaintiffs likewise would not introduce new improvements in the subject area.

7. Records (Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24), pp. 19-21.

8.Id. at 25-26.

9.Id. at 27-28.

10.Id. at 29-30.

11.Id. at 31-33.

12.Id. at 50-51.

13.Id. at 52-53.

14.Id. at 63-64.

15.Id. at 72-73.

16.Id. at 127-128.

17.Id. at 129.

18.Id. at 130.

19.Id. at 131-134.

20.Id. at 136.

21.Id. at 205-208.

22. Section 3. Default; declaration of. —

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.

23. Records (Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24), p. 208.

24.Id. at 209-2013.

25.Id. at 230-232.

26.Id. at 312-328.

27. 267 Phil. 172, 186-187 (1990).

28. 493 Phil. 452 (2005).

29. 436 Phil. 177 (2002).

30. 548 Phil. 60 (2007).

31. 716 Phil. 1 (2013).

32.Rollo, pp. 92-93.

33.Id. at 94.

34. Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; [and]

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

35.Rollo, p. 139.

36.Id. at 13.

37. 730 Phil. 215 (2014).

38. 827 Phil. 231 (2018).

39.Id. at 238; citing Unduran v. Aberasturi, 771 Phil. 536, 562 (2015).

40.Id. at 242.

41. 710 Phil. 235 (2013).

42.Id. at 256-257.

43.Rollo, pp. 26-27.

44.Id. at 37-39.

45.Id. at 49-51.

46.Id. at 29, 40, and 52-53.

47.Spouses Mamadsual v. Moson, 268 Phil. 77, 85 (1990).

48.Spouses Sabitsana v. Muertegui, supra note 31, at 13-14.

49. 564 Phil. 580 (2007).

50.Id. at 596-597.

51. 799 Phil. 116 (2016).

52.Id. at 130.

53.Id. at 131-132.

54. Records (Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24), pp. 385 and 390.

55.Id. at 381-382, 398.

56. See Agusto v. Abing [115 Phil. 94, 97 (1962)], citing Cajilig v. Co. 109 Phil. 98, 100 (1960) and R.S. Pañgilinan & Co., Inc. v. Pasicolan [107 Phil. 645, 650 (1960)], in which the Court ruled that where there are several plaintiffs having separate and distinct claims against a common defendant, arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions and involving the same question of law or fact, jointly sue said defendant, it is the amount of each separate claim, and not the sum total of all the claims, that furnishes the test for determining the jurisdiction of the court over the case.

57. Records (Civil Case No. 2010-6-7-24), pp. 416-417.

58.Id. at 422.

59.Id. at 418-419.

60.Id. at 422.

61.Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 430 (2000).

62.Supra, note 47.

63.Id. at 85-86.

64.Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, 783 Phil. 536, 550 (2016).

65.Heirs of Santiago v. Heirs of Santiago, 452 Phil. 238, 248, (2003).

66.Quintos v. Nicolas, 736 Phil. 438, 450-451 (2014).

67. 617 Phil. 221 (2009).

68.Id. at 227-229.

69. The exceptions are: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. (As enumerated in Spouses Pico v. Spouses Salcedo, supra note 67 at 228.)