FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219050. July 28, 2021.]
HEIRS OF MARIANO BONIBOG LANTONG AND ANA BATANGAN LANTONG, NAMELY: PERFECTO BATANGAN LANTONG, PACITA LANTONG SANDULOG, AND BUCAL BATANGAN LANTONG, petitioners, vs.DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court's First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 28, 2021, which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 219050 (Heirs of Mariano Bonibog Lantong and Ana Batangan Lantong, namely: Perfecto Batangan Lantong, Pacita Lantong Sandulog, and Bucal Batangan Lantong v. Department of Agrarian Reform). — The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), timely filed before the Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro City (CA) its appellant's brief on August 10, 2011, 1 or within the requested extended period from July 21, 2011 to August 10, 2011. Pertinently, Section 12, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "SEC. 12. Extension of time for filing briefs. — Extension of time for the filing of briefs will not be allowed, except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended." Here, the motions for extension of time filed by the OSG — first, from April 22, 2011 to July 21, 2011, and second, from July 21, 2011 to August 10, 2011 — were filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. That the OSG's motions for extension were not acted upon by the CA when the OSG filed the appellant's brief on August 10, 2011 is not crucial. As a matter of practice, the CA normally grants such extension, especially when the pleading was actually filed within the period sought, as in this case.
On the issue of legal representation, the Court sustains the ruling of the CA that, being the law office of the government, its agencies, instrumentalities, officials, and agents, the OSG should have been served with summons on behalf of the DAR, pursuant to Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, to wit: "The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. x x x." Accordingly, only the OSG can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, except under certain circumstances when it may deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices. 2 DAR is an unincorporated government agency which possesses no juridical personality of its own, hence, the suit is against the agency's principal — the State. 3 Consequently, summons should have been served upon the OSG as its legal representative.
The fact that the Republic is not impleaded as a defendant in the complaint does not bar it from participating in the proceedings. To be sure, the Republic is a real party-in-interest since the lots in dispute form part of the inalienable lands of the public domain that were withdrawn from sale or settlement by Proclamation No. 188 4 dated June 29, 1950. Accordingly, these lots are outside the commerce of man and incapable of ownership. As correctly argued by the OSG, the fact that the petitioners are claiming ownership of these public inalienable lands, petitioners' complaint is essentially directed against the State.
Assuming that the OSG was served with summons, the case will not prosper nonetheless, because the State is immune from suit. The petitioners filed a complaint for the recovery of possession of the subject lots and declaration of nullity of the Memorandum of Agreement between the DAR and the Municipality of Kalilangan. The DAR is a government agency that has no juridical personality of its own; thus, the complaint must be construed as one against the principal — the State. Under settled jurisprudence, a suit against the State is not permitted, except upon a showing that it has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. 5 In this case, there is no consent, express or implied, that may be inferred on the part of the State. Similarly, the petitioners cannot rely on the decision in Heirs of Manguiat v. The Hon. Court of Appeals6 in support of their argument that the CA should have remanded the case to the trial court for the proper service of summons, instead of dismissing it. In that case, the Court affirmed the CA's ruling which disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby resolved that the (sic): (a) the Partial Decision dated 18 February 2000; (b) the Order dated 17 July 2000; and (c) Writ of Execution dated 10 August 2000 in Civil Case No. TG-1904 entitled "Heirs of Mamerto Manguiat, [e]t [a]l., Plaintiffs, versus J.A. Development Corporation, Bureau of Telecommunication[s], Juan Dela Cruz, and Pedro Dela Cruz, Defendants[,"] are hereby ordered SET ASIDE, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The public respondent is hereby ordered to follow strictly Sec. 3(c), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis supplied and citation omitted.)
Apparently, petitioners interpreted the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision as an order to remand the case to the trial court presumably for the purpose of serving summons to the OSG. However, Section 3 (c), Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not refer to service of summons but to default. 8 The CA did not order the remand of the case to the trial court for the service of summons to the OSG. The second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the CA Decision referred to the matter of default which was among the issues in that case.
FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Review on Certiorari9 is DENIED. The assailed December 2, 2014 Decision 10 and June 17, 2015 Resolution 11 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01859-MIN are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 14.
2.Republic v. Heirs of Cecilio and Moises Cuizon, 705 Phil. 596, 606-607 (2013).
3.Republic v. Domingo, 673 Phil. 256, 269 (2011).
4. "RESERVING FOR RICE, CORN AND OTHER FOOD PRODUCTION PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN BARRIOS ADTUYONG, ROXAS AND DAGUMABAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF MARAMAG, AND BARRIOS BARANDIAS, KIBANING AND KALILANGAN, MUNICIPALITY OF PANANTUKAN, ALL IN THE PROVINCE OF BUKIDNON, ISLAND OF MINDANAO."
5.Supra note 3.
6. 584 Phil. 403 (2008).
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60770, dated August 29, 2001 and November 16, 2001, respectively, are AFFIRMED. Likewise, the Decision and Resolution of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61703, dated January 22, 2003 and September 29, 2003, respectively, are AFFIRMED. The partial decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 18, 2000, its order dated July 17, 2000, and the writ of execution dated August 8, 2000 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Corona, Azcuna, and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ.,
7.Id. at 408-409.
8. SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. —
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim states a common cause of action against several defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
9.Rollo, pp. 5-35.
10.Id. at 44-54. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a member of the Court).
11.Id. at 55-56.