Heirs of La Madrid v. Tumaliuan

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 243799. December 2, 2021.]

HEIRS OF BEN LA MADRID, NAMELY: HILARION L. LA MADRID, MARTIN L. LA MADRID, ENRICO L. LA MADRID, BENEDICT L. LA MADRID, FERDDIE MARK L. LA MADRID, NEIL L. LA MADRID, ANTHONY L. LA MADRID, ROMUALD L. LA MADRID, AND VISITACION L. DUMANGLAS, petitioners, vs.PERLA TUMALIUAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedDecember 2, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 243799 (Heirs of Ben La Madrid, namely: Hilarion L. La Madrid, Martin L. La Madrid, Enrico L. La Madrid, Benedict L. La Madrid, Ferddie Mark L. La Madrid, Neil L. La Madrid, Anthony L. La Madrid, Romuald L. La Madrid, and Visitacion L. Dumanglas v. Perla Tumaliuan). — This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated March 21, 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated December 17, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 107463, affirming the Decision 4 dated May 25, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City (RTC), in Civil Case No. 7866, granting the complaint for recovery of possession and quieting of title filed by Perla Tumaliuan against Mario Paraggua (Mario), Lydia Paraggua (Lydia), and Ben Lamadrid (Ben).

Perla Tumaliuan (Perla) filed a Complaint 5 dated November 27, 2012 for recovery of possession and quieting of title against Mario, Lydia, and Ben. She claimed that she is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land, denominated as Lot Nos. 3702-B and 3702-E, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 032-2011002710 6 and 032-2011002709, 7 respectively, and both located at Tanza, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. 8 According to Perla, she purchased the subject lots from Angelita Angbuete (Angelita) on November 4, 2011, as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale. Consequently, she had the subject lots registered and declared for taxation purposes in her name. 9 ICHDca

Perla averred that the defendants therein entered the subject lots without any legal right and consent from her. She sent demand letters requiring them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject lots to her, but to no avail. 10 She, thus, prayed for judgment ordering the defendants to cede possession of the subject lots and for them to pay moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual and exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 each, attorney's fees, and reasonable monthly rental until possession is transferred to her.

Defendants Ben, Mario, and Lydia filed an Answer 11 dated December 28, 2012. They averred that Ben is in actual possession of the subject lots. His possession can be traced back in 1968 when his father, Modesto La Madrid (Modesto), was installed as a tenant by Quintin Balao. 12 On March 15, 1980, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued a Certificate of Land Transfer 13 in favor of Modesto covering the subject lots. The Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR also issued a Certification 14 dated April 23, 2002 affirming the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer. When Modesto died in 1998, Ben, together with his wife and children, continued to possess and cultivate the subject lots. 15 By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27 (P.D. No. 27) and the law on intestate succession, therefore, the heirs of Modesto, including Ben, are now the lawful owners of the subject lots. 16

Defendants argued that the certificates of title in the name of Perla are null and void because she acquired the subject lots through fraud and in gross violation of agrarian laws. Moreover, Perla is a buyer in bad faith, having acquired the subject lots despite knowing that Ben and his family are in actual possession as lawful owners. 17

Finally, they noted that Angelita, from whom Perla supposedly bought the subject lots, had earlier filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ben. The case, however, was dismissed by the trial court, 18 and, when it was brought on appeal by the appellate court. 19

During pre-trial, defendants therein, Mario and Lydia did not appear despite notice. Upon motion of Perla, she was allowed to present evidence ex-parte against the said defendants. 20

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision 21 dated May 25, 2016, ruling in favor of Perla. The RTC found that Perla acquired the subject lots from Angelita through a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 4, 2011, free from any lien and encumbrances. 22 Ben, on the other hand, failed to substantiate his claim that the DAR awarded a tract of land to his father. The Certificate of Land Transfer he submitted during trial is merely a photocopy, and therefore, inadmissible in evidence. In any case, Ben failed to prove that the subject lots were indeed portions of the lot supposedly awarded to his father. 23

The RTC held that Ben failed to establish that his father was constituted as a tenant by a certain Quintin Balao in 1968, considering that the documents he submitted to support such allegation, i.e., Certification issued by Rogelio Follante, 24 Rice and Corn Land Tenure Survey, 25 DAR Certification 26 dated April 18, 2005, Emancipation Patent Survey Result, 27 Department of Agricultural Adjudication Board (DARAB) Decision 28 dated April 30, 1994, blue print copy of Plan CSD-2-005812-D, 29 and the Summary List of Rice and Corn, 30 are all photocopies and not admissible in evidence. 31

The RTC ruled that, in contrast with Ben whose possession is without any legal justification, Perla was able to prove by preponderant evidence her ownership over the subject lots. Thus, in accordance with Article 428 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover possession of the subject lots. 32 ASEcHI

The RTC, however, dismissed the claim of Perla for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and reasonable monthly rental, finding no basis to award the same. 33 It also dismissed the complaint against defendants therein Mario and Lydia, in view of Ben's admission that he is in sole possession of the subject lots. 34 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the plaintiff fully established her case against defendant Lamadrid by preponderance of evidence and renders judgment directing said defendant to cede in favor of the plaintiff possession over Lot No. 3702-B and Lot No. 3702-E, both located at Tanza, Tuguegarao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 032-2011002710 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 032-2011002709, respectively, and dismissing the action against defendants Paraggua for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED. 35

Aggrieved, Ben appealed to the CA, which affirmed the ruling of the RTC in its Decision 36 dated March 21, 2018. The CA ruled that, while Ben only submitted a photocopy of the Certificate of Land Transfer supposedly in favor of his father, Perla failed to object on its admissibility at the time it was offered. Thus, the RTC was not precluded from accepting the Certificate of Land Transfer into evidence. 37

Nonetheless, the CA held that the issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer merely evinces that the grantee is qualified to avail of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him. The Certificate of Land Transfer serves as a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation, or for as long as the tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. A Certificate of Land Transfer, therefore, does not automatically grant a tenant-farmer absolute ownership of the covered landholding. 38

The CA emphasized that before acquiring full ownership, a tenant-farmer must comply with the prescribed conditions and procedures for acquiring full ownership, to wit: (1) payment in full of the just compensation for the landholding, duly determined by final judgment of the proper court; (2) possession of the qualifications of a farmer-beneficiary under the law; (3) full-pledged membership of the farmer-beneficiary in a duly recognized farmers' cooperative; and (4) actual cultivation of the landholding. In the case of Ben, he failed to present evidence showing compliance with these conditions. Thus, his claim over the lots is only inchoate. 39 cTDaEH

The CA noted that Perla, on the other hand, asserts ownership based on a valid sale between her and Angelita, who had a registered title over the subject lots. It ruled that persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title may rely on the face of the certificate, and they are not required to go beyond what appears on it. Moreover, good faith is presumed and it is upon the party alleging otherwise to prove bad faith. In the present case, aside from his sweeping allegation that Perla obtained the titles through fraud and in gross violation of agrarian laws, Ben failed to prove that Perla acquired the property in bad faith. 40

The CA found that Perla successfully caused the registration of the subject lots in her name and was issued the corresponding transfer certificates of title. These certificates of title enjoy conclusive presumption of validity and are the best proof of ownership over the subject lots. 41

Ben filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution 42 dated December 17, 2018.

Meanwhile, Ben passed away. His heirs, Hilarion L. La Madrid, Martine L. La Madrid, Enrico L. La Madrid, Benedict L. La Madrid, Ferddie L. La Madrid, Neil L. La Madrid, Anthony L. La Madrid, Romuald L. La Madrid, and Visitacion L. Dumanglas (heirs of Ben) filed the present petition seeking to reverse and set aside the judgment of the CA.

The heirs of Ben argue that Perla is a buyer in bad faith. According to them, Perla admitted that she was aware that there were occupants on the subject lots even before she purchased these from Angelita. Despite this knowledge, however, Perla did not inquire into the nature of the occupants' possession and proceeded with the sale. 43

The heirs of Ben aver that the subject lots are agricultural lots, which were tenanted by their predecessor-in-interest even before P.D. No. 27 took effect. Citing Locsin v. Villanueva, 44 they argue that ownership of the lands covered under the Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27 is moved or transferred from the registered owner to the tenant. In the present case, the right of their predecessor-in-interest, Modesto, as a transferee or grantee of the subject lots, was confirmed by the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer in his favor. 45 Considering that Perla did not secure the required certificate of non-tenancy issued by the DAR and a certificate that it is excluded from the coverage of the land reform program, the sale of the subject lots to her is null and void. 46

In her Comment, 47 Perla counters that the issues raised by the heirs of Ben are factual in nature, and thus, beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 48 In any case, the CA did not err in ruling in her favor, considering that she is the registered owner of the subject lots. A Torrens certificate of title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. As a title holder, therefore, she is entitled to all attributes of ownership of the property, including possession, subject only to the limits imposed by law. 49

The heirs of Ben filed a Reply, 50 stating that they are not raising issues of facts in the present petition. 51 They aver that, on the contrary, the facts of this case are already established and not disputed: (1) they are in actual possession of the subject lots; (2) Perla knew about their previous possession even before she bought the subject lots from Angelita Angbuete; (3) Perla did not secure the required DAR clearance for the transfer of the subject lots in her name; 52 and (4) the subject lots are agricultural lots. 53 cSaATC

The petition is denied.

At the outset, the Court finds it proper to look into the nature of the complaint filed by Perla against Ben. The Complaint 54 was denominated as one for Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunction, and damages. Perla alleged that she is the registered owner of the subject lots and that Ben entered her properties without any legal right or consent from her. Since he refused to vacate despite demands, she filed the complaint praying for judgment to be rendered ordering Ben and his successors-in-interest to surrender possession of the subject lots to her.

Jurisprudence provides that there are three kinds of available actions to recover possession of real property, thus:

Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico)[sic]. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.

Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant's possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding. 55

In her complaint, Perla never asked that she be declared the owner of the subject lots, but only that she be allowed to recover possession thereof from Ben. Thus, her complaint is clearly an accion publiciana, 56 or an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of real property independently of title. 57 It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. 58

In an accion publiciana, the objective of the plaintiff is to recover possession only, not ownership. 59 When the parties, however, raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. 60 In Supapo v. Spouses De Jesus61(Supapo), the Court emphasized that the resolution of the court on the issue of ownership in such a case is merely provisional and not conclusive, thus: cHDAIS

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. 62

Relative to this, the Court, in Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, 63 clarified that, in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession. 64 In the present case, Ben, Mario, and Lydia raised, as a counterclaim in their answer, the nullity of Perla's certificates of title on the ground that she acquired the subject lots through fraud and in gross violation of agrarian laws. They averred that Ben is one of the lawful owners of the subject lots, having inherited the same from his father, Modesto, who, in turn, acquired the subject lots by virtue of a Certificate of Land Transfer issued by the DAR.

The parties having raised the issue of ownership, the Court will thus proceed to provisionally pass upon their respective claims, if only to resolve the matter of who is better entitled to possession.

It is not disputed that Perla is the registered owner of the subject lots. During trial, she presented copies of TCT Nos. 032-2011002710 65 and 032-2011002709, 66 both duly registered in her name. Moreover, she submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 67 dated November 4, 2011, copy of the Certificate Authorizing Registration 68 issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, as well as certified true copies of the tax declarations 69 covering the subject lots in her name.

While Ben avers that Perla is a buyer in bad faith, the CA found otherwise. The CA held that Ben only made a sweeping allegation that Perla obtained the titles through fraud and in violation of agrarian laws, but failed to present evidence to prove his claim. The question of whether a person acted with good faith or bad faith in purchasing and registering real property is a question of fact, 70 which is generally not cognizable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings of the appellate court are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court when supported by substantial evidence. 71 While there are recognized exceptions 72 to this rule, the Court finds that none applies to the present case.

As a general rule, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property. 73 Otherwise stated, the certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. 74 Moreover, while tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim over the property, 75 and may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. 76

On the other hand, a Certificate of Land Transfer does not vest ownership in the holder thereof. 77 In Heirs of Buensuceso v. Perez, 78 the Court elaborated on this point and held that:

[T]he mere issuance of the CLT does not vest full ownership on the holder and does not automatically operate to divest the landowner of all of his rights over the landholding. The holder must first comply with certain mandatory requirements to effect a transfer of ownership. Under R.A. No. 6657 in relation with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228, the title to the landholding shall be issued to the tenant-farmer only upon the satisfaction of the following requirements: (1) payment in full of the just compensation for the landholding, duly determined by final judgment of the proper court; (2) possession of the qualifications of a farmer-beneficiary under the law; (3) full-pledged membership of the farmer-beneficiary in a duly recognized farmers' cooperative; and (4) actual cultivation of the landholding. We explained in several cases that while a tenant with a CLT is deemed the owner of a landholding, the CLT does not vest full ownership on him. The tenant-holder of a CLT merely possesses an inchoate right that is subject to compliance with certain legal preconditions for perfecting title and acquiring full ownership. x x x 79 ISHCcT

Indeed, a Certificate of Land Transfer is only an evidence of the government's recognition that the beneficiary is qualified to avail of the statutory mechanisms for the acquisition of the land title by him [or her] as provided by Presidential Decree No. 27. This recognition is neither permanent nor irrevocable. 80 It is only compliance with the prescribed conditions which entitles farmers/grantee to an emancipation patent by which he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership over the landholding. 81

Thus, it is clear that a Certificate of Land Transfer, by itself, is not sufficient to confer ownership in favor of the holder thereof. The law requires compliance with certain mandatory requirements before an awardee may be considered as the owner of the landholding subject of the Certificate of Land Transfer. On this score, the Court adopts the finding of the CA that Ben failed to show that he or his predecessor-in-interest has complied with the requirements so as to be considered as owners of the subject lots.

In Dela Cruz v. Domingo, 82 the Court ruled that as between the holder of an emancipation patents with corresponding transfer certificates of title, and the holder of a Certificate of Land Transfer earlier issued, the former is considered the owner of the covered lands. The Court noted that while the latter was previously issued emancipation patents over various lands, he was for some reason, not issued emancipation patents over the disputed lands. Thus, the Court said that this can only mean that he failed to qualify as owner thereof under the government's agrarian reform program. 83

From the foregoing, the Court is constrained to rule that, as between Perla, the registered owner, and the heirs of Ben, who rely on a Certificate of Land Transfer issued in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, it is the former who has a better right of possession over the subject lots. 84

At this juncture, it is well to point out that the decision in the forcible entry case earlier filed by Angelita Angbuete against Ben is not, in any way, determinative of the outcome of the present case or conclusive on the issue of possession. A case for forcible entry is concerned with the issue of right to physical possession of real property. In an accion publiciana, the subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real property. 85 Notably, in that case, Angelita Angbuete introduced evidence that the Certificate of Land Transfer in favor of Modesto over the subject lots was cancelled by an order of the DAR in a previous case. It appears that such order has long been final and executory for failure of Modesto, or his heirs, to appeal the same. 86 Nevertheless, since such matter was not raised here, it cannot be used by the Court to resolve the present accion publiciana. As discussed above, the right of Perla to possess the subject lots stems from her being the registered owner thereof.

In any case, the Court stresses that its resolution on the issue of ownership is only provisional and made only for the purpose of determining who between the parties is better entitled to possession. On this score, the Court adopts its closing remarks in the case of Supapo, thus:

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the ownership and possession (as a consequence of such ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership. 87 CAacTH

The proper action for the final determination of ownership and possession (as a consequence of such ownership), is an accion reivindicatoria that may be filed against Perla as the registered owner of the subject lots. 88

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 21, 2018 and the Resolution dated December 17, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107463 are AFFIRMED. The petitioners, Hilarion L. La Madrid, Martin L. La Madrid, Enrico L. La Madrid, Benedict L. La Madrid, Ferddie Mark L. La Madrid, Neil L. La Madrid, Anthony L. La Madrid, Romuald L. La Madrid, and Visitacion L. Dumanglas, and all other successors-in-interest of Ben La Madrid, are hereby ORDERED to TURN OVER POSSESSION of the subject lots to respondent Perla Tumaliuan.

SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., no part; Gaerlan, J., additional Member per Raffle dated November 24, 2021.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 14-23.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a member of this Court), with Associate Justices Victoria Isabel A. Paredes and Marie Christine Azcarraga Jacob, concurring; id. at 32-38.

3.Id. at 39-40.

4. Penned by Judge Marivic C. Cacatian-Beltran; id. at 26-31.

5. Records, pp. 1-4.

6.Id. at 6-7.

7.Id. at 8-9.

8.Id. at 1.

9.Id. at 2.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 29-34.

12.Id. at 30.

13.Id. at 35.

14.Id. at 36.

15.Id. at 31.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 32.

18.Id. at 91-97.

19.Id. at 98-102.

20.Rollo, p. 26.

21.Id. at 26-31.

22.Id. at 29.

23.Id.

24. Records, p. 104.

25.Id. at 105.

26.Id. at 106.

27.Id. at 107.

28.Id. at 108-115.

29.Id. at 116.

30.Id. at 117.

31.Rollo, p. 29.

32.Id.

33.Id. at 30.

34.Id.

35.Id. at 31.

36.Id. at 32-38.

37.Id. at 35.

38.Id. at 36.

39.Id. 36-37.

40.Id. at 37.

41.Id. at 38.

42.Id. at 39-40.

43.Id. at 18-19.

44. 272 Phil. 15, 26 (1991).

45.Rollo, p. 21.

46.Id. at 22.

47.Id. at 43-49.

48.Id. at 46.

49.Id. at 48.

50.Id. at 74-78.

51.Id. at 74.

52.Id. at 75.

53.Id. at 76.

54. Records, pp. 1-4.

55.Heirs of Yusingco v. Busilak, 824 Phil. 454, 460-461 (2018), citing Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 523 Phil. 39, 45-46 (2006); Encarnacion v. Amigo, 533 Phil. 466, 472 (2006); Suarez v. Spouses Emboy, Jr., 729 Phil. 315, 329-330 (2014).

56.Heirs of Amistoso v. Vallecer, 822 Phil. 461, 473 (2017).

57.Heirs of Elliot v. Corcuera, G.R. No. 233767, August 27, 2020.

58.Gabriel, Jr. v. Crisologo, 735 Phil. 673, 683 (2014).

59.Id.

60.Supapo v. Spouses De Jesus, 758 Phil. 444, 456 (2015).

61.Supra.

62.Id. at 456. (Citations omitted)

63. G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, 911 SCRA 557.

64.Id. at 579.

65. Records, pp. 6-7.

66.Id. at 8-9.

67.Id. at 10-11.

68.Id. at 12.

69.Id. at 13-14.

70.Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas v. Limbaco, 670 Phil. 274, 286 (2011), citing Bautista v. Silva, 533 Phil. 627, 637 (2006).

71.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016).

72. (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures x x x; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible x x x; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion x x x; (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts x x x; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting x x x; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee x x x; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court x x x; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based x x x; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents x x x; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record. x x x [Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., 269 Phil. 225, 232 (1990) (Citations omitted)].

73.Heirs of Pastora T Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 222614, March 20, 2019, 898 SCRA 1, 10, citing Heirs of Brusas v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 47, 54 (1999).

74.Tensuan v. Heirs of Vasquez, G.R. No. 204992, September 8, 2020, citing Abobon v. Abobon, 692 Phil. 530, 540 (2012).

75.Republic of the Philippines v. Carrasco, 539 Phil. 205, 216 (2006), citing Republic v. Alconaba, 471 Phil. 607, 621 (2004).

76.Id., citing Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., 490 Phil. 654, 667-668 (2005).

77.Dela Cruz v. Domingo, 821 Phil. 497, 505 (2017).

78. 705 Phil. 460 (2013).

79.Id. at 469-472. (Italics and emphasis in the original; citations omitted).

80.Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, 278 Phil. 544, 550 (1991).

81.Id.

82.Supra note 77, at 507.

83.Id.

84. Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.

The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

85.Jose v. Alfuerto, 699 Phil. 307, 325 (2012), citing Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 555 Phil. 570, 579 (2007).

86. Records, p. 42.

87.Supapo v. Spouses De Jesus, supra note 60, at 467. (Emphasis ours)

88. See Macutay v. Samoy, G.R. No. 205559, December 2, 2020.