Heirs of Escobal v. Pagtananan

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 232411. March 15, 2022.]

HEIRS OF JESUS ESCOBAL, petitioner, vs.ALETH PAGTANANAN, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 15, 2022which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 232411 (Heirs of Jesus Escobal v. Aleth Pagtananan). — This involves a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated January 19, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136448, and its Resolution 3 dated October 7, 2016, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed issuances granted the appeal via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and nullified the Decision dated October 13, 2013, and Resolution dated June 11, 2014 of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No. 17662.

The antecedent facts follow:

The subject of this controversy are three (3) parcels of land located in Sabang, Pagsanjan Laguna, all of which are under the name of Alipio Cobarrubias (Alipio), viz.: a) covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15269 of the Province of Laguna with an area of 11,704 square meters, more or less; b) covered by Tax Declaration No. 99-19-014 00104 with an area of 8,060 square meters, more or less; and c) covered by Tax Declaration No. 190014-00127 with an area of 6,912 square meters, more or less. 4

The registered owner, Alipio, was married to Brigida Limuaco (Brigida); together, they have eight (8) children: Ella C. Bangalan, Conrado Cobarrubias, Gloria C. Rosal (Gloria), Tirso Cobarrubias (Tirso), Rosalia C. Calixterio, Ruelto C. Avila, Anita Cobarrubias, and Amor Cobarrubias (Amor). 5

On January 16, 1965, Alipio died without a will; months thereafter or on August 20, 1965, Brigida also died intestate. 6 Two of their children likewise died intestate — Gloria on April 21, 1973 and Tirso on November 13, 2013. Gloria is survived by his spouse Renato Rosal, Sr., and their six (6) children which includes herein respondent Aleth Pagtananan (respondent). Tirso, on the other hand, is survived by his wife Natividad Rivera, and their two (2) children. 7

On May 6, 2009, Jesus Escobal (Escobal) filed a complaint for Reinstatement, Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) against the respondent involving the subject properties. 8

In his complaint, Escobal alleged that he is a tenant of the subject parcels of cocoland, consisting of an area of three (3) hectares more or less; that sometime in the year 2000, he was asked by Amor, the owner thereof, to till the land in exchange for 1/5 of the net harvest in cash. Escobal submitted that during the period of tenancy, he planted different kinds of crops and performed several farm works. In support of his allegations, Escobal attached in his Complaint various receipts of the shares given to him by Amor. 9

After Amor died on August 2, 2005, Escobal asserted that on several occasions, the respondent unlawfully and forcibly took over the harvesting of the coconuts without his consent. The respondent also destroyed his residential farmhouse located in the subject properties and instituted against him a complaint for ejectment. Escobal thus prayed that PARAD declare him to be a tenant of the subject properties and award him moral and exemplary damages. 10

The respondent in his Answer, denied the material allegations in the Complaint. The respondent averred that it was Escobal and his wife who entered the premises without the consent of the owners and that at no time did Escobal cultivate the subject properties. 11

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the PARAD rendered its Decision 12 on February 17, 2011 finding as follows: CAIHTE

WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. DECLARING the plaintiff (petitioner) as the de jureand bona fide tenant of the subject property presently owned by the defendant (respondent) and other co-heirs, thereby ORDERING his immediate REINSTATEMENT;

2. DIRECTING the defendant to respect and maintain the peaceful possession of the plaintiff on the subject property;

3. ORDERING the MARO of Pagsanjan, Laguna to compute the back shares of the plaintiff, in accordance with the sharing agreement, commencing from the date of his dispossession on the later part of the year 2007 to the present;

4. ORDERING the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount determined in paragraph 3 hereof;

5. ORDERING the MARO of Pagsanjan, Laguna to assist the parties in the execution of the Agricultural Leasehold Contract pursuant to the latest DAR Administrative Order concerning Leasehold Contract; and

6. No pronouncement as to the other costs.

SO ORDERED. 13

The respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the PARAD in its Resolution 14 dated March 1, 2012. The respondent then filed an appeal before the DARAB. 15

On October 15, 2013, the DARAB rendered its Decision 16 affirming the ruling of the PARAD, viz.:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The appealed Decision dated February 17, 2011 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED. 17

Motion for Reconsideration having been similarly denied by the DARAB in its Resolution 18 dated June 11, 2014, the respondent appealed to the CA.

Meanwhile, Escobal died on June 17, 2015. His counsel then filed a Notice of Death with Substitution of Heirs on July 4, 2015. 19 The motion was granted and Escobal was substituted by herein petitioners. 20

On January 19, 2016, the CA rendered its Decision 21 finding merit in the petition. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 15, 2013 and the Resolution dated June 11, 2014 issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 17662 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in DARAB Case No. R-0403-0005-09 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.22

Petitioners filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the January 19, 2016 Decision, however, the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution 23 dated October 7, 2016.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari whereby the Court is tasked to resolve the issue of whether or not the CA erred in reversing the finding of the DARAB that Escobal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant of the subject properties.

The petitioners argue that the factual findings of the PARAD and DARAB should not be disturbed by the CA and this Court as they are supported by substantial evidence. They insist that while there is no express agreement between the parties to establish tenancy relationship, Escobal's long period of cultivation and remittance of share in the harvest and lease rentals to Amor are sufficient to support the conclusion that he is a bonafide tenant. With respect to the element of consent, the petitioners submit that the consent given by Amor, the legal possessor, is binding upon the owners even if they have not given their consent to the agreement. 24 In view of the existence of the tenancy agreement, petitioners posit that contrary to the finding of the CA, the case clearly falls within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. 25

The petition is not meritorious.

In view of their acquired expertise in the performance of their official functions and exercise of primary jurisdiction, the factual findings of administrative officials and agencies, when supported by substantial evidence, are generally accorded respect if not finality by the courts. 26 This rule, nevertheless, is not absolute. The factual determination of administrative agencies may be set aside and reversed on appeal when they are unsupported by the quantum of evidence required, or when any of the following exceptions are present: DETACa

(1) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 27

The Court finds that the CA was correct in adjudging that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule. Certainly, the rulings by the PARAD and DARAB were based on an erroneous interpretation of undisputed facts and are unsupported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Court is not bound by the same and may review the facts anew.

The existence of an agricultural tenancy cannot be presumed. 28 It must be clearly and convincingly established by the person arguing its existence by showing the concurrence of the following elements:

(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 29

Of the foregoing, the third element is particularly contentious in this case. The petitioners argue that the element of consent has been satisfied, when Amor, the legal possessor and who was then managing the subject properties, asked Escobal to till the subject property sometime in 2000. Simply stated, the petitioners suggest that the Amor may give consent for and on behalf of the owners of the property. The Court does not agree.

The CA was correct in ruling that there was no express or implied consent in this case from the owners of the subject properties as to create a tenancy relationship. It is undisputed that the subject properties were originally owned by Alipio. After Alipio's and his wife's death, the properties passed on to their six children as heirs. In the absence of showing that there has been a settlement of estate and partition, the subject properties are owned in common by the six children as heirs. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the PARAD and DARAB proceeded under the wrong premise by concluding that the subject properties were solely owned by Amor, when in truth, she is merely a co-owner thereof. As such, in the absence of an express or implied authority from her co-owners, Amor has no right of dominion over the entirety of the subject properties.

Under the Civil Code, a co-owner cannot, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the property owned in common even though benefits for all would result therefrom. 30 It follows from this proscription that none of the co-owners can, without the consent of the other co-owners, allow or validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person. 31 In this case, the creation of tenancy which allowed Escobal to cultivate the subject properties and build his house thereon, are undoubtedly substantial alterations, which thus necessitates the express or implied consent of all the owners.

The petitioners argue that Amor's appointment as manager/overseer of the subject property vests the latter the personality and authority to act and give consent for and in behalf of her co-owners. The Court is not persuaded.

Foremost, the records are bereft of the quantum of proof necessary to establish that Amor has been designated in such capacity by his co-owners. Herein, there is no contract creating a contract of agency. Similarly, Escobal failed to allege acts from which it can be inferred that the rest of co-owners impliedly constituted Amor as their agent. It must be emphasized that "[t]he law makes no presumption of agency, and proving its existence, nature, and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it." 32 In order to prove agency, "[o]n the part of the principal, there must be an actual intention to appoint or an intention naturally inferable from his words or actions, while on the part of the agent, there must be an intention to accept the appointment and act on it." 33 Escobal failed to allege and prove these acts on the part of the co-owners to establish the existence of an implied agency.

Even assuming that agency exists, the designation of Amor as manager/overseer does not give her the authority to enter into a tenancy agreement. The basis of agency is representation, that is, in order to bind the principal, an agent must perform acts within the scope of her authority. Even assuming as true the petitioners' allegation that Amor has been designated to administer the subject property, the same is an agency couched in general terms and extends only to acts of administration 34 and does not extend to acts of strict dominion 35 such as entering into a tenancy agreement. "The right to hire a tenant is a personal right of the landowner." 36 The delegation to another of the exercise of such power must be unmistakably made, and the grant of consent clearly expressed. In this light, the absence of delegation and/or manifestation of consent from the rest of the co-owners of the subject property rendered the tenancy agreement invalid. aDSIHc

It may not be amiss to state that it is not only the third element that is missing. The Court similarly finds that the petitioners also failed to present adequate proof to establish the presence of the first and the sixth elements.

The first element is wanting as the agreement was entered into by only one of the owners of the subject property, as previously elucidated. Anent the sixth element, it is important to point out that the mere cultivation does not establish tenancy. "[T]enancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land but more importantly a legal relationship." 37 As such, it is not ruled on the basis of physical possession or cultivation of the land, but of the existence of a mutual agreement by the parties upon two things: first, for the other to cultivate his or her land, and second, the terms of harvest sharing. 38 Both of which are wanting in this case, the first on account of the absence of consent of all of the co-owners, and the second, for lack of allegation showing the sharing agreement between Escobal and the owners. To be precise, what is required is proof of the terms of harvest sharing, in this case, the receipts presented by the petitioners fall short of the evidence required to establish this fact. As correctly noted by the CA —

The receipts attached to the complaint hardly qualify as independent evidence of sharing and/or payment of lease rentals. A perusal thereof would reveal that the receipts contain only the following: date, figures and a signature of a certain Almonte. The receipts do not bear the name or signature of Amor Cobarrubias or Aleth Pagtananan and Jesus Escobal, or the agricultural produce subject matter of the receipts or even the alleged 1/5 sharing. The receipts do not prove that Amor Cobarrubias or Aleth Pagtananan did receive a share or received the same pursuant to an agreed system of sharing. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

The affidavits executed by Mariano Hizon, Orlando Hizon and Ciriacp Guevarra stating that Jesus Escobal is a tenant of Amor Cobarrubias, are insufficient to establish a finding of tenancy relationship between the landowners and Jesus Escobal. The affiants did not provide details based on their personal knowledge as to how the crop-sharing agreement was implemented, how much was given by Jesus Escobal to Amor Cobarrubias, when and where the payments were made, or whether they have at any instance witnessed Amor Cobarrubias receive her share of the harvest from Jesus Escobal. 39

In addition, neither was it shown that the share supposedly received by Amor inured to the benefit of the rest of the owners. Clearly, the sixth element is absent in this case. Jurisprudence instructs that harvest sharing is a vital element of every tenancy. A de jure tenant is expected to know the particulars of his arrangement with the landowner. The absence of a clear-cut sharing agreement signifies at most that cultivation was made by mere tolerance sans tenancy. 40 Occupancy and cultivation of an agricultural land do not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvest, and consent of landowner. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be supplied by mere conjectures. 41

Without the required allegations and proof, the CA was correct in adjudging that Escobal is not a tenant of the subject properties, and is therefore not entitled to the protection accorded upon such status under existing laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated January 19, 2016 and Resolution dated October 7, 2016 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136448 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."Inting, J., no part; Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated March 14, 2022.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-19.

2.Id. at 32-45. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court), concurring.

3.Id. at 21-21b.

4.Id. at 32-33.

5.Id. at 33.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 32.

9.Id. at 33.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 33-34.

12.Id. at 87-99. Rendered by Provincial Adjudicator Ramon I. Bausas, Id. at 87-99.

13.Id. at 98-99.

14.Id. at 86.

15.Id. at 35.

16.Id. at 74-85.

17.Id. at 85.

18.Id. at 71-73.

19.Id. at 8.

20.Id. at 8, 35, 157.

21.Supra note 2.

22.Rollo, p. 43.

23.Supra note 3.

24.Rollo, p. 11.

25.Id. at 16.

26.NGEI Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., et al. v. Filipinas Palmoil Plantation, Inc., et al., 697 Phil. 433, 443 (2012).

27.Id. at 444.

28.Caluzor v. Llanillo, et al., 762 Phil. 353 (2015).

29.Id. at 365-366.

30. CIVIL CODE, Article 491.

31.Cruz v. Catapang, 568 Phil. 472, 479 (2008).

32.Yun Kwan Bung v. PAGCOR, 623 Phil. 23, 44 (2009).

33.Id.

34. CIVIL CODE, Article 1877.

ARTICLE 1877. An agency couched in general terms comprises only acts of administration, even if the principal should state that he withholds no power or that the agent may execute such acts as he may consider appropriate, or even though the agency should authorize a general and unlimited management.

35. CIVIL CODE, Article 1878 (15).

36.Reyes v. Spouses Joson, 551 Phil. 345, 353 (2007).

37.Caluzor v. Llanillo, supra note 28 at 366.

38.Id. at 367.

39.Rollo, pp. 41-42.

40.Caluzor v. Llanillo, supra note 28 at 368.

41.Id. citing Estate of Pastor M. Samson v. Spouses Susano, 664 Phil. 590, 612-613 (2011).