Heirs of Cayabyab v. Bright Maritime Corp.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 253338. September 7, 2022.]

HEIRS OF THE LATE EDWIN N. CAYABYAB, REPRESENTED BY NISARISA L. CAYABYAB, petitioners, vs. BRIGHT MARITIME CORP., AND/OR GS MARITIME CO. LTD., AND/OR DESIREE P. SILLAR, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court's First Division issued a Resolution datedSeptember 7, 2022, which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 253338 (Heirs of the Late Edwin N. Cayabyab, represented by Nisarisa L. Cayabyab, petitioners vs. Bright Maritime Corp., and/or GS Maritime Co. Ltd., and/or Desiree P. Sillar, respondents). — This is an Appeal by Certiorari1 which seeks to reverse and set aside the December 6, 2019 Decision 2 and September 4, 2020 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 157580. The CA affirmed the April 30, 2018 Resolution 4 and June 28, 2018 Resolution 5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 04-000233-18 (4) (NLRC NCR CN. OFW (M) 02-01528-17) which affirmed the January 31, 2018 Decision 6 of the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissing the complaint for death benefits filed by the heirs of Edwin Cayabyab, represented by his wife, Nisarisa Cayabyab (petitioners), against Bright Maritime Corp., and/or GS Maritime Co. Ltd., and/or Desiree P. Sillar (respondents).

The Antecedents

Edwin Cayabyab (Edwin) and Nisarisa Cayabyab (Nisarisa) were married on May 16, 1998 and sired four children. On February 2, 2016, Edwin entered into a Contract of Employment 7 with respondents as cook/steward for the M/V NIKOLAOS GS (vessel). Prior to his deployment, Edwin underwent and subsequently passed the Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) conducted by the company-designated physician who declared him fit for sea duty. Sometime in March 2016, he boarded the vessel to start his work. 8

On June 2016, Edwin failed to remit his salary to his wife and communicate with her, either through phone or internet. Then, on September 2016, an unidentified person phoned Nisarisa informing her about an unpaid loan of Edwin which was due. Two weeks later, a utility worker from the local manning agent called Nisarisa asking her to go to respondents' office in connection with the unpaid loan of her husband. She failed to go because she was allegedly busy with work. Nisarisa claimed not having had any communication with her husband since June 2016. 9

On February 2, 2017, petitioners (the heirs of Edwin, represented by Nisarisa) filed a Complaint 10 against respondents for death benefits, medical expenses, and burial allowance for the presumed death of Edwin under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract 11(POEA-SEC) before the LA.

Petitioners claimed that since Edwin went missing and had not communicated with them, the presumption would be that Edwin is already dead. Additionally, since Edwin's disappearance occurred at work during the period of his employment, petitioners were therefore entitled to burial and death benefits under the provisions of the POEA-SEC. Petitioners also claimed for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees on account of respondents' refusal to honor their obligation under the contract. 12

Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that on June 3, 2016, while docked at Port Taranto, Italy, Edwin left the vessel at around 6:10 p.m. carrying his backpack, laptop, and clothes. He had an on-shore pass signed by the vessel's Master, as well as a photocopy of his passport. Respondents claimed that Edwin's crewmates saw him leave and that he had told them that he was buying some items at a shopping mall and would return by midnight. The next morning, June 4, 2016, as Edwin had not returned, the vessel's Master opened Edwin's cabin and found his personal belongings missing. The vessel's Master then reported the matter to the Port Authority and Immigration Office of Port Taranto, Italy. The incident was likewise entered in the vessel's logbook. Respondents contended that Edwin had abandoned the vessel and is not yet presumed to be legally dead but only missing pursuant to Article 391 13 of the Civil Code, 14 which states that a seafarer must be missing for four (4) years before the heirs may be entitled to claims. Thus, petitioners have no right to their claims under the POEA-SEC provisions. 15

The LA Ruling

In its Decision dated January 31, 2018, the LA dismissed the complaint of petitioners. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for death, funeral and medical benefits filed by complainants against respondents is hereby DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.

SO ORDERED. 16

The LA ruled that there was no proof of actual death of the seafarer, and thus, he cannot be presumed dead under the conditions provided under the Civil Code. Therefore, petitioners' complaint could not prosper. 17

Petitioners thus, appealed the decision of the LA with the NLRC. 18

The NLRC Ruling

On April 30, 2018, the NLRC issued its resolution which affirmed the decision of the LA. The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Labor Arbiter's decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 19

The NLRC agreed with the decision of the LA, stating that there was no competent evidence of Edwin's death, and that he could not be presumed dead under the Civil Code as he had only been missing for eight (8) months when petitioners filed the complaint. Since there was neither legal basis for Edwin's death nor his presumed death, the NLRC held that petitioners had no cause of action against respondents.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied for lack of merit in the June 28, 2018 Resolution 20 of the NLRC.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari21 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its December 6, 2019 Decision, the CA affirmed the resolutions of the NLRC. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated April 30, 2018 and Resolution dated June 28, 2018 issued by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LAC No. OFW (M) 04-00233-18(4) (NLRC NCR CN. OFW (M) 02-01528-17) are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 22 (italics omitted)

The CA held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in affirming the LA's decision and dismissing petitioners' complaint. As claimants for death benefits, petitioners have the burden to prove the death of Edwin by substantial evidence, and that it was work-related. Here, the CA declared that petitioners were not able to discharge the burden of proof. The CA also accorded respect to the factual findings of the NLRC, especially since they were consistent with the LA's and supported by substantial evidence. The CA concluded that while the principle of liberality should be given in favor of the seafarer in construing POEA-SEC, it should not be allowed for claims of compensation based on surmises. 23

The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its September 4, 2020 Resolution. 24

Hence, this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues

(1) Whether circumstantial evidence is present in order to sustain petitioners' claim on the presumption of death of Edwin;

(2) Whether petitioners are entitled to death benefits under the POEA-SEC; and

(3) Whether petitioners are entitled to damages and attorney's fees under the law and jurisprudence.

Petitioners argue that this Court has previously ruled that circumstantial evidence may be appreciated to establish the death of a person in the absence of a body. Further, since respondents have control and supervision of Edwin, it is respondents who have the burden of proving the fact of Edwin's voluntary disappearance. 25

In their Comment/Opposition, 26 respondents counter that Edwin abandoned and deserted the vessel and cannot be presumed legally dead — only missing — at the time petitioners filed their complaint. Further, the cases petitioners cited were criminal cases where danger of death was clearly apparent. Such is not the case with Edwin. Respondents assert that the burden of proof to substantiate their claim lies with the claimants, and that petitioners were not able to provide any proof of such claims. Finally, respondents point out that factual findings of the NLRC should not be disturbed especially when they coincide with those of the LA and when supported by substantial evidence. 27

In their Reply, 28 petitioners argue that respondents' allegation that Edwin abandoned the vessel is highly doubtful, as the crew log entry of Edwin seemed to only be inserted, the entries not being in chronological order. Further, petitioners question why respondents failed to promptly inform them about the alleged abandonment and desertion of Edwin and, if it were true that Edwin indeed abandoned the vessel, the fact that respondents did not file a case for desertion against Edwin was highly suspicious. 29

In respondents' Rejoinder, 30 they counter that Edwin is not actually or legally presumed dead, and therefore, petitioners are not entitled to death benefits. Secondly, the crew log being assailed by petitioners were actually filled up by crew members themselves, and Edwin's abandonment is clear from his own log-out entry and blank log-in entry; therefore, he never came back after leaving the vessel. Respondents also stress that petitioners again provided no proof that the crew log entries were inserted. 31

The Court's Ruling

The Court finds the appeal unmeritorious.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that NLRC decisions brought before the CA are final and executory in nature 32 and can only be reversed on a finding of grave abuse of discretion through a Rule 65 petition. 33 Thus, in reviewing the present Rule 45 petition, this Court is bound by the intrinsic limitations of Rule 65 proceedings, which look into the legal errors that the CA may have committed in determining the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the reviewed NLRC decision. 34

It also bears reiterating that in a petition for review on certiorari, this Court is not a trier of facts, and is not bound to re-examine the evidence on records as the findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies are accorded finality and respect, especially when affirmed by the CA. 35 While there are recognized exceptions 36 to this rule, this case is not one of them.

Guided by the foregoing, the Court now proceeds to determine whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners unentitled to their claim for death benefits under the POEA-SEC.

Compensation proceedings for the death of a seafarer are governed by the provisions of the POEA-SEC, which is deemed incorporated in every employment contract of seafarers. 37 The POEA-SEC states the standard terms and conditions governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on board ocean-going vessels, specifically Section 20 (B), which provides:

Section 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —

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B. Compensation and Benefits for Death

1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. 38

Death benefits and other remunerations may be claimed when the seafarer dies of a (a) work-related death; and (b) the death occurred during the term of the contract. 39 In applying the above rule, these two elements must concur. Similarly, the Court has held in several cases that in order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer to be entitled to death compensation from the employer, claimants have the burden to prove by substantial evidence 40 said two elements. 41 Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and not merely apparent. 42

In this case, however, petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proof required as they could not even provide the most basic and primary proof needed in compensation proceedings of work-related deaths of seafarers, i.e., the death of the seafarer himself. Petitioners insist that Edwin should be considered dead as they had neither heard from, nor seen him, since June 2016. However, aside from this claim, petitioners offered no other evidence or competent proof to support a finding of Edwin's death, or if in fact, he was in any danger of death. Nor was there any evidence provided that Edwin had disappeared under "highly suspicious circumstances" 43 while in the employ of respondents.

As entered in the vessel's logbook, and corroborated by a statement of the vessel's Ship Master, Petros Kontosizes 44(Ship Master), Edwin voluntarily left the vessel while docked at Port Taranto, Italy, carrying his on-shore pass signed by the Ship Master, and a photocopy of his passport. He was seen leaving the vessel at night but did not return the next morning. 45 The next day, the Ship Master opened Edwin's cabin and found Edwin's personal things missing. That same day, the Ship Master reported the incident to the Port Authority Immigration Office. Nowhere in this narration of events can it be concluded that foul play was involved, or that Edwin had disappeared under highly suspicious circumstances. As mentioned, the factual findings of the lower courts and tribunals are accorded great respect and will not be disturbed as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 46 In this case, the findings of the LA, NLRC and CA are consistent in their ruling that there was no competent evidence found to prove the death of Edwin.

Mere allegations are not evidence. 47 Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. 48 Accordingly, this Court has held that inasmuch as a missing seaman's death cannot be proven, the latter cannot be presumed dead immediately considering that the New Civil Code provides for specific rules before a missing person can be properly presumed dead. 49 Articles 390 and 391 of the New Civil Code provide:

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years.

From the aforementioned provisions, Edwin cannot legally be presumed dead. He cannot even be presumed dead under Art. 391 of the Civil Code for he did not go missing "on board a vessel." The presumption established in paragraph 1 of the above-cited article applies where the vessel is lost during a sea voyage and a person on board is unheard of for four years since the loss of the vessel. 50 In this case, the vessel was not lost during a sea voyage. Edwin left the vessel voluntarily on June 3, 2016 and did not return. Petitioners filed their complaint on February 2, 2017, or after a lapse of only eight months. As there was no evidence to prove Edwin's demise, nor any legal basis for the presumption of his death by virtue of the Civil Code, the CA, NLRC and LA were correct in not applying the provisions of the POEA-SEC regarding the death of a seafarer.

As sufficiently explained in the case of Pantollano v. Korphil Shipmanagement and Manning Corp., 51 this Court held that a seafarer who disappears while on a vessel in open sea cannot be presumed dead in the following circumstance:

The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. x x x [N]othing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to him. He could have transferred to another vessel or watercraft. He could even have swum to safety. Or he could have died. Or worse, he could have taken his own life. Legal implications — such as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of the wife — are so important that courts should not so easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be taken as a fact.

Hence, a person missing under the circumstances of Edwin, who was not established to have died upon his disappearance or to be in a situation where he could be in danger of death, cannot be declared dead nor presumed as such, until the lapse of the period fixed by law on the presumption of death. Consequently, petitioners cannot be considered beneficiaries entitled to compensation under the law. Further, not being entitled to such claims, the other claims for damages and attorney's fees must likewise be denied.

On a final note, it is unfortunate that uncertainty shrouds the fate of Edwin. However, the factual circumstances in this case clearly do not justify the grant of death benefits as prayed for by petitioners as beneficiaries. While the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of seafarers in construing the POEA-SEC, this Court, more importantly, cannot allow claims for compensation based on conjectures and surmises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The December 6, 2019 Decision and September 4, 2020 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 157580, are AFFIRMEDin toto. aScITE

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 10-29.

2. Id. at 140-151; penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. and Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas, concurring.

3. Id. at 152-153.

4. Id. at 126-137; penned by Presiding Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog, III, with Commissioners Erlinda T. Agus and Dominador B. Medroso, Jr., concurring.

5. Id. at 138-139; Annex "L."

6. Id. at 80-88; penned by Labor Arbiter Ma. Claradel C. Javier-Rotor.

7. Id. at 35.

8. Id. at 141.

9. Id. at 142.

10. Id. at 36.

11. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010 (2010 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships).

12. Rollo, pp. 142-143.

13. Art. 391 (1) of the Civil Code.

ARTICLE 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane[.]

14. Republic Act No. 386 or AN ACT TO ORDAIN AND INSTITUTE THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines." Approved June 18, 1949.

15. Rollo, p. 143.

16. Id. at 88.

17. Id.

18. Id. at 89-104.

19. Id. at 136.

20. Id. at 138-139.

21. CA rollo, pp. 3-29.

22. Id. at 150.

23. Id. at 146-150.

24. Id. at 152-153.

25. Id. at 15-16.

26. Id. at 157-187.

27. Id. at 164-177.

28. Id. at 190-201.

29. Id. at 190-193.

30. Id. at 206-223.

31. Id. at 207-209.

32. Rule VII, Section 14 of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as Amended.

SECTION 14. FINALITY OF DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. — (a) Finality of the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission. — Except as provided in Section 9 of Rule X, the decisions, resolutions or orders of the Commission shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the counsel or authorized representative or the parties if not assisted by counsel or representative. (b) Entry of Judgment. — Upon the expiration of the ten (10)-calendar day period provided in paragraph (a) of this Section, the decision, resolution, or order shall be entered in a book of entries of judgment. In the absence of return cards, certifications from the post office or the courier authorized by the Commission or other proofs of service to the parties, the Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider the decision, resolution or order as final and executory after sixty (60) calendar days from date of mailing. (14a) (As amended by En Banc Resolution No. 05-14, Series of 2014)

33. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, reads:

Section 1.Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxx xxx xxx

34. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Masterbulk Pte. Ltd. v. Heirs of Fritz D. Buenaflor, G.R. No. 227447, June 23, 2020.

35. Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Magna T. Utanes, G.R. No. 236498, September 16, 2020.

36. Id., citing Manila Shipmanagement & Manning, Inc. v. Aninang, 824 Phil. 916, 925 (2018).

The Court, however, permitted a relaxation of this rule whenever any of the following circumstances is present:

1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;

4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. when the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. when in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

7. when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court;

8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent;

10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

11. when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

37. Reyes v. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., G.R. No. 230502, February 15, 2022.

38. Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, POEA Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 2010, dated October 26, 2010.

39. Mabute v. Bright Maritime Corp., G.R. No. 219872, September 9, 2020.

40. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. v. Malicse, 820 Phil. 941, 952 (2017).

41. See also New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. Datayan, 773 Phil. 94, 104 (2015).

42. Malicdem v. Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 224753, June 19, 2019, 905 SCRA 243, 258.

43. Rollo, pp. 15-16.

44. Id. at 166; also referred to as Ship Master Petros Kontozisis in other parts of the rollo (pp. 75 and 78) and records (pp. 73, 76 and 537).

45. Id. at 143.

46. Jalit, Sr. v. Cargo Safeway, Inc., G.R. No. 238147, September 29, 2021.

47. GSIS v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., 721 Phil. 740, 753-754 (2013).

48. Dra. Dela Llana v. Biong, 722 Phil. 743, 757 (2013).

49. Pantollano v. Korphil Shipmanagement and Manning Corp., 662 Phil. 189, 198 (2011).

50. Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v. Villanueva, 112 Phil. 897, 907 (1961).

51. Id., see note 48 at 201.