THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208386. February 26, 2014.]
HEIRS OF SATURNINO ASUNCION, REPRESENTED BY HIS SPOUSE HELEN A. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. ESPERANZA AGUSTIN RAMOS, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 26, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 208386(Heirs of Saturnino Asuncion, represented by his spouse Helen A. Asuncion v. Esperanza Agustin Ramos) — Petitioner Helena A. Asuncion's letter dated February 3, 2014 requesting help and clarification of the Resolutions dated September 30, 2013 and December 11, 2013 is NOTED.
Considering that in the Resolution dated December 11, 2013, the Court denied with finality petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 30, 2013 denying the petition for review on certiorari and directed that entry of judgment be made in due course, the Court resolves to NOTE WITHOUT ACTION respondent's comment on petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Before us is a letter sent by petitioner Helena A. Asuncion (Helena) concerning her case in G.R. No. 208386 entitled Heirs of Saturnino Asuncion, represented by his spouse Helena A. Asuncion v. Esperanza Agustin Ramos. Helena is one of the petitioners in the said case who filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98554.
On September, 30, 2013, this Court resolved to deny the said petition for review on certiorari in a minute Resolution 1 by upholding the findings of the Court of Appeals that the action for reconveyance filed by the respondent in the said case does not prescribe, citing the case of Spouses Huang v. Court of Appeals, et al. 2 To wit:
Acting on the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated May 31, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Manila, in CA-G.R. CV No. 98554, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to show any reversible error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. (Mendoza, J., on official leave; Reyes, J., designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1557 dated September 19, 2013). ESTDIA
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied by this Court in a Resolution dated December 11, 2013 which states:
The Court resolves to NOTE the notice of appearance as collaborating counsel for petitioners, filed by Atty. Francisco S. Sevilla, with the conformity of petitioner Helena A. Asuncion, stating that notices of this Court be served on the principal counsel.
Acting on petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 30, 2013 which denied the petition for review on certiorari, the Court further resolves to DENY the motion with FINALITY, as no substantial arguments were raised to warrant its reconsideration.
In view of the denial of the petition and motion for reconsideration, respondent's opposition to the petition is NOTED WITHOUT ACTION.
Let entry of judgment be made in due course.
In the said letter, Helena is seeking clarification of the aforementioned Resolutions of this Court. A close scrutiny of the said letter, however, would reveal that petitioner is seeking a review and/or reconsideration of her case, to wit:
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Particularly, your honors, the appellate court ruled that prescription does not run against my husband and me for my allegedly acknowledging in a letter that I am not the owner of the parcels of land involved in the instance case, particularly the Sta. Monica properties and that according to the appellate court I also acknowledged that the Arabiat properties is not ours when there is no written evidence to support such allegation. According to the appellate court, this amounted to an express trust which does not prescribed. Assuming your honors that this is true, this express trust applies only to the Sta. Monica properties because of my letter, and not the Arabiat properties on which only an implied trust is applicable which clearly has prescribed as we are in possession of the said properties for almost thirty (30) years, while the law requires only ten (10) years. Moreover, the Arabiat properties belongs (sic) to our parents, which we acquired from our common father upon his instruction. The respondent in this case, who is my sister Esperanza, does not have any evidentiary proof to support her claim to the Arabiat properties; and if the decision of the Court of Appeals is upheld, this is clearly a case of unjust enrichment on her part. Because she would now own all the properties left by our parents leaving nothing to us as co heirs.
For me your honors, this is an injustice which should be rectified. It must be emphasized that the Arabiat properties which we have been cultivating from a raw land to a now productive land for almost thirty (30) years consist of nineteen (19) hectares, while the Sta. Monica properties consists of fifteen (15) hectares. If all this (sic) properties is (sic) transferred to the petitioner, my sister Esperanza, she will now own all the properties left by our parents. This clearly is inequitable.
I am now in the twilight of my life being more than 80 years old, what I am fighting (sic) is my share in the inheritance and for my children in the estate of our father which I believed are justly due us. If my sister really believed that she is the owner of the disputed property why did she not file the action for reconveyance when my husband was still alive but did so only after five years from his death.
I therefore intercede for your help in this case, as I believed this is a short cut of due process where a person who is not entitled to a property becomes so without clearly showing why.
I hope this letter merits your kind and favourable attention so us (sic) to prevent a manifest injustice that will happen if the aforementioned resolutions are not clarified and/or reconsidered. Caloocan City, February 3, 2014. 3
(Sgd.)
Since Helena is seeking a review and/or reconsideration of her case, her letter constitutes a second motion for reconsideration which is not allowed under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the same Rules. It is to be noted that Helena's first motion for reconsideration has already been denied by this Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 2013.
Moreover, Helena questions the denial by this Court of her petition for review on certiorari and the denial of her first motion for reconsideration thereof through the assailed minute Resolutions dated September, 30, 2013 and December 11, 2013, arguing that said minute resolutions are inaccurate conclusions in view of the contradictory findings of the trial and appellate courts.
Helena's contention is unmeritorious. caTESD
The validity of minute resolutions finds support in A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC also known as the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Rule 13 thereof provides:
SEC. 6. Manner of adjudication. — The Court shall adjudicate cases as follows:
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(d) By minute resolution when the Court: . . . (2) denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the said Rules, citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or order of the court below; . . . (4) denies a motion for reconsideration, citing as legal basis the absence of a compelling or cogent reason to grant the motion, or the failure to raise any substantial argument to support such motion . . . .
From the foregoing, it can be inferred that Helena's contention is baseless and that she is clearly not aware of the decision-making process of the Court as provided in the said Internal Rules. The Court has repeatedly declared that "a minute resolution constitutes actual adjudication on the merits." 4 As recently held by this Court in the case of Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., 5 minute resolutions are the result of a thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with, and adopts the, findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It would be an exercise in redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions that the CA reached.
Verily, the minute resolutions issued by this Court, dated September, 30, 2013 and December 11, 2013, are valid as the same were made with legal basis after finding that no reversible error was committed by the CA in its Decision dated May 31, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2013.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to treat petitioner Helena A. Asuncion's letter request for help and for clarification of the resolutions of this Honorable Court, dated September 30, 2013 and December 11, 2013, as a second motion for reconsideration and DENY the same for lack of merit, considering that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2, Rule 56 of the same Rules.
No further pleading will be entertained. (J. Abad, on leave; J. Bersamin, designated Acting Member, per Special Order No. 1640 dated February 19, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 75.
2. G.R. No. 108525, September 13, 1994, 236 SCRA 420.
3. Emphasis supplied.
4. Smith Bell & Co. (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 274 Phil. 472, 479 (1991).
5. G.R. No. 196358, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 883, 889.