Hanlon y Santos v. Samontina y Ceballos

G.R. No. 237236 (Notice)

This is a civil case, G.R. No. 237236, involving a petition for review on certiorari filed with the Supreme Court against an interlocutory order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, City of Manila. The legal issue in this case is whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review on certiorari assailing an interlocutory order of the RTC. The Supreme Court ruled that it does not have such jurisdiction, and the petition was denied. The Court emphasized the distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order and reiterated the principle of hierarchy of courts, which requires that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with the Supreme Court.

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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237236. April 18, 2018.]

ELVIRA HANLON y SANTOS, ELISA MENDENILLA y SANTOS, AND VENERANDO SANTOS y SAUZA, petitioner,vs. LETECIA SAMONTINA y CEBALLOS, ERLINDA RIMALOS y SAMONTINA, PACIFICA AGUILAR y SAMONTINA, ET AL., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 18, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 237236 (Elvira Hanlon y Santos, Elisa Mendenilla y Santos, and Venerando Santos y Sauza vs. Letecia Samontina y Ceballos, Erlinda Rimalos y Samontina, Pacifica Aguilar y Samontina, et al.). — This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 15, 2018 Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, City of Manila in Civil Case No. 13-129878, entitled "Letecia Samontina y Ceballos, et al. v. Elvira Hanlon y Santos, et al."

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Adelaida Sauza, upon her death, left a parcel of land with an area of 187.50 square meters situated in the corner of Valencia and Jhocson Streets, City of Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 137045. Respondents filed a Petition for Partition of said property with Prayer for Accounting of Rentals on April 26, 2013, docketed as Civil Case No. 13-129878 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, City of Manila. 2 In said petition, the parties allege that being her nephews and nieces, they are the heirs of the late Adelaida Sauza, who died single and without issue.

Years later, or on May 31, 2017, in said action for partition, respondent Lourdes Samontina (Lourdes) filed her judicial affidavit. 3 Said judicial affidavit pertains to the "declaration of nullity of the deed of donation" dated May 18, 2012, by the Late Adelaida Sauza, as donor, in favor of petitioner Elvira Hanlon y Santos (Elvira), the sole donee. 4 A few months thereafter, or on January 5, 2018, petitioners filed their Comment-Objection to the Offer of Testimony of respondent Lourdes, arguing that the instant case is one for partition; therefore, the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the validity or nullity of the deed of donation. 5

On February 15, 2018, the RTC issued the assailed Order, noting the objection raised by petitioners and giving them, at the same time, the opportunity to go to this Court to file the necessary pleadings. Thus:

Upon consideration of the objection to the Judicial Affidavit as well as the Comment, as well as the arguments of both parties, this court resolves to just note the objection raised by defendants and this Court will allow the affiant Madame Lourdes Samontina to testify subject to cross examination.

But in the interest of justice, this Court will give a chance for the respondents to go to the Supreme Court to file the necessary pleadings.

In the meanwhile (sic), tentatively set the continuation of trial of this case on April 12, 2018 at 8:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

Reconsideration thereof was denied in open court. 6 Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioners maintain that the RTC does not have jurisdiction to try and hear the testimony of Lourdes with respect to the alleged nullity of a deed of donation since the case before it is an action for partition.

We resolve to deny the petition.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court invoked the Court's appellate jurisdiction over questions of law that have been decided by the lower courts with finality. 7 This is in accordance to Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (emphasis ours)

A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. 8

On the other hand, an order which does not completely dispose of the case because it leaves something to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the case is an interlocutory order. It "refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides some point or matter but it is not the final decision on the whole controversy." 9 The Court, in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 10 has elucidated on their distinctions in this wise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

In contrast to final judgments and orders, interlocutory orders of the RTCs may not be the subject of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari, 11 as provided for in Section 1 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of the same Rule, to wit:

Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

No appeal may be taken from:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) An interlocutory order;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. Modes of Appeal. —

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Appeal by certiorari. — In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with the Rule 45.

The questioned February 15, 2018 Order of the RTC is an interlocutory order which cannot be the subject of the present petition. The Order neither completely disposes of the case as it merely noted petitioners' objection to the purpose for which the testimony of Lourdes is being offered and scheduled the hearing on the subject Judicial Affidavit. Evidently, the trial on the merits has not yet been concluded and no final judgment has been rendered by the RTC.

Notably, petitioners have mistakenly identified the issue herein as one that concerns the trial court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of a court is vastly different from the exercise of discretion pursuant to that jurisdiction. The real issue in the case at bar is whether the trial court can properly hear the testimony of a witness in the partition case that incidentally touches upon the validity of a deed of donation — the actual controversy being the RTC's exercise of jurisdiction in allowing Lourdes to testify and not the court's jurisdiction over the actual subject matter of the case, which is the action for partition. In this regard, the propriety of a court's exercise of its jurisdiction can only be questioned in a certiorari action based on Section 1, 12 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court under the conditions set forth therein.

Nevertheless, even if the Court treats the present petition as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the same must still be dismissed for violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts. This well-settled principle dictates that petitioners should file the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and not directly with this Court. 13

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED."

 

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 10. By Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr.

2.Id. at 15.

3.Id. at 54-62.

4.Id. at 15.

5.Id. at 15.

6.Id. at 19.

7.Trajano v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, G.R. No. 190253, June 11, 2014.

8.Spouses Mendiola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159746, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 27; citing Neypes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.

9.Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 503, 521, July 13, 1998, cited in Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110147, April 17, 2001, 356 SCRA 563, 570.

10. G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011.

11.Rayos v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 196063, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 684, 688.

12. Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

13. See Rayos, supra note 11, at 688-689.

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