THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 206608. August 13, 2014.]
HAN-PHIL INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner, vs. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated August 13, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 206608 (Han-Phil Industries, Inc. v. Technology Developers, Inc.). — Subjects of this resolution are 1] the September 17, 2012 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas (RTC-Batangas), granting the Motion to Dismiss (the complaint for declaration of nullity of the sheriff's levy and sale filed by respondent Technology Developers, Inc. [TDI]); and 2] its March 27, 2013 Resolution 3 denying petitioner Han-Phil Industries, Inc.'s (Han-Phil's) motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Records show that TDI filed a collection suit against Han Hyung Park (Park) and Han-Phil before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati City (RTC-Makati) for unpaid rentals allegedly incurred by Park and Han-Phil on the basis of a contract of lease for the use and occupancy of TDI's parcel of land located in Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. TDI alleged that Park and Han-Phil defaulted in the payment of the monthly rental and vacated its property leaving unpaid accrued rentals in the total amount of P5,904,000.00, covering the period from October 1995 to September 1997, and unpaid Meralco electric bills amounting to P700,239.12 for the period from April 1997 to September 1997.
In their defense, Park claimed that the rentals and electric bills were already fully paid while Han-Phil claimed that TDI had no cause of action against it for lack of privity of contract because it was Park alone who entered into a contract of lease with it.
On June 11, 2001, after trial on the merits, the RTC-Makati rendered a decision 4 against Park, but dismissed the complaint against Han-Phil for lack of privity of contract. Subsequently, a writ of execution was issued against Park's real properties which included the condominium unit in Malabon City (Malabon property) and the real estate property with buildings in Lobo, Batangas (Batangas property). The properties were levied upon and later sold at a public auction with TDI as the sole uncontested bidder.
On March 20, 2006, Han-Phil filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of the sheriff's levy and sale of the subject properties, particularly the Batangas property, before the RTC-Batangas, arguing that the said levy and the subsequent sale involved real properties owned by Han-Phil.
On October 24, 2008, TDI filed a motion to dismiss 5 Han-Phil's complaint for declaration of nullity of the sheriff's levy and sale of the subject properties on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing the Court's ruling in Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 6 TDI argued that "the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution." 7ECSaAc
Han-Phil opposed TDI's motion by arguing that such motion was merely pro forma and that its remedy was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of a motion to dismiss.
On December 11, 2008, the RTC-Batangas issued the questioned order granting TDI's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned out that Han-Phil's complaint for declaration of nullity of the sheriff's levy and sale involved exactly the same properties that were disputed before RTC-Makati. It stated that the parties involved in the case were the same parties in the case before the RTC-Makati. Hence, it concluded that only the RTC-Makati had the authority to nullify the levy and sale over the subject properties. Han-Phil's motion for reconsideration was denied.
On appeal, the CA rendered the assailed decision resolving the case both procedurally and substantively in favor of TDI. The CA relaxed the 10-day rule requirement under Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court by ruling that there was substantial compliance of the same on the part of TDI. It likewise stated that TDI could raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings in this case, even on appeal, and, therefore, waiver or estoppel could lie. There was no violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule either. Finally, the CA agreed with TDI and applied the ruling in Ching, that "the determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution." Thus, the CA concluded that Han-Phil's complaint for declaration of nullity of the sheriff's levy and sale of the subject properties should have been filed before the RTC-Makati.
Hence, this petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS DATED OCTOBER 21, 2008 DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT DID NOT OBSERVE THE TEN (10) DAY PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 5, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS DATED OCTOBER 21, 2008 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT AN ANSWER HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED TWO YEARS PRIOR.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE WAS NOT VIOLATED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING [THAT] THE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI.8
Han-Phil essentially argues that TDI filed a defective motion to dismiss because it scheduled it for hearing beyond the ten (10)-day period in violation of Section 5, 9 Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The subsequent action taken by the RTC-Batangas on such defective motion did not cure the flaw because a motion with a fatally defective notice was a useless scrap of paper which the court had no authority to act on.
Han-Phil further argues that TDI filed its motion to dismiss, dated October 21, 2008, two (2) years late and after it had filed its answer on November 29, 2006.
Han-Phil likewise contends that TDI violated the Omnibus Motion Rule under Section 8, 10 Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It stated that TDI actively participated and failed to object to the jurisdiction of the RTC-Batangas which was equivalent to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and, thus, its willingness to abide by its resolution. Therefore, TDI was estopped from impugning the court's jurisdiction.
Lastly, Han-Phil asserts that the Batangas property was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC-Batangas. Since Han-Phil was a stranger in the RTC-Makati case, it had no choice but to file a separate and independent action before the RTC-Batangas. Han-Phil claims that, as a third person, it can vindicate its claim over the subject property through a separate and distinct action as provided under Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
TDI's counter-position
TDI counters that the 10-day rule invoked by Han-Phil in Section 5 cannot be strictly applied in this case; that lack of jurisdiction can be raised at any time of the proceedings even for the first time on appeal and cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence or even by the express consent of the parties; and that the jurisdiction over Han-Phil's complaint lies with the RTC-Makati which rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution over the subject properties.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit. Accordingly, the Court denies due course to the petition as it finds no reversible error in the questioned CA decision and resolution warranting the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Being the court which issued the writ of execution, the RTC-Makati clearly has the sole jurisdiction on the matter. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reads:
SECTION 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. — If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. TcHCDE
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or separate action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim.
[Emphasis supplied]
The CA correctly cited Ching as the applicable case. To reiterate, the Court, in said case, wrote:
The Makati annulment case should have been dismissed from the start for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC of Makati does not have the authority to nullify the levy and sale on execution that was ordered by the CFI of Manila, a co-equal court. The determination of whether or not the levy and sale of a property in execution of a judgment was valid, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the judgment and issued the writ of execution.
Beginning with the case of Orais v. Escaño, down to the subsequent cases of Nuñez v. Low, Cabigao v. del Rosario, Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., National Power Corp. v. De Veyra, Luciano v. Provincial Governor, De Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador, Cojuangco v. Villegas, Darwin v. Tokonaga, we laid down the long standing doctrine] . . . that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. TSHcIa
There is no dispute that the subject conjugal property was under custodia legis of the CFI of Manila. It was initially attached under a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the CFI of Manila. Said property was later on levied upon and sold under a writ of execution issued by the same court. Since the attachment, levy and sale have been carried out upon orders of the CFI of Manila, any and all questions concerning the validity and regularity thereof necessarily had to be addressed to the CFI of Manila.
Petitioners, however, contend that one of the owners of the property, petitioner Encarnacion Ching, was not a party to the collection case. Not being a party thereto, Encarnacion Ching should be allowed to file a separate case as a third-party claimant and said filing cannot be considered as an encroachment upon the jurisdiction of a co-equal and coordinate court.
We do not agree.
[Emphasis supplied; citations omitted]
As can be gleaned from Ching, the fact that Han-Phil was a stranger in the case before the RTC-Makati is irrelevant. The matter and all relevant and subordinate issues should be threshed out in the RTC-Makati.
The manifestation of TDI that Han-Phil is just a business conduit of Park and that the latter and his wife Evangeline Park are the majority stockholders of Han-Phil; that Han-Phil and Park have the same office address at 102 Yellowbell Mansion, Araneta Village, Malabon City; that said office belongs to Park; that they have the same lawyer, Atty. Jose F. Manacop; and that Park, through his counsel, made judicial admissions that the subject Batangas property belonged to him are noted. Whether these are relevant and significant are issues to be addressed by the RTC-Makati.
Anent the other issues raised by Han-Phil such as the 10-day hearing on the motion rule under Section 5 of Rule 15 and the filing of the motion to dismiss the complaint after two years, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA on those points. HDATSI
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. (Villarama, Jr., J., designated Acting Member in view of the vacancy in the Third Division, per Special Order No. 1691, dated May 22, 2014)
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 175-184. Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Angelita A. Gacutan.
2. Id. at 117-118.
3. Id. at 215.
4. RTC Decision, id. at 73-78.
5. Id. at 111-113.
6. 446 Phil. 121 (2003).
7. 446 Phil. 121, 128-129 (2003).
8. Rollo, pp. 11-12.
9. Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. (5a)
10. Section 8. Omnibus Motion. — Subject to the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived. (8a)