FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249984. June 15, 2022.]
NOEMI E. HALAGHAY, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CHARLIE E. HALAGHAY, petitioner,vs. THE PRESIDING JUSTICES OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL FORMER TWENTIETH [20TH] DIVISION, ROBERTO HSIEH A.K.A. ROBERTO SIA, VAN BERMEJO HSIEH, JEEP BERMEJO HSIEH and RAYMUNDO H. HALAGHAY, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 15, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249984 (Noemi E. Halaghay, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Charlie E. Halaghay, v. The Presiding Justices of the Honorable Court of Appeals, Special Former Twentieth [20th] Division, Roberto Hsieh a.k.a. Roberto Sia, Van Bermejo Hsieh, Jeep Bermejo Hsieh and Raymundo H. Halaghay.) — This is a Petition for Certiorari1 (petition) which seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution 2 dated 25 July 2019, Resolution 3 dated 30 August 2018, and Decision 4 dated 18 April 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. CV No. 05539. The CA affirmed the Decision 5 dated 11 February 2015 of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. RTC-1105.
Antecedents
In 1987, Noemi E. Halaghay (petitioner) and her husband, private respondent Raymundo Halaghay (Raymundo) (collectively, Spouses Halaghay), executed a contract of lease over a seven (7)-hectare property with Lucita Bacus Mahilum (Lucita) for P269,500.00. 6 This transaction was allegedly a contract of sale and was only styled as a lease because, at the time of sale, Lucita had no title to the property. 7
In 1991, Spouses Halaghay purchased another two (2)-hectare mangrove land from Mr. Virgilio Espinosa and Mrs. Dolores Espinosa (Mrs. Espinosa) for P20,000.00. 8 The deed of sale states that the property was the subject of an application "for fishpond purposes" filed by Mrs. Espinosa with the Bureau of Lands. 9
Both properties, totaling nine hectares in area, are located in San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. 10 The properties were untitled public lands and described in the transfer documents as fishponds. 11 Spouses Halaghay continued to use the properties as such even without any fishpond permit. 12
Meanwhile, petitioner left the country to work in the United States of America. Raymundo stayed in the Philippines and filed an application for fishpond permit with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), 13 but the permit was never granted. 14 Raymundo was also tasked to process the application for titling of the property, but he purportedly neglected the same. 15
The marriage of Spouses Halaghay soured. Eventually, petitioner was granted a decree of divorce by the District Court of Clark County, Nevada. 16
Subsequently, Charlie Halaghay, petitioner's son, called her and informed her that a big portion of their fishpond was being covered with rocks and sand. 17 The workers were acting for private respondent Roberto Hsieh (Roberto). 18
Petitioner returned to the Philippines and confronted Raymundo regarding the fishpond. At that time, Raymundo just had a stroke and was incoherent. Petitioner was only able to discern that Raymundo had waived his claim over the land in payment of his debt to Roberto. 19 Petitioner also confronted Roberto, who confirmed that Raymundo had waived his rights to the fishpond. 20
It turned out that several titles covering the subject property were issued in favor of Roberto and his children, private respondents Van Bermejo Hsieh (Van) and Jeep Bermejo Hsieh (Jeep). 21 The titles were issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted to Roberto. 22 aScITE
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of title, recovery of real rights and shares, and damages 23 against Raymundo, Roberto, Van, and Jeep. 24 She argued that the nine (9)-hectare property was sold to Roberto without her consent. She prayed that the titles be cancelled or, in the alternative, that she be granted the value of her share to the property. 25
Roberto, Van, and Jeep contended that Spouses Halaghay never owned the subject property, and that they purchased the property from the government. 26 Nonetheless, Roberto admitted that he paid Raymundo P128,000.00 in exchange for waiving his rights over the property and in consideration of the improvements made on the property. 27
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision 28 dated 11 February 2015, the RTC ruled that the certificates of title issued in favor of Roberto, Van, and Jeep may not be cancelled in favor of petitioner. This is because the property was public land owned by the Republic of the Philippines. 29 However, as a matter of equity, petitioner is entitled to receive her share to the value of the properties. 30 The dipositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff NOEMI A. HALAGHAY represented by Charlie E. Halaghay and against defendants ROBERTO HSIEH aka ROBERTO SIA, JEEP BERMEJO HSIEH and VAN BERMEJO HSIEH to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiff the following amounts, to wit:
1) Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P350,000.00) Pesos representing her marital share in the seven (7) hectare fishpond;
2) Twenty Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos representing her marital share in the two (2) hectare mangrove land;
3) Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees based on quantum meruit; and
4) Cost of suit, all computed at twelve (12%) interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.31
The RTC found that Spouses Halaghay did not own the property. 32 Nonetheless, at the time he applied for a patent, Roberto knew that Spouses Halaghay were in possession of the property. This even prompted Roberto to have Raymundo execute a waiver of rights in exchange for P128,000.00. 33 Such amount was lower than the amount paid by Spouses Halaghay when they purchased the properties. As respondents Roberto and Raymundo unjustly enriched themselves, petitioner is entitled to recover her share to one-half of the value of the properties. 34
Instead of using the purchase price as basis, the RTC opted to use the value of the properties at the time Raymundo waived his rights. The RTC cited the results of its inquiry with the San Carlos City Assessor's Office and pegged the value of the fishpond at P100,000.00 per hectare and the mangrove land at P25,000.00 per hectare. 35 The values were reckoned in 2002 and 2005, the years when the certificates of title were issued to Roberto, since there is no evidence of when Raymundo waived his rights. 36 The RTC then awarded to petitioner half of the assessed value of the properties. 37
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 38 claiming that the RTC should have awarded higher amounts based on the Bureau of Internal Revenue's zonal valuation. Her motion was denied by the RTC in a Resolution 39 dated 09 March 2015.
In the same Resolution, the RTC clarified that the property was never owned by Spouses Halaghay. 40 When they bought the property, they were aware that the property was public land and not owned by the sellers. At most, Spouses Halaghay only had possessory rights to the property. 41 Moreover, petitioner failed to adduce evidence on the value of the property or the marital share due her. Nonetheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the RTC did not dismiss the complaint. Instead, it ascribed value to the lands so that petitioner may recover her share. 42 Hence, the RTC refused to award higher sums to petitioner. HEITAD
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision 43 dated 18 April 2018, the CA affirmed the RTC and held that Spouses Halaghay did not own the property, which was public land. 44 The CA further ruled that Spouses Halaghay were builders in bad faith, for they occupied public land and introduced improvements thereon knowing that they had no right to do so. There is also no proof on the amount of actual damages petitioner should recover. As such, petitioner should not be entitled to any recompense. Nonetheless, the CA maintained the RTC's monetary awards as a matter of equity, considering that Roberto applied for a patent despite actual knowledge that another person was occupying the property. 45
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for Reconsideration, 46 citing new documentary evidence awaiting release by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 47
In a Resolution 48 dated 30 August 2018, the CA denied petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA noted that, due to petitioner's failure to timely move for reconsideration, its Decision dated 18 April 2018 had already attained finality. 49
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 08 October 2018, questioning the denial of her motion for extension. 50 In its Resolution 51 dated 25 July 2019, the CA denied petitioner's motion for being a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
The issues for the Court's resolution are: (1) whether the CA erred in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and motion for extension of time; and (2) on the merits, whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision.
Ruling of the Court
In filing this petition for
At the outset, it bears stressing that this petition is one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision, final order, or resolution of the CA is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 52
The CA's Resolutions are final in character, as they disposed of the controversy and affirmed the finality of its Decision dated 18 April 2018. The CA already passed upon the merits of the case. Hence, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari.
Moreover, this petition does not fall under the exception where a defective petition for certiorari may be treated as a petition for review on certiorari. An important consideration in applying the exception is that the petition must be filed within the reglementary period to file an appeal. 53 Here, the petition was filed 60 days from receipt of the CA's Resolution dated 25 July 2019. This is evidently beyond the 15-day period prescribed in Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
A petition for certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal where the latter remedy is available. 54 On this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.
Even assuming that this petition may be treated as a petition for review on certiorari, the petition should still be denied for lack of merit. The CA's Resolutions dated 25 July 2019 and 30 August 2018, and Decision dated 18 April 2018, must be affirmed.
The CA did not err in denying
The CA correctly denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration assailing the denial of her motion for extension of time. As aptly pointed out by the CA, petitioner's motion was essentially a second motion for reconsideration. Its ultimate goal was the reversal of the CA Decision.
When the CA denied petitioner's motion for extension of time, it disposed of the appeal and treated its Decision as final and executory. 55 In fact, the CA merely noted without action petitioner's first motion for reconsideration. 56 At that point, petitioner should have already filed a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The filing of another motion for reconsideration is unprocedural and expressly prohibited by Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is no reason to reverse the CA's Resolution dated 25 July 2019.
Similarly, We affirm the CA's Resolution dated 30 August 2018, which denied petitioner's motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration.
It is well-settled that a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is not allowed. 57 While this rule may admit of exceptions in the spirit of liberality, the movant must be able to prove cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance. 58
In this case, petitioner relies on the alleged unavailability of the certification she requested from the CENRO. 59 The CENRO certification, stating that the property is alienable and disposable, purportedly supports her assertion that she acquired the property through possession. 60
However, the proffered reason does not justify the relaxation of the rules. In the first place, ordinary prudence dictates that, before filing her complaint and at the trial court level, petitioner should have already secured all the evidence needed to prosecute her cause. Her belated request for the CENRO certification on appeal, and, worse, on motion for reconsideration before the CA, was caused by her own omission. She cannot rely on her own negligence to excuse noncompliance with the rules. Besides, petitioner is not allowed to introduce evidence for the first time on appeal. 61
With petitioner's failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration, the CA Decision had attained finality. ATICcS
The CA did not err in
Even if We were to ignore the foregoing, on the merits, the petition must still be denied.
Petitioner's cause of action is premised on Spouses Halaghay's ownership of the subject property. 62 Thus, to recover her share or cause the cancellation of the certificates of title, petitioner must prove that: (1) Spouses Halaghay acquired title to public land through any of the modes specified in Commonwealth Act No. 141 63 (Public Land Act) or through acquisitive prescription; and (2) her husband conveyed to another the land they own without her consent. 64 Petitioner is aware of this burden. In fact, petitioner's allegations make out a case for confirmation of imperfect title. 65
Notably, the lands are covered by titles issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted in favor of Roberto. The issuance of the patent confirms that the subject property is a public land owned by the government, and Roberto complied with the conditions for the issuance of the certificates of title. 66 No proof to the contrary was adduced by petitioner. Her bare allegations cannot defeat the titles which enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in their issuance. 67
In fact, petitioner admitted that Roberto immediately took possession of the property and developed it as a residence after he secured the patent. 68 These actions are consistent with the requirements under the Public Land Act. 69
We have indeed ruled that patents may be cancelled if the lands had become private prior to the issuance of the patents. 70 This is because the Public Land Act only applies to lands of the public domain. 71 However, in all cases, there must be a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, for the period required by law. 72 Possession must be from 12 June 1945 or earlier for the obtainment of imperfect title, 73 or, for acquisitive prescription, at least 30 years from the time the property was declared patrimonial in character. 74
In this case, except for the self-serving allegations of petitioner and her witnesses, she did not offer any other proof of compliance with either of the required periods. The records do not show other proof of possession in the concept of an owner, such as payment of real estate taxes or tax declarations. 75
Even the affidavits of her witnesses do not clearly show the duration and nature of Spouses Halaghay's possession. They only affirm that Spouses Halaghay allegedly leased the property in 1985 and purchased the same in 1987. 76 There is no evidence of when Lucita, their alleged predecessor-in-interest, occupied the property. Thus, while Spouses Halaghay possessed the property, there is insufficient proof of the length and character of such possession.
As pointed out by the CA, several circumstances show that Spouses Halaghay did not possess the property under a bona fide claim of ownership. For one, petitioner and Lucita denominated their transaction as a lease because they were aware that Lucita "ha[d] no title to it and therefore cannot sell it." 77 Also, in filing an application for a free patent, 78 Spouses Halaghay formally acknowledged that the subject property belonged to the government and is still part of the public domain. 79 Similarly, Spouses Halaghay recognized the public character of the land when they applied for and pursued the issuance of fishpond permits that pertain to public lands. 80 From all indications, therefore, Spouses Halaghay used the property, knowing that it belonged to the State, without the requisite authorizations.
Relatedly, Spouses Halaghay could not have acquired the property through prescription in the absence of an express declaration by the State that the property was no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. 81 Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remained a property of the public dominion, and, thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. 82 The CENRO certification that the land is alienable and disposable does not necessarily mean that the property could have been acquired through prescription. 83
Given the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. The amounts awarded by the RTC may no longer be disturbed as the CA Decision affirming them had already attained finality. Nonetheless, legal interest on the total monetary award is modified to six percent (6%) per annum, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 84 This modification is not barred by the principle of immutability of judgment as it pertains to compensatory interest arising from the final judgment. 85
Lastly, Roberto died during the pendency of this petition. 86 Thus, he must be substituted by his heirs pursuant to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court. TIADCc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 25 July 2019, Resolution dated 30 August 2018, and Decision dated 18 April 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05539 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the total monetary award shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
Counsel for private respondent Roberto Hsieh is ordered to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the deceased as parties within thirty (30) days from notice.
The letter dated 26 April 2022 of Atty. Wilfred D. Tubillara, M.D., counsel for petitioner, in compliance with the Resolution dated 30 June 2021; the Compliance with the Show Cause Resolution dated 30 June 2021 of Atty. Wilfred D. Tubillara, M.D., stating therein the reason for the failure to timely file a reply to the comment on the petition; the notice of change of address of Atty. Wilfred D. Tubillara, M.D., at Room 209 Medical Arts Building, Adventist Medical Center-Bacolod, C.V. Ramos Ave., Brgy. Taculing, 6100 Bacolod City, Negros Occidental; and the petitioner's reply to the comment, are ALL NOTED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-36.
2.Id. at 39-41; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga.
3.Id. at 140-142; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Louis P. Acosta.
4.Id. at 113-124; penned by CA Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and concurred in by Associate Justices Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig and Louis P. Acosta.
5.Id. at 42-46; penned by Presiding Judge Kathrine A. Go.
6.Id. at 17.
7.Id. at 17 and 78-79.
8.Id. at 85.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 78 and 85.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 115.
13.Id. at 97-98.
14.Id. at 115.
15.Id. at 18.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 18.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 116.
20.Id. at 19.
21.Id. at 117.
22.Id. at 121.
23.Id. at 117.
24.Id.
25.Id.
26.Id.
27.Id. at 116.
28.Id. at 42-46; penned by Presiding Judge Kathrine A. Go.
29.Id. at 44.
30.Id. at 44-45.
31.Id. at 45-46.
32.Id. at 44.
33.Id.
34.Id. at 44-45.
35.Id. at 45.
36.Id.
37.Id.
38.Id. at 47.
39.Id. at 47-50.
40.Id. at 47.
41.Id. at 48.
42.Id. at 49.
43.Id. at 113-124.
44.Id. at 120.
45.Id. at 123.
46.Id. at 125-126.
47.Id. at 127-131.
48.Id. at 140-142.
49.Id. at 142.
50.Id. at 143-145.
51.Id. at 39-41.
52.Idul v. Alster Int'l. Shipping Services, Inc., G.R. No. 209907, 23 June 2021 [Per J. Hernando].
53.Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 98 (2000).
54.Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, 575 Phil. 384, 399 (2008).
55.Rollo, p. 142.
56.Id.
57.Gonzales v. Serrano, 755 Phil. 513 (2015).
58.Id.
59.Rollo, p. 25.
60.Id.
61.Calanasan v. Spouses Dolorito, 722 Phil. 1, 7 (2013).
62. FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 91 in relation to Art. 96.
63. An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relative to Lands of the Public Domain. Approved 07 November 1936.
64. See Commonwealth Act No. 141, Sec. 11.
65.Rollo, p. 31.
66. See Commonwealth Act No. 141, Secs. 11 to 14.
67.Alvarico v. Sola, 432 Phil. 792, 799 (2002).
68.Rollo, p. 34.
69. Under Section 14 of the Public Land Act, before a certificate of title or homestead patent is issued, the applicant must prove that he has resided continuously for at least one year in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the same, and he has cultivated at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the application for homestead.
70.Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, 783 Phil. 536, 548-549 (2016).
71.Id. at 548.
72. Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, Sec. 48 (b); See also Presidential Decree No. 1529, Sec. 14 (2).
73. See Republic v. Spouses Go, 815 Phil. 306 (2017); Republic v. Carrasco, 539 Phil. 205 (2006).
74.Heirs of Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081, 19 June 2019; Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, 605 Phil. 244, 274 (2009).
75. See Heirs of Tappa v. Heirs of Bacud, supra; Heirs of Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, supra.
76.Rollo, pp. 78-85.
77.Id. at 81 and 120.
78.Id. at 61.
79.Taar v. Lawan, 820 Phil. 26, 57 (2017).
80.Rollo, p. 97; See Act No. 4003; Presidential Decree No. 43, s. 1972; Presidential Decree No. 704, s. 1974; Republic Act No. 8550.
81.Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, supra.
82.Id.
83. See Rollo, p. 134.
84.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013).
85.Consolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 833 Phil. 888, 899 (2018).
86.Rollo, p. 152.