FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220087. November 9, 2015.]
HACIENDA SAN ISIDRO/SILOS FARMS AND REY SILOS LLAMADO, petitioners, vs. LUCITO VILLARUEL AND HELEN VILLARUEL, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 9, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220087 (Hacienda San Isidro/Silos Farms and Rey Silos Llamado, petitioners, v. Lucito Villaruel and Helen Villaruel, respondents.)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Amended Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City in CA GR SP. No. 07025 dated 9 January 2015 and 20 July 2015, respectively.
By way of a background, petitioners are engaged in the farming business, more specifically in the planting of sugar canes while private respondents, Lucito and Helen Villaruel, are husband and wife who worked with petitioners. Thereafter, private respondents filed their separate complaints against petitioners for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and payment of service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees. Eventually, said complaints were consolidated before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
On 14 February 2011, the LA rendered a ruling which considered the dismissal of Lucito as legal but without due process; while Helen was declared a regular employee of petitioners and likewise ruled to have been illegally dismissed from her employment.
Thereafter, upon appeal by petitioners, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed in its 30 September 2011 Decision the aforesaid LA's ruling and rendered a judgment finding the dismissal of Lucito as legal having been afforded with due process; and Helen as not petitioners' regular employee and therefore not entitled to any money claims. However, in granting respondents' motion for reconsideration thereof, the NLRC changed its position and reinstated with modification the LA's previous ruling against petitioners in the 27 January 2012 Resolution. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said resolution was further denied in the 30 March 2012 Resolution.
Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated said judgment by the NLRC before the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was granted in its 27 March 2013 Decision. The appellate court explained that the propriety of the dismissal of Lucito cannot be reviewed anymore since it was not raised on appeal before the NLRC, and that Helen, although it was established that she worked with petitioners, has failed to prove the existence of all the elements to establish the employer-employee relationship between her and the petitioners to consider her a regular employee. In other words, it ruled that: (a) Lucito's dismissal was with just cause as it has attained finality for failure to raise the same on appeal; and (b) Helen was not a regular employee of petitioners.
Subsequently, in its 9 January 2015 Amended Decision, the appellate court changed its mind by declaring that Helen was indeed a regular employee as contemplated under Article 280 of the Labor Code, and was illegally dismissed. It expounded by stating that "[a] review of the records of the case, the evidence of the private respondents[,] and the admission of the petitioners reveals that Helen Villaruel has been working for a long period of time with the petitioners performing jobs consisting of sugarcane cultivation, counting patdan (canepoints) and other works related to sugar farming. . . . The issue, therefore, revolves on the determination of Helen Villaruel's employment status prior to her dismissal since the petitioners never denied that Helen Villaruel has worked in their farm. More importantly they never categorically denied that Helen Villaruel is not an employee but only argued that she is not a 'regular employee' which concerns her employment status." Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid amended decision was denied in the CA's Resolution dated 20 July 2015. ICHDca
Hence, this appeal raising the primordial issue of whether or not the CA erred in declaring that Helen was a regular employee of petitioners and was illegally dismissed, and hence entitled to her money claims and awards in accordance with our labor laws.
We find the instant petition impressed without merit.
In Gapayao v. Fulo, 3 the High Court expressed that "[f]arm workers generally fall under the definition of seasonal employees. We have consistently held that seasonal employees may be considered as regular employees. Regular seasonal employees are those called to work from time to time. The nature of their relationship with the employer is such that during the off season, they are temporarily laid off; but reemployed during the summer season or when their services may be needed. They are in regular employment because of the nature of their job, and not because of the length of time they have worked." Moreover, in another case, 4 it was further expounded that in order to exclude the asserted "seasonal" employee from those classified as regular employees, the employer must show that: (1) the employee must be performing work or services that are seasonal in nature; and (2) he had been employed for the duration of the season. Hence, when the "seasonal" workers are continuously and repeatedly hired to perform the same tasks or activities for several seasons or even after the cessation of the season, this length of time may likewise serve as badge of regular employment. In fact, even though denominated as "seasonal workers," if these workers are called to work from time to time and are only temporarily laid off during the off-season, the law does not consider them separated from the service during the off-season period. The law simply considers these seasonal workers on leave until re-employed.
Applying the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements in the present case, a reading of the records reveals that Helen was indeed a farm worker who was in the regular employ of petitioners. For a number of years, she had been working on petitioners' land by sugarcane cultivation, counting patdan (canepoints), and other works related to sugar farming. Her employment was continuous in the sense that it was done for more than one harvesting season. Moreover, no amount of reasoning could detract from the fact that these tasks were necessary or desirable in the usual business of petitioners.
In view of the fact that, based on the evidence presented, it was ruled that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between petitioners and Helen in accordance with Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and that the latter was illegally dismissed, we cannot rule otherwise in the absence of any compelling evidence. 5 Thus, the CA was correct in amending its earlier ruling insofar as private respondent Helen is concerned.
The rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. Note that only substantial evidence is required to establish a fact in cases before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies. Substantial evidence, as amply explained in numerous cases, is that amount of "relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 6 In the case at bench, private respondent Helen has established the existence of the employer-employee relationship and the illegal dismissal based on relevant evidence appreciated and considered by the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." SERENO, J., on official business; CARPIO, J., acting member per S.O. No. 2261 dated October 28, 2015.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 34-52; Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo I. Delos Santos with Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Marie Christine Azcarraga Jacob concurring.
2. Id. at 55-57.
3. G.R. No. 193493, 13 June 2013, 698 SCRA 485, 499 citing AAG Trucking and/or Alex Ang Gaeid v. Yuag, G.R. No. 195033, 12 October 2011, 659 SCRA 91, 102, and Azucena, Everyone's Labor Code, 325 (2012).
4. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Acibo, G.R. No. 186439, 15 January 2014, 713 SCRA 596, 609-610.
5. See 3rd Alert Security and Detective Services, Inc. v. Navia, G.R. No. 200653, 672 SCRA 649, 652.
6. Reno Foods v. NLRC, 319 Phil. 500, 506-507 (1995).