FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160517. September 21, 2015.]
MAGDALENA B. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EFIGENIA PANTALEON, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 21, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 160517 — MAGDALENA B. GUTIERREZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and EFIGENIA PANTALEON, Respondents.
The petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolution dated July 29, 2003 (dismissing her petition for certiorari and mandamus for her non-compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court), 1 and the resolution dated September 25, 2003 (denying her motion for reconsideration), 2 both promulgated on said dates by the Court of Appeals (CA), insisting that the CA should have relaxed the rules of procedure.
This appeal originated from the filing by respondent Efigenia Pantaleon of a criminal complaint for perjury against the petitioner 3 based on the latter's affidavit attesting to the loss of her duplicate owner's copies of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. T-125408 (M) and TCT No. T-125409 (M) to theft. 4 Pantaleon averred that said TCTs had actually been delivered by the petitioner to her as security for her loan from the latter amounting to P245,000.00; 5 that the petitioner had defaulted in paying the loan on its maturity; 6 that the petitioner's affidavit of loss had stated that the petitioner was executing the same in order to secure new owner's copies of the TCTs; 7 and that the petitioner was able to register the affidavit of loss in the Office of the Register of Deeds, leading to the annotation of the declaration of loss of the TCTs on the file copies of the TCTs. 8
On March 9, 2001, the Office of the Public Prosecutor found probable cause for perjury against the petitioner. 9 After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, 10 she appealed to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which ultimately denied her petition for review. 11 She then appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which also denied her appeal, stating:
This refers to the appeal of Magdalena B. Gutierrez, thru counsel, dated November 29, 2002, from the resolution promulgated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on May 27, 2002, dismissing her petition for review of the resolution of the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor of Region III, San Fernando Pampanga, finding probable cause against Gutierrez for perjury as defined under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code and punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.
We dismiss this appealmotu proprio pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 58 promulgated by this Office on June 30, 1993, pertinent portion of which, provides:
'No appeal from the petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death . . .' 12
Not satisfied, the petitioner instituted her special civil actions for mandamus and certiorari in the CA to compel the OP to give due course to her appeal. 13 However, the CA promulgated the assailed resolutions adverted to earlier.
In this appeal, the petitioner prays for the relaxation of the rules of procedure, and for the dismissal of the charge of perjury for lack of probable cause. She further contends that Memorandum Circular No. 58 of the OP violated the constitutional provision on the President's control over the acts of the Secretary of Justice. 14
The petition for review lacks merit.
The CA correctly dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and mandamus because of her non-compliance with the formal requirements prescribed by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Such requirements were not mere procedural lapses to be excused. In Nayve v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court observed:
We find the focal issue to be: Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in dismissing outright CA-G.R. SP No. 58205 for petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of Section 1, Rule 65? acEHCD
Petitioner asks for a liberal construction and application of the Rules of Court and submits that the foregoing infirmities cited by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition are mere procedural lapses arising from urgency of filing and rush in the preparation of petition and should not impair her right to appeal as provided by law and the rules. Petitioner also claims that by dismissing the petition on mere technicalities, the Court of Appeals missed the opportunity to pass upon the merits of the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal and the subsequent order implementing the Final Notice to Vacate.
Petitioners submissions are far from convincing. In exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, we have disregarded procedural defects in order to correct a patent injustice. To our mind, however, petitioner has not shown any compelling and exceptional reason in this case for us to relax the requirements set forth under Rule 65. A writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Failing that, the petition will not prosper." (Emphasis supplied)
As to the exceptional cases and compelling reasons that would merit the relaxation of the requirements of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Court has said that the non-compliance must not in any way be attributable to the non-complying party. 16 Here, however, that condition is not met considering that the petitioner's counsel admitted that "the non-inclusion as Annex of said Order was due to [his] inadvertence and mix up." 17 The excuse was too insubstantial to merit the liberalization of the rules. Indeed, no procedural error would have been committed had the petitioner and her counsel been careful and circumspect in handling their case.
The petitioner's other contention does not hold water. In Angeles v. Gaite, 18 the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 58 was upheld, viz.:
Petitioner's arguments have no leg to stand on. They are mere suppositions without any basis in law. Petitioner argues in the main that Memorandum Circular No. 58 is an invalid regulation, because it diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power. This argument is absurd. The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . the President has not fully abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice. To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said matter.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners contention that Memorandum Circular No. 58 violates both the Constitution and Section 1, Chapter 1, Book III of EO No. 292, for depriving the President of his power of control over the executive departments deserves scant consideration. In the first place, Memorandum Circular No. 58 was promulgated by the Office of the President and it is settled that the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Memorandum Circular No. 58 has not been reprobated by the President; therefore, it goes without saying that the said Memorandum Circular has the approval of the President."
Lastly, the Court cannot command the Public Prosecutor to reverse the finding of probable cause for perjury against the petitioner. The determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing the information was an executive function that pertained exclusively to the Public Prosecutor to whom has been vested the wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. 19 Consequently, sound judicial policy dictates that courts should refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary investigations unless the Public Prosecutor, in determining probable cause, has committed grave abuse of discretion. 20 But the petitioner has not even imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Public Prosecutor. All she has done here was to contend that some of the elements of perjury were not present. It is settled, however, that the absence or presence of the elements of a crime is an evidentiary matter to be best passed upon in a full-blown trial. 21 SDHTEC
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." PERLAS-BERNABE, J., on official leave; JARDELEZA, J., acting member per S.O. No. 2188 dated September 16, 2015.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, p. 25, penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (retired), and concurred in by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (later a Member of the Court/retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (now a Member of the Court).
2. Id. at 27.
3. Id. at 10.
4. Id. at 11.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 13-14.
10. Id. at 14.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 54.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id. at 18-21.
15. G.R. No. 144117, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 355, 362.
16. See Batelec II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Energy Industry Administration Bureau (EIAB), G.R. No. 135925, December 22, 2004, 447 SCRA 482, 495; quoting paragraph 5 of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96.
17. Rollo, p. 52.
18. G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 408, 415-421.
19. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Reynado, G.R. No. 164538, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 88, 101.
20. Callo-Claridad v. Esteban, G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 185, 199.
21. Clay & Feather International, Inc. v. Lichaytoo, G.R. No. 193105, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 516, 526.