Greenfields Memorial Corp. v. Toledanes
This is a civil case regarding a petition for review on certiorari filed by Greenfields Memorial Corporation against Danilo Toledanes. The case originated from a construction contract dispute and was first heard by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), which ruled in favor of Toledanes. Greenfields filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the CIAC committed grave abuse of discretion. However, the CA dismissed the petition for being a wrong remedy and ruled that Greenfields should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Greenfields then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising the issues that the CA dismissed the petition on technicalities and that the CA failed to resolve the petition on its merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the petition lacks merit, as the remedy of certiorari does not lie against the Final Award of the CIAC. The Supreme Court also emphasized that procedural rules are not to be disregarded and that the CA cannot be faulted in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy.
ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225483. February 18, 2019.]
GREENFIELDS MEMORIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.DANILO M. TOLEDANES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 18, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 225483 (GREENFIELDS MEMORIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. DANILO M. TOLEDANES, Respondent.) — Subject of this petition for review on certiorari 1 the June 17, 2016 is the decision 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 137539 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner for being a wrong remedy.
Antecedents
The CA summarized the facts as follows:
Greenfields Memorial Corporation (petitioner) is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine laws.
Danilo Toledanes (private respondent) is a licensed general contractor and the owner of a construction company operating under the name of DJCM Construction.
On March 14, 2012, petitioner and private respondent entered into a Construction Contract for the implementation of Phase 1 site development of petitioner's proposed memorial park located at Barrio Parut (6), Vintar, Ilocos Norte.
The parties agreed to a progress-billing-method in the payment of the construction works. Private respondent presented to petitioner a total of 14 progress billings for regular work and two billings for additional work. Up until the twelfth billing, petitioner faithfully paid the progress billings.
However, pending the completion of the project the business relationship of the parties went sour. Mrs. Wilhelmina C. Acacio (Acacio), the Corporate Secretary and Treasurer of petitioner suspected that private respondent has been over-billing them as to the work accomplishments. Hence, [petitioner] required private respondent to submit a detailed report of the work already accomplished as reflected in the billing statements submitted. Unfortunately, private respondent did not submit the necessary documents and abandoned the project instead.
On October 14, 2013, petitioner filed a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against private respondent before the CIAC docketed as CIAC Case No. 36-2013. CAIHTE
For his defense, private respondent asserts that he did not abandon the project but rather it was petitioner's employees who forcibly ejected his employees from the project site and prevented them from entering the premises. He further averred that petitioner detained his equipments and materials.
For a proper resolution of the complaint before the CIAC, the parties agreed for a joint ocular inspection of the project site to determine the extent of the work done by private respondent. The inspection was conducted from March 13 to 15, 2014 with the attendance of the CIAC Arbitrators as well as the representatives of both parties.
Thereafter, a hearing was conducted wherein both parties presented their respective geodetic engineers who conducted the ocular inspection and their findings. However, the findings of the engineers vary and CIAC was left to determine which version is more accurate with the work accomplished. 3
Ruling of the CIAC
On June 27, 2014, the CIAC rendered a Final Award, 4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, we, Eduardo R. Ceniza, Beatriz C. Lampas and Julius D. Borja, hereby decide and award in full and final disposition of this arbitration, as follows:
(a) It is declared that Annex "1" of the Answer with Counterclaim is the true and genuine BILL OF PARTICULARS that was attached to the Construction Contract and which correctly describes the items of work and the price or cost of each item of work;
(b) It is declared that it was Claimant who terminated, without valid cause, the Construction Contract;
(c) Respondent is hereby ordered to pay Claimant the amount of Php21,657.08, with legal interest thereon at the rate of six per cent (6%) per annum commencing from date of this Final Award until the principal amount is fully paid;
(d) The claim for attorney's fees of both parties is denied, each party to bear its own attorney's fees;
(e) The cost of arbitration shall be borne by both parties, share-and-share alike;
(f) All other claims and relief not specifically disposed of here are denied for lack of merit.
xxx xxx xxx
SO ORDERED. 5
Aggrieved by the CIAC ruling, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CIAC. The petitioner also maintained that no plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists against the Final Award because of E.O. No. 1008 (Creating An Arbitration Machinery in the Construction Industry in the Philippines) which made awards and decisions of the CIAC final and unappealable.
Ruling of the CA
On June 17, 2016, 6 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari for being a wrong remedy, and ruled that the petitioner should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, and that the petition was filed beyond the prescribed period. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, for being the improper legal remedy, this petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.7
Issues
The petitioner filed the present appeal based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 137539 ON PURE TECHNICALITIES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT RESOLVE THE PETITION ON CERTIORARI ON ITS MERITS AND COMPLETELY IGNORED SUBSTANTIAL PROOF THAT RESPONDENT WAS UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AT PETITIONER'S EXPENSE. 8 DETACa
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Herein petitioner maintains that the remedy of certiorari lies against the Final Award of the CIAC because of Sec. 19 of E.O. No. 1008 which reads:
Sec. 19. Finality of Awards. — The arbitral award shall be binding upon the parties. It shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The petitioner is mistaken.
The issue on remedy against awards and decisions of the CIAC is not novel. The CA had properly relied on our ruling in Metro Construction, Inc. vs. Chatham Properties, Inc.9 that judgment, awards or final orders of quasi-judicial tribunals, including the CIAC, are appealable under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. We explained in our ruling in Metro Construction in this wise:
Any remaining doubt on the procedural mutation of the provisions on appeal in E.O. No. 1008, vis-à-vis Circular No. 1-91 and R.A. No. 7902, was completely removed with the issuance by the Supreme Court of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Both categorically include the CIAC in the enumeration of quasi-judicial agencies comprehended therein. Section 3 of the former and Section 3, Rule 43 of the latter, explicitly expand the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-judicial agencies or instrumentalities to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner therein provided. Indisputably, the review of the CIAC award may involve either questions of fact, of law, or of fact and law.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no controversy on the principle that the right to appeal is statutory. However, the mode or manner by which this right may be exercised is a question of procedure which may be altered and modified provided that vested rights are not impaired. The Supreme Court is bestowed by the Constitution with the power and prerogative, inter alia, to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, as well as to review rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, which, however, shall remain in force until disapproved by the Supreme Court. This power is constitutionally enshrined to enhance the independence of the Supreme Court.
The right to appeal from judgments, awards, or final orders of the CIAC is granted in E.O. No. 1008. The procedure for the exercise or application of this right was initially outlined in E.O. No. 1008. While R.A. No. 7902 and circulars subsequently issued by the Supreme Court and its amendments to the 1997 Rules on Procedure effectively modified the manner by which the right to appeal ought to be exercised, nothing in these changes impaired vested rights. The new rules do not take away the right to appeal allowed in E.O. No. 1008. They only prescribe a new procedure to enforce the right. No litigant has a vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing vested rights; hence, he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to remedy." 10
Furthermore, we fail to find merit in the petitioner's claim of uncertainty as to the proper remedy considering that Rule 18, Section 18.2 of the CIAC Revised Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration provides that "[a] petition for review from a final award may be taken by any of the parties within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court."
Also noteworthy is the finding by the CA that the petition for certiorari was filed on October 13, 2014, while petitioner received a copy of the CIAC Final Award on July 4, 2014. As such, the CA cannot treat the certiorari petition as a petition for review under Rule 45, not only for being filed out of time, but also because the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. 11 ATICcS
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being an inappropriate remedy. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation; they help provide a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious observance by the parties of the procedural rules. 12
Under its second assignment of error, the petitioner wanted us to recalibrate the evidence presented before the CIAC, insisting that the CA had completely ignored substantial proof that the respondent was unjustly enriched at the petitioner's expense. The petitioner also insisted on the respondent's alleged abandonment, overcharges and refund.
Unfortunately, these issues are purely factual and may not be taken up in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, save in exceptional circumstances 13 which in IBEX International, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance System, 14 we had the occasion to explain that:
It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development Corporation, we said:
In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.
Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of administrative due process. 15 (citations omitted)
None of the aforementioned circumstances exist herein which would justify exemption of this case from the general rule. Such being the case, the Court, not being a trier of facts, has no obligation to examine, winnow and weigh anew the evidence presented before the arbitration body. 16
Lastly, we cannot give any credit to the petitioner's assertion that the respondent would be unjustly enriched should the questioned issuances of the tribunals below not be reversed. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Avia Filipinas International, Inc., we discussed that:
x x x Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that "[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
Article 22 of the same Code also states that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." In accordance with jurisprudence, there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment essentially contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the person who receives the payment has no right to receive it. 17
As found by the CIAC, the respondent's description of the items of work and the unit price of each item in his billing statements exactly match with the description of the items of work and the unit price of each item shown in the Bill of Quantities. Also, the CIAC had found that respondent's position with regard to the issue on abandonment as more credible and supported by clear evidence. In sum, the petitioner failed to convince this Court that there is a need to review these factual findings.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of merit; AFFIRMS the June 17, 2016 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 137539; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay costs of suit. TIADCc
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2.Rollo, pp. 33-41, penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla, concurred in by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting.
3.Id. at 35-36.
4.Id. at 61-123.
5.Id. at 121-122.
6.Supra note 1.
7.Rollo, p. 41.
8.Id. at 8.
9. G.R. No. 141897, September 24, 2001, 365 SCRA 697.
10.Id. at 724-725.
11.Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127275, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 442, 448.
12.Zapanta v. Co King Ki, G.R. No. 191694 (Resolution), December 3, 2014, 743 SCRA 657, 666.
13.SeeDepartment of Public Works and Highways v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., G.R. No. 191591, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 138, 151.
14. G.R. No. 162095, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 306.
15.Id. at 314-315.
16.SeeDiesel Construction Co., Inc. v. UPSI Property Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 154885, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 12, 30.
17. G.R. No. 180168, February 27, 2012, 667 SCRA 34, 43.
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