FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-21-004. May 5, 2021.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4461-RTJ]
MARIA BRIGOLI GOOD, petitioner,vs. HON. ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BOGO CITY, CEBU, and HON. HERNANI A. ESPINA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, BORBON, CEBU, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated May 5, 2021 which reads as follows:
"A.M. No. MTJ-21-004 [formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4461-RTJ] — (MARIA BRIGOLI GOOD, petitioner, v. HON. ANTONIO D. MARIGOMEN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Bogo City, Cebu, and HON. HERNANI A. ESPINA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Borbon, Cebu, respondents). — This resolves the Affidavit-Complaint 1 dated September 4, 2015 filed by Maria Brigoli Good (Good) charging Judge Hernani A. Espina (Judge Espina) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Borbon-Tabogon, Borbon, Cebu, and Judge Antonio D. Marigomen (Judge Marigomen) of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bogo City, Cebu, with grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, grave abuse of authority, and gross inefficiency.
Antecedents
On November 26, 2012, Good filed a complaint 2 for unlawful detainer against Barangay Camposong, Borbon, Cebu (defendant), involving Lot No. 518, situated in the said barangay. 3 The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Espina and was docketed as Civil Case No. 332. Summons 4 was sent to the defendant on even date.
Good alleged that during the proceedings, Judge Espina failed to strictly apply the Rules on Summary Procedure. 5 Purportedly, he admitted the defendant's Answer which was filed on December 10, 2012, one day beyond the 10-day reglementary period. He likewise set the case for preliminary conference on January 23, 2013, beyond the 30-day period mandated by the Rules. 6
During the scheduled preliminary conference on January 23, 2013, the defendant failed to appear. Hence, Good moved that the defendant be declared in default. However, Judge Espina refused to resolve the motion, and instead, declared a recess. On top of this, Judge Espina ignored the manifestation of Good's counsel that he was not furnished with the defendant's Pre-Trial Brief. Judge Espina simply brushed the contention aside and declared that the trial court had been furnished with copies of the parties' respective Pre-Trial Briefs. Then, he set the case for mediation in violation of the Rules. 7
Thereafter, Judge Espina issued an Order dated April 3, 2013, directing the parties to submit their respective position papers within fifteen days. The defendant filed two Motions for Extension of Time to file its position paper. Judge Espina granted them, and admitted the defendant's position paper. 8
Subsequently, on October 17, 2013, Judge Espina dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on the ground of "lack of evidence and/or merit." 9
Dissatisfied with the ruling, Good filed a Notice of Appeal 10 on November 27, 2013, which was given due course in the Order dated December 10, 2013. 11
On appeal, Judge Marigomen affirmed in toto Judge Espina's Decision. He ruled that, save for certain instances, the findings of fact of the trial court are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the appellate court. Moreover, Judge Marigomen declared that Judge Espina's alleged violations of the Rules on Summary Procedure must be brought before the Court for appropriate action. 12
Unperturbed, Good filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 13 which was denied in the Order dated June 22, 2015. 14
Aggrieved by the acts of Judge Espina and Judge Marigomen, Good filed the instant administrative complaint 15 against them.
On June 27, 2016, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) issued a Report 16 recommending the dismissal of the Complaint against Judge Marigomen considering that the act for which he was charged pertains to the exercise of his judicial functions, and thus, not ripe for administrative inquiry.
However, the OCA found a prima facie case for gross ignorance of the law against Judge Espina based on the allegations that he violated the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Thus, the OCA recommended that Judge Espina be ordered to file his Comment on Good's Complaint-Affidavit.
On August 22, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution 17 adopting the OCA's recommendation, thereby dismissing the administrative complaint against Judge Marigomen, and directing Judge Espina to comment on the Complaint-Affidavit.
On December 15, 2016, Good sought partial reconsideration 18 of the Court's ruling. CAIHTE
Meanwhile, Judge Espina filed his Comment 19 dated January 20, 2017, vehemently denying the accusations hurled against him.
First, he clarified that the defendant's Answer was filed on time. He explained that Summons was served on the Barangay Captain of Camposong on November 29, 2012. Thus, the defendant had 10 days from said date, or until December 9, 2012 to file its Answer. However, December 9 was a Sunday. Thus, defendant appropriately filed its Answer on December 10, which was the next working day. 20
Second, Judge Espina explained that he set the case for preliminary conference on January 23, 2013, after taking into consideration the recently concluded long holiday season and the town fiesta of Borbon, Cebu. He related that he wanted to allow ample time for the parties to receive the Order dated December 11, 2012, considering the holiday season and the lack of a process server to personally serve said Order. 21
Third, Judge Espina contended that the defendant seasonably filed its Pre-Trial Brief before the scheduled preliminary conference. The records showed that Good's counsel was furnished a copy of the defendant's pre-trial brief via registered mail on January 16, 2013. In fact, Good's counsel never raised said issue when the case was called for preliminary conference. 22
Fourth, Judge Espina denied Good's accusation that he failed to issue an order to declare the defendant in default due to its failure to appear during the preliminary conference. He averred that Good's counsel did not actually file a motion to declare the defendant in default but merely manifested an intention to do so. Likewise, he exercised judicial discretion and called the case for the second time at 9:30 a.m. to give the defendant and its counsel ample time to attend the hearing, which they did. 23
Fifth, Judge Espina retorted that he correctly referred the case for court-annexed mediation to the Philippine Mediation Center, Cebu City unit. He pointed out that A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA dated January 11, 2011, unequivocally states that all civil cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure are mandatorily referred for court-annexed mediation. Good's counsel did not object to the referral of the case, thereby showing that their camp was amenable to his directive. 24
Sixth, Judge Espina admitted that he issued an Order dated July 23, 2013, giving the defendant's counsel an additional period of 15 days or until August 2, 2013, within which to file its position paper. He claimed that he did not act on the second motion for extension of time, but conceded that he still admitted the defendant's position paper in the interest of justice. 25
Finally, Judge Espina urged that the issues raised in the present administrative complaint are the same errors elevated on appeal before the RTC and the CA. In fact, the RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 26
On July 3, 2017, the Court issued a Resolution 27 noting Judge Espina's comment and denying with finality Good's Plea for Partial Reconsideration regarding the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Marigomen.
Undeterred, Good filed a string of pleadings ranging from Most Sincere Appeal for Second Motion for Reconsideration dated September 20, 2017; 28 Motion for Action on the Merits dated December 6, 2017; 29 and A Humble Plea for Accommodation dated May 16, 2018, 30 repeatedly asking the Court to explain why it dismissed the administrative case against Judge Marigomen.
OCA Report and Recommendation
In a Report 31 dated July 10, 2020, the OCA recommended that Judge Espina be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and procedure in view of his violation of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The OCA stated that Judge Espina ignored the law when he set the case for preliminary conference beyond the thirty-day period prescribed by the Rules. Likewise, he overstepped his authority when he allowed the defendant to file two motions for extension of time to submit its position paper, despite the clear prohibition in Rule 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The OCA opined that Judge Espina's invocation of good faith cannot prevail over the mandatory character of the Rules. Accordingly, the OCA recommended that Judge Espina be meted a penalty of P10,000.00 with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. 32 Anent the administrative case against Judge Marigomen, the OCA recommended that it be considered closed and terminated. 33
Ruling of the Court
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
It must be noted at the outset that the administrative complaint against Judge Marigomen became final and executory when the Court denied with finality Good's partial motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated July 3, 2017. Hence, the order of dismissal may no longer be altered, amended or modified.
However, Judge Espina must be held administratively liable.
Violation of the Rules on
Significantly, the Rules on Summary Procedure was promulgated to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases. 34 In line with said objective, Section 7 of the Rules mandates that the case must be set for pre-trial within 30 days after the last answer is filed:
Sec. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. — Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof. This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.
Notably, in Dr. Hipe v. Judge Literato, 35 the Court imposed administrative sanctions against a judge who failed to set the case for pre-trial conference within the mandated time frame. According to the Court, the judge's utter lack of familiarity with the Rules erodes the public's confidence in the judiciary. Hence, it is imperative for judges to always be conversant with the law and fundamental legal principles. They must have the basic legal procedures at the palm of their hands. 36
Additionally, to ensure that a summary action proceeds speedily and efficiently, the Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits the filing of motions and pleadings that cause undue delay in the resolution of the case:
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
xxx xxx xxx
Interestingly, in Alconcera v. Judge Majaducon,37the judge was declared remiss in his duty for granting a motion for extension of time notwithstanding the clear prohibition in Section 19 (e) of the Rules:
In addition, by granting Labao's "Motion for Time to File Answer," respondent, in effect, violated Section 19(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting motions for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper. By granting it, he defeated the summary nature of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
As a member of the judiciary, respondent is supposed to know his law. The Code of Judicial Conduct provides that "A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." Respondent was sorely remiss in that obligation in at least one instance. His ignorance of procedure, manifest from the records, properly fell under Section 8 of the Rule on Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts, specifically gross ignorance of the law or procedure.38(Citations omitted)
In the same vein, in Spouses Reaport v. Judge Mariano, 39 the judge was found guilty of violating the Rules on Summary Procedure, particularly Section 7, for failing to schedule the pre-trial conference within 30 days after the filing of the defendant's answer; and Section 19, for granting a motion for postponement. 40 The Court sternly declared that a magistrate who abets needless, groundless, and unmeritorious motions for postponement, especially in ejectment cases, is administratively accountable. 41 DETACa
Despite the clear prohibition under the Rules, Judge Espina claims that he was motivated by good faith when he set the case for pre-trial conference beyond the mandated period. He explains that he wanted to give the parties ample time to receive the court's orders, taking into account the long holiday season, town fiesta, and lack of a process server. Moreover, he proffers that he granted the defendant's motion for extension to file its Position Paper out of his desire to resolve the case on the merits, rather than on technicality.
The Court is not persuaded.
Regardless of how noble Judge Espina's intentions may have been, he may not brazenly disregard the procedural rules. It bears stressing that the adoption of the Rules on Summary Procedure is part of the judiciary's commitment to enforce the litigants' constitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. Thus, any member of the judiciary who causes delays sought to be prevented by the Rules must be held administratively accountable. 42
However, the Court notes that Judge Espina satisfactorily explained the other allegations in Good's Complaint. Specifically, he clarified that the defendant's Answer was filed on time. The last day for filing the Answer fell on December 9, which is a Sunday. Under Section 1, Rule 22 of the Revised Rules of Court, "[i]f the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. 43 Hence, the filing of the Answer on December 10 (the next working day) was thereby warranted.
Likewise, there is nothing improper with Judge Espina's decision to declare a recess, and call the case for a second time to give the defendant and its counsel ample time to attend the preliminary conference. He explained that the case was called for the first time at 9:00 a.m. However, the defendant and its counsel were not yet present. Hence, he decided to call the case again at 9:30 a.m. to allow the defendant to join the proceedings. Certainly, there is nothing questionable about such act. Besides, it must also be noted that the preliminary conference proceeded without any objection from Good or her counsel.
Lastly, Judge Espina's act of referring the case for mediation is warranted under A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA dated January 11, 2011, which states that all civil cases covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure are mandatorily referred for court-annexed mediation.
Gross Ignorance of the Law
Significantly, one who accepts the exalted position of a magistrate owes the public and the court the ability to be proficient in the law and to maintain professional competence at all times. 44 Lest it be forgotten, competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office. 45 Accordingly, the Court has strictly ruled that the judge's failure to apply elementary rules of procedure constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Notably, good faith or lack of malice will not serve as grounds for exoneration when the rules violated are so basic. 46 Unfortunately, in this case, Judge Espina failed to demonstrate the required competence in handling an ejectment case.
In imposing the appropriate penalty, the Court takes into consideration that this is the first time Judge Espina is being administratively sanctioned in his relatively long years of service in the judiciary. Likewise, his acts were not tainted with bad faith. Accordingly, the Court approves the OCA's recommendation to impose a fine of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, Judge Hernani A. Espina is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and procedure for which he is FINED P10,000.00. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall warrant an even more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Judge Espina in the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
The instant administrative complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Hernani A. Espina is RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 1-9.
2.Id. at 10-14.
3.Id. at 1.
4.Id. at 283.
5.Id. at 2.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 3-4.
8.Id. at 4-5.
9.Id. at 140-146.
10.Id. at 147.
11.Id. at 243.
12.Id. at 213-224.
13.Id. at 225-227.
14.Id. at 229.
15.Id. at 1-9.
16.Id. at 242-246.
17.Id. at 246-247.
18.Id. at 254-257.
19.Id. at 261-281.
20.Id. at 269-270.
21.Id. at 270-271.
22.Id. at 272-273.
23.Id. at 273-274.
24.Id. at 275-276.
25.Id. at 276-278.
26.Id. at 278.
27.Id. at 351-352.
28.Id. at 459-460.
29.Id. at 475-477.
30.Id. at 482-483.
31.Id. at 503-513.
32.Id. at 513.
33.Id.
34.Carriaga v. Judge Anasario, 444 Phil. 685, 689-690 (2003), citing Bongato v. Sps. Malvar, 436 Phil. 109, 123-124 (2002).
35. 686 Phil. 723 (2012).
36.Id. at 733.
37. 496 Phil. 833 (2005).
38.Id. at 841-842.
39. 413 Phil. 299 (2001).
40.Id. at 301-302.
41.Id.
42.Tugot v. Judge Coliflores, 467 Phil. 391, 401-402 (2004), citing Atty. Velez v. Judge Flores, 445 Phil. 54, 63 (2003).
43. RULE 22. COMPUTATION OF TIME. Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
44.Mariano v. Judge Nacional, 598 Phil. 6, 13 (2009).
45.Id.
46.Id. at 12-13; Diaz v. Judge Gestopa, Jr., 667 Phil. 566, 573 (2011).