SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 172602. September 3, 2007.]
HENRY T. GO, petitioner, vs. THE FIFTH DIVISION, SANDIGANBAYAN and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner of the Decision dated April 13, 2007.
Petitioner, a private individual, stands charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, the clear terms of which punishes public officers who, on behalf of the government, enter into contracts or transactions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. ISTECA
The first element of the crime is that the accused must be a public officer who enters into a contract on behalf of the government. The philosophy behind this is that the public officer is duty bound to see to it that the interest of the government is duly protected. Thus, should the contract or transaction entered into by such public officer is manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government's interests, the public officer is held liable for violation of Section 3 (g), whether or not this public officer profited or will profit thereby.
In Luciano v. Estrella, 1 Justice J.B.L. Reyes opines that the act treated in Section 3 (g) partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial. 2 Section 3 (g), however, applies restrictively only to public officers entering into a contract on behalf of the government manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the government. HIDCTA
The pronouncement in Luciano v. Estrella 3 is instructive:
Second, herein respondent municipal officials were charged with violation of Republic Act 3019 under its Section 3(g), or specifically, for having entered, on behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. It is not at all difficult to see that to determine the culpability of the accused under such provision, it need only be established that the accused is a public officer; that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and that such a contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to that government. In other words, the act treated thereunder partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum; . . . ECaHSI
In Luciano v. Estrella, the private persons who were charged with "conspiring and confederating together" with the accused public officers to have unlawfully and feloniously, on behalf of the municipal government of Makati, Rizal, entered into a contract or transaction with the JEP Enterprises, were also charged with violation of Section 4 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, for knowingly inducing or causing the above-mentioned public officials and officers to enter into the aforementioned contract or transaction.
These private individuals were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence, which simply means that the criminal liability of the public officers for violation of Section 3 (g) is separate and distinct from the liability of private persons under Section 4 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy to violate Section 3 (g), the liability of private individuals who participated in the transaction must be established under the appropriate provision which is Section 4 (b), for knowingly inducing or causing the public officers to commit Section 3 (g) where criminal intent must necessarily be proved. This is in clear recognition that Section 3 (g), a malum prohibitum, specifically applies to public officers only. ISHaTA
The information in this case, reads:
The undersigned Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, accuses VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR. and HENRY T. GO with violation of Sec. 3(g), R.A. No. 3019 committed as follows: TcSHaD
On or about November 26, 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957 as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event that the latter defaults specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 © in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which term is more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT law, and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
From a cursory reading of the Information, it indubitably shows that all the elements enumerated for the violation of Section 3 (g) relate to the public officer, not to the private individual, for as have been emphasized, Section 3 (g) is a crime that can only be committed by public officers.
This brings to the fore the overstated point that Section 3 (g), by its clear terms, can only be committed by public officers, for if it were otherwise, then the law itself would have clearly provided for it. Notably, even certain paragraphs of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 provide for its application to private individuals, but not Section 3 (g), thus:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — . . .
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The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or offering or giving to the public officer the employment mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or untimely release of the confidential information referred to in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily disqualified, in the discretion of the Court, from transacting business in any form with the Government. AaCEDS
It is clear that sub-paragraph (g) is not included in the quoted portion of Section 3. There are indeed offenses punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws where the mere allegation of conspiracy will suffice in order to validly charge the persons who connived in the commission of the offense. In Section 3 (g), however, and other penal provisions, which can only be committed by a certain class of persons, an allegation of conspiracy to indict those which are clearly not within its purview, is deficient, as shown in Luciano v. Estrella where the public officers were convicted under Section 3 (g) and yet the private parties therein were acquitted inspite of the allegation of conspiracy in the Information.
In voting to grant the motion for reconsideration, I am not saying that petitioner is innocent or that he can no longer be prosecuted if indeed he is liable for any crime relating to his acts that led to the signing of the ARCA. As emphasized in my Dissenting Opinion dated April 13, 2007, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3019 provides for the prohibition on private individuals, thus: ETIDaH
SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. — (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. DTISaH
It is well-settled that penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally for the accused, so much so that the scope of a penal statute cannot be extended by good intention or by implication. The Information lumping petitioner with a public official for conspiracy to violate Section 3 (g), is totally infirm. Section 3 (g) can only be violated by a public officer. The acts for which private persons can be charged together with the public officials are enumerated in the last paragraph of Section 3 and Section 4, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Republic Act No. 3019. If warranted, petitioner Go should be charged for violation of Section 4 (b) in relation to Section 3 (g).
In my Dissent to the Decision dated April 13, 2007, reference was made to Articles 210 (Direct Bribery) and 212 (Corruption of Public Officials) of the Revised Penal Code. In Direct Bribery, the public officer agrees to perform an act either constituting or not constituting a crime, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer. Only the public officer may be charged under and be held liable for Direct Bribery under Article 210, while the person who conspired with the public officer, who made the promise, offer or gave the gifts or presents, may be indicted only under Article 212 for Corruption of Public Officials, regardless of any allegation of conspiracy. DHacTC
Another concrete example is Campomanes v. People. 4 Petitioner Campomanes, a private individual, was charged with conspiring with a public officer who failed to render account for public funds disbursed punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are as follows: (1) the offender is a public officer; (2) he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) the offender is required by law to render accounts to the Commission on Audit; and (4) fails to render an account for a period of two months.
The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that Campomanes is not a public officer and applied Article 222 in relation to Article 218. Article 222 also involves failure to render an account not by a public officer, but by a private individual who has charge of any national, provincial or municipal funds, revenues or property. Notwithstanding the charge of conspiracy, petitioner Campomanes was made to answer not to Article 218, which pertains only to public officers, but to Article 222. DCIAST
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED and the Decision dated April 13, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092 dated December 6, 2005 denying petitioner's Motion to Quash and its March 24, 2006 Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to DISMISS Criminal Case No. 28092 in so far as petitioner Henry T. Go is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, J., votes to deny the Motion for Reconsideration. Please see my dissenting opinion.
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, Jr., JJ., join the dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
AZCUNA, J., concurring:
Petitioner moves for reconsideration of the Decision of this Court holding that he can be liable under Sec. 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on an allegation that he was in conspiracy with a public official.
The Decision relies on Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203. DTSaIc
In that case, the First Division of the Court ruled that a private individual may be liable for conspiracy with a public official under Sec. 3 (h) of Republic Act 3019.
I agree that there is no difference between Sec. 3 (h) and Sec. 3 (g) in this respect. If a private individual can be charged for conspiracy with a public official in Sec. 3 (h) — directly or indirectly having a financial or pecuniary interest in any contract, business or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having an interest, so can a private individual be charged with conspiracy with a public official under Sec. 3 (g) for entering into a contract under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. IDAEHT
Petitioner, however, rightly claims that in the Domingo case, the information alleged sufficient specifics as to what constituted the conspiracy, namely, by acting as a dummy for the public official and allowing his business to be used by him.
Normally, an allegation of conspiracy is sufficient, leaving the details to be established by the evidence at the trial. HDTSCc
There is, however, a need to distinguish the instance, as in this case, where the conspiracy is an element of the offense itself and not merely a circumstance that increases the penalty. For the only way a private individual can be liable under Sec. 3 (g) is if he acted in conspiracy with the public official. Where the conspiracy is constitutive of the offense, it should be alleged with more specifics than where it merely increases the penalty to that of the most guilty. Otherwise, there would be a failure to accord the accused his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense of which he stands charged.
The allegation in this case against petitioner simply stated that he acted "in conspiracy with" the accused public official. I find this insufficient. EACTSH
Finally, all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused.
In light of the foregoing, I am of the view that the motion for reconsideration should be granted. acADIT
GARCIA, J., concurring:
I vote to grant the subject motion for reconsideration as I join the earlier Dissenting Opinion of Madame Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago contra the majority opinion dated April 13, 2007 penned by Mr. Justice (now ret.) Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
Justice Santiago's dissent is correct or at least defensible. Section 3 (g) of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) which punishes the act of entering, on behalf of the government, into a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government may, as the dissent stressed, be committed only by public officers. As may be gathered from settled jurisprudence, 1 the first element of the crime of violating Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 is that the accused is a public officer, irresistibly implying that only a public officer can be adjudged guilty for the offense, implying, in turn, that a private individual cannot be held liable under Sec. 3 (g), applying the conspiracy principle. There can be no denying that there are certain offenses which are limited to or can be committed only by a certain class of persons, meaning only they can be successfully prosecuted and punished for acts punishable as such offense. Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, where only one authorized to sign and conclude government contracts may be proceeded against, as only he can enter into contract on behalf of the government, is such offense. Mention may also be made of felonies punishable under Articles 204 to 207 of the Revised Penal Code and falling under the category of "Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office," which only judges, in the exercise of judicial functions, can be held liable of. EHCcIT
The notion of a private individual being held liable for violation of Sec. 3 (g) under the conspiracy theory has practically nothing to commend itself. Sec. 3 (g) presupposes that the offender is duly authorized to enter into a contract on behalf of the government, which means that he is a public officer since only a public officer can possess such an authority. Now, then, it is legally impossible for a private person to agree with one so authorized to enter into a contract manifestly unfavorable to the government and then decide, in concert with the public officer, to commit the unlawful act. Let it be stressed that conspiracy, as a criminal law concept, contemplates of two or more persons coming to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and deciding to commit it. Theoretically, then, for conspiracy to exist, each malefactor must independently have the legal capability to commit the unlawful act. For, if one is incapable, how can he possibly agree and decide to commit it? Needless to state, petitioner Go, even if he wanted to, could not have entered into a binding transaction for and in behalf of the government, be it favorable or unfavorable to the latter.
The conclusion negating the conspiracy scenario under Sec. 3 (g) becomes all the more compelling if we consider Sec. 3 (g) side by side with the preceding Sec. 3 (e). Section 3 (e) punishes the act of causing undue injury to any party or giving such party undue benefits thru evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence. By case law, one of the elements to be proven in order to constitute a violation of Sec. 3 (e) is that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former. 2 The conspiracy angle under Sec. 3 (e) is not present in the enumeration of the essential elements of the crime penalized under Sec. 3 (g). 3 The absence must have some legal and logical basis. What comes immediately to mind is what is adverted to earlier, i.e., that a private person cannot plausibly agree with a public officer to enter into a contract manifestly disadvantageous to the government and then act on that agreement by concluding/signing one. Surely, the private person cannot, for want of authority, agree in the first place to execute/sign a government contract. cHECAS
If at all then, a private individual, if charged in conspiracy with a public officer, can be prosecuted and convicted under Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019. But such private individual cannot plausibly be charged either directly or in conspiracy with a public officer, and be convicted for violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019.
There is no dispute in this case that petitioner/movant Henry T. Go is not a public officer. As such, he cannot be lumped with then DOTC Secretary Vicente Rivera in the information for violation of Sec. 3 (g). The remedy of the government prosecutors against petitioner lies elsewhere, that is, to charge him, if warranted, under the proper provision/s of the Anti-Graft Law or the Revised Penal Code, which is precisely Justice Santiago's belabored point. cISDHE
Hence, my vote to GRANT petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Respectfully submitted.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:
This refers to the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
On April 13, 2007, the Court rendered its Decision in this case dismissing the Petition for Certiorari and affirming in toto the Resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28092, entitled People of the Philippines v. Vicente C. Rivera, Jr. and Henry T. Go, which denied petitioner Go's Motion to Quash and the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated March 24, 2006 which denied petitioner Go's Motion for Reconsideration. 1
Petitioner Go contends that the Court misconstrued the pronouncements in Luciano v. Estrella, 2 Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 3 Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 4 and Marcos v. Sandiganbayan. 5 He also contends that a mere allegation of conspiracy is not enough to hold him, a private person, equally liable with the public officer for violation of Section 3 (g) since the actual recital of facts constituting the conspiracy must be made explicit in the Information in order to meet the fundamental right of an accused to be fully informed of the charge against him. aAHSEC
Go's contentions are without merit.
The cases of Luciano, Singian, Jr., Domingo and Marcos were properly applied by the Court. CIaDTE
In Luciano, certain municipal public officers and private individuals were charged with violation of Sections 3 (g) and 4 (b) of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in connection with a contract involving traffic deflectors. The Court held therein that "[t]he act treated thereunder (referring to Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019) partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the commission of that act as defined by law, not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. And this construction would be in consonance with the announced purpose for which R.A. No. 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of certain acts of public officers and private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto."
In Singian, certain officers of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Singian, a private individual, were charged with violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 in connection with alleged behest loan accommodations extended by PNB to Integrated Shoe, Inc. Even though one of the elements of the offense under Section 3 (g) is that the accused is a public officer, this case illustrates that private persons, when conspiring with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for violation of Section 3 (g). TADaCH
In Domingo, Jaime Domingo, the Municipal Mayor of San Manuel, Isabela, and Diosdado Garcia, a private individual, were charged with Section 3 (h) of R.A. No. 3019 as it appears that the latter was used as a dummy to cover up the business transaction of the Mayor with the municipality. While one of the elements of the offense under Section 3 (h) is that the accused is a public officer, like Section 3 (g), Garcia, a private individual was held equally liable with the Municipal Mayor, pursuant to Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019.
In Marcos, then First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, as Chairman of the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) and Jose P. Dans, Vice-Chairman of the Light Rail Transport Authority (LRTA), were charged with violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 in connection with a lease agreement entered into by LRTA with PGHFI. When Dans was acquitted, Marcos filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Court granted her motion, finding that since she signed the lease agreement as a private person, not as a public officer, she cannot be convicted under Section 3 (g). It is this particular statement that petitioner is hanging on to for the reconsideration of the Court's Decision in the present petition. However, in its subsequent declaration in Marcos, the Court ruled: HICSTa
Neither can petitioner be considered as in conspiracy with Jose P. Dans, Jr., who has been found without any criminal liability for signing the same Lease Agreement. Absent any conspiracy of petitioner with Dans, the act of the latter cannot be viewed as an act of the former. Petitioner is only answerable for her own individual act. Consequently, petitioner not having signed Exhibit "B" as a public officer, there is neither legal nor factual basis for her conviction under Section 3(g) of Rep. Act 3019. 6
The aforesaid declaration of the Court — that Marcos's acquittal was based on the finding that she signed the lease agreement as a private person, not a public officer — should be taken in the context of the above-quoted paragraph. TCacIE
In other words, considering that Dans was acquitted, there could not be conspiracy between him and Marcos; and in the absence of conspiracy, Marcos could not be convicted for her individual act of signing the Lease Agreement as a private person.
The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision to advance one's case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety. 7 ECaTDc
In addition to the foregoing cases are Meneses v. People 8 and Froilan v. Sandiganbayan. 9 In Meneses, the Court did not concede to the argument that private persons cannot be convicted of violation of Section 3 (e) and (j) of R.A. No. 3019, its application being limited only to public officers. The Court stated that Section 1 of the law makes clear the legislative intention to make the application of the statute extend both to public officers and private persons, thus:
The policy of the Philippine government, in line with the principle that a public office is a public trust is to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft and corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 10 EHSADc
The Court held that "having conspired and confederated with the accused public officers, in the perpetration of acts designed towards the obtention of pecuniary benefits or advantage, in violation of law, they [referring to the private person] must be deemed to have consented to and adopted as their own, the offense of said public officers, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all." 11
In Froilan, petitioner Froilan, a private individual, was charged with three public officers in connection with the procurement of laboratory chemicals for the Bohol Agricultural College, a government educational institution. While one of the issues raised was whether a private individual can be held liable under Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019, the Court never delved on the issue and, instead, it acquitted the accused in the absence of another element of the offense — that the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Indubitably, it shows that even a private individual may be charged and held accountable under Section 3 (g), when he is charged in conspiracy with public officers or employees. EDISaA
In all these cases, the Court had consistently held that private individuals, when conspiring with public officers, may be found guilty of offenses under Section 3, even though one of the elements of the offense is that the accused is a public officer.
On the alleged inadequacy of the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 12 elucidated on how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, applying People v. Quitlong, 13 viz: cEAHSC
Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy,' must aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
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The Information in this case sufficiently states the facts which petitioner Go is charged with, thus: TEacSA
[T]he accused VICENTE C. RIVERA, JR., . . . in conspiracy with accused HENRY T. GO, . . . did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously entered into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA), after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which ARCA substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT Law) providing that the government shall assume the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default specifically Article IV, Section 4.04 (c) in relation to Article I, Section 1.06 of the ARCA which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO and in violation of the BOT Law and manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied).
It bears stressing that the allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 15 A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the information. 16
In view of the foregoing, I vote to deny the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner and maintain the Decision dated April 13, 2007. aSTAHD
Footnotes
1. G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
2. People v. Quijada, G.R. Nos. 115008-09, July 24, 1996, 259 SCRA 191, 228.
3. Supra note 1 at 780.
4. G.R. No. 161950, December 19, 2006.
GARCIA, J., concurring:
1. Ingco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112584, May 23, 1997, 272 SCRA 563; Morales v. People, G.R. No. 144047, July 26, 2002, 385 SCRA 259; Duterte v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130191, April 27, 1998, 289 SCRA 721 and Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998, 297 SCRA 95.
2. Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 307; General Bank & Trust Co. v. Ombudsman, 324 SCRA 113; Garcia v. Ombudsman, 325 SCRA 667; Medina v. Sandiganbayan, 218 745.
3. Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and other cases listed in supra note 1.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J., dissenting:
1. Rollo, p. 403.
2. 145 Phil. 454 (1970).
3. G.R. Nos. 160577-94, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 348.
4 G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474 SCRA 203.
5. 357 Phil. 762 (1998).
6. Id. at 789.
7. Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 776, 800 (2000); Valderrama v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 477, 484 (1996); Policarpio v. Philippine Veterans Board and Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 106 Phil. 125, 131 (1959).
8. G.R. Nos. L-71651 and L-71728, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 303.
9. 385 Phil. 32 (2000).
10. Meneses v. People, supra note 8, at 315.
11. Id. at 316.
12. 427 Phil. 820 (2002).
13. 354 Phil. 372 (1998).
14. Id. at 390.
15. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 11, at 862, citing People v. Paguntalan, G.R. No. 116272, March 27, 1995, 242 SCRA 753, 780; People v. Reyes, 316 Phil. 1 (1995); People v. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995, 248 SCRA 122, 130.
16. Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, id.