GG & G Distributors, Inc. v. Calangi

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239499. September 12, 2018.]

GG & G DISTRIBUTORS, INC., petitioner,vs. MA. CAROLINA S. CALANGI AND WENDELL SANTOS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 12 September 2018 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239499 — GG & G Distributors, Inc. versus Ma. Carolina S. Calangi and Wendell Santos

The Court resolves to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February 7, 2018 and Resolution2 dated May 18, 2018 in CA-G.R. SP No. 151897.

Contrary to GG & G Distributors, Inc.'s (GG & G) allegation, the CA was correct in affirming the Municipal Trial Court in Cities' (MTCC) denial of GG & G's motion for final extension of time to file their formal offer of evidence. The Court has ruled that "substantial justice" cannot be used as a valid reason for not complying with Section 19 (e) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, which prohibits the filing of motions for extension of time to file pleadings, to wit:

SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. — The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper[.] 3

The CA correctly ruled that the demand letters not formally offered cannot be admitted in evidence.

Section 34, Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence clearly states that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified." This formal offer is required because it is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of fact and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. 4 Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him. 5 To be sure, this requirement is a fundamental. part of due process because the respondent, or defendant, or accused, is called upon to craft his defense, and present evidence only against evidence that has been offered and admitted. 6 Certainly, as stated in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v. Spouses Parocha, 7 the rule on formal offer of evidence is not a trivial matter — it can be said to be the very basis of due process.

Furthermore, the Petition should be denied also on the ground of double jeopardy.

The rule of double jeopardy teaches that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. 8 By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 9

In People v. Asis, 10 the Court ruled that outrageous arbitrariness places a case within the exception from the rule on double jeopardy, to wit:

The rule is that "while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice." 11 The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan12 presents an instructive exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due process of law. "The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy." 13

The present case does not fall under the exception because the MTCC's acquittal of Ma. Carolina S. Calangi (Calangi) and Wendell Santos (Santos) was based on the failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Calangi and Santos had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time of the checks' presentment, an essential element of the crime.

The CA thus did not commit any reversible error in affirming the acquittal of Calangi and Santos.

SO ORDERED." (CARPIO, J., on wellness leave; PERLAS-BERNABE, J., designated Acting Chairperson per S.O. No. 2592 dated September 5, 2018; REYES, J., JR., J., designated additional Member per S.O. No. 2587 dated August 28, 2018)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MARIA LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of CourtBy:TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 106-118. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, with Associate Justices Franchito N. Diamante and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.

2.Id. at 86.

3. REVISED RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE, October 15, 1991; see Carriaga v. Anasario, 444 Phil. 685, 690 (2003); Perez v. Concepcion, 378 Phil. 918, 922-923 (1999).

4. Ricardo J. Francisco, EVIDENCE, 3rd edition, 1996, p. 537.

5. See De Castro v. Court of Appeals, 75 Phil. 829, 834 (1946); Ayala v. Valencia, 5 Phil. 182 (1905).

6. See Republic v. Spouses Gimenez, 776 Phil. 233, 256 (2016), citing Heirs of Emilio Santioque v. Heirs of Emilio Calma, 536 Phil. 524, 543-544 (2006).

7. 550 Phil. 571, 575 & 579 (2007).

8.Canceran v. People, 762 Phil. 558, 570 (2015).

9.Chiok v. People, 774 Phil. 230, 249-250 (2015).

10. 643 Phil. 462 (2010).

11.Id. at 471, citing People v. Laguio, Jr., 547 Phil. 296, 315 (2007).

12. 228 Phil. 42 (1986).

13.People v. Asis, supra note 10, at 471, citing Castro v. People, 581 Phil. 639, 647 (2008).