ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183967. December 11, 2013.]
EDWINA R. GARRIDO, MARIA JOSEFINA G. JUERGENS, JOSE ENRIQUE GARRIDO, JOSE RAFAEL GARRIDO, petitioners, vs. DANILO DELA PAZ, PARKASH MANSUKHANI AND CLINICA HILARIO, INC., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 11, 2013 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 183967 (Edwina R. Garrido, Maria Josefina G. Juergens, Jose Enrique Garrido, Jose Rafael Garrido vs. Danilo Dela Paz, Parkash Mansukhani and Clinica Hilario, Inc.). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks the reversal of the Resolutions dated September 26, 2007 2 and July 10, 2008 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00403. The CA dismissed via the assailed resolutions the petitioners' appeal from the Decision 4 dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 27,057-99, an action for torts and damages against Clinica Hilario, Inc. (CHI), Dr. Danilo Dela Paz (Dr. Dela Paz) and Dr. Parkash Mansukhani (Dr. Mansukhani) (respondents).
The factual antecedents are as follows: Ricardo Garrido (Ricardo), the deceased husband of petitioner Edwina Garrido (Edwina) was confined for medical treatment at CHI, also known as Davao Doctors Hospital, for almost a year prior to his death on September 8, 1999. While Ricardo was still confined at CHI, Edwina filed the action for torts and damages against the respondents, imputing negligence in their management of the health condition of Ricardo. The original complaint was subsequently amended to reflect the fact of Ricardo's death. 5 The complaint, in brief, provided that the wrongful removal on September 12, 1998 of Ricardo's breathing tube by Dr. Dela Paz, his neurologist, even without the approval of Dr. Mansukhani, his pulmonologist, resulted in Ricardo's failing health, comatose and eventual death. 6
On May 3, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint on the ground of the failure to prove the respondents' negligence and consequent liability. Feeling aggrieved, Edwina appealed to the CA, which required her to file an appellant's brief within forty-five (45) days from her receipt of the CA's notice dated November 24, 2006. 7
Edwina claimed to have received a copy of the notice on December 19, 2006. On January 30, 2007, she moved for an extension of time of 15 days from February 2, 2007, or until February 17, 2007, within which to file the brief. Since February 17, 2007 was a Saturday, the required appellant's brief was filed only on February 19, 2007. 8cDTCIA
On September 26, 2007, the CA issued the Resolution dismissing the appeal on several grounds. First, the required appellant's brief was filed out of time. Contrary to Edwina's claim, the CA's records provided that the notice requiring the filing of the brief was received by the party on December 4, 2006. Accordingly, the reglementary period for the filing of the brief ended on January 7, 2007. Even her motion for extension of time filed only on January 30, 2007 was then belatedly filed. Second, the brief filed by Edwina did not contain an assignment of errors and a clear and concise statement of the case. Third, a copy of the RTC decision being assailed in the CA appeal was not attached to the appellant's brief.
Edwina's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2008. Hence, this petition, where Edwina is joined by her co-petitioners Maria Josefina G. Juergens, Jose Enrique Garrido and Jose Raphael Garrido, who are her children with the late Ricardo. 9
The petitioners admit that they erroneously reckoned their 45-day period for the filing of the brief from December 19, 2006. 10 They claim to have lost, "due to unavoidable circumstances", their copy of the notice sent by the CA. 11 They also claim that the belated submission of a copy of the RTC decision should have been deemed a substantial compliance with the rules. In any case, they argue that notwithstanding the deficiencies in the brief, the CA should have relaxed the rules given the alleged merit of their appeal. The petitioners insist that the respondents were grossly negligent in the treatment of Ricardo, 12 specifically citing the alleged error committed by Dr. Dela Paz in extubating Ricardo even without the consent and knowledge of Dr. Mansukhani. 13 For the petitioners, Dr. Mansukhani was also grossly negligent given his failure to rectify the effects of the premature extubation of the patient by Dr. Dela Paz. 14 Finally, they claim that CHI was equally liable because it had the obligation to oversee and supervise the quality of medical service of its consultants or physicians. 15
The petition is denied.
At the outset, the Court corrects the statement made by the CA that the petitioners' 45-day reglementary period for the filing of the appellants' brief, reckoned from December 4, 1996, expired on January 7, 2007. Forty-five days from December 4, 1996 fell on January 18, 2007; hence, the motion for extension of time that was filed on January 30, 2007 was late by 12 days, and not 23 days as provided in the CA Resolution dated September 26, 2007. 16
In affirming the CA's dismissal of the appeal, the Court refers to Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which sanctions the dismissal of an appeal on the ground of an appellant's failure to file a brief within the time allowed by the Rules. Furthermore, it is recognized that the CA's dismissal of an appeal for failure to file an appellant's brief is a matter of judicial discretion. The fundamentals of justice and fairness are observed, bearing in mind the background and web of circumstances surrounding the case. 17
In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the CA's dismissal of the appeal, given the petitioners' failure to offer good reasons for the belated filing of the motion for extension of time to file the appellant's brief, and ultimately, the brief. The petitioners' contention that they lost a copy of the notice that they received from the CA fails to justify. In a line of cases, the Court has explained that concomitant to a plea for a liberal interpretation of the rules, there should be an effort on the part of the party involving liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. 18 The petitioners failed in this regard. As a result, the CA correctly held that by the time the motion for extension of time to file the appellant's brief was filed on January 30, 2007, "there was no more period to extend." 19cACEHI
The CA also did not err in dismissing the appeal on the ground of the absence of an assignment of errors in the appellant's brief. Such ground for dismissal is provided in Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellant's brief . . . .
The Court rejects the petitioners' bare claim that the requirement for an assignment of errors was substantially complied with given the arguments and issues that were discussed in the brief. First, the Court cannot validate such statement due to the petitioners' own failure to attach to their petition a copy of the brief which they filed before the CA. Second, the Court has explained in Mendoza v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Inc. 20that "[t]he statement of issues is not to be confused with the assignment of errors, since they are not one and the same; otherwise, the rules would not [have] required a separate statement for each. An assignment of errors is an enumeration by the appellant of the errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court for which he/she seeks to obtain a reversal of the judgment, while the statement of issues puts forth the questions of fact or law to be resolved by the appellate court." 21
Finally, the failure to attach the RTC decision that was challenged before the CA violated Section 13 (h), Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, which requires that a copy of the judgment or final order appealed from be appealed to the appellant's brief. CTSDAI
Even if the Court should take exception by giving the petition due course, the result would still be its dismissal. The Court emphasizes that it is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the well-defined exceptions to this rule, it will not delve once more into the findings of fact. 22 The issue on the alleged negligence of the respondents necessarily calls for such findings of fact, and upon review, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the petitioners failed to show that the respondents were guilty of gross negligence in their treatment of Ricardo.
The burden of proof was upon the petitioners to establish by preponderance of evidence that there was a reasonable connection between the alleged breach of duty on the part of the respondents and the subsequent death of Ricardo. "Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other." 23 The petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
Four essential elements must concur in a suit for damages, namely: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation. Even in medical negligence cases, all elements must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent and thus, liable for damages. 24 The injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes; that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. "[T]he proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." 25 Here, the RTC aptly observed and stated in its Decision:
[T]here is no evidence of plaintiffs [herein petitioners] in their collective testimonies and their expert witness, Dr. Marilyn Lim, [that] the defendants doctors and defendant hospital [herein respondents], were guilty of negligence in the alleged extubation of the patient, as a direct and proximate cause of his comatose condition before his official declaration of death, more than one year from September 12, 1998.
xxx xxx xxx
It is likewise established on record, [that] the extubation admittedly done by Dr. Danilo dela Paz, was a decision, apparently made as a product of agreement of all attending specialist doctors of the patient at least three days before September 12, 1998 . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed[,] as shown on record, before extubation, the essential parameters were complied [with], among others, the patient was awake, on alert. Second, the vital signs were stable, blood pressure [was] normal, the heartbeat and respiratory rate [were] normal and the arterial blood gas, [was] within acceptable limits. AIHTEa
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. . . [E]ven the testimony of Dr. Marilyn Lim, the only expert witness presented by plaintiffs, to support their cause of action against the defendant doctors, do[es] not appear very decisive, on the fact that the extubation, was indeed the proximate cause of the seizures and attack of the patient, [which] incidentally caused his comatose condition until his [discharge] in the hospital. 26
In Lucas v. Tuaño, 27the Court emphasized that "[a] verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony." 28 Absent the same, the respondents cannot be held civilly liable for the alleged negligence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 26, 2007 and July 10, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00403, dismissing the appeal from the Decision dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 27,057-99, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 4-42.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Elihu A. Ybañez, concurring; id. at 46-50.
3. Id. at 52.
4. Issued by Judge Renato A. Fuentes; id. at 71-122.
5 Id. at 72-73.
6. Id. at 107.
7. Id. at 47.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 11.
10 Id. at 16.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 27.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Id. at 36.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 47.
17. Bergonia v. Court of Appeals (4th Division), G.R. No. 189151, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 322, 329.
18. Lee v. People, G.R. No. 192274, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 618, 624, citing Navarro v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company, 473 Phil. 472, 481 (2004).
19. Rollo, pp. 47-48.
20. G.R. No. 165575, February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA 333.
21. Id. at 347, citing De Liano v. CA, 421 Phil. 1033, 1042, 1044 (2001).
22. Casilang, Sr. v. Casilang-Dizon, G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 385, 400-401.
23. Aba v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7649, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 361, 372, citing Habagat Grill v. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil 603, 613 (2005); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, et al., 568 Phil. 188, 197 (2008).
24. Lucas v. Tuaño, G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 173, 199-200, citing Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, 344 Phil. 323, 332 (1997).
25. Id. at 201, citing Calimutan v. People, 517 Phil. 272, 284 (2006).
26. Rollo, pp. 109, 111.
27. G.R. No. 178763, April 21, 2009, 586 SCRA 173.
28. Id. at 205.