Gamil y Manalo v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239816. September 29, 2021.]

ALEX GAMIL y MANALO @ "AXEL", petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239816 (Alex Gamil y Manalo @ "Axel" v. People of the Philippines). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated August 16, 2017 and Resolution 3 dated May 21, 2018 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 38155. The Decision of the CA affirmed the Judgment 4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84 of Batangas City (RTC) dated September 18, 2015, which found Alex Gamil y Manalo guilty of violation of Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to thirteen (13) years and one (1) day, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

As culled from the RTC Judgment, 5 the facts indicate that Alex Gamil y Manalo (petitioner)6 was charged for violation of R.A. No. 9165 under the following Information:

That on or about February 5, 2014, at around 3:45 in the afternoon at Relocation Site, Brgy. Balete, Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there knowingly, willfully and criminally possess or have under his custody and control two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing more or less an aggregate weight of 0.09 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, more commonly known as "Shabu," a dangerous drug, which is a clear violation of the above-cited law. 7 SDHTEC

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Accordingly, preliminary conference and pre-trial conference were held. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. 8

The prosecution narrated that at around 3:45 in the afternoon of February 5, 2014, while Senior Police Officer 1 Tom Falejo (SPO1 Falejo) was at the relocation site in Brgy. Balete, Batangas City, he saw petitioner, who is his neighbor, and a male companion, playfully pushing each other at a nipa hut in front of Cunag residences. When he saw SPO1 Falejo approaching, petitioner's male companion ran away. Thereafter, SPO1 Falejo, who was three to four meters away, saw petitioner dropped something. When SPO1 Falejo approached petitioner, he found out that the thing dropped by petitioner was a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu. Thereafter, he arrested petitioner and informed him of his constitutional rights as an arrested person. When he frisked petitioner, he recovered another plastic sachet tucked on the right portion of petitioner's waistband. 9

At the place of arrest, SPO1 Falejo marked the two plastic sachets with his initials "TGF 1" and "TGF 2" using a ballpen. He claimed that he was not able to mark the shabu with the date of arrest because there was no more space for any additional markings. Afterwards, he brought petitioner and the confiscated items to the barangay outpost whereby Brgy. Councilor Reynaldo Belo (Brgy. Councilor Belo) made a record of the arrest of petitioner in the barangay blotter. They then proceeded to conduct the inventory and took photographs upon the arrival of investigator Police Officer 1 Ruther Carandang (PO1 Carandang) and a representative from Department of Justice (DOJ) Rodel Espina (Espina). During the inventory, SPO1 Falejo again marked the two sachets with the same marking he previously made, this time using a pentel pen. A certificate of inventory was prepared and signed by SPO1 Falejo, Brgy. Councilor Belo and DOJ representative Espina. Thereafter, SPO1 Falejo turned over the two sachets of shabu to PO1 Carandang, which was duly recorded in the chain of custody form. 10

From the barangay hall, the police officers brought petitioner to the Batangas City Police Station to record his arrest in the police blotter. Afterwards, PO1 Carandang presented the confiscated item to desk officer PO3 Llegado. Being the investigator, PO1 Carandang prepared the spot report, and the request for laboratory examination of the specimen and request for the drug test of petitioner. Throughout these preparations, PO1 Carandang remained in custody of the sachets of shabu. After preparing the documents, PO1 Carandang, together with petitioner, and a mobile patrol group proceeded to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. At the crime laboratory office, PO1 Carandang turned over the specimen, as well as the pertinent documents, to chemist Police Chief Inspector Herminia Llacuna (PCI Llacuna), which was recorded in the chain of custody form. 11 AScHCD

On the part of the defense, petitioner took the witness stand and narrated that on February 5, 2014, he was at the basketball court of Gate 2, Relocation Site, Brgy. Balete, Batangas City, together with Raymond Macatangay (Raymond). While he was talking to Raymond, SPO1 Falejo, who came from his back, suddenly put his arms around his shoulder, poked a gun on his side, and told him not to resist. He asked the police officer as to what is the problem but SPO1 Falejo merely replied that he should just go with him. SPO1 Falejo then brought him to the barangay hall. Upon arrival thereat, he was handcuffed for reasons he was unaware of. A moment later, a patrol car arrived at the barangay hall where he was boarded, and was brought to the police station. He stayed at the police station for two hours and afterwhich, he was again brought back to the relocation site and then to the barangay hall wherein entries in the barangay blotter were made. He was photographed together with the barangay councilors, and afterwards, he was brought back to the police station where a report was made regarding his arrest. He was then brought to the camp and underwent a drug test procedure. Thereafter, he was charged for violation of Article II, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165. 12

Petitioner likewise claimed that SPO1 Falejo was his neighbor in Brgy. Balete, Batangas. In 2013, an incident happened between him, his nephew and SPO1 Falejo. He recalled that while he and his nephew were having a drinking spree, SPO1 Falejo, who was then plying his tricycle, got mad because he could not pass by, as the tricycle of petitioner's nephew was parked in the middle of the road. During that time, SPO1 Falejo asked them angrily why was the tricycle parked in the middle of the road. He then ordered them to remove the tricycle or he will be forced to tow it 13 to which petitioner and his nephew complied. 14

After due proceedings, the RTC rendered its Judgment 15 dated September 18, 2015 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ALEX GAMIL y Manalo @ "Axel" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 (possession of dangerous drugs) and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00).

The period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor subject to the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10592.

The subject dangerous drugs, particularly the two (2) small plastic sachets containing shabu, with markings TGF 1 and TGF 2, and big transparent plastic sachet, marked as Exhibits "N", "N-1" and "N-2" respectively shall be immediately transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for its proper disposal in accordance with law and pertinent regulations. AcICHD

SO ORDERED.

In so ruling, the RTC held that petitioner was arrested inflagrante delicto as he was caught performing the overt act of having in his control, custody and possession, a plastic sachet containing shabu. Such act was buttressed by his subsequent act of dropping the plastic sachet containing shabu. 16 After he was frisked by SPO1 Falejo, a subsequent plastic sachet containing shabu was found in his possession. Giving full faith and credence to the testimony of the police officers and according them regularity in the performance of their official duty, the RTC found that the elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established. 17

Thereafter, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, which rendered a Decision 18 dated August 16, 2017 affirming the RTC Decision. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED.

Accordingly, the assailed Judgment dated 18 September 2015 of the REGIONAL Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 84, Batangas City in Criminal Case No. 18621 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

In affirming the guilt of petitioner, the CA found that he did not interpose an objection on the irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment, thus, he is estopped from assailing the same. Having failed to do so, the objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is deemed waived. 19 The CA likewise found that petitioner was caught red-handed in possession of a regulated drug and SPO1 Falejo effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. By committing a crime in full view of SPO1 Falejo, he was duty bound to apprehend petitioner. 20 It also pronounced that the sachets recovered from petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest but also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine. 21 As regards the chain of custody, the CA concluded that there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs was safeguarded. 22

Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution 23 dated May 21, 2018.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following issues:

I.

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming petitioner's conviction despite the illegality of his warrantless arrest; hence, rendering the alleged confiscated shabu inadmissible in evidence

II.

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming petitioner's conviction despite the evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the alleged confiscated shabu

III.

Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding petitioner's defense that his warrantless arrest was actuated by ill-motive TAIaHE

The core issue the needs resolution in the instant case revolves around the admissibility of the two plastic sachets containing shabu that were recovered from petitioner despite the absence of a search warrant.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 24

Upon a review of the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case, this Court hereby sets aside petitioner's conviction.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that the police officers recovered two sachets of shabu from petitioner, the first one recovered after he dropped the same, and the second one recovered after he was frisked by SPO1 Falejo. Petitioner nevertheless claims that the two sachets that were allegedly recovered from him are inadmissible in evidence since the warrantless arrest and the eventual search upon his person were unlawful. 25 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner was validly arrested without a warrant as he was seen by SPO1 Falejo dropping a plastic sachet that contained an illegal substance, thus, the confiscated illegal drug is admissible in evidence. The OSG adds that petitioner's assertion that his arrest without a warrant is illegal is unavailing since he only raised such defense for the first time on appeal. As he failed to raise his objection thereto before he entered his plea, he is deemed to have waived the issue on the legality of his arrest. 26

Warrantless search and seizures

Article III, Sec. 2 27 of the 1987 Constitution protects the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature. In this regard, it is mandated that a search warrant or a warrant of arrest, anchored upon probable cause, be issued before any search or seizure may be considered as reasonable. To further strengthen this constitutional safeguard, Article III, Sec. 3 28 of the Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 29

A warrantless search does not however automatically result into the classification of the confiscated items as a fruit of a poisonous tree that should be excluded as a piece of evidence. Jurisprudence recognizes exceptional instances when warrantless searches and seizures are considered permissible, thus: cDHAES

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest . . .;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . .;

3. Search of a moving vehicle; x x x

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 30

Two of these exceptions to a search warrant — a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest and "stop and frisk" — are often confused with each other. 31 In the case of Malacat v. CA, 32 the importance of knowing which of the two exceptions should be applied in examining a warrantless search was expounded as follows:

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

xxx xxx xxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment x x x

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 33 ASEcHI

From the foregoing, it is observable that the standard to be applied when this Court is presented with a situation of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest differs from a situation where the warrantless search is a result of a stop and frisk operation. In the former, the case is examined based on the existence of probable cause, while in the latter, the case is examined based on a genuine reason of suspicion. Nevertheless, confusion still lingers as to which of these two standards should be applied considering that these exceptions both involve the apprehension of a suspect. This is especially true in the case of dangerous drugs where the item from which a suspicion may arise is not easily observable. The question thus remains: what standard should be applied when presented with a set of facts whereby a person who was suddenly apprehended is found in possession of a dangerous drug after the conduct of a search? The Court takes the opportunity to make the necessary demarcation.

With regard to a stop and frisk search, a review of jurisprudence would show that the various cases examined based on this standard are cases where the apprehension made by police officers were preceded by a tip received from an informant regarding the existence of an illegal activity.

In the case of People v. Aminnudin, 34 PC officers received a tip that Aminnudin was on board a vessel carrying a marijuana. 35 As he descended from the gangplank and after the informer had pointed to him, the PC officers accosted him and inspected the bag he was carrying. 36 Upon confirming that the bag contained marijuana leaves through laboratory examination, he was charged in court for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 37 This Court nevertheless acquitted him of the charge because of the illegal search made on him. 38

In said case, this Court examined the facts of the case based on the standard of a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest and held that Aminnudin was not committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. 39 Hence, there was no basis to conduct a warrantless search upon him and the evidence obtained from him was declared inadmissible in evidence. 40

Nevertheless, in the case of People v. Cogaed, 41Aminnudin42 was analyzed based on the standards of a stop and frisk search. 43 In Cogaed, 44 PSI Sofronio Bayan received a text message from an unidentified informant that a certain Marvin Buya will transport marijuana. The police officers then set up a checkpoint and as a jeepney passed by, its driver disembarked and pointed to Cogaed and his companion carrying marijuana. The police officers then apprehended Cogaed and upon examination, they were able to confirm the existence of marijuana. Citing the applicability of Aminnudin45 and other cases, this Court rendered judgment declaring the search as illegal, using the standards under a stop and frisk search. 46 It was also held therein that the search made upon Cogaed does not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. 47

Another case cited in Cogaed48 is People v. Aruta, 49 whereby the police officers were tipped by an informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana. 50 The police officers positioned themselves at the PNB Building and when a bus arrived thereat, two females and a male got off. 51 Thereafter, the informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as Aling Rosa. The police then apprehended Aling Rosa, and asked about the contents of her bag. She handed the bag to the police officers and upon inspection, they found that the bag contained marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag. 52 Aruta charged for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, but was acquitted because of the illegal search made on her. 53 ITAaHc

As presented in Cogaed54 and the cases it relied upon, the searches made thereon were declared illegal because of the failure to comply with the standards of a stop and frisk search. In these cases, tips were acquired by police officers regarding the conduct of an illegal activity. Thus, there was already a pre-conceived notion about the existence of an illegal activity, which generated a suspicion on a particular person.

In contrast, in cases where no tips were received by police officers before making an arrest, recent jurisprudence would show that the basis for declaring the illegality of an arrest is the standard based on warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest. In the case of People v. Villareal, 55 a police officer was in a tricycle when he saw Villareal, whom he recognized as the one he previously arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 56 Upon seeing the police officer, Villareal tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. 57 The police officer was then able to confiscate a plastic sachet of shabu in Villareal's possession. 58 The Court thereafter examined the case based on the standards of a search incidental to a lawful arrest and concluded that the search was unreasonable. 59

Likewise, in the case of Dominguez v. People, 60 the police officer therein was a meter away from Dominguez when he was seen holding with his left hand, a small transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, suspected to be shabu. 61 He was eventually arrested and the substance recovered from him was examined, which turned positive for shabu. 62 Therein, the Court applied the standard of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest and not that of a stop and frisk search in concluding that the search upon Villareal was illegal.

The difference in the standard applied in examining the aforementioned cases lies in the quantum of proof required in a stop and frisk search on one hand, and a search incidental to a lawful arrest, on the other hand. A stop and frisk search requires the presence of a suspicion brought about by experiences of police officers in apprehending criminals. It seeks to deter the commission of a crime. As such, when the police officers receive a tip regarding the impending transport, sale or possession of a dangerous drug, they are seeking to deter the commission of a crime. A suspicion directed towards a specific person is likewise formed because of the tip. Nevertheless, as the suspicion must be based on a genuine reason, the police officers cannot just rely on the information they received. It must be supported by acts of the suspect amounting to a suspicious activity upon which a conclusion may be formed that a criminal activity is afoot.

On the other hand, a search incidental to a lawful arrest is premised on the requirements of a valid warrantless arrest under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. In this case, there is no prior knowledge regarding the commission of a crime and no specific person is being observed. Rather, police officers upon patrol or upon chancing the commission of a crime, in response to their duty, arrests a suspect and searches him/her for an illegal item. In such a case, probable cause based on personal knowledge must be used as a standard in determining the legality of the arrest and the consequent search made upon the accused.

While there may be instances when the other exceptions to a warrantless search may be applied, the distinction between a stop and frisk search and a search incidental to a lawful arrest is necessary in order to have a clear guideline on the standard to be applied in examining the facts presented before the courts. CHTAIc

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, as there was no tip received by SPO1 Falejo when he effected the arrest of petitioner, this case must be examined based on the standards of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

In determining the existence of probable cause to effect a lawful warrantless arrest that would justify a warrantless search, the parameters under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court, must be observed, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraph n (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)

In these cases, two elements must concur, namely (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he/she has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 63 In an arrest made in flagrante delicto, it is required that the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught. Probable cause refers to such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 64

As explained in People v. Racho, 65 a lawful arrest must precede or at least must be substantially contemporaneous to the search made by a police officer, provided there is probable cause to arrest the offender, thus:

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. 66

In the instant case, SPO1 Falejo testified that he saw petitioner and another man playfully pushing each other and afterwards saw petitioner drop a transparent plastic sachet. After approaching petitioner, he found out that the item dropped by petitioner was shabu. His testimony reads as follows: EATCcI

Q: Upon seeing that they were as you say "nagkukulitan or naghihilahan," what happened next?

A: When the male person together with the accused saw me, Ma'am, approaching near them, the male person ran away.

Q: What about this "Axel"?

A: Axel, Ma'am? He dropped something, Ma'am.

Q: How far were you from Axel when you saw him dropped something?

A: More or less, three to four meters, Ma'am.

Q: Upon seeing that this Axel dropped something, what did you do, if any?

A: I approached, Ma'am, to know what was the item dropped by Axel.

Q: Were you able to find out what the item that he dropped was?

A: Yes, Ma'am.

Q: What was it?

A: One (1) transparent plastic sachet containing shabu, Ma'am.

Q: What did you do upon seeing that the item dropped by Axel was transparent plastic sachet containing shabu?

A: When I saw that the item was shabu, I arrested Axel, ma'am.

Q: By the way Mr. Witness, what made you conclude that the item that Axel dropped was shabu?

A: It was a transparent plastic sachet containing shabu, Ma'am.

Q: My Question Mr. Witness is, you obviously saw that it was a transparent plastic sachet. It contained something inside. What made you think that that something inside the plastic sachet was shabu?

A: Because I have seen for many times shabu Ma'am. 67

Significantly, petitioner's act of playfully pushing another person is not a crime. The same is true with the act of dropping an item. According to SPO1 Falejo, he effected the arrest of petitioner because he saw shabu many times and immediately inferred that the item dropped by petitioner was indeed shabu. This circumstance does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Being three meters away from petitioner, it was not possible for SPO1 Falejo to immediately recognize the item dropped by petitioner as shabu. Moreover, an inference that the item inside the plastic sachet is shabu is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of probable cause. As held in People v. Villareal, 68 "personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed, is required.

When SPO1 Falejo immediately arrested petitioner without knowing or even asking what the contents of the transparent sachet was, he was not equipped with personal knowledge to conclude that petitioner was committing a crime. While he claimed to have seen shabu many times, there was no sensory perception whatsoever that allowed him to validate his inference. With a miniscule amount of shabu inside a plastic sachet, the absence of any activity on the part of petitioner that would suggest the commission of a crime, cannot serve as a basis to satisfy the requirement of probable cause in effecting his arrest. DHITCc

Indeed, mere possession of dangerous drugs is already a crime in itself that is punishable under R.A. No. 9165. Nevertheless, in examining whether an illegal possession is committed, there must at least be a reasonable suspicion that would form as basis of a personal knowledge in the commission of a crime. In Dominguez v. People, 69 the search made by a police officer on the body of the accused, whom he had seen from a meter away, holding a plastic sachet, was acquitted from a charge under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as follows:

The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dominguez was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision, SPO1 Parchaso would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's testimony reveals that before the arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic sachet. He was unable to describe what said plastic sachet contained, if any. He only mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he had already arrested Dominguez and subsequently confiscated said plastic sachet.

xxx xxx xxx

The present case is similar to People v. Villareal, where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional, as simply holding something in one's hands cannot in any way be considered as a criminal act:

On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in appellant's hands was indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the street and examining something in one's hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113. cEaSHC

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule 11362 n of the Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. As already discussed, standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in one's hands cannot in any way be considered as criminal acts. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. 70

In the same vein, petitioner's act of playfully pushing another and dropping a plastic sachet do not constitute a crime. Before resorting to a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the existence of a crime must first be established. There being none, the search made on petitioner cannot be considered as a valid warrantless search.

In seeking to sustain the conviction of petitioner, the OSG relies on the case of Castro v. People. 71 However, in said case, there was a tipster and the accused therein threw the plastic sachet upon seeing the police officers. 72 Evidently, no such circumstance was present in this case. Rather, no suspicious behavior was displayed by petitioner when SPO1 Falejo approached him. As narrated by SPO1 Falejo, it was petitioner's companion who ran away upon seeing him. If there was anyone who provoked suspicion, it was the companion of petitioner, and not the latter. Here, there was no other overt act committed by petitioner that would show any reasonable suspicion that he was holding a shabu. SPO1 Falejo cannot just make a conclusion based on inference alone, which was not proven. Thus, there was no probable cause to arrest petitioner, more so, conduct a search on his body. IAETDc

Failure to object to the admissibility

While petitioner failed to raise the illegality of his arrest prior to his arraignment, the same does not amount to a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 73 In Veridiano v. People, 74 the Court explained the consequences of an invalid arrest as follows:

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused." CTIEac

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest. 75

Thus, while the failure to raise an objection before arraignment on the illegality of an arrest does not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused, a different consequence obtains with regard to the evidence obtained on account of the illegal arrest. The rules on admissibility of evidence is not dependent on the presence or absence of an objection. It is determined by its relevance to the issues raised in a case and on whether it is excluded by the Constitution, the laws, or the Rules. 76 In this case, the evidence obtained by SPO1 Falejo is considered as a fruit of the poisonous tree and is inadmissible in any proceeding.

Apropos, with the dangerous drug obtained by SPO1 Falejo from petitioner being the corpus delicti in the charge for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, rendered herein as inadmissible in evidence, petitioner's acquittal must necessarily follow.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38155 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Alex Gamil y Manalo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. He is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution, the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 12-33.

2.Rollo, pp. 37-49. Penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob, with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro (ret.) and Danton Q. Bueser (ret.) concurring.

3.Id. at 51-53.

4. Penned by Presiding Judge Dorcas P. Ferriols-Perez, id. at 74-80.

5.Id.

6. Referred as accused in the RTC Decision.

7.Rollo, p. 74.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 75.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 76.

13.Id.

14. TSN, May 22, 2015, p. 13.

15.Supra note 4.

16.Id. at 77.

17.Id. at 78-79.

18.Supra note 2.

19.Id. at 43.

20.Id. at 44.

21.Id. at 45.

22.Id. at 47.

23.Supra note 3.

24.Vaporoso and Tulilik v. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019.

25. See Rollo, p. 23.

26.Id. at 138-142.

27. Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

28. Section 3. x x x

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

29.SeeSindac v. People, 794 Phil. 421, 428 (2016), citations omitted.

30.SeePeople v. Sison, et al., G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019, citingPeople v. Cogaed, 740 Phil. 212, 228 (2014) which citedPeople v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868, 879-880 (1998).

31.Sabuco v. People, G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019.

32. 347 Phil. 462 (1997).

33.Id. at 479-482.

34. 246 Phil. 424 (1988).

35.Id. at 427.

36.Id.

37.Id.

38.Id. at 435.

39.Id. at 433-434.

40.Id. at 434.

41. 740 Phil. 212 (2014).

42.Supra.

43.Supra note 41 at 236.

44.Supra.

45.Supra.

46.Id. at 234-237.

47.Id. at 237.

48.Supra.

49. 351 Phil. 868 (1998).

50.Id. at 875.

51.Id.

52.Id. at 875-876.

53.Id. at 874; 895.

54.Supra.

55. 706 Phil. 511 (2013).

56.Id. at 513.

57.Id.

58.Id. at 514.

59.Id. at 517-523.

60. G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019.

61.Id.

62.Id.

63.Villamor and Bonaobra v. People, 807 Phil. 894, 904 (2017).

64. 838 Phil. 102 (2018).

65. 640 Phil. 669 (2010).

66.Id. at 676-677.

67. TSN, June 4, 2016, pp. 6-7.

68.Supra note 55.

69.Supra note 60.

70.Id.

71. 671 Phil. 201 (2011).

72.Id. at 205.

73.SeePeople v. Bacla-An Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 739, 748 (2003).

74. 810 Phil. 642 (2017).

75.Id. at 653-654.

76. Rules of Court, Rule 128, Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and not excluded by the Constitution, the law or these Rules.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.

n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official document.