Gallarde, Jr. v. Tarlac I Electric Cooperative, Inc.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 229002. February 13, 2017.]

MANOLO B. GALLARDE, JR., petitioner,vs. TARLAC I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. and ALLAN G. BERMUDEZ, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 13, 2017, which reads as follows: HSAcaE

"G.R. No. 229002 (Manolo B. Gallarde, Jr. vs. Tarlac I Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Allan G. Bermudez). — The Court resolves to:

(1) GRANT petitioner's motion for an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period; and

(2) EXCLUDE the National Labor Relations Commission as respondent from the title of this case pursuant to Section 4 (a), Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 from the Resolutions dated July 29, 2016 1 and October 20, 2016 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146730. The assailed Resolutions denied the petition before the CA for having been filed out of time.

The Facts

Petitioner claims that he was a regular employee of respondent Tarlac I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (TARELCO I) since September 15, 1995 as a meter reader. On October 25, 2013, he claims to have been illegally dismissed by respondent on the basis of NEA Memorandum No. 2013-020, which stated that all employees of electric cooperatives who shall file their Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 Barangay Elections shall be considered as automatically resigned effective the last day of filing of the Certificate of Candidacy. At that time, petitioner was receiving a salary of Php18,000.00 per month, with full benefits as a regular employee and a member of the employees' union.

It appears that petitioner has been elected and performed duties as barangay kagawad of Brgy. Pance, Ramos, Tarlac since 2007. During the 2010 elections, petitioner was elected as the barangay captain of his barangay. Thus, he filed again his certificate of candidacy for the position of barangay captain during the 2013 barangay elections. HESIcT

On October 25, 2013, however, the abovementioned NEA Memorandum was issued and petitioner was no longer allowed to report for work. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against respondents. The case was docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-III-10-22176-14.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In a Decision 3 dated November 6, 2015, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed and ordered his reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complainant, MANOLO B. GALLARDE, JR. is declared to have been ILLEGALLY DISMISSED by the respondents, TARLAC I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (TARELCO I) to be reinstated to his former position as "METER READER" or to any equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits attached to his position with full backwages from his dismissal on October 17, 2013 up to the promulgation of this Decision (November 6, 2015).

The reinstatement of the complainant is immediately executory with the directive for respondents to submit a report of compliance of his reinstatement within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of this Decision.

Further, respondents, TARLAC I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (TARELCO I) and MR. ALLAN G. BERMUDEZ, General Manager are jointly and solidarily liable to pay complainant the following:

1. BACKWAGES in the amount of FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P432,000.00);

2. 13th month pay for the year 2013 in the amount of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00);

3. ATTORNEY'S FEES in the amount of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000.00);

4. His claim for rice allowance, 14th & 15th month pay, incentives and clothing allowance, must be paid to complainant if indeed he was already receiving these benefits before he was dismissed and terminated from his employment on October 17, 2013;

5. All other claims of the complainant are hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

According to the Labor Arbiter, the elective position of petitioner as barangay captain is exempted from the coverage of disqualified EC officials and employees under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 269 as amended by Republic Act No. 10531. Thus, petitioner was not disqualified to be employed with respondent cooperative despite having been elected as barangay captain. caITAC

Respondents elevated the case on appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) by filing a notice of appeal and an appeal memorandum.

Ruling of the NLRC

In a Decision 4 dated February 29, 2016, the NLRC ruled in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 06 November 2015 rendered by Labor Arbiter Mariano L. Bactin is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is issued dismissing complainant-appellee's complaint for lack of merit. All other dispositions are set aside except for the award of (a) 13th month pay for the year 2013, (b) rice allowance, (e) 14th and 15th month pay and (d) clothing allowance to be paid solely by respondent-appellant Tarlac I Electric Cooperative, Inc.

SO ORDERED.

The NLRC found that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the validity of the NEA Memoranda, considering that it had no jurisdiction to do so. Unless such memoranda is annulled in a direct proceeding, and not a collateral one such as the present illegal dismissal complaint, the legal presumption of its validity stands and should be given probative value. Petitioner was neither coerced to resign from TARELCO I nor forced to file his certificate of candidacy since he voluntarily pursued his candidacy despite full knowledge of its repercussions. Thus, the NLRC ruled that petitioner was not illegally dismissed, but instead, had effectively resigned from his employment.

Aside from this, the NLRC also ruled for the exclusion of respondent Allan G. Bermudez from being adjudged as jointly and solidarily liable for the payment of petitioner's monetary award absent any proof of bad faith or malice on his part.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision, but this was denied in a Resolution 5 dated April 29, 2016. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on July 25, 2016, and eventually a Petition for Certiorari on August 10, 2016.

Ruling of the CA

The CA denied petitioner's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in the First Assailed Resolution dated July 29, 2016, the dispositive portion of which reads: ICHDca

WHEREFORE, petitioner Manolo B. Gallarde's Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is hereby DENIED. This case is deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 20, 2016, but this was denied in the Second Assailed Resolution dated October 20, 2016.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the case for having been filed out of time and without determining the legal issues raised in the petition.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition for having been filed out of time.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

We find that the CA committed no reversible error in dismissing the petition.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is non-extendible. While there are certain exceptional cases wherein an extension may be granted upon the discretion of the court, the extension must have a reasonable or meritorious explanation. Our discussion on the matter in Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. (Formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.) v. Court of Appeals6 is applicable in this case, to wit:

In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. we had the occasion to settle the seeming conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 65 which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court's sound discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that 'no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.' Absent such a prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion."

Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus: TCAScE

[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel's receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009. It is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory.

Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules. Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of private respondent's counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule."

We see no reason to overturn the Resolutions of the CA. Petitioner not only failed to file his petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period, but he also filed his Motion for Extension of TimetoFile Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 after the expiration of the 60-day period. Worse, petitioner did not state any good excuse or justification to warrant the relaxation of the strict application of the 60-day period as elucidated in Labao v. Flores. 7

Thus, We find that the CA committed no reversible error in denying petitioner's Motion for Extension, as well as his Petition for Certiorari. cTDaEH

Lastly, pursuant to Rule 45 and other related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, governing appeals by certiorari to this Court, only petitions which are accompanied by or which strictly comply with the requirements specified therein shall be entertained. On this basis, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition for review on certiorari of the Resolutions dated July 29, 2016 and October 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, as the petition lacks:

a. Proper verification under Rule 45.1 in relation to Rule 7.4;

b. Clear and legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment/final order/resolution certified by the Clerk of Court of the court a quo, in violation of Rule 45.4 d and .5 in relation to Rule 56.5 d.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 29, 2016 and October 20, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146730 are hereby AFFIRMED. (Caguioa, J., designated as Fifth Member of the Third Division per Special Order No. 2417 dated January 4, 2017)

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 22-24. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Jhosep Y. Lopez.

2.Id. at 27-29.

3.Id. at 42-54. Rendered by Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Mariano L. Bactin.

4.Id. at 56-71. Penned by Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Grace E. Maniquiz-Tan and Commissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley.

5.Id. at 80-83.

6. G.R. No. 191215, February 3, 2014, 715 SCRA 153, 163-168.

7. G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 723.