SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9415. June 30, 2021.]
SALVADOR G. GALAO, petitioner,vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO G. MANLAPAO, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 30 June 2021 which reads as follows:
"A.C. No. 9415 — (Salvador G. Galao v. Atty. Edmundo G. Manlapao, Jr.). — While a lawyer is mandated to serve his clients with competence and diligence, his zealousness cannot extend to representing them even after his authority to appear as their counsel had ceased.
ANTECEDENTS
The present disbarment case, stemmed from two illegal dismissal cases, filed by several security guards sometime in September 2010 against Maricalum Mining Corporation Security Force (MMCSF) and "G" Holdings, Inc. (GHI), where Atty. Edmundo G. Manlapao, Jr. (Atty. Manlapao) stood as counsel for the security guards. In the first illegal dismissal case entitled "Anthony H. Taleon, et al.v. G Holdings, Inc., et al.," 1 Atty. Manlapao represented the following individuals, among others: Douglas G. Carnazo (Carnazo), Roseberto C. Sinahon (Sinahon), Eddie A. dela Cruz (dela Cruz), Danilo D. Dalumpines (Dalumpines), Virgilio C. Obidas (Obidas) and Lope G. Hallara, Jr. (Hallara). In the second illegal dismissal case, 2 Atty. Manlapao appeared as the attorney of Edgardo G. Gumban (Gumban).
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the security guards. Consequently, GHI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). MMCSF, through its general manager Salvador G. Galao (Galao), also appealed.
On August 1, 2011, pending appeal, security guards Carnazo, Sinahon, dela Cruz and Gumban (Carnazo, et al.) withdrew the authority they have given to Atty. Manlapao to represent them in the illegal dismissal cases. 3 Subsequently, Carnazo, et al., entered into a Compromise Agreement with MMCSF, signed Waiver and Quitclaims releasing MMCSF from liabilities in exchange for the settlement of their wages and monetary claims, 4 and filed individual motions to dismiss the cases. 5 However, on August 24, 2011, Atty. Manlapao opposed the motions to dismiss, contending that he had no knowledge of the filing of these pleadings. 6
On September 5, 2011, Carnazo, et al., reiterated in a letter addressed to the NLRC Commissioner that they have withdrawn Atty. Manlapao's authority and clarified that they did not authorize Atty. Manlapao to file the Opposition to their motions to dismiss. 7 Eventually, on December 8, 2011, the NLRC granted Carnazo, et al.'s motions to dismiss and approved the compromise agreements. 8
On January 9, 2012, Atty. Manlapao filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) 9 of the NLRC's decision granting Carnazo, et al.'s motions to dismiss. Although the MR was verified only by Hallara and a certain Jessie Escosura, 10 Atty. Manlapao claimed that he represented all the security guards-complainants.
On March 9, 2012, the remaining complainants, namely: Dalumpines, Obidas, and Hallara, entered into Compromise Agreements with the MMCSF. They signed Quitclaim, Release, and Waiver Documents and likewise revoked the authority they had given to Atty. Manlapao to represent them. 11 Further, Hallara executed an Affidavit revoking his signature in the MR dated January 9, 2012. 12
Subsequently, the NLRC denied Atty. Manlapao's MR. On March 13, 2012, despite the letters of withdrawal of authority, Atty. Manlapao still filed a Manifestation stating that the January 9, 2012 MR was filed in representation of all the security guards-complainants, including Carnazo, et al., to wit:
MANIFESTATION
COME NOW complainants in the above entitled case, by counsel, and to this Honorable Commission respectfully state:
That on January 9, 2012[,] the herein complainants filed a motion for reconsideration from the Decision in the above entitled cases;
That in its Resolution dated January 31, 2012, which the complainants received through counsel on March 5, 2012, the Commission stated that the motion for reconsideration was filed by Jessie Escosura and Lope Hallara, Jr.;
That the said statement is not accurate because the motion was filed by all the complainants as shown in the following portions of the motion:
a. The motion was filed under the caption of the two cases and [the] opening statement says:
"COME NOW the complainants in the above-entitled cases x x x";
b. The last sentence of the motion states: "Complainants pray for other just and equitable [sic] in the premises";
c. The undersigned counsel signed the motion as "Counsel for the Complainants."
That Jessie Escosura and Lope Hallara, Jr. were just the complainants who verified the motion, but it should not be taken to mean that they were the only ones who filed the motion for reconsideration. 13 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Hence, Galao instituted the present disbarment case against Atty. Manlapao. Galao claimed that Atty. Manlapao's filing of the MR and Manifestation, even after his authority to represent the security guards as an attorney, had been withdrawn, and constitutes professional misconduct. 14
In his Comment, 15 Atty. Manlapao argued that Galao is not a party-in-interest to the case, not being one of the clients he represented. Atty. Manlapao also averred that he was not privy to the waiver, quitclaims, and compromise agreement signed by the security guards.
In his Report and Recommendation dated July 18, 2016, 16 the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Manlapao be held administratively liable for willfully appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority, and that Atty. Manlapao be penalized with a fine of P5,000.00, with a stern warning that a similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
In its Resolution dated May 27, 2017, 17 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors adopted in toto the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It also denied Atty. Manlapao's MR in its Resolution dated June 18, 2019. 18
Afterward, the case was transmitted to this Court for review.
Meanwhile, the Court NOTES the IBP Board of Governor's (1) Notice of Resolution No. XXII-2017-1083 dated May 27, 2017, 19 which adopted the findings of fact and recommendations of the investigating commissioner in his Report dated July 18, 2016 imposing the penalty of fine of P5,000.00; and (2) Notice of Resolution dated June 18, 2019, 20 which denied the motion for reconsideration there being no new reasons or arguments adduced to justify the reversal of the previous decision of the Board of Governors, transmitted by letter dated March 12, 2020 of Director Randall C. Tabayoyong, IBP' Commission on Bar Discipline, together with the records and compact disc containing the PDF file of the case.
RULING
The Court adopts the findings and recommended penalty of the IBP Investigating Commissioner as affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors.
Atty. Manlapao primarily argues that Galao has no legal interest to file the disbarment case against him, not being one of his clients. Further, he avers that he was not privy to the documents signed by the security guards.
Atty. Manlapao's contentions fail to persuade the Court.
Even if Galao was not one of Atty. Manlapao's clients, Galao could still file the disbarment complaint against him owing to the sui generis nature of a disbarment proceeding. A disbarment or suspension proceeding is neither purely civil nor purely criminal, and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor. 21 The public interest is the primary objective, and the true question for determination is whether or not a member of the Bar is still fit to be allowed to retain such membership. 22 Besides, Section 21, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court unequivocally provides that "proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the IBP, upon the verified complaint of any person." 23
On the other hand, Atty. Manlapao's contention that he was not privy to the documents signed by the security guards deserves scant consideration. In his Comment, he admitted that he received the pleadings and documents signed by the security guards through mail. 24 These documents were notarized. Well-settled is the rule that "a duly notarized contract enjoys the prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution, as well as the full faith and credence attached to a public instrument. To overturn this legal presumption, the evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant to establish that there was a forgery that gave rise to a spurious contract." 25 Since Atty. Manlapao failed to allege, much less prove, that the documents were spurious or falsified, these documents are presumed to be authentic and have been duly executed.
Now, on to the merits. Generally, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears. 26 A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from his client. 27 Nevertheless, a lawyer must be mindful that he has no power to act as counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed, unless by leave of court. 28 To do otherwise, is to run the risk of facing disciplinary actions.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among others, corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Villahermosa, Sr. vs. Caracol, 29(Villahermosa) Atty. Caracol was found administratively liable for filing a motion, which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela," although he was not authorized by the plaintiffs in the case. Worse, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren was not his client and had already been dead for more than a year from the filing of the motion, yet, Atty. Caracol misrepresented himself as Efren's counsel, submitted documents with Efren's falsified signature, and failed to inform the court about Efren's demise. Thus, the Court suspended Atty. Caracol from the practice of law for a year, noting that he used "underhanded means," which cannot be condoned.
On the other hand, in Vargas v. Ignes30(Vargas), the Court ruled that Atty. Ignes' acts of appearing as counsel for Koronadal Water District and filing two cases in court, even after his authority as its counsel had expired, were tantamount to willfully and deliberately appearing as counsel without authority. He was fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). Likewise, the respondent in Santayana v. Alampay31(Santayana) was meted with the same penalty when he appeared as private counsel of the National Electrification Administration and filed a MR and petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals sans authority from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and the Commission on Audit.
In this case, Atty. Manlapao is guilty of willfully appearing as counsel without authority. He filed a MR claiming that he represented all security guards and a Manifestation reiterating that all the security guards filed the MR. 32 However, Atty. Manlapao knew fully well, that some of his clients had already withdrawn their authority and had already entered into compromise agreements with MMCSF. By filing these pleadings, he misled, or allowed the trial court to be misled, as regards his authority to represent individuals who had already ceased to be his clients. He also failed to observe candor towards the opposing party. These are violations of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 8 — A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, x x x.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01. A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Further, Canon 19 provides that "A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW." While a lawyer is mandated to serve his clients with competence and diligence, his zealousness cannot extend to representing them even after his authority to appear as their counsel had ceased. Indubitably, to act as one's counsel without authority is already outside the bounds of the law.
Anent the penalty, the Court has repeatedly held that disbarment should be imposed only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar, or where the misconduct borders on the criminal or committed under the scandalous circumstance. 33 Conversely, where a lesser penalty corresponding to the infraction may suffice, the lesser penalty should be imposed.
In Villahermosa, 34 the Court suspended the erring lawyer for one year because he committed other infractions aside from failing to obtain authority from the real parties-in-interest in the case. On the other hand, in the cases of Santayana35 and Vargas, 36 the Court imposed the penalty of a P5,000.00 fine upon the lawyers who appeared as attorney without authority but did not commit other violations.
In this case, the Court deems it proper to impose the penalty imposed in Santayana and Vargas because no other infraction was committed by Atty. Manlapao. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, no prejudice was inflicted upon the complainant and any of the parties.
FOR THE STATED REASONS, Atty. Edmundo G. Manlapao is GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority and FINED P5,000.00. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar infractions in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Manlapao is required to submit proof of payment of the fine within five (5) days from receipt of this resolution.
SO ORDERED." (Lopez, J.Y., J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Docketed as NLRC RAB Case No. VI-09-10707-10, pp. 15-18.
2. Docketed as NLRC RAB Case No. VI-09-10729-10, pp. 19-20.
3.Rollo, pp. 21-32.
4.Id. at 46-57.
5.Id. at 304.
6.Id. at 81-84.
7.Id. at 85-90.
8.Id. at 6.
9.Id. at 178-192.
10.Id. at 193.
11.Id. at 8.
12.Id. at 7.
13.Id. at 195-197.
14.Id. at Volume II, Preliminary Mandatory Brief of the IBP-CBD, pp. 29-36.
15.Id. at 222-234.
16.Id. at Volume V, Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD, pp. 2-9.
17.Id. at 331.
18.Id. at 330.
19.Id. at 331.
20.Id. at 330.
21. In re: Almacen v. Yaptinchay, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970.
22.Bides-Ulaso v. Noe-Lacsamana, 617 Phil. 1, 14 (2009).
23. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. x x x.
24.Rollo, p. 229.
25.Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 267 (2017).
26. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may there upon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
27.Land Bank of the Phils. v. Pamintuan Development Co., 510 Phil. 839, 843-844 (2005).
28.Villahermosa, Sr. v. Caracol, 751 Phil. 1, 7 (2015).
29.751 Phil. 1, 4 (2015).
30.637 Phil. 1, 13 (2010).
31.494 Phil. 1, 4 (2005).
32.Rollo, pp. 178-197.
33.Ko v. Maduramente, A.C. No. 11118, July 14, 2020.
34.Supra note 26.
35.Supra note 28.
36.Supra note 27.