Gabriela Women's Party v. Commission on Elections

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 225198. February 7, 2017.]

GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS NATIONAL CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 7, 2017, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 225198 (Gabriela Women's Party, represented by its National Chairperson, Hon. Emerenciana A. De Jesus vs. Commission on Elections). — This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court, which seeks to annul and set aside the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) Resolution No. 008-16 2 dated May 19, 2016 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), sitting en banc as the NBOC for Senators and Party-List Representatives.

On May 9, 2016, the national and local elections, including the party-list elections, were held. Gabriela Women's Party (GABRIELA) was one of the candidates for the position of party-list representative. On May 19, 2016, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the NBOC for Senators and Party-List Representatives, issued NBOC Resolution No. 008-16, 3 which declared the winning party-list groups in the party-list elections. The pertinent portion of NBOC Resolution No. 008-16 reads:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), Republic Act Nos. 9369, 8436, 7166, 6646 and other election laws, and applying the rule in Banat vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 179271, dated April 21, 2009), the [COMELEC] sitting en banc as the [NBOC] for Party-List DECLARES the following party-list groups as winners in the party-list elections of May 9, 2016, entitled to the total seat/s, as provided next to their respective names, to serve for a term of three (3) years, beginning noon of June 30, 2016, in accordance with Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

POLITICAL PARTY/	ACRONYM	GRAND	PERCENTAGE	GUARANTEED	ADDITIONAL
COALITIONS/		TOTAL	(%) OF TOTAL	SEATS	SEATS	TOTAL
SECTORAL			VOTES			SEATS
ORGANIZATIONS			GARNERED
Ako Bicol Political	AKO BICOL	1,664,975	5.1423	1	2	3
Party
Gabriela Women's	GABRIELA	1,367,795	4.2245	1	1	2
Party
One Patriotic Coalition	1PACMAN	1,310,197	4.0466	1	1	2
of Marginalized
Nationals
Act Teachers Party-List	ACT	1,180,752	3.6468	1	1	2
	TEACHERS
Coalition of	SENIOR	988,876	3.0542	1	1	2
Associations of Senior	CITIZENS
Citizens in the
Philippines
Kabalikat ng	KABAYAN	840,393	2.5956	1	1	2
Mamamayan
Agri-Agra na Reporma	AGRI	833,821	2.5753	1	1	2
para sa Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas Movement
Puwersa ng Bayaning	PBA	780,309	2.4100	1	1	2
Atleta
Buhay Hayaan	BUHAY	760,912	2.3501	1	1	2
Yumabong
Abono Party-List	ABONO	732,060	2.2610	1	1	2
Anak Mindanao Party-	AMIN	706,689	2.1826	1	1	2
List
Cooperative Natcco	COOP-	671,699	2.0746	1	1	2
Network Party	NATCCO
Akbayan Citizens'	AKBAYAN	608,449	1.8792			1
Action Party
Bayan Muna	BAYAN	606,566	1.8734			1
		MUNA
Agricultural Sector	AGAP	593,748	1.8338			1
Alliance of the
Philippines
An Waray	AN WARAY	590,895	1.8250			1
Citizens Battle Against	CIBAC	555,760	1.7165			1
Corruption
Ang Asosasyon Sang	AAMBIS-OWA	495,483	1.5303			1
Mangunguma Nga
Bisaya Owa
Mangunguma, Inc.
Advocacy for Social	KALINGA	494,725	1.5280			1
Empowerment and
Nation Building
Through Easing
Poverty, Inc.
Advocacy for Teacher	A TEACHER,	475,488	1.4686			1
Empowerment Through	INC.
Action Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational Reforms,
Inc.
You Against Corruption	YACAP	471,173	1.4552			1
and Poverty
Democratic Independent	DIWA	467,794	1.4448			1
Workers Association,
Inc.
Trade Union Congress	TUCP	467,275	1.4432			1
Party
Abang Lingkod, Inc.	ABANG	466,701	1.4414			1
		LINGKOD
LPG Marketers	LPGMA	466,103	1.4396			1
Association, Inc.
Alliance of	ALONA	434,856	1.3431			1
Organizations,
Networks and
Associations of the
Philippines, Inc.
Social Amelioration &	I-SAGIP	397,064	1.2263			1
Genuine Intervention
on Poverty
Butil Farmers Party	BUTIL	395,011	1.2200			1
Acts-Overseas Filipino	ACTS-OFW	374,601	1.1570			1
Workers Coalition of
Organizations
Anakpawis	ANAKPAWIS	367,376	1.1347			1
Ang Kabuhayan	ANG	348,533	1.0765			1
		KABUHAYAN
Angkla: Ang Partido ng	ANGKLA	337,245	1.0416			1
mga Pilipinong Marino,
Inc.
Ang Mata'y Alagaan	MATA	331,285	1.0232			1
1st Consumers Alliance	1-CARE	329,627	1.0181			1
for Rural Energy, Inc.
Ang National Coalition	ANAC-IP	318,257	0.9829			1
of Indigenous Peoples
Action Na!, Inc.
Arts Business and	ABS	301,457	0.9311			1
Science Professionals
Kabataan Party-List	KABATAAN	300,420	0.9279			1
Bagong Henerasyon	BH (Bagong	299,381	0.9246			1
Henerasyon)
Ating Agapay Sentrong	AASENSO	294,281	0.9089			1
Samahan ng mga
Obrero, Inc.
Serbisyo sa Bayan Party	SBP	280,465	0.8662			1
Magdalo Para sa	MAGDALO	279,356	0.8628			1
Pilipino
Una ang Edukasyon	1-ANG	278,393	0.8598			1
		EDUKASYON
Manila Teachers'	MANILA	268,613	0.8296			1
Savings and Loan	TEACHERS
Association, Inc.
Kusug Tausug	KUSUG	247,487	0.7644			1
		TAUSUG
Aangat Tayo	AANGAT	243,266	0.7513			1
Agbiag! Timpuyog	AGBIAG!	240,273	0.7435			1
Ilocano, Inc.
						––––
	TOTAL					59
						===

SO ORDERED. 4

During the proclamation of the winning party-list groups, GABRIELA raised a point of clarification as regards the allocation of seats among the winning party-list groups. It claimed that it is entitled to two more seats in addition to their one guaranteed seat. The COMELEC brushed aside GABRIELA's manifestation and only declared a total of two seats for GABRIELA. 5

On May 20, 2016, GABRIELA filed its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Correction of Manifest Error and Proclamation of additional seat for GABRIELA with the COMELEC en banc. 6 It pointed out that considering that there are 238 seats available to legislative districts, using the formula for determining the seats available to party-list representatives laid down by the Court in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, 7 59.5 seats are reserved for party-list representatives in the House of Representatives. 8 CAIHTE

GABRIELA further explained that in computing the number of additional seats to which each of the party-list groups who have obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections, the percentage of the total votes they garnered should be multiplied by the remaining available seats, which is the difference between the total seats reserved and the guaranteed seats of the two percenters. Thereafter, GABRIELA averred that the whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. 9

GABRIELA's argument can be summed up as follows:

238 (No. of seats available for
legislative districts)
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––	x	0.20	=	59.5
0.80
4.2245% (GABRIELA's percentage		47.5 (59.5 less the
of total votes garnered)	x	12 guaranteed seats of	=	2.0066375
		the two percenters)

Accordingly, GABRIELA claimed that it is entitled to two additional seats or a total of three party-list seats. It pointed out that the COMELEC, in computing the additional seat/s to which it is entitled, rounded down the number of reserved seats to party-list representatives from 59.5 to 59, thereby arriving at 1.985515 instead of 2.0066375. GABRIELA posited that COMELEC's mathematical inaccuracy deprived it of an additional seat. 10

The NBOC Legal Group referred the said Omnibus Motion to the NBOC Supervisory Committee for appropriate action. 11

On May 24, 2016, GABRIELA filed a Submission, which, inter alia, requested that its Omnibus Motion be set for hearing. 12 GABRIELA's request was likewise referred to the NBOC Supervisory Committee for appropriate action. 13

On June 1, 2016, the NBOC Supervisory Committee recommended that GABRIELA's Omnibus Motion be denied for lack of merit. 14 It pointed out that GABRIELA's claim that the reserved seats for party-list representatives, for purposes of computing the additional seats, should be pegged at 59.5 and not 59 is misplaced since fractional seats should be disregarded. 15 It claimed that the COMELEC correctly applied the formula laid down by the Court in BANAT. 16

On June 7, 2016, GABRIELA filed with the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion to Resolve its Omnibus Motion. 17 On July 11, 2016, while its Omnibus Motion was still pending before the COMELEC en banc, GABRIELA filed with this Court this petition for certiorari, claiming that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring that it is only entitled to one additional seat.

On July 19, 2016, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 16-0481, which adopted the NBOC Supervisory Committee's recommendation. 18 GABRIELA received a copy of COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 16-0481 on August 15, 2016. 19

In support of this petition, GABRIELA maintains that it is entitled to two more seats in addition to its guaranteed seat. It claims that the COMELEC is not entitled to use its discretion in disregarding the 0.5 from the product of the computation for the determination of the 20% of party-list seats. 20

Moreover, GABRIELA claims that the use of 60 allocated seats, instead of 59 as used by the COMELEC as basis for issuing NBOC Resolution No. 008-16, is more consistent with the policy declaration of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. 21 It explains that, mathematically, 59 is 19.8653% while 60 is 20.1342%, and that both are 20% if rounded off. GABRIELA argues that fixing the reserved seats for party-list representatives at 60 favors broader participation. 22

On the other hand, the COMELEC, in its Comment, 23 avers that the instant petition should be dismissed for utter lack of merit. It asserts that GABRIELA committed forum shopping when it filed this petition for certiorari despite the pendency of its motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc. 24

The COMELEC further alleges that it did not commit any abuse of discretion when it ruled that GABRIELA is only entitled to one seat in addition to its guaranteed seat. 25 It maintains that in computing the number of seats for party-list representatives in the 2016 elections, it correctly used the whole integer 59 instead of 59.5 since there are no fractional seats under R.A. No. 7941. 26 The COMELEC further alleges that to declare that there should be 60 party-list seats would contravene the first inviolable parameter of the Philippine party-list system, which provides that the total number of all party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives. 27

Ruling of the Court

The petition is dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.

"Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment." 28 "There is forum shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one (1) forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari." 29 "It is an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already congested court dockets." 30

To deter the pernicious practice of forum shopping, Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court mandates that: DETACa

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

GABRIELA committed forum shopping when it filed this petition for certiorari with the Court despite the pendency of its Omnibus Motion with the COMELEC. In filing this petition without awaiting the resolution of its pending Omnibus Motion with the COMELEC, GABRIELA asked for simultaneous remedies in two different fora. 31 Indeed, the Omnibus Motion then pending with the COMELEC en banc and this petition for certiorari both seek the same relief, i.e., that NBOC Resolution No. 008-16 be reconsidered and corrected in order to reflect the correct number of seats that GABRIELA allegedly won.

"The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts." 32 GABRIELA abused the court processes when it filed this petition with the Court despite the pendency of its Omnibus Motion with the COMELEC en banc.

Worse, contrary to the directive of Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, GABRIELA did not even bother to state in its verification and certification of non-forum shopping the fact that its Omnibus Motion was then still pending before the COMELEC. 33

GABRIELA's failure to comply with the rule against forum shopping alone constitutes a sufficient ground to dismiss this petition. 34 To avoid any confusion, the Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum shopping, and any violation of these rules results in the dismissal of a case. 35

However, the Court deems it proper to make the following observations which, although rendered unnecessary by the dismissal of this petition on account of GABRIELA's commission of forum shopping, should nevertheless be pointed out:

First, there are only 59 seats reserved for party-list representatives in the 2016 elections, not 60 as claimed by GABRIELA. Section 5 (2) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." To compute the maximum number of seats available to party-list representatives, the Court has laid down the following formula in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, 36 as affirmed by BANAT:

Number of seats available
to legislative districts				Number of seats available to
––––––––––––––––––––	x	.20	=	party-list representatives
.80

There are 238 seats for district representatives in 2016 elections. Applying the formula laid down by the Court in Veterans and BANAT, the product of 59.5 is obtained, viz.:

238
––––	x	.20	=	59.5
.80

In determining the maximum number of seats reserved for party-list representatives, only the whole integer of 59 is considered. This is because what is being determined is the number of seats that can actually be allocated to the winning party-list groups and a fraction of a seat fails in this qualification since only a complete or undivided count guarantees the grant of a seat. Logic would dictate that a fraction of a seat cannot be properly allocated to the winning party-list groups.

The maximum number of seats available to party-list representatives cannot be pegged at 60 since it would violate the first inviolable parameter of the Philippine-style party-list election laid down by the Court in Veterans and BANAT, i.e., the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list. If the maximum number of party-list seats would be fixed at 60, this would bring the total number of representatives to 298 and, accordingly, the percentage of party-list representatives would be equal to 20.1342%. aDSIHc

Admittedly, fixing the maximum number of reserved seats for party-list representatives to 59 would bring the total number of representatives to 297 and, in such case, the percentage of party-list representatives would only be equal to 19.8653%, which is less than the 20% constitutional threshold. Nevertheless, the Court has already determined that Section 5 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory; it merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress. 37 The total number of party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. 38

Second, it behooves the COMELEC, having the particular expertise as the agency charged with the enforcement and administration of all election laws, rules and regulations, to make an exhaustive re-examination of its computation on the allocation of seats among the winning party-list groups considering its far-reaching effects.

The allocation of seats to the winning party-list groups involves two rounds. The first round of seat allocation involves the grant of one guaranteed seat to each of the parties, organizations, and coalitions who have received at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list candidates after they have been ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of votes they each obtained. 39 In the 2016 elections, only 12 party-list groups have obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for party-list candidates. 40 Thus, 47 available seats remain which would then be distributed in the second round of seat allocation.

The second round of seat allocation, in turn, involves two steps: first, the percentage of total votes garnered by the party-list group is multiplied by the remaining available seats, i.e., the difference between the maximum seats reserved for party-list representatives and the guaranteed seats of the two percenters. The whole integer of the product thereof corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. 41 The first step of the second round of seat allocation can be summed up in the following formula:

Percentage of total	x	(maximum seats reserved for	=	whole integer of the
votes garnered		party-list representatives less		product is the party's
		guaranteed seats of the		share in the remaining
		two percenters)		available seats

This case presented two versions on how the remaining available seats would be allocated in the first step of the second round of seat allocation. GABRIELA's version used the multiplicand 59.5, representing the reserved seats for party-list representatives in the 2016 elections. Using GABRIELA's version, the computation of the additional seat/s to which GABRIELA is entitled would be as follows:

4.2245%

x

(59.5-12)

=

2.0066375

If GABRIELA would be granted two additional seats, instead of only one as ruled by the COMELEC, 13 party-list seats would be allocated to 11 party-list groups 42 in the first step of the second round of seat allocation, leaving 34 seats to be distributed to the qualified party-list groups in the second step of the second round of seat allocation.

On the other hand, the COMELEC's version used 59 as the reserved seats for party-list representatives in the 2016 elections. Using the COMELEC's version, GABRIELA would only be entitled to one additional seat, viz.:

4.2245%

x

(59-12)

=

1.985515

Pursuant to the COMELEC's version, only 12 seats would be allocated to 11 party-list groups 43 in the first step of the second round of seat allocation, leaving 35 seats to be distributed to the qualified party-list groups in the second step of the second round of seat allocation.

Under the second step of the second round of seat allocation, one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank is assigned until all available seats are completely distributed. The three-seat cap is then applied to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list groups are entitled to. 44

Pursuant to GABRIELA's version, the remaining 34 seats would be distributed to the parties next in rank by assigning one seat to each of them, from Cooperative Natcco Network Party and so forth until the remaining seats are all distributed. However, since GABRIELA qualified for two additional seats, the last ranked party-list group, Agbiag! Timpuyog Ilocano, Inc., would necessarily lose its seat in the House of Representatives. Under the COMELEC's version, however, Agbiag! Timpuyog Ilocano, Inc., would still qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives since there are still 35 seats to be allocated in the second step of the second round of seat allocation. ETHIDa

Nevertheless, considering that the winning party-list groups have already been proclaimed by the COMELEC and their respective representatives have already assumed office, matters concerning the adjustment of seats granted to the qualified party-list groups, if any, should be brought to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal; the Court may not pass upon the same in this certiorari action. 45

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Velasco, Jr., Peralta and Del Castillo, JJ., no part. Caguioa, J., on leave. (adv46)

 

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) FELIPA B. ANAMAClerk of Court

(With Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and

Separate Opinions

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:

I concur with the ponencia's finding that petitioner Gabriela Women's Party's (GABRIELA) petition for certiorari1 should be dismissed outright on the ground of forum shopping. As the ponencia holds, GABRIELA committed forum shopping when it filed the instant petition before the Court despite the pendency of its Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration 2 with respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking the same relief — i.e., the reconsideration and/or correction of NBOC Resolution No. 008-16 3 in order to increase GABRIELA's entitlement to party-list seats. Worse, GABRIELA did not even bother to disclose the pendency of said incident in the attached verification and certification of non-forum shopping. This blatant commission of forum shopping should not be countenanced; hence, the dismissal of the petition is warranted. 4

As the petition has been dismissed solely on this ground, the Court is precluded from making a definitive pronouncement on the actual merits of this case. Therefore, the statements made by the ponencia on this score 5 partake of the nature of an obiter dictum, which thus, lacks binding force. 6

All the more, the party-list representatives for the 2016 Elections had already been proclaimed, and now have assumed office. Hence, the adjustment of seats and the concomitant qualification and disqualification of representatives are matters that should be properly brought before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its members. 7

This notwithstanding, I offer my own observations on the substantive aspect of this case merely for the constructive guidance and considered reflection of the adjudicating tribunal when the proper case arises.

I.

The guidelines in allocating the seats available to party-list representatives were laid down in Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC (Veterans), 8 which were further refined in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. COMELEC (BANAT). 9 Based on these guidelines, the process for computation is as follows:

1. The maximum number of available party list seats (APLS), which under Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution "shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list," shall be first determined. This is arrived at by using the following formula:

Number of Seats				Number of
available to				Seats Available
legislative districts	x	0.20	=	to Party List
––––––––––––––––––				Representatives
0.80				(or APLS) 10

2. Once the APLS is determined, the party-list candidates shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 11

3. The percentage of votes that each party-list candidate garnered shall then be ascertained by using the following formula:

Number of votes garnered	=	Percentage of votes
–––––––––––––––––––––		garnered 12
Total votes cast

Upon this determination, all party-list candidates that garnered at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast (in other words, "the two percenters") shall each be automatically entitled to one (1) seat. This constitutes the first round of allocation of the available party-list seats. The total number of seats allotted to the "two percenters" (TP) shall then be noted for the next step. 13

4. Any of the "two percenters" may then qualify for additional seats by using the following formula:

Percentage of				Additional Seat
total votes	x	(APLS - TP)	=	for Party-List
garnered				Candidate 14

It should be noted, however, that should the foregoing application yield a product constituting fractional values (e.g., 0.66, 1.87, 2.39), said product shall be ROUNDED-DOWN to the nearest whole integer as the prevailing laws and rules do not allow for fractional seats. 15

Also, it should be noted that no party-list candidate shall be awarded more than two (2) additional seats, since a party may only hold a maximum of three (3) seats. 16 cSEDTC

5. If the APLS has not been fully exhausted by the first allocation of seats to the two percenters, including the allocation of additional seats under Step 4 above, then the remaining seats shall then be allocated (one [1] seat each) to the parties next in rank, i.e., those "two percenters" that did not qualify for an additional seat pursuant to Step 4, 17 and thereafter, those who did not get at least two percent (2%) of the total number of votes cast, until all the available seats are completely distributed. 18

In BANAT, Steps 4 and 5 constitute the second round of allocation of the available party-list seats. However, it is my view that Step 4, i.e., the process of allocating additional seats to the "two percenters" should be demarcated from Step 5, i.e., the process of filling up the APLS by giving seats to the "two percenters" that did not qualify for additional seats under Step 4, and thereafter, to the "non-two percenters" next in rank until all the available seats are distributed, considering that Steps 4 and 5 each cover an allocation process distinct from the other. Hence, in the interest of conceptual integrity, there should be three (3) rounds of seat allocation, instead of two (2) as enunciated in BANAT:

A. The first round of allocation constitutes the distribution of guaranteed seats to the qualified two percenters.

B. The second round of allocation constitutes the distribution of additional seats in addition to the guaranteed seats of the qualified two percenters.

C. The third round of allocation constitutes the distribution of seats to the "two percenters" that failed to earn additional seats under the second round of allocation, and thereafter, the "non-two percenters" by rank until all available party-list seats are filled up.

II.

In the case at bar, what is peculiar is that the application of Step 1 as indicated above, i.e., the determination of the APLS, yielded a product containing a fractional value, as follows:

238
––––	x	.20	=	59.5
0.80

This is different from the factual circumstances in both Veterans and BANAT, wherein whole numbers were arrived at right after the preliminary application of Step 1 above (i.e., 52 for Veterans and 55 for BANAT). As such, the Court, in those cases, did not have any opportunity to deliberate upon the consequences of arriving at fractional numbers after the application of Step 1. Fractional numbers were arrived at in BANAT, but only with respect to the allocation of additional seats to the "two percenters" of the 2007 Elections, which process already constitutes Step 4 above. Thus, it was held: AIDSTE

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. 19 (Emphases supplied)

Due to variance in milieu, the question of whether or not the rounding-off of the preliminary APLS figure is warranted under our laws is a novel issue, and is, in fact, the bone of contention of the parties before this Court.

The COMELEC's position is that the APLS figure arrived at this case, i.e., 59.5, should be ROUNDED-DOWN to the nearest whole integer, i.e., 59, considering that to round-off the figure to 60 would bring the total number of representatives to 298. This would, in turn, increase the percentage of party-list representatives to 20.1342% of the entire membership of the House of Representatives and, as a consequence, violate the 20% ceiling laid down by Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. As remarked, there is simply no provision in our prevailing laws and rules on party-list elections allowing for a fractional seat. 20

Thus, using the rounded-down figure of 59, GABRIELA would be entitled to: (a) one (1) guaranteed seat by virtue of getting at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast in the party-list elections; and (b) only one (1) additional seat, since an application of the formula to determine entitlement to an additional seat yielded 1.985515, 21 which would then be rounded-down to the nearest whole integer, which is 1.

On the other hand, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen), in his Separate Concurring Opinion, sides with the position of GABRIELA that the APLS figure of 59.5 should stay "as is" when computing for the potential additional seats that a "two-percenter" such as GABRIELA should get, arguing that: (a) the quote in BANAT, wherein it was stated that "[f]ractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats," was only in reference to fractional numbers yielded after the additional seats are computed (Step 4 above), and did not pertain to the fractional numbers yielded in computing for the APLS (Step 1 above); 22 (b) disregarding fractional numbers only after computing the additional seats provides a logical and mathematically sound interpretation to the formulas in Veterans and BANAT; 23 and (c) the process of retaining the APLS as it is provides for greater representation and participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups. 24 Thus, Justice Leonen concludes that GABRIELA should get two (2) additional seats instead of only one (1), since an application of the formula to determine entitlement to an additional seat yielded 2.006638, 25 which when rounded-down to the nearest whole integer, would be 2.

Further, Justice Leonen observes that giving another seat to GABRIELA would not push the total party-list seats to 60 and thus violate the 20% constitutional limit, considering that another party-list who got at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast, namely, Cooperative Natcco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), should not have been entitled to an additional seat, as the COMELEC computed. This is because, whether one applies the "rounded down APLS" of 59 (0.975062) 26 or the "as is APLS" of 59.5 (0.985435), 27 COOP-NATCCO would only gain a fractional additional seat which is less than 1. Hence, as per BANAT, the COMELEC should not have rounded up these figures so as to accord COOP-NATCCO an additional seat.

III.

At the outset, I respectfully disagree with Justice Leonen's finding that COOP-NATCCO should not have been entitled to an additional seat. While the application of Step 4 as described above to COOP-NATCCO's case — regardless of the usage of "rounded-down" APLS of 59 or the "as is" APLS of 59.5 — would altogether yield a fractional figure less than 1, the subsequent application of Step 5 as described above will result in COOP-NATCCO getting an additional seat before all the other non-two percenters next in rank are given one (1) seat each until all available seats are fully exhausted. In other words, while COOP-NATCCO did not qualify for an additional seat under the application of Step 4 above, it is entitled to an additional seat pursuant to the filling up process under Step 5, in accordance with BANAT.

Further, I harbor certain reservations on Justice Leonen's statement that maintaining the APLS figure "as is" at 59.5 — which means no rounding-off, either up or down — "not only fulfills the constitutional allocation but also provides for greater representation and participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups." 28

It should be emphasized that this Court's eventual determination of the proper APLS to be used, whether "rounded-down" or "as is," would, in effect, constitute a definitive standard figure to be applied in all future cases, and not only to this one. Each election carries with it distinct voting results and, thus, would entail the application of the various computation steps to distinct figures. Hence, I venture into a hypothesis of whether or not the "as is" APLS, if applied to varying facts, would truly yield a result that would indeed ensure greater representation and participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups. A presentation of the would-be winners under both the "rounded-off" or "as is" APLS systems would be key to this endeavor. AaCTcI

IV.

In the COMELEC's NBOC Resolution No. 008-16 using the rounded down" APLS of 59, the winning party-lists were tabulated as follows:

POLITICAL	ACRONYM	GRAND	PERCENT-	GUARAN-	VALUE	ENTITLE-	DISTRIBU-	TOTAL
PARTY/		TOTAL	AGE	TEED	FOR	MENT TO	TION OF	SEATS
COALITIONS/			(%) OF	SEATS	DETERMI-	ADDITIO-	REMAIN-
SECTORAL			TOTAL	(STEP 3)	NATION OF	NAL SEATS	ING SEATS
ORGANIZATI			VOTES		ADDITIO-	(STEP 4)	(STEP 5)
ONS			GARNERED		NAL SEATS
					(59)
Ako Bicol	AKO BIKOL	1,664,975	5.1423	1	2.416881	2		3
Political Party
Gabriela	GABRIELA	1,367,795	4.2245	1	1.985515	1		2
Women's
Party
One Patriotic	1PACMAN	1,310,197	4.0466	1	1.901902	1		2
Coalition of
Marginalized
Nationals
Act Teachers	ACT	1,180,752	3.6468	1	1.713996	1		2
Party-List	TEACHERS
Coalition of	SENIOR	988,876	3.0542	1	1.435474	1		2
Associations	CITIZEN
of Senior
Citizens in the
Philippines
Kabalikat ng	KABAYAN	840,393	2.5956	1	1.219932	1		2
Mamamayan
Agri-Agra na	AGRI	833,821	2.5753	1	1.210391	1		2
Reporma para
sa Magsasaka
ng Pilipinas
Movement
Pwersa ng	PBA	780,309	2.4100	1	1.1327	1		2
Bayaning
Atleta
Buhay Hayaan	BUHAY	760,912	2.3501	1	1.104547	1		2
Yumabong
Abono Party-	ABONO	732,060	2.2610	1	1.06267	1		2
List
Anak	AMIN	706,689	2.1826	1	1.027542	1		2
Mindanao
Party-List
Cooperative	COOP-	671,699	2.0746	1	0.975062	1		1
Natcco	NATCCO
Network Party
Akbayan	AKBAYAN	608,449	1.8792				1	1
Citizens'
Action Party
Bayan Muna	BAYAN	606,566	1.8734				1	1
	MUNA
Agricultural	AGAP	593,748	1.8338				1	1
Sector
Alliance of the
Philippines
An Waray	AN WARAY	590,895	1.8250				1	1
Citizens Battle	CIBAC	555,760	1.7165				1	1
Against
Corruption
Ang	AAMBIS-	495,783	1.5303				1	1
Asosasyon	OWA
Sang
Mangunguma
Nga Bisaya
Owa
Mangunguma,
Inc.
Advocacy for	KALINGA	494,725	1.5280				1	1
Social
Empowerment
and Nation
Building
Through
Easing
Poverty, Inc.
Advocacy for	A TEACHER	475,488	1.4686				1	1
Teacher	INC.
Empowerment
Through
Action
Cooperation
and Harmony
Towards
Educational
Reforms, Inc.
You Against	YACAP	471,173	1.4552				1	1
Corruption
and Poverty
Democratic	DIWA	467,794	1.4448				1	1
Independent
Workers
Association,
Inc.
Trade Union	TUCP	467,275	1.4432				1	1
Congress
Party
Abang	ABANG	466,701	1.4414				1	1
Lingkod, Inc.	LINGKOD
LPG	LPGMA	466,103	1.4396				1	1
Marketers
Association,
Inc.
Alliance of	ALONA	434,856	1.3431				1	1
Organizations,
Networks and
Associations
of the
Philippines,
Inc.
Social	1-SAGIP	397,064	1.2263				1	1
Amelioration
& Genuine
Intervention
on Poverty
Butil Farmers	BUTIL	395,011	1.2200				1	1
Party
Acts-Overseas	ACTS-OFW	374,601	1.1570				1	1
Filipino
Workers
Coalition of
Organizations
Anakpawis	ANAKPAWIS	367,376	1.1347				1	1
Ang	ANG	348,533	1.0765				1	1
Kabuhayan	KABUHAYAN
Angkla: Ang	ANGKLA	337,245	1.0416				1	1
Partido ng
mga
Pilipinong
Marino, Inc.
Ang Mata'y	MATA	331,285	1.0232				1	1
Alagaan
1st Consumers	1-CARE	329,627	1.0181				1	1
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc.
Ang National	ANAC-1P	318,257	0.9829				1	1
Coalition of
Indigenous
Peoples
Action Nal,
Inc.
Arts Business	ABS	301,457	0.9311				1	1
and Science
Professionals
Kabataan	KABATAAN	300,420	0.9279				1	1
Party-List
Bagong	BH (Bagong	299,381	0.9246				1	1
Henerasyon	Henerasyon)
Ating Agapay	AASENSO	294,281	0.9089				1	1
Sentrong
Samahan ng
mga Obrero,
Inc.
Serbisyo sa	SBP	280,465	0.8662				1	1
Bayan Party
Magdalo Para	MAGDALO	279,356	0.8628				1	1
sa Pilipino
Una ang	1-ANG	278,393	0.8595				1	1
Edukasyon	EDUKASYON
Manila	MANILA	268,613	0.8296				1	1
Teachers'	TEACHERS
Savings and
Loan
Association,
Inc.
Kusug Tausug	KUSUG	247,487	0.7644				1	1
	TAUSUG
Aangat Tayo		243,266	0.7513				1	1
Agbiag!	AGBIAG!	240,723	0.7435				1	1
Timpuyog
Ilocano, Inc.
								––––
TOTAL								59
								====

 

Accordingly, rounding-down the APLS to 59 would, inter alia: (a) entitle GABRIELA to only two (2) seats; and (b) overall, qualify a total of 46 different party-list candidates to at least one (1) seat each, with Ako Bicol Political Party (AKO BIKOL) being the highest-ranked qualifier and Agbiag! Timpuyog Ilocano, Inc. (AGBIAG!) the lowest-ranked qualifier.

Meanwhile, the following is the tabulation of party-list seats applying the "as is" APLS of 59.5, as espoused by Justice Leonen:

 

POLITICAL	ACRONYM	GRAND	PERCENT-	GUARAN-	VALUE	ENTITLE-	DISTRIBU-	TOTAL
PARTY/		TOTAL	AGE	TEED	FOR	MENT TO	TION OF	SEATS
COALITIONS/			(%) OF	SEATS	DETERMI-	ADDITIO-	REMAIN-
SECTORAL			TOTAL	(STEP 3)	NATION OF	NAL SEATS	ING SEATS
ORGANIZATI			VOTES		ADDITIO-	(STEP 4)	(STEP 5)
ONS			GARNERED		NAL SEATS
					(59.5)
Ako Bicol	AKO BIKOL	1,664,975	5.1423	1	2.442593	2		3
Political Party
Gabriela	GABRIELA	1,367,795	4.2245	1	2.006638	2		3
Women's
Party
One Patriotic	1PACMAN	1,310,197	4.0466	1	1.922135	1		2
Coalition of
Marginalized
Nationals
Act Teachers	ACT	1,180,752	3.6468	1	1.73223	1		2
Party-List	TEACHERS
Coalition of	SENIOR	988,876	3.0542	1	1.450745	1		2
Associations	CITIZEN
of Senior
Citizens in the
Philippines
Kabalikat ng	KABAYAN	840,393	2.5956	1	1.23291	1		2
Mamamayan
Agri-Agra na	AGRI	833,821	2.5753	1	1.223268	1		2
Reporma para
sa Magsasaka
ng Pilipinas
Movement
Pwersa ng	PBA	780,309	2.4100	1	1.14475	1		2
Bayaning
Atleta
Buhay Hayaan	BUHAY	760,912	2.3501	1	1.116298	1		2
Yumabong
Abono Party-	ABONO	732,060	2.2610	1	1.073975	1		2
List
Anak	AMIN	706,689	2.1826	1	1.038474	1		2
Mindanao
Party-List
Cooperative	COOP-	671,699	2.0746	1	0.985435		1	1
Natcco	NATCCO
Network Party
Akbayan	AKBAYAN	608,449	1.8792				1	1
Citizens'
Action Party
Bayan Muna	BAYAN	606,566	1.8734				1	1
	MUNA
Agricultural	AGAP	593,748	1.8338				1	1
Sector
Alliance of the
Philippines
An Waray	AN WARAY	590,895	1.8250				1	1
Citizens Battle	CIBAC	555,760	1.7165				1	1
Against
Corruption
Ang	AAMBIS-	495,783	1.5303				1	1
Asosasyon	OWA
Sang
Mangunguma
Nga Bisaya
Owa
Mangunguma,
Inc.
Advocacy for	KALINGA	494,725	1.5280				1	1
Social
Empowerment
and Nation
Building
Through
Easing
Poverty, Inc.
Advocacy for	A TEACHER	475,488	1.4686				1	1
Teacher	INC.
Empowerment
Through
Action
Cooperation
and Harmony
Towards
Educational
Reforms, Inc.
You Against	YACAP	471,173	1.4552				1	1
Corruption
and Poverty
Democratic	DIWA	467,794	1.4448				1	1
Independent
Workers
Association,
Inc.
Trade Union	TUCP	467,275	1.4432				1	1
Congress
Party
Abang	ABANG	466,701	1.4414				1	1
Lingkod, Inc.	LINGKOD
LPG	LPGMA	466,103	1.4396				1	1
Marketers
Association,
Inc.
Alliance of	ALONA	434,856	1.3431				1	1
Organizations,
Networks and
Associations
of the
Philippines,
Inc.
Social	1-SAGIP	397,064	1.2263				1	1
Amelioration
& Genuine
Intervention
on Poverty
Butil Farmers	BUTIL	395,011	1.2200				1	1
Party
Acts-Overseas	ACTS-OFW	374,601	1.1570				1	1
Filipino
Workers
Coalition of
Organizations
Anakpawis	ANAKPAWIS	367,376	1.1347				1	1
Ang	ANG	348,533	1.0765				1	1
Kabuhayan	KABUHAYAN
Angkla: Ang	ANGKLA	337,245	1.0416				1	1
Partido ng
mga
Pilipinong
Marino, Inc.
Ang Mata'y	MATA	331,285	1.0232				1	1
Alagaan
1st Consumers	1-CARE	329,627	1.0181				1	1
Alliance for
Rural Energy,
Inc.
Ang National	ANAC-1P	318,257	0.9829				1	1
Coalition of
Indigenous
Peoples
Action Nal,
Inc.
Arts Business	ABS	301,457	0.9311				1	1
and Science
Professionals
Kabataan	KABATAAN	300,420	0.9279				1	1
Party-List
Bagong	BH (Bagong	299,381	0.9246				1	1
Henerasyon	Henerasyon)
Ating Agapay	AASENSO	294,281	0.9089				1	1
Sentrong
Samahan ng
mga Obrero,
Inc.
Serbisyo sa	SBP	280,465	0.8662				1	1
Bayan Party
Magdalo Para	MAGDALO	279,356	0.8628				1	1
sa Pilipino
Una ang	1-ANG	278,393	0.8595				1	1
Edukasyon	EDUKASYON
Manila	MANILA	268,613	0.8296				1	1
Teachers'	TEACHERS
Savings and
Loan
Association,
Inc.
Kusug Tausug	KUSUG	247,487	0.7644				1	1
	TAUSUG
Aangat Tayo		243,266	0.7513				1	1
Agbiag!	AGBIAG!	240,723	0.7435				1	1
Timpuyog
Ilocano, Inc.
								–––
TOTAL								60
								===

As Justice Leonen pointed out, retaining the APLS at its fractional value of 59.5 would, inter alia, result in the increase of GABRIELA's additional seats from 1 to 2 and thus, giving it a total of three (3) seats. Notably, however, the increase in the total number of seats awarded to GABRIELA would concomitantly result in the decrease of the seats to be distributed under Step 5 as described above. This is significant because the lowest-ranked qualified party-list in the "rounded-down" APLS scenario, i.e., AGBIAG!, would no longer qualify under the "as is" APLS scenario, considering that retaining AGBIAG!'s qualification would result in the increase of the total party-list seats to 60, which would then breach the 20% ceiling prescribed by the Constitution. In effect, under the "as is" APLS system, the total number of winning party-list candidates would decrease to 45, and thus, disqualifying the 46th party-list of a seat, i.e., AGBIAG!, which it would have otherwise garnered under the "rounded down" APLS system.

Overall therefore, it is my observation that, following the guidelines in Veterans and BANAT, an increase in the entitlement of additional seats for "two percenters" such as GABRIELA, would lead to a concomitant decrease in the total number of winning party-list candidates as there would be less seats to be distributed among the "non-two percenters." When applied, the award of an additional seat to GABRIELA would effectively deprive AGBIAG! of a seat in the party-list elections, as the latter is the last-ranked party-list. This development would then decrease the total number of winning party-list candidates to only 45 from the original 46. In my view, this effectively forms some sort of a concentration of power with certain party-lists that earned additional seats, at the expense of other party-lists — which presumably represents a marginalized group different from the other party-lists — that could have gotten a seat as well if only the former did not win additional seats. acEHCD

To reiterate, the formula used by BANAT in determining whether or not a party-list that successfully went over the two percent (2%) threshold is entitled to any additional seats is as follows:

Percentage of				Additional Seat
total votes	x	(APLS - TP)	=	for Party-List
garnered				Candidate

Under this formula, the percentage of total votes garnered is the multiplicand. On the other hand, the value derived from subtracting the TP from the APLS is the multiplier.

Following the basic principles of mathematics, a higher multiplicand29or multiplier30 would necessarily yield a higher product. 31 Thus, if the APLS is rounded-down to the nearest whole integer (as the COMELEC held), it would result in a lower multiplier (i.e., 59 - 12 = 47), which in turn would yield a lower product. On the other hand, leaving the APLS as is (as Justice Leonen advocates) would result in a higher multiplier (i.e., 59.5 - 12 = 47.5) and, consequently, a higher product. In other words, it seems that if we opt to use a higher multiplier by leaving the APLS "as is" and without performing any rounding-down, the product — i.e., the additional seat to be awarded to a "two percenter" — would be higher, and consequently, more likely to reach a whole number. This, in turn would translate to additional seats for the "two percenter." On the contrary, if we opt to use a lower multiplier by rounding down the APLS, the product would be lower, and consequently, less likely to reach a whole number. This, in turn, would mean that while a "two percenter" may be denied an additional seat, such denial would open up a slot for a lower-ranked party-list to qualify for a seat.

Essentially, my findings can be summarized as follows:

A. If we leave the value of an APLS with a fractional value "as is," then it is more likely for a "two percenter" to be entitled to additional seats. Thus, there will be lesser seats to be distributed among the "non-two percenters" lower in rank.

B. If we round-down an APLS with a fractional value to the nearest whole integer, it is less likely for a "two percenter" to be entitled to additional seats. Thus, there will be more seats to be distributed among the "non-two percenters" lower in rank.

C. A higher number of additional seats awarded to "two percenters" translates to a lower number of total winning party-list candidates, and thus, means lesser opportunities for "non-two percenters" lower in rank to qualify for a seat. Since party-list candidates represent diverse marginalized and underrepresented groups, it then appears that more groups may be heard through their representatives in Congress, when the additional seats of "two percenters" are reduced, under the application of the "rounded-down" regime.

Taking all of these into consideration, the following quandary arises: Is the ideal of "greater representation and participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups" best subserved if (A) more party-lists qualify for seats in Congress or (B) if the two percenters are given more additional seats? To my mind, a thorough and comprehensive discernment on this matter is integral in determining what APLS regime should be set as a standard when allocating party-list seats. However, as above-intimated, this standard can be definitively established by this Court only when the proper case arises. For now, the present petition is dismissed on the sole ground of forum shopping.

LEONEN, J., concurring:

I agree that the Gabriela Women's Party (Gabriela) committed forum shopping by filing the Petition for Certiorari while its Omnibus Motion was still pending before the Commission on Elections En Banc. Thus, its Petition should be dismissed.

Nevertheless, I wish to offer a few thoughts on the issue of computation of additional seats of party-list members to the House of Representatives.

Article VI, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution provides that party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total membership of the House of Representatives. The provision reads:

SECTION 5.

xxx xxx xxx

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Republic Act No. 7941 1 provides for the allocation of the number of seats to be given for every party-list group that garnered the highest number of votes and the procedure for its allocation. Sections 11 and 12 of the law provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

For purposes of the May 1988 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:

a. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

b. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. SDHTEC

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

To aid in the computation of the seats available to party-list representatives, this Court provided a formula in Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 2 which was reiterated in BANAT v. Commission on Elections: 3

Number of seats available
to legislative districts	x	0.20	=	Number of seats available to
–––––––––––––––––––––				party-list representatives
0.80

This formula, however, was not meant to defeat the spirit and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941. Nor was it meant to deprive a party-list group of the correct number of seats to which it is entitled.

The ponencia correctly states that there are two (2) rounds of computation to be made to determine the allocation of seats. 4 The first round determines the maximum number of seats to be allocated to party-list representatives using the formula above.

In BANAT, there were only 220 total legislative seats available; 5 thus, the formula was able to yield a whole number rather than a fractional number:

220
–––––––	x	0.20	=	55
0.80

The issue in BANAT centered on how the additional seats were to be allocated, that is, how to interpret Sections 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 7941. 6 This Court interpreted the formula as: 7

Votes for a party-list		(seats available for party-		integer of the product
group		list groups - guaranteed		(party's share in the
––––––––––––––––––	x	seats of the party-list groups	=	remaining available
Total number of		able to garner 2% of the		seats)
votes cast for party-		total number of votes)
list groups

Considering that the integer would inevitably yield a fractional number, this Court in BANAT stated that "[f]ractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R[epublic] A[ct] No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats." 8 However, this was a reference to fractional numbers yielded after the additional seats are computed.

Here, the first round of computations already yielded a fractional number since there are 238 available legislative seats. Using the Veterans formula, the maximum number of seats available is 59.5:

238
–––––	x	0.20	=	59.5
0.80

As referred to in Article VI, Section 5 (2) of the Constitution, this number represents the 20% allocation to party-list groups in the House of Representatives. In subtracting 0.5 from this amount, this Court would grant party-list groups less than what the Constitution actually provides.

In the 2016 Elections, Gabriela garnered 1,367,795 votes, or 4.2245% of the total number of votes cast. 9 Twelve (12) party-list groups were able to garner two percent (2%) of the total votes cast. Using 59 seats to compute for their additional seats would yield only 1.98 seats:

4.2245%	x	(59 - 12)	=	1.985515
		or
4.2245%	x	47	=	1.985515

Using 59.5 seats, however, to compute for Gabriela's additional seats would yield 2.006 seats:

4.2245%	x	(59.5 - 12)	=	2.0066375
		or
4.2245%	x	47.5	=	2.0066375

The difference between these two computations is significant. Consistent with BANAT, the first computation would only allow for one (1) additional seat since there is no 0.98 of a legislative seat. The same principle would apply for the second computation above. Only two (2) additional seats would be granted because there is no 0.006 of a legislative seat.

Rounding off or rounding down fractional amounts even before the computations have been finished, manipulates the results of what should be a definite mathematical equation. Providing inaccurate variables results in an inaccurate total.

Disregarding fractional amounts in the first round of computation, that is, in computing the maximum number of available seats, would yield less than what is constitutionally provided for. In my opinion, disregarding fractional numbers only after computing the additional seats provides a logical and mathematically sound interpretation to the formulas in Veterans and BANAT.

The Commission on Elections allocated the party-list seats as follows: 10

POLITICAL	ACRONYM	GRAND	PERCEN-	GUA	ADDI-	TOTAL
PARTY/		TOTAL	TAGE (%)	RAN-	TIONAL	SEATS
COALITIONS/			OF TOTAL	TEED	SEATS
SECTORAL			VOTES	SEATS
ORGANIZATIONS			GARNERED
Ako Bicol	AKO BICOL	1,664,975	5.1423	1	2	3
Political Party
Gabriela Women's	GABRIELA	1,367,795	4.2245	1	1	2
Party
One Patriotic	1PACMAN	1,310,197	4.0466	1	1	2
Coalition of
Marginalized
Nationals
Act Teachers	ACT	1,180,752	3.6468	1	1	2
Party-List	TEACHERS
Coalition of	SENIOR	988,876	3.0542	1	1	2
Associations of	CITIZENS
Senior Citizens in
the Philippines
Kabalikat ng	KABAYAN	840,393	2.5956	1	1	2
Mamamayan
Agri-Agra na	AGRI	833,821	2.5753	1	1	2
Reporma para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
Puwersa ng	PBA	780,309	2.4100	1	1	2
Bayaning Atleta
Buhay Hayaan	BUHAY	760,912	2.3501	1	1	2
Yumabong
Abono Party-List	ABONO	732,060	2.2610	1	1	2
Anak Mindanao	AMIN	706,689	2.1826	1	1	2
Party-List
Cooperative Natcco	COOP-	671,699	2.0746	1	1	2
Network Party	NATCCO
Akbayan Citizens'	AKBAYAN	608,449	1.8792			1
Action Party
Bayan Muna	BAYAN	606,566	1.8734			1
	MUNA
Agricultural Sector	AGAP	593,748	1.8338			1
Alliance of the
Philippines
An Waray	AN WARAY	590,895	1.8250			1
Citizens Battle	CIBAC	555,760	1.7165			1
Against
Corruption
Ang Asosasyon	AAMBIS-	495,483	1.5303			1
Sang Mangunguma	OWA
Nga Bisaya Owa
Mangunguma, Inc.
Advocacy for Social	KALINGA	494,725	1.5280			1
Empowerment and
Nation Building
through Easing
Poverty, Inc.
Advocacy for	A TEACHER,	475,488	1.4686			1
Teacher	INC.
Empowerment
through Action
Cooperation and
Harmony Towards
Educational
Reforms, Inc.
You Against	YACAP	471,173	1.4552			1
Corruption and
Poverty
Democratic	DIWA	467,794	1.4448			1
Independent
Workers
Association, Inc.
Trade Union	TUCP	467,275	1.4432			1
Congress Party
Abang Lingkod,	ABANG	466,701	1.4414			1
Inc.	LINGKOD
LPG Marketers	LPGMA	466,103	1.4396			1
Association, Inc.
Alliance of	ALONA	434,856	1.3431			1
Organizations,
Networks and
Associations of the
Philippines, Inc.
Social Amelioration	1-SAGIP	397,064	1.2263			1
& Genuine
Intervention on
Poverty
Butil Farmers	BUTIL	395,011	1.2200			1
Party
Acts-Overseas	ACTS-OFW	374,601	1.1570			1
Filipino Workers
Coalition of
Organizations
Anakpawis	ANAKPAWIS	367,376	1.1347			1
Ang Kabuhayan	ANG	348,533	1.0765			1
	KABUHAYA
	N
Angkla: Ang	ANGKLA	337,245	1.0416			1
Partido ng mga
Pilipinong Marino,
Inc.
Ang Mata'y	MATA	331,285	1.0232			1
Alagaan
1st Consumers	1-CARE	329,627	1.0181			1
Alliance for Rural
Energy, Inc.
Ang National	ANAC-IP	318,257	0.9829			1
Coalition of
Indigenous
Peoples Action
Na!, Inc.
Arts Business and	ABS	301,457	0.9311			1
Science
Professionals
Kabataan Party-	KABATAAN	300,420	0.9279			1
List
Bagong	BH (Bagong	299,381	0.9246			1
Henerasyon	Henerasyon)
Ating Agapay	AASENSO	294,281	0.9089			1
Sentrong Samahan
ng mga Obrero,
Inc.
Serbisyo sa Bayan	SBP	280,465	0.8662			1
Party
Magdalo Para sa	MAGDALO	279,356	0.8628			1
Pilipino
Una ang	1-ANG	278,393	0.8598			1
Edukasyon	EDUKASYON
Manila Teachers'	MANILA	268,613	0.8296			1
Savings and Loan	TEACHERS
Association, Inc.
Kusug Tausug	KUSUG	247,487	0.7644			1
	TAUSUG
Aangat Tayo		243,266	0.7513			1
Agbiag!	AGBIAG!	240,723	0.7435			1
Timpuyog
Ilocano, Inc.
						––––
TOTAL						59
						===

Twelve (12) parties were able to garner two percent (2%) of the total votes cast, which entitled each to one (1) guaranteed seat. After subtracting the guaranteed seats, the second computation is done to compute for any additional seats these party-list groups may be entitled to. Applying the same formula to the rest of the party-list groups entitled to additional seats yields a different result:

POLITICAL	ACRONYM	GRAND	PERCEN-	ADDI-	ADDI-	AC
PARTY/		TOTAL	TAGE (%)	TIONAL	TIONAL	TUAL
COALITIONS/			OF TOTAL	SEATS	SEATS	ADDI-
SECTORAL			VOTES	WITH	WITH	TIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS			GARNERED	59.5	59	SEAT
1. Ako Bicol	AKO BICOL	1,664,975	5.1423	2.442593	2.416881	2
Political Party
2. Gabriela	GABRIELA	1,367,795	4.2245	2.006638	1.985515	1
Women's Party
3. One Patriotic	1PACMAN	1,310,197	4.0466	1.922135	1.901902	1
Coalition of
Marginalized
Nationals
4. Act Teachers	ACT	1,180,752	3.6468	1.73223	1.713996	1
Party-List		TEACHERS
5. Coalition of	SENIOR	988,876	3.0542	1.450745	1.435474	1
Associations of	CITIZENS
Senior Citizens in
the Philippines
6. Kabalikat ng	KABAYAN	840,393	2.5956	1.23291	1.219932	1
Mamamayan
7. Agri-Agra na	AGRI	833,821	2.5753	1.223268	1.210391	1
Reporma para sa
Magsasaka ng
Pilipinas
Movement
8. Puwersa ng	PBA	780,309	2.4100	1.14475	1.1327	1
Bayaning Atleta
9. Buhay Hayaan	BUHAY	760,912	2.3501	1.116298	1.104547	1
Yumabong
10. Abono Party-	ABONO	732,060	2.2610	1.073975	1.06267	1
List
11. Anak	AMIN	706,689	2.1826	1.036735	1.025822	1
Mindanao Party-
List
12. Natcco Network	Cooperative	COOP-
Party	NATCCO	671,699	2.0746	0.985435	0.975062	1

As demonstrated, only Gabriela is significantly affected by a different multiplier. The rest of the party-list groups will not experience any change in their additional allocated seats.

However, computing the additional seats of all two-percenters would also yield a peculiar result. The 12th party-list group with a guaranteed seat is not actually entitled to an additional seat after the second round of computations. COOP-NATCCO garnered 671,699 votes, or 2.0746% of the votes. Using 59 to compute for additional seats would yield 0.975062 of a seat: AScHCD

2.0746% x (59 - 12) = 0.975062

There is no 0.975062 of a legislative seat. Even if the multiplier 59.5 is used to compute for their additional seats, it would still yield to a fractional number less than 1:

2.0746% x (59.5 - 12) = 0.985435

The Commission on Elections, however, granted one (1) additional seat to COOP-NATCCO. If the same rule on fractional seats were applied, COOP-NATCCO would not have been entitled to an additional seat, regardless of whether its additional seats were computed on the basis of 59 legislative seats or 59.5 legislative seats.

Removing the incorrectly granted additional seat to COOP-NATCCO would have brought the total number of seats allocated for party-list groups to 58 or 19.5945%. This total, which is neither 59 nor 59.5, is not equivalent to the 20% allocation that party-list groups are entitled to. In any case, this Court would not have jurisdiction to remove the seat granted to COOP-NATCCO as the party-list group has already been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office. 11

Another solution would be to use precise mathematical formulas only until additional seats less the fractional amounts are apportioned. Whatever seats remain after the second computation would be distributed according to rank.

If we subtract the 12 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters and the 13 additional seats using the 47.5 multiplier, we are left with 33.5 seats. These 33.5 seats would be distributed according to rank. Thus, one seat would be given to the next in rank, COOP-NATCCO, in addition to its guaranteed seat. The rest of the 32.5 seats are distributed up to Aangat Tayo, the 46th in rank. Only 0.5 of a seat would remain after distribution. The 47th in rank, Agbiag!, would not have been guaranteed a seat.

Like COOP-NATCCO, this Court does not have the jurisdiction to remove Agbiag!'s seat. However, keeping their seats should not be at the expense of disenfranchising Gabriela's voters since entitlement to additional seats is based on the total amount of votes actually cast for the party-list group. In view of the unfortunate situation created by these mathematical inaccuracies, the party-list groups should have had 60 legislative seats for this election, instead of 59.

Although this Court in BANAT held that nothing in the Constitution or Republic Act No. 7941 mandates that the entire 20% allocation must be filled up, 12 removing fractional numbers before the computations have even been completed has the effect of preventing party-list groups from attaining the 20% allocation. This interpretation is inconsistent with the policy of the law "to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" 13 and "[enhance] their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature." 14 Granting Gabriela its additional allocated seat not only fulfills the constitutional allocation but also provides for greater representation and participation of marginalized and underrepresented groups.

I acknowledge Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe's concern that using a fractional value in computing the additional seats may have the effect of giving more seats to higher ranked party-list groups. Republic Act No. 7941 equates greater representation and participation with the number of votes garnered, not the number of sectors or advocacies represented. Otherwise, the law would not have granted additional seats based on the proportionate number of votes cast. One (1) seat would have been given to each party-list group according to rank until the 20% allocation is exhausted. If the constitutional allocation is 59 seats, then 59 party-list groups — instead of just 47 party-list groups — would have representation in Congress.

Having more party-list groups in Congress does not always guarantee a wider representation of marginalized sectors. The present party-list system, with the interpretation suggested in this opinion, more accurately mirrors the representation devised by the electorate. It equates greater representation with the number of votes cast, which, in turn, translates to the electorate having the power to choose which sector or advocacy to support. Therefore, it counts every vote even if, in the formula, the vote will tentatively be a fraction in the computation. The more seats a party-list group acquires in an election, the greater its power to coalesce with other party-list groups. The larger the coalition, the greater the chances of passing legislation for a particular sector or advocacy. A party-list group can even gain enough electoral support to be able to advance into the mainstream and actually win seats in legislative districts. This results in a Congress that represents a wider range of ideologies to meet the needs of the electorate. That is what is meant by proportionate representation.

ACCORDINGLY, with these reservations, I vote to DISMISS the Petition for violation of the rule on forum shopping.

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-22.

2.Id. at 27-30.

3.Id.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 11.

6.Id. at 31-40.

7. 604 Phil. 131 (2009).

8.Rollo, p. 36.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 36-37.

11.Id. at 101.

12.Id. at 45-46.

13.Id. at 81.

14.Id. at 104-111.

15.Id. at 106, 109.

16.Id. at 110-111.

17.Id. at 47-49.

18.Id. at 112-118.

19.Id. at 59-61.

20.Id. at 17.

21. Party-List System Act. Approved on March 3, 1995.

22.Rollo, p. 17. GABRIELA mistakenly wrote that "x x x 59 is 19.8319% while 60 is 20.16807%."

23.Id. at 78-100.

24.Id. at 84-87.

25.Id. at 87-88.

26.Id. at 88-89.

27.Id. at 90.

28.Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., 635 Phil. 372, 389 (2010).

29.Mayor Saludaga v. COMELEC, et al., 631 Phil. 653, 664 (2010).

30.Young v. John Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 832 (2003).

31.See Disini v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 637 Phil. 351, 353 (2010); Montes v. CA (Sixth Division), 523 Phil. 98, 107 (2006).

32.Spouses Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et al., 686 Phil. 236, 250 (2012).

33. Rollo, p. 22.

34.See Santos v. COMELEC, 515 Phil. 458, 465 (2006).

35.Dy v. Mandy Commodities Co., Inc., 611 Phil. 74, 84 (2009).

36. 396 Phil. 419 (2000).

37.Id. at 438.

38.Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, supra note 7, at 170.

39.Id. at 160.

40. The following party-list groups obtained at least two percent of the total votes cast for party-list candidates: (1) AKO BICOL; (2) GABRIELA; (3) 1PACMAN; (4) ACT TEACHERS; (5) SENIOR CITIZENS; (6) KABAYAN; (7) AGRI; (8) PBA; (9) BUHAY; (10) ABONO; (11) AMIN; and (12) COOP-NATCCO.

41.Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, supra note 7, at 163.

42. AKO BICOL and GABRIELA would each receive two additional seats, while the following party-list groups would receive one additional seat each: (1) 1PACMAN; (2) ACT TEACHERS; (3) SENIOR CITIZENS; (4) KABAYAN; (5) AGRI; (6) PBA; (7) BUHAY; (8) ABONO; and (9) AMIN.

43. AKO BICOL would still receive two additional seats, while GABRIELA, 1PACMAN, ACT TEACHERS, SENIOR CITIZENS, KABAYAN, AGRI, PBA, BUHAY, ABONO, and AMIN would receive one additional seat each.

44.Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC, supra note 7, at 163.

45. Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution, in part, provides that: "The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x."

PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:

1.Rollo, pp. 3-21.

2. Correction of Manifest Error and Proclamation; id. at 31-38.

3. Issued on May 19, 2016; id. at 27-30.

4. See ponencia, pp. 6-7.

5. See id. at 7-10.

6. "An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law that is not necessary in the determination of the case before the court. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata. (Ocean East Agency, Corporation v. Lopez, G.R. No. 194410, October 14, 2015, 772 SCRA 414, 428-429, citation omitted.)

7. Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

8. 396 Phil. 419 (2000).

9. 604 Phil. 131 (2009).

10. See Section 5 (2), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

11.BANAT, supra note 9, at 158 and 162.

12. See id. at 160.

13. See id. at 160-161.

14. See id. at 162-163.

15.Id. at 163.

16. See id.

17. In BANAT, two-percenters that did not reach a whole integer of one in the application of Step 4 (e.g., COOP-NATCCO with 0.9766, BUTIL with 0.9766, and BATAS with 0.9196) were given one (1) additional seat each, before the remainder of the available party-list seats were distributed to the non-two percenters by rank. (See id. at 163-165.)

18. See id.

19.BANAT, supra note 9, at 162-163.

20. See ponencia, pp. 5-6.

21. 4.2245% x (59-12) = 1.985515 (See id. at 10).

22. See Justice Leonen's Separate Concurring Opinion, p. 3.

23.Id. at 4.

24.Id. at 11.

25. 4.2245% x [59.5-12] = 2.0066375 (See id. at 4).

26. 2.0746% x [59-12] = 0.975062 (See id. at 9-10).

27. 2.0746% x [59.5-12] = 0.985435 (See id.).

28.Id. at 11; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

29. "Multiplicand" is referred to as the number that is to be multiplied by another. <https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/multiplicand> (visited February 6, 2017).

30. "Multiplier" is referred to as the number by which another number is multiplied. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/multiplier> (visited February 6, 2017).

31. "Product" is referred to as the number or expression resulting from the multiplication together of two or more numbers or expressions. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/product> (visited February 6, 2017).

LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. Party-List System Act (1995).

2. 396 Phil. 419 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

3. 604 Phil. 131, 152 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

4. Ponencia, pp. 9-10.

5.BANAT v. Commission on Elections, 604 Phil. 131, 152 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

6.Id.

7.Id. at 163.

8.Id.

9. Ponencia, p. 1.

10. National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 008-16, May 19, 2016 <http://www.comelec.gov.ph/?r=2016NLE/Resolutions/nboc_res00816> (visited January 13, 2017).

11.See Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 712 Phil. 192 (2013) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

12.BANAT v. Commission on Elections, 604 Phil. 131, 170 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].

13. Rep. Act No. 7941 (1995), sec. 1.

14. Rep. Act No. 7941 (1995), sec. 1.