THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 236231. November 17, 2021.]
MICHAEL GABRIEL y AGUILAR, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 17, 2021, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 236231 (MICHAEL GABRIEL y AGUILAR, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.) — To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti by demonstrating strict compliance with the chain of custody of the seized drugs. Any deviation from this requirement will cast doubt on the origins of the seized item and will merit an acquittal. 1
This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 filed by Michael Gabriel y Aguilar (Gabriel) assailing the Decision 3 and Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals which, in turn, affirmed the Decision 5 of the Regional Trial Court convicting Gabriel for illegal possession 6 of dangerous drugs, in violation of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information, Gabriel was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs punished under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of January 2012, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly possess and have in his custody and control 0.03 gram of white crystalline substance contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, which substance was found positive to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as "Shabu," a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited law.
Contrary to Law. 7
Upon arraignment, Gabriel pleaded not guilty to the charges. 8 Pre-trial thereafter followed, and upon its termination, and trial on the merits then ensued. 9
The prosecution presented (1) Police Officer II Joy Llamera (PO2 Llamera); (2) Police Superintendent Beaune V. Villaraza (PSUPT. Villaraza); (3) Police Officer I Raymond Matundan (PO1 Matundan); and (4) Police Officer II Froilan Quisquino (PO2 Quisquino) as its witnesses. 10
According to the prosecution, at around 3:45 a.m. on January 28, 2012, Gabriel's sister-in-law Nerissa Gabriel (Nerissa) called PO2 Llamera to report an ongoing "pot session" inside her house at Eskwela Street, Bagong Bayan, Binangonan, Rizal. 11 Upon receipt of the report, a Chief of Police instructed PO2 Llamera and PO1 Matundan to conduct an operation for Gabriel's possible arrest. 12
PO2 Llamera and PO1 Matundan arrived at the target area and saw two persons — later identified as Gabriel and Louie Francisco (Francisco) — drinking liquor. PO2 Llamera saw Gabriel holding a small plastic sachet which he suspected to contain shabu. PO2 Llamera confiscated this sachet and marked it with the initials "MIC." Meanwhile, PO1 Matundan seized two pieces of aluminum foil and one lighter from Francisco, which PO1 Matundan marked as "LOU-1," "LOU-2," and "LOU-3," respectively. 13
At the police station, PO2 Llamera made an inventory and took photographs of the seized items. Afterwards, custody over Gabriel and Francisco, as well as of the seized items, were turned over to PO2 Quisquino. 14 PO2 Quisquino then brought the seized items to the Rizal Province Crime Laboratory for examination. The heat-sealed plastic sachet seized from Gabriel containing white crystalline substance yielded positive for shabu, a dangerous drug while the two pieces of aluminum foil seized from Francisco, tested negative. 15
Gabriel was the sole witness for the defense. He denied the material allegations against him. He recalled that on January 27, 2012, he attended a friend's wedding celebration, after which he went on a drinking spree with Francisco and his daughter Criza at the rooftop of his house. At around 11:00 p.m., several police officers arrived, frisked Gabriel, Francisco, and Criza and brought them to the police station where they were charged for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 16 The charges against Francisco and Criza, however, were dropped. 17
In its May 30, 2014 Decision, 18 the Regional Trial Court found Gabriel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The Regional Trial Court gave full credence to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and held that the apprehending officers properly established the chain of custody of the seized drugs. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
In light of this, we find accused Michael Gabriel GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11, Article II, [Republic Act] No. 9165 and illegally possessing a total of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and accordingly sentence him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to each [sic] pay a fine of P300,000.00, Bail posted for his provisional liberty is hereby REVOKED and we ORDER his immediate arrest. Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007.
SO ORDERED. 19
Aggrieved, Gabriel appealed his conviction. Gabriel asserted that he was illegally arrested by the police officers because at the time of his arrest, they did not have a warrant of arrest or personal knowledge that he had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. 20 While he is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of his arrest by entering his plea and his active participation during the trial, this waiver did not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 21 Since his warrantless arrest was illegal, the accompanying search and seizure was likewise illegal. 22 Therefore, the allegedly seized drugs were inadmissible. 23
Gabriel also asserted that the integrity and evidentiary weight of the seized items were compromised because the apprehending officers failed to conduct, much less offer into evidence, an inventory of the seized items. 24 Worse, the required third-party witnesses were not present, and therefore were neither made to sign nor given copies of the inventory of the seized items. 25
On the other hand, the prosecution emphasized Gabriel's failure to object to the alleged irregularity of his arrest prior to his arraignment. Furthermore, while the certificate of inventory was not formally offered in evidence, it was identified and thus formed part of the records. 26 While the inventory and photographing of the items seized were not made at the scene of the crime, the prosecution asserted that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items was properly preserved. 27
In its April 21, 2017 Decision, 28 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court in toto. While the Receipt/Inventory of Evidence Seized and the accompanying photograph were not formally offered, the Court of Appeals upheld their admission into evidence. According to the Court of Appeals, these documents have been identified, marked, and attached to the records of the case in the course of trial. 29 It also held that the integrity of the items seized were sufficiently proved by the prosecution through its witnesses' straightforward testimonies. 30
Still dissatisfied, Gabriel filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 31 The Court of Appeals denied this motion in its assailed December 7, 2017 Resolution, 32 as the arguments raised therein had already been considered and resolved in its earlier Decision. 33
Hence, petitioner Gabriel filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari. 34
In his Petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in convicting him of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. He asserts that the integrity and evidentiary weight of the seized items were compromised because no effort was exerted in contacting the required third-party witnesses, nor was there any justifiable reason why the inventory and taking of photographs were made at the police station instead of the alleged crime scene. 35
On the other hand, the prosecution contends that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's finding of petitioner's guilt. Considering that the petition raises issues of fact which have been ruled by the Regional Trial Court and sustained by the Court of Appeals, this Court is bound by these factual findings. 36
The main issue to be resolved for this Court's resolution is whether or not the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner Michael Gabriel y Aguilar for violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165. Subsumed in this issue is whether or not the prosecution established the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti by demonstrating strict compliance with the chain of custody of the seized drugs.
Petitioner must be acquitted.
This Court is not a trier of facts and the scope of this Court's judicial review of decisions of the Court of Appeals through a petition for review on certiorari is generally confined only to errors of law, and questions of fact are not entertained. 37 Nonetheless, this rule is not without exceptions, such as in this case where the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 38
In Filoteo Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 39 this Court held that any objection involving the validity of an arrest must be made before an accused enters his or her plea, otherwise this objection is deemed waived.
Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest and brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the crime. Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his plea in the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.:
"Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error." 40 (Emphasis supplied)
In Veridiano v. People, 41 this Court explained:
The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused." 42
Here, nowhere in the records does it appear that petitioner moved for the quashal of the information against him on the ground that his arrest was illegal. Moreover, it appears that petitioner raised the issue on legality of his arrest for the first time on appeal. Thus, petitioner is deemed to have waived any irregularity attendant to his arrest.
However, contrary to the Court of Appeal's ruling that "there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against the accused," this Court finds that the arresting officers' unjustified deviations from Section 21 cast doubt on the corpus delicti. This Court thus grants the petition for the prosecution's failure to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In all prosecutions for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, the corpus delicti pertains to the dangerous drugs confiscated by the apprehending officers. 43 To sustain a conviction for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti by demonstrating strict compliance with the chain of custody of the seized drugs. 44 Any deviation from this requirement "leave[s] the door open for tampering, substitution, and planting of evidence" 45 and will cast doubt as to the origins of the seized item. 46
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides the chain of custody requirements for handling seized and/or surrendered drugs. It states that:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
In People v. Manabat, 47 this Court explained that Section 21 of the Republic Act No. 9165, requires that:
(1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. 48
As regards the marking, physical inventory, and photographs of the seized items, these must be done immediately after their seizure and confiscation, 49i.e., at the place of the arrest. 50
As to the requirement of third-party witnesses, this Court has held that the presence of these witnesses is most needed during the time of the warrantless arrest in order to belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. 51 Thus, when any of the required witnesses were not shown to be present at the time of arrest, there arises a reasonable doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti. 52
In People v. Tomawis, 53 this Court explained:
The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or loss of the seized drug. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza, without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching, planting or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of [Republic Act No.] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of [Republic Act No.] 9165.
The practice of police operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished — does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate against the planting of drugs.
To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized and confiscated drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation." 54 (Citations omitted)
The significance of complying with the foregoing requirements cannot be overemphasized. The requirements pertain to matters of substantive law which cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. 55 Noncompliance is tantamount to failure in establishing identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By failing to establish an element of these offenses, noncompliance will, thus, engender the acquittal of an accused. 56
To illustrate, when the arresting officers marked the items without the required witnesses and conducted the inventory of the items in a place other than the place of arrest, the first link in the chain of custody was incipiently broken. 57
Here, petitioner asserted that the apprehending officers failed to conduct, much less offer into evidence, an inventory of the seized items allegedly prepared by the apprehending officers. 58 Additionally, the required third-party witnesses were not present, were not made to sign and were not given copies of the inventory of the seized items. 59 He maintains that the police officers failed to submit a justifiable reason for their failure to contact the required third-party witnesses. 60 Taken all together, he calls for his acquittal based on reasonable doubt. 61
Petitioner's arguments deserve consideration.
It does not escape our attention that the prosecution admitted that the inventory and photographing of the items seized were not made at the scene of the crime. 62
Furthermore, the required third-party witnesses were not present, were not made to sign, and were not given copies of the inventory of the seized items. 63 Indeed, the records are bereft of any proof that any required third-party witness was present in the conduct of the operation.
That failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Republic Act No. 9165 does not automatically invalidate the arrest and seizure 64 is immaterial. While deviations from Section 21's chain of custody requirements may be entertained in exceptional cases, "the prosecution bears the burden of first acknowledging procedural lapses and specifically pleading justifiable grounds for these lapses. It must also plead specific safety measures taken in view of the deviations made from the chain of custody requirements." 65 The prosecution cannot simply invoke the saving clause found in Section 21 — that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved — without justifying their failure to comply with the requirements stated therein. 66 In this case, there were no apparent efforts on the part of the apprehending officers to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 or to explain its lapses. 67
In People v. Holgado, 68 this Court emphasized that cases involving minuscule quantities of dangerous drugs demand a more exacting compliance with the rule on chain of custody because of the increased likelihood of planting and tampering. This Court explained:
While the [minuscule] amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21. In [Mallillin] v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives."
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The reasons for acquitting accused-appellants for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 (i.e., the prosecution's complete failure to introduce in evidence the drugs seized and the testifying police operative's own failure to properly account for the paraphernalia he himself took part in seizing) 52 seriously cast doubt, not only on accused-appellants' own guilt, but more so on the soundness and reliability of the measures taken and procedures followed by the police operatives. These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police operatives themselves.
Trial courts should meticulously consider the factual intricacies of cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced narrative must be scrupulously considered. Courts must employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving [minuscule] amounts of drugs. These can be readily planted and tampered. Also, doubt normally follows in cases where an accused has been discharged from other simultaneous offenses due to mishandling of evidence. Had the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals been so judicious in this case, a speedier resolution would have been handed to Holgado and Misarez whose guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not established. 69
Applying Holgado, the apprehending officers in this case should have been more meticulous in complying with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 to preserve the integrity of the seized shabu, especially considering that the allegedly seized drugs weigh only 0.03 gram. 70
The failure of the prosecution to strictly comply with the exacting standards in Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, casts serious doubt on the origin, identity, and integrity of the seized dangerous drugs allegedly taken from petitioner. As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes for which Gabriel is charged has not been established, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is proper that petitioner be acquitted.
We close by hearkening to the same words with which we ended in Holgado:
It is lamentable that while our dockets are clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions involving the proverbial "big fish." We are swamped with cases involving small fry who have been arrested for miniscule amounts. While they are certainly a bane to our society, small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both law enforcers and prosecutors should realize that the more effective and efficient strategy is to focus resources more on the source and true leadership of these nefarious organizations. Otherwise, all these executive and judicial resources expended to attempt to convict an accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent in the overall picture. It might in fact be distracting our law enforcers from their more challenging task: to uproot the causes of thus drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases involving greater amounts of drugs and the leadership of these cartels. 71
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 36781 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Michael Gabriel y Aguilar is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Director General of the Bureau of Corrections for immediate implementation. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report the action he has taken to this Court within five days from receipt of this Resolution. For their information, copies shall also be furnished to the Police General of the Philippine National Police and the Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Binangonan, Rizal is directed to turn over the seized sachet of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.People v. Veloo, G.R. No. 252154, March 4, 2021 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/67407> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division]; People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165, 1175 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
2.Rollo, pp. 10-30.
3.Id. at 32-52. The April 21, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 36781 was penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Florito S. Macalino of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 54-57. The December 7, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 36781 was penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, and concurred in by Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Florito S. Macalino of the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
5.Id. at 76-77. The May 30, 2014 Decision in Criminal Case No. 12-0052 was penned by Presiding Judge Dennis Patrick Z. Perez of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67.
6. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11 provides:
SECTION 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. — The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
7.Rollo, p. 33.
8.Id.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 82.
11.Id. at 83.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 35-36.
17.Id. at 63.
18.Id. at 76-77.
19.Id. at 36.
20.Id. at 65.
21.Id. at 67.
22.Id. at 66.
23.Id. at 67.
24.Id. at 68-69.
25.Id. at 69-72.
26.Id. at 89.
27.Id. at 67-68.
28.Id. at 32-52.
29.Id. at 46-47.
30.Id. at 32-33.
31.Id. at 103-111.
32.Id. at 54-57.
33.Id.
34.Id. at 10-28.
35.Id. at 21-24.
36.Id. at 133.
37.Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388, 414 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
38.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 186 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
39. 331 Phil. 531 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc]; Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
40.Id. at 578.
41. 810 Phil. 642 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
42.Id. at 654.
43.People v. Jaafar, 803 Phil. 582 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
44.People v. Veloo, G.R. No. 252154, March 4, 2021 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdoes/1/67407> [Per C.J. Peralta, First Division].
45.People v. Que, 824 Phil. 882, 901 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
46.People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165, 1175 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
47.People v. Manabat, G.R. No. 242947, July 17, 2019 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65603> [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
48.Id.
49. Republic Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 21 (1).
50.Id.
51.People v. Tomawis, 830 Phil. 385 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
52.Id. at 405.
53. 830 Phil. 385 (2018) [Per J. Caguioa, Second Division].
54.Id. at 408-409.
55.People v. Crispo, 828 Phil. 416 (2018) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].
56.People v. Dela Cruz, 744 Phil. 816-837 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
57.People v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65518> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
58.Rollo, pp. 68-69.
59.Id. at 69-72.
60.Id. at 72.
61.Id.
62.Id. at 100.
63.Id. at 69-72.
64.Id. at 100.
65.People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339; August 7, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65610> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division] citing People v. Sanchez, 590 Phil. 214, 234 (2008) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
66.Tolentino v People, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, <https://elibraryjudiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdoes/1/66108> [Per J. A.B. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].
67.Rollo, p. 78.
68. 741 Phil. 78 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
69.Id. at 99-100.
70.Rollo, p. 33.
71. 741 Phil. 78, 100 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].