FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 9828. April 19, 2022.][Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4347]
"G" HOLDINGS, INC., REPRESENTED BY ATTY. SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, complainant, vs.ATTYS. DANNY L. PONDEVILLA, RONNIE P. CAUSAPIN AND RODOLFO E. CATAGUE, JR.,respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 19, 2022 which reads as follows: HTcADC
"A.C. No. 9828 [Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4347] — "G" HOLDINGS, INC., represented by ATTY. SALVADOR B. BRITANICO, complainant, versusATTYS. DANNY L. PONDEVILLA, RONNIE P. CAUSAPIN and RODOLFO E. CATAGUE, JR., respondents.
Complainant "G" Holdings, Inc. (complainant), a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the business of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies and is herein represented by Atty. Salvador B. Britanico, filed this disbarment case against Attys. Danny L. Pondevilla, Ronnie P. Causapin, and Rudolfo E. Catague, Jr. (collectively, respondents) for alleged gross misconduct and violations of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). The complainant alleged that respondents acted as witnesses to falsified minutes of an auction sale dated October 29, 2003, which, in turn, paved the way for the execution of a falsified certificate of sale in favor of one Abraham F. Javier relative to a labor case docketed as Case No. OS-AJ-10-96-014 1 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). 2
In 1992, the complainant executed a Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Asset Privatization Trust wherein it agreed to purchase 90% of Maricalum Mining Corporation's (MMC) shares and financial claims. These financial claims were converted into promissory notes issued by MMC to the complainant and were secured by a deed of chattel and real estate mortgage over MMC's properties. Four years later, a labor dispute arose between MMC and the exclusive bargaining agent of its rank and file employees. This was Case No. OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). 3
Eventually, the labor case was decided with finality in favor of the employees and a partial writ of execution was issued by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to satisfy the claims of the employees for full backwages and other benefits. However, according to the complainant, the partial writ of execution automatically triggered the effectivity of the default clause in the deed of chattel and real estate mortgage executed by MMC in its favor. Thus, this prompted the complainant to extrajudicially foreclose MMC's properties and assets within the Sipalay Mines Complex in July 2001. Thereafter, a public auction sale was conducted over the foreclosed properties of MMC and a certificate of sale covering the properties and assets of MMC at the Sipalay Mines Complex was issued in favor of the complainant. 4
Six months after, however, the new DOLE Secretary issued an alias writ of execution and break-open order in Case No. OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). The complainant opposed the implementation of the order and the case reached this Court via G.R. No. 160236, which initially issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on October 28, 2003, or one day before the scheduled public auction sale, and ultimately ruled in favor of the complainant. 5
The complainant alleged that subsequently, it learned of documents submitted to the Office of the DOLE Secretary in connection with Case No. OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96) and attached to the records thereof. Among these documents were the Minutes of Auction Sale dated October 29, 2003, which were signed by herein respondents as witnesses, a notarized Certificate of Sale dated October 29, 2003, and a Sheriff's Return of Service dated November 3, 2003 submitted to the DOLE Secretary. The complainant alleged that these documents referred to a public auction that never took place and emphasized that the TRO in G.R. No. 160236 was faxed by the Court to the DOLE Bacolod City District Office on October 28, 2003 which was also certified as received by the Sheriff's Office by one Suzette Espinosa of the DOLE Office. It also submitted affidavits from three supposed witnesses, two of whom attested that no public auction occurred in the Barangay Hall or anywhere in Barangay San Jose on October 29, 2003. 6 The other witness, on the other hand, claimed that he was supposed to head a group of policemen to assist the sheriffs in entering the MMC Compound for the conduct of an auction sale. However, due to a radio communication that informed the group about the TRO in G.R. No. 160236, the group no longer proceeded to the MMC Compound. 7
As such, the complainant asserted that the Minutes of Auction Sale dated October 29, 2003 was spurious. As consenting witnesses thereto, respondents did not only attest to having seen the sheriffs sign the document, but also signified their awareness of the incidents narrated in the document and that they have given consent to the same to make it binding and obligatory on them to the extent of their involvement as indicated in the instrument. Hence, respondents purportedly bore false witness contrary to justice and truth, and to the prejudice of others and their profession. 8
Respondents, for their part, countered that they were not the counsel of any of the parties in Case No. OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). They only came to know about the scheduled public auction sale on October 29, 2003 when their separate clients sent them to observe the proceedings and to negotiate for the purchase of some of the items posted in the Notice of Public Auction Sale from the winning bidder. 9
In the same vein, respondents averred that they were not privy to the proceedings in G.R. No. 160236, more so about the existence of the alleged TRO issued in said case on October 28, 2003. They also found incredible the supposed transmittal of the Court via telefax of the TRO to the DOLE Office in Bacolod City. Instead, what respondents allegedly learned upon their own investigation was that the DOLE Sheriff's Office in Bacolod City did not receive a copy of the TRO and that, in fact, the sheriffs who conducted the public auction sale on October 29, 2003 were in Sipalay City on October 28, 2003 and not in Bacolod City. 10
Respondents likewise pointed out that the affidavits of two of the witnesses of the complainant were executed almost eight (8) years after the public auction sale. In contrast, seven (7) DOLE personnel who accomplished and signed the Minutes of the Auction Sale, the Certificate of Sale, and the Sheriff's Return of Service enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their service. All these instruments, per respondents, truly confirmed the actual conduct of the auction sale on October 29, 2003. 11
In his Report and Recommendation, 12 the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of sufficient basis and preponderant evidence. 13 Firstly, the Investigating Commissioner held that the imposition of disciplinary action on respondents hinged on evidence or judicial declarations by an appropriate court that the questioned Minutes of Auction Sale were indeed spurious and falsified. There was, however, no court declaration that would affirm that the Minutes of Auction Sale was so. 14
The Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to the affidavits of the two witnesses for the complainant, finding that their declarations were inconsistent and inaccurate. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that while these two witnesses stated that there was no auction sale conducted in the Barangay Hall or anywhere else in Barangay San Jose on October 29, 2003, the document itself provided that the auction sale was conducted on such date at the Administrative Building inside the MMC Compound in Barangay San Jose, Sipalay City. The phrase "anywhere else in Barangay San Jose" could not inspire belief, as well, as it was a general statement that was merely an opinion. In effect, considering that the statements of the witnesses for the complainant did not categorically state that they were at the Administrative Building at the time the supposed auction sale was conducted, they can only be considered as hearsay which had no probative value. 15
Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner noted that administrative complaints were filed before the Administrative Complaints Committee of the DOLE, questioning the conduct of the auction sale on October 29, 2003 and assailing the documents surrounding OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). The said Committee, through the DOLE Regional Director, declared that evidence supported a finding that an auction sale was indeed conducted on October 29, 2003. The order of the Committee had not been overturned or reversed; hence, reliance on its findings may be had. 16
In its Notice of Resolution 17 dated October 12, 2019, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the complaint. The complainant moved for reconsideration, 18 but the IBP-BOG also resolved to deny the same via its Resolution 19 dated January 9, 2021.
The Court affirms the dismissal of the complaint.
Preliminarily, the Court takes exception to the pronouncement of the IBP anent the evidentiary threshold in disbarment proceedings. The Court clarifies anew that it has already been settled that the quantum of proof applied in administrative proceedings against lawyers is substantial evidence and not preponderance of evidence. The Court, in Reyes v. Nieva20(Reyes), had already determined that a survey of jurisprudence would reveal this to be so, and thus stressed to finally control and quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold. 21 Moreover, Reyes recognized that the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence, as opposed to preponderance of evidence, is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending disciplinary cases:
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to preponderance of evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor." 22
Substantial evidence is defined under Section 6, Rule 133 of the 2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence as "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," 23 while the burden of proof is defined under Section 1, Rule 131 as "the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his or her claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law." 24
The complainant must then prove by substantial evidence the allegations in the complaint. Basic is the rule that a mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. It is likewise well to remember that, in suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence. 25
In this case, the complainant failed to discharge its burden of presenting substantial evidence to prove that respondents knowingly stood as witnesses to a public auction sale that was never conducted and consequently, to a falsified or spurious Minutes of Auction Sale.
Firstly, as aptly observed by the IBP, the complainant merely banked on the affidavits of witnesses, two of which were accomplished almost eight (8) years after the subject public auction sale took place. Their affidavit also merely contained generally worded statements that no public auction occurred "in the Barangay Hall or anywhere in Barangay San Jose" on October 29, 2003, when the assailed Minutes of Auction Sale and the other relevant documents relative thereto indicated that the public auction sale was conducted in the Administrative Building inside the MMC Compound in Barangay San Jose, Sipalay City.
Quite tellingly, as well, the third witness, Mr. Paterno Torralba, later clarified in another affidavit that his earlier affidavit was prepared by a representative from the complainant who told him that the company would be operating the mines at MMC and that he might be hired if he chose to cooperate. 26
As likewise highlighted by the IBP, in another administrative complaint filed by the complainant against the sheriffs before the DOLE in connection with the same assailed documents surrounding the public auction sale in this case, the Regional Director revealingly found that the documents are not spurious or falsified and that, indeed, said documents "support the existence of a public auction sale conducted within the compound of the Maricalum Mining Corporation (MMC) in Brgy. San Jose, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental from 9:00 A.M. to 9:45 A.M. on October 29, 2003." 27
As a final note, it is well to emphasize that the conclusions of the IBP in this case, as affirmed by the Court, are not determinative of any issues of law and facts regarding the parties' legal rights in OS-AJ-10-96-014 (NCMB-RBVI-08-06-96). The limited function of the Court in this case is to only pass upon the issues as to whether there is substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively liable. 28 That being said, the Court agrees with the observation of the IBP that the charges against respondents would best be settled through a court declaration on the validity of the assailed Minutes Auction Sale, which, however, does not exist. To be sure, while it is oft-repeated that a disbarment proceeding is sui generis, the question of respondents' moral fitness as members of the Bar would require the Court to pass upon the complainant's serious allegations of deceit and falsification. As such, it would be of little consequence that a disbarment proceeding has a different objective than the reliefs afforded in a criminal case or a civil action, for in arriving at the conclusion that respondents violated the Lawyer's Oath and the relevant provisions of the CPR, the Court would necessarily make a finding that they committed acts that are, however, more appropriately within the province of a civil or criminal action. Thus, in this regard, the perceived distinction among these proceedings may be wholly rendered illusory since the factual basis for the lawyer's administrative liability is inextricably intertwined with those that are best threshed out or litigated in civil and criminal courts.
The Court, therefore, finds that the IBP properly exerted to apply a measure of prudence in this case by assessing the evidence submitted by the complainant itself and the countervailing evidence submitted by respondents. A cursory examination of these pieces of evidence, as set forth above, readily reveals that they fail to support the allegations of the complainant and meet the substantial evidence threshold it is burdened to discharge.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the complaint filed against respondents, ATTYS. DANNY L. PONDEVILLA, RONNIE P. CAUSAPIN, and RODOLFO E. CATAGUE, JR., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." Gaerlan, J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Also OS-AJ-10-96-014 in some parts of the rollo.
2.Rollo, pp. 3-4.
3.Id. at 5.
4.Id. at 5-6.
5.Id. at 6-8.
6.Id. at 9-14.
7.Id. at 408.
8.Id. at 15.
9.Id. at 109.
10.Id. at 109-110.
11.Id. at 111-114.
12.Id. at 402-418.
13.Id. at 418.
14.Id. at 414.
15.Id. at 471-473.
16.Id. at 473-474.
17.Id. at 402-403.
18.Id. at 419-427.
19.Id. at 457-458.
20. A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196.
21.Id. at 229.
22.Id. at 229-230. Citation omitted.
23.Tan v. Alvarico, A.C. No. 10933, November 3 2020, p. 6, citing Section 6, Rule 133, 2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC).
24.Id., citing Section 1, Rule 131, 2019 Amendments to the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence (A.M. No. 19-08-15-SC).
25.Capinpin v. Atty. Espiritu, A.C. No. 12537, September 3, 2020, pp. 6-7. Citation omitted.
26.Rollo, p. 415.
27.Id. at 411-412 and 416. Italics omitted.
28. See Castro v. Bigay, Jr., A.C. No. 7824, July 19, 2017, 831 SCRA 274.