THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 217089. September 2, 2020.]
CARLO FRANCISCO, LOUIE LONGARA, MARIA ROWENA AGUSTIN, FERDINAND ANGELES and RONNIE DUMANDAN, petitioners, vs.SKYCABLE CORPORATION and CARLO KATIGBAK, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 2, 2020, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 217089 (Carlo Francisco, Louie Longara, Maria Rowena Agustin, Ferdinand Angeles and Ronnie Dumandan, Petitioners, v. Skycable Corporation and Carlo Katigbak, Respondents). — The Court resolves to NOTE the transmittal letter dated July 9, 2020 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, elevating to the Court the CA rollo of this case.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review 1 which seeks to reverse and set aside the 07 August 2014 Decision 2 and 02 February 2015 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 118456, entitled, "Carlo Francisco, et al. v. Skycable Corporation, Carlo Katigbak and National Labor Relations Commission."
Petitioners Carlo Francisco (Francisco), Louie Longara (Longara), Maria Rowena Agustin (Agustin), Ferdinand Angeles (Angeles) and Ronnie Dumandan (Dumandan; petitioners, collectively), claiming to be regular employees of respondent Skycable Corporation (Skycable), filed a labor complaint for correction of their length of service as appearing in their 201 files and for the corresponding adjustments in their wages and other benefits. 4
Apparently, petitioners Francisco, Dumandan and Angeles have been working for Skycable since 01 February 1998, 01 July 2003 and 01 May 1999, respectively. However, they were treated as "independent contractors," and not as regular employees. It was only on 01 March 2008, 16 January 2008, and 16 June 2008 that petitioners Francisco, Dumandan and Angeles became regular employees of Skycable respectively. 5
Meanwhile, petitioners Agustin and Longara insisted that they have been working for Skycable as early as 01 March 1997 and 03 November 1997, respectively. They started as customer service representatives, but were merely treated as "project employees," and later on, as "fixed-term employees." It was only after five (5) years, or in 2003, that they were accorded regular status. 6
For their part, respondents Skycable and Carlo Katigbak (respondents, collectively) maintained that prior to being hired as regular workers of Skycable in 2008, petitioners Francisco, Angeles and Dumandan were independent contractors of Skycable based on the Agency Agreements 7 they executed with CATV, Inc., 8 (now Skycable), and were paid on commission basis.
According to Skycable, petitioner Francisco only started working as their regular employee on 01 March 2008, initially, as MDU Account Specialist, and later, as MDU Account Supervisor on 01 October 2008. 9 The same is true with petitioner Dumandan who only started working at Skycable on 16 January 2008 as Corporate Account Specialist, and later, as Corporate Account Supervisor on 01 October 2008. 10 On the other hand, Skycable employed petitioner Angeles as probationary VAS Sales Supervisor on 22 April 2008, and only became a regular employee of Skycable on 16 June 2008. 11
With regard to petitioners Agustin and Longara, Skycable asserted that from 1997, they were project employees of Customer Contact Center, Inc., 12 until they were hired as fixed-period employees by CATV, Inc., under separate Fixed-Term Employment Contracts 13 in 2003. Longara's one (1)-year fixed-term contract commenced on 25 January 2003. Later that year, he was hired by Skycable as a regular employee, a Customer Service Associate, on 15 October 2003, and was promoted as Supervisor effective 01 March 2007.
Meanwhile, petitioner Agustin also signed a Fixed-Term Employment Contract with then CATV, Inc., on 15 January 2003 for a fixed period of one (1) year, to commence on 24 January 2003. She was hired by Skycable on 16 October 2003 as Customer Service Associate until her promotion as Supervisor effective 16 October 2007. Like petitioner Longara, petitioner Agustin also worked as a project employee of Customer Contact Center, Inc., before working for CATV, Inc. 14
By its 17 February 2010 Decision, 15 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 16
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the dismissal, adopting in its entirety the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter in its 29 October 2010 Resolution. 17
In affirming the dismissal with respect to petitioners Angeles and Dumandan, the NLRC took into consideration the Agency Agreements they executed with CATV, Inc. On the other hand, Francisco was a fixed-term employee on a commission basis. The NLRC discussed:
Established is the fact that on March 5, 2003 to September 5, 2003 and on July 10, 2003 to January 10, 2003 (sic), complainants-appellants Angeles and Dumandan were respectively hired as Sales Agent under an Agency Agreement. Under this Agreement, they would be paid purely on commission basis at the rate of all collections and actually made and received by the company. They were likewise required to furnish the company a performance bond to secure the faithful performance of the Agreement and to answer for damages that may be incurred by them during the term of Agreement. Neither was there any showing that respondent-appellee x x x dictate upon them the means and methods on how they perform their work. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Though complainants-appellants Angeles and Dumandan were required to meet a quota, this requirement does not indicate control since the means and methods in achieving the quota is left to their discretion.
xxx xxx xxx
What is more, records also bear out that x x x Angeles and Dumandan were not required to regularly report to the office of the company or submit periodic written report on their sales performance and activities during the above mentioned period or earlier. x x x
On the same breadth, we are not equally persuaded that complainant-appellant Carlo Francisco was a regular employee prior to his regularization.
Worthy to note that respondents-appellees incessantly assert that complainant-appellant Francisco was a fixed-term employee whose compensation was on commission basis. Despite this averment of respondents-appellees material to the cause of action of complainant-appellant Francisco, the latter opted not to dispute the same. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The assertion of respondents-appellees is deemed an established fact.
Truly, the Account Executive allowance Earning Statement offered in evidence by x x x Francisco fortified his fixed-term employment status prior to his regularization.
xxx xxx xxx
The Certification issued to x x x Francisco does not sway us from our earlier finding in view of the evidence on the contrary. Neither the health card issued to him [is] sufficient to uphold his posture. A more concrete and substantial evidence is need[ed] to establish his case. 18
With respect to petitioners Agustin and Longara, the NLRC ruled they were project employees of Customer Contact Center, Inc., commencing on 16 June 2001. It was only in January 2003 that Agustin and Longara were hired as a fixed-term employees of Skycable for a period of one (1) year. The NLRC explained:
x x x Agustin and Longara's claim that they were regular employees since March 1, 1997 and November 3, 1997 is evidently unfounded.
The Home Development Mutual Fund submitted by x x x Agustin contrary to her supposition only strengthened the absence of employer-employee relationship between her and respondent-appellee company prior to her regularization. A plain view of the subject documents shows that complainant-appellant Agustin has several employers from 1998 to 2002. For the months of May 1999 to June 2000 and for the month of May 2001, the employer of complainant-appellant Agustin was Snelling Resources Corporation. That for the months of June 2001 to November 2002, her employer was Customer Contact Center x x x. 19
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 which was denied by the NLRC in its 30 December 2010 Resolution. 21
Unperturbed, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA, which dismissed the same. The CA ratiocinated:
Defeating petitioners' arguments, however, is that petitioners Francisco, Angeles and Dumandan were not employees of private respondent Company starting March 5, 2003, but that they eventually became employees of private respondent Company on March 1, 2008, June 16, 2008, and January 16, 2008, respectively. This is because, as the records revealed, petitioners Francisco, Angeles, and Dumandan initially performed work in behalf of private respondent Company as Sales Agents and were designated as independent contractors, under an "Agency Agreement" covering the period from March 5, 2003 to September 5, 2003, and from July 10, 2003 to January 10, 2004. Under such "Agency Agreement[s]," petitioner Francisco, Angeles, and Dumandan were paid on a purely commission basis and were not subject to the control and supervision of private respondent Company as to the means and methods of carrying out their work.
Records further disclosed that petitioners Francisco, Angeles, and Dumandan became employees of private respondent Company after each of them were hired for different positions under their respective "Regular Employment Agreements." Petitioner Francisco was hired by private respondent Company only on March 1, 2008 as an "MDU Account Specialist" under a "Regular Employment Agreement." For his part, petitioner Angeles became an employee of private respondent Company only on June 16, 2008 when he was hired as a "VAS Field Sales Supervisor" under a "Regular Employment Agreement." As to petitioner Dumandan, he became an employee of private respondent Company on January 16, 2008 when he was hired as a "Corporate Account Specialist" under a "Regular Employment Agreement."
xxx xxx xxx
Trumping the contentions of petitioners Agustin and Longara however, is that petitioners Agustin and Longara only became regular employees of private respondent Company on October 16, 2003 when they were each issued a "LETTER OF APPOINTMENT FOR REGULAR EMPLOYMENT." Prior to being issued their respective "LETTER[S] OF APPOINTMENT FOR REGULAR EMPLOYMENT," petitioners Agustin and Longara were hired as fixed-period employees under a separate "FIXED-TERM EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT for Customer and Call Center Services," as was also found by public respondent NLRC in its assailed Resolution dated October 19, 2010[.] 23 (Emphasis supplied)
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision dated 07 August 2014 24 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED. 25
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 26 but the same was denied through the assailed 02 February 2015 Resolution. 27 Upon the denial of the said motion, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review, insisting that they are regular employees of Skycable since the inception of their engagement with the company. They presented the following issues for consideration of the Court:
1. Did the Court of Appeals commit a substantive error of law in holding that petitioners were not regular employees but fixed-term employees or independent contractors at the time they were initially hired by respondent company?
2. Did the Court of Appeals commit a procedural error in disregarding the affidavits of petitioners' co-employees showing that it was respondent company which actually exercised control over the petitioners in the years that they worked in the Customer Contact Center, Inc. or as account executives prior to their being formally hired by respondent company as indicated in their 201 files? 28
We now resolve.
The Petition is substantially factual
To begin with, the Petition calls for re-evaluation of evidence which is not appropriate under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court considering that this Court's jurisdiction under such rule is limited only to errors of law. 29
In Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 30 the Court discussed:
As a general rule, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts. Case law provides that "there is a 'question of law' when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a 'question of fact' when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of 'law' or 'fact' is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. Parties praying that this Court review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals must demonstrate and prove that the case clearly falls under the exceptions to the rule. They have the burden of proving to this Court that a review of the factual findings is necessary. Mere assertion and claim that the case falls under the exceptions do not suffice. 31
It is noteworthy to mention that petitioners, in their pleadings before this Court, have not "alleged, substantiated and proved" that the case falls under the recognized exceptions. 32
Findings of facts of the administrative
Moreover, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed. 33
Here, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA were consistent in their factual findings that petitioners were independent contractors and fixed-term employees before they became regular employees.
In particular, Royale Homes Marketing Corporation vs. Alcantara34 teaches that:
The determination of whether a party who renders services to another is an employee or an independent contractor involves an evaluation of factual matters which, ordinarily, is not within the province of this Court. In view of the conflicting findings of the tribunals below, however, this Court is constrained to go over the factual matters involved in this case.
There being no conflict with the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the CA, this Court is not obliged to go over the factual matters relative to this case.
In any event, the Court, in the
Nevertheless, the Court deems it wise, in the interest of substantial justice, to take another look to this case.
The primary evidence of the nature of the parties' relationship in this case is the written contract that they signed and executed in pursuance of their mutual agreement. While the existence of employer-employee relationship is a matter of law, the characterization made by the parties in their contract as to the nature of their juridical relationship cannot be simply ignored. 35
Petitioners Francisco, Angeles and Dumandan respectively entered into Agency Agreements with CATV, Inc. (now Skycable), where they were designated as independent contractors from 05 March 2003 to 05 September 2003, and from 10 July 2003 to January 10, 2004.
An independent contractor is one who carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work, or service on one's own account and under one's own responsibility according to one's own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof. 36 In view of the "distinct and independent business" of independent contractors, no employer-employee relationship exists between independent contractors and their principals. 37
As account executives, petitioners Francisco, Angeles and Dumandan were not required to report to the office as it is expected that they were always out in the field. They only went to CATV, Inc., when requested to do so by the company officials with whom they coordinated with. They had the option of whether to attend or not the activities, sponsored seminars, and sales strategies meetings which are merely designed to help them reach their quotas.
With respect to petitioners Agustin and Longara, they signed a Fixed-Term Employment Contract on 15 January 2003. Prior to this, they were Project Employees of Customer Contact Center, Inc.
The decisive determinant in fixed-term employment is not the activity that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of the employment relationship. The duration of a fixed-term employment agreed upon by the parties may be any day certain, which is understood to be "that which must necessarily come although it may not be known when." 38
In order to be valid, the fixed-termed contract must satisfy: (1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or (2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or the latter. These conditions must be read together. 39
In here, there is no showing that petitioners Agustin and Longara were pressured to sign the contracts. They were free to refuse or accept the offer. Upon signing, they know exactly when their contracts would end. There were no indications to show that respondent company resorted to fixed-term contracts in order to evade regularization. Parenthetically, we note that even before the expiration of the one (1) year period as provided in the Fixed-Term Employment Contract, they were offered regular employment by the respondent company.
Meanwhile, petitioners also claim that the CA disregarded the affidavits of their co-employees which prove that it was respondent company which exercised control over them even before their regularization.
It is presumed that all matters within an issue raised in a case were passed upon by the court. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the court a quo discharged its task properly. 40 Though the affidavits were not mentioned in its Decision, it does not mean that they were disregarded entirely by the CA.
In any event, the Court finds it wise to discuss the weight of such affidavits.
Petitioners presented the similarly worded (except for the personal circumstances) Sworn Statements of Angela Cabrera, 41 Amina San Gregorio 42 and Josephine Salvador, 43 with respect to the employment of Francisco, Angeles and Dumandan.
Respondents, however, point to the fact that San Gregorio and Salvador could not have personal knowledge as to the terms of the agency agreements executed in 2003, when they have been employed only in 2004. Petitioners failed to refute this contention squarely.
The allegations made by Angela Cabrera, Amina San Gregorio and Josephine Salvador were refuted by Ma. Lourdes Torres, the Administrative Manager of Skycable, who has been with the company since March 1994. 44
While it may be argued that she is a biased witness on account of her employment with Skycable, jurisprudence teaches that:
In Lufthansa German Airlines v. CA, this Court, citing the earlier case of Santos v. Concepcion and Santos, ruled that the presence of an employer-employee relationship where a witness is an employee of a party is not or itself sufficient to discredit his testimony.
While it may be true, as the trial court opines[,] "that testimony of employees of a party is 'of course' open to the criticism that they would naturally testify, as far as they possibly could in favor of their employers, and in weighing testimony such a relation between a witness and a party is frequently noticed by the court," it is equally true that the witness is an employee or an overseer of a party is not of itself sufficient to discredit his testimony. x x x 45
In any event, granting that the allegations therein are true, 46 still it could not establish the "control" that would make Francisco, Angeles, and Dumandan regular employees. Attending sales blitz, 47 department meetings for the purpose of discussing sales strategies, company-sponsored sales seminars, and imposing sales quotas, do not mean to control them. These activities were meant to serve as a guide and to upgrade their skills for a more efficient marketing performance. 48
On the other hand, with respect to Longara and Agustin, petitioners presented the similarly worded (except for the personal circumstances) Sworn Statements of Bernadette Trajeco, 49 Catherine Villanueva, 50 Jocelyn Langit, 51 Larry Bala, 52 and Carmelyn Limbo.
As correctly pointed out by Leonor Namoc, Director for Customer Service since February 2002, in her Affidavit, 53 it was only when Longara and Agustin became regular employees that they were subject to control of Skycable. However, during the time that they were employees of Customer Contact Center, Inc., and prior to their becoming employees of Skycable, they were not subject to control by the company as to the means and methods by which they performed their services.
In fine, petitioners have failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error which would warrant the exercise of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the 07 August 2014 Decision and 02 February 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118456, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-24.
2.Id. at 26-41; penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias, and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Eleventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 43-44; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican and concurred in by Associate Justices Agnes Reyes Carpio and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes of the Special Former Eleventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
4.Id. at 13.
5.Id. at 418-419.
6.Id. at 419.
7.Id. at 341-348.
8. Also Central CATV, Inc.
9.Rollo, p. 432.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 96-97.
13.Id. at 99-101.
14.Id. at 431-432.
15.Id. at 187-192.
16.Id. at 191-192.
17.Id. at 206-214; penned by Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Napoleon M. Menese.
18.Id. at 209-212.
19.Id. at 212-213.
20.Id. at 215-220.
21.Id. at 221-222.
22.Id. at 223-238.
23.Id. at 32-37.
24.Id. at 26-41.
25.Id. at 41.
26.Id. at 45-51.
27.Id. at 43-44.
28.Id. at 15.
29.Gatan v. Vinarao, G.R. No. 205912, 18 October 2017, 842 SCRA 602, 609.
30. 807 Phil. 640-653 (2017); G.R. No. 199799, 20 March 2017, 821 SCRA 41, 48-49.
31.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167-191 (2016); G.R. No. 171722, 11 January 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 207.
32. The Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. [Carbonell vs. Carbonell-Mendez, G.R. No. 205681, 01 July 2015, 762 Phil. 529-539 (2015); 761 SCRA 260]
33.Diversified Security Agency, Inc. v. Bautista, 632 Phil. 301-309 (2010); G.R. No. 152234, 15 April 2010, 618 SCRA 289, 294.
34. G.R. No. 195190, 28 July 2014, 731 SCRA 147, 159.
35.Id.
36.Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388-450 (2014); G.R. Nos. 204944-45, 03 December 2014, 744 SCRA 31, 73; Orozco v. The Fifth Division of the Honorable Court of Appeals, 584 Phil. 35-57 (2008); G.R. No. 155207, 13 August 2008, 562 SCRA 36, 56.
37.Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388-450 (2014); G.R. Nos. 204944-45, 03 December 2014, 744 SCRA 31, 73.
38.GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, G.R. No. 176419, 27 November 2013, 710 SCRA 690, 709.
39.Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu, 749 Phil. 388-450 (2014); G.R. Nos. 204944-45, 03 December 2014, 744 SCRA 31, 71.
40.246 Corporation v. Daway, 461 Phil. 830-843 (2003); G.R. No. 157216, 20 November 2003, 416 SCRA 315, 319.
41.Rollo, pp. 61-62.
42.Id. at 63-64.
43.Id. at 65-66.
44.Id. at 335-337.
45.Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Soriano, 525 Phil. 765-803 (2006); G.R. No. 166039, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 704, 707.
46. See rollo, p. 61.
It states:
"xxx xxx xxx
3. That as account executives, Messrs. Carlo Francisco, Ferdinand Angeles and Rommel Dumandan were subject to the control of their supervisors as to the means and methods by which they performed their work;
4. That for instance, they were required by the company to attend an activity known as "sales blitz." This would mean going into a particular area and conducting door-to-door selling under the close scrutiny of their supervisors. This was conducted by the company one-day almost every week.
5. They are also required to attend department meetings for the purpose of discussing sales strategies. These meetings were conducted weekly and would last for two hours or more;
6. Occassionally (sic), account executives were also required to attend company-sponsored seminars;
7. Failure on the part of account executives to attend these activities could result to sanctions imposed upon them. For instance, persistent refusal or failure to attend these activities could mean the termination of their employment;
8. Furthermore, they were required to maintain a sales quota. As far as I can recall, the company required every account executive to main (sic) at least 25 consummated sales every month. Failure to reach the quota for three months would mean termination from the company;
9. The tools and equipment used by the account executives in their work were provided by the company. The fliers that were distributed to customers, the streamers used during sales blitz, and the pagers used by the account executives were all owned by the company;
10. Moreover, the account executives had to observe strict procedure with respect to each sales made. For example, they were required to remit the proceeds coming from their sales within 24 hours. Failure to comply with the above procedure would mean termination from the company."
47. See rollo, p. 55. This would mean going into a particular area and conducting door-to-door selling under the close scrutiny of their supervisors. This was conducted by the company one-day almost every week.
48.Abante, Jr. v. Lamadrid Bearing & Parts Corp., 474 Phil. 414-429 (2004); G.R. No. 159890, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 368, 380.
49.Rollo, p. 67. It reads:
"xxx xxx xxx
3. That as Customer Service Associates, Mr. Louie P. Longara and Ms. Ma. Rowena R. Agustin were subject to the control of their Skycable supervisors as to the means and methods by which they performed their work;
4. They are also required to attend group and department meetings for the purpose of discussing call handling techniques & strategies. These meetings were conducted weekly and would last for two hours or more;
5. Occasionally, Customer Service Representative was also required to attend company-sponsored seminars and trainings to enhance call handling;
6. Moreover, the Customer Service Representative has to observe strict compliance [with] the policies and procedures in handling calls. For example, they were required to record all transactions with customers;
7. Their performance grading was based on the set expectation of the company;
8. Their Customer Care function is the same as the function of a regular Skycable employee;
9. To improve more their skills and to familiarize on the Call Center operation, they were assigned in different groups and functions that needs (sic) decision making."
50.Id. at 68.
51.Id. at 69.
52.Id. at 70.
53.Id. at 338-339.