SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 206061. September 16, 2013.]
FOREVER RICHSONS TRADING CORPORATION AND/OR ADAN CO, OWNER-MANAGER, petitioners, vs. ELSIE MOLINA, ROSALINA RUIZ, ELISA LUMAGOD, REYNALDO GELICA AND RESTITUTO TUDE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 16 September 2013 which reads as follows:
(G.R. No. 206061 (Forever Richsons Trading Corporation and/or Adan Co, Owner-Manager, petitioners v. Elsie Molina, Rosalina Ruiz, Elisa Lumagod, Reynaldo Gelica and Restituto Tude, respondents.)
Subject of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision 1 dated 28 September 2012, as well as the Resolution 2 dated 7 February 2013, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03139-MIN. The appellate court reversed and set aside the Resolution 3 dated 22 June 2009 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reinstated the latter's prior Resolution 4 dated 24 December 2008. The appellate court similarly denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. CAHTIS
The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondents Elsie Molina (Molina), Rosalina Ruiz (Ruiz), Elisa Lumagod (Lumagod), Reynaldo Gelica (Gelica) and Restituto Tude (Tude) against herein petitioners Forever Richsons Trading Corporation (FRTC) and/or Adan Co (Co).
The antecedents are:
Petitioner FRTC is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of plywood production while petitioner Co is its Owner-Manager. Respondents Molina, Ruiz, Lumagod, Gelica and Tude, on the other hand, were employees of petitioners. 5
Respondent Molina was first hired by petitioners on 2 March 2000. She was assigned as a team leader with five members tasked with signing the team's Production Report showing their weekly work output. This report served also as the basis for the company-prepared Summary indicating their group income for the week. Her contract ended every five months, after which, petitioners would hire her again for the same function. On 1 January 2006, however, Molina was informed that petitioner Co had decided to terminate her services after payment of separation pay. Molina was then asked to sign blank sheets of paper but she did not receive any separation pay. Molina was, instead, transferred to Chaverson Wood Industry, Inc., a sister company of petitioner FRTC. Then, on 22 June 2006 (the last day of her latest contract), Molina found her name among the list of laid-off workers. Her co-workers were paid separation pay but since she refused to accept hers, she continued to work until Christmas break. But, when she reported back to work on 3 January 2007, Molina was not allowed entry into the company grounds as her name was again included in the list of laid-off workers. 6 CTDHSE
Respondent Ruiz, on the other hand, was hired on pakyaw basis on 7 March 2000 to work in petitioners' Sundry Department. After her five-month contract ended, she was re-hired, still, on pakyaw basis. This continued until 22 June 2006 when she found her name included in the company's list of laid-off workers and was prevented from entering the company premises. 7
Similarly, respondent Lumagod started working with petitioner FRTC on 16 June 2000 as staff in its Sundry Department. Her five month contract was renewed every time it became due. While her name was also included in the 22 June 2006 list of laid-off workers, she continued working until she applied for sick leave on 21 November 2006. When she returned on 1 December 2006, however, she was informed that her services had already been terminated; thus, she was not allowed to enter the company premises. 8
Respondent Tude and Gelica, who were employed on 8 October 2004 and 7 March 2002, respectively, were not asked to sign a five-month employment contract. Respondent Tude's employment contract did not have a period but he was paid on pakyaw basis. Respondent Gelica, on the other hand, was hired as a probationary worker. In June, respondent Tude was informed that his services will be terminated effective 16 June 2006. After signing some documents, he was given his pay for the week and he did not report for work thereafter. As to respondent Gelica, his accident prompted him to file a leave of absence effective 26 January 2006. He still received his pay during his leave but when he returned for work after the five-month period, he was instructed to just report in January 2007. Nonetheless, when he went back in January 2007, he was not anymore allowed to enter the company premises. 9
The foregoing prompted the respondents to file the instant Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims. cCaEDA
On 27 November 2007, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision 10 dismissing respondents' Complaint. The Labor Arbiter held that there was no dispute on the employment status of the respondents as their Contract of Employment is for a fixed or specific term voluntarily agreed upon by them as part of the terms and conditions of their employment. Moreover, the severance of employment was not upon the initiation of the petitioners but by the respondents themselves by tendering their respective voluntary resignation. Noteworthy, upon receipt of respondents' letters of resignation, petitioners paid them their respective separation pays and quitclaims as evidenced by the Waiver and Release Claims duly signed by the former. Such petitioners' acceptance of respondents' resignation resulted in the termination of employer-employee relationship between them. The Labor Arbiter did not give credence to the allegations of respondents that petitioners employed a reprehensible practice of requiring them to sign blank papers and documents and eventually use the same for whatever purpose to defeat their legitimate claims. Being mere allegations without proof to the contrary, the same could not be given any probative value. 11 IcESDA
On appeal to the NLRC, the latter, in a Resolution dated 24 December 2008 reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter Decision. The NLRC found respondents' work with petitioner FRTC necessary and desirable to its business and deemed them to be regular employees. 12 The NLRC observed, thus:
It is undisputed on record that [herein respondents] were hired as casual workers on different dates by the [herein petitioners]. Upon the expiration of their contract every five (5) months, they were automatically re-hired to do the same jobs. This practice has been going on since their employment, majority of whom started in year 2000, until the termination of their employment. It is, therefore, crystal clear that [respondents] were hired and rehired on the basis of the workers' particular skills. In fact, [respondents] perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer and they have been rendering services continuously with the [petitioners] for six (6) years, at the least. Hence, they are deemed to be regular employees. 13 (emphasis supplied). DIEAHc
In view thereof, the NLRC declared that being regular employees, respondents can only be dismissed from employment on the basis of just or authorized causes, which is not obtaining in the case at bench. As such, the NLRC held that respondents' dismissal from employment is illegal. The NLRC consequently ordered respondents' reinstatement to their respective positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. The NLRC similarly ordered payment of respondents' full backwages and other benefits computed from the time they were illegally dismissed up to the time of their actual reinstatement. And, if reinstatement is not feasible, then payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service. 14
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid NLRC Resolution, which the NLRC granted in its Resolution 15 dated 31 March 2009. The NLRC, thus, set aside its prior Resolution dated 24 December 2008 and reinstated and affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter Decision dated 27 November 2007. This time, the NLRC explained that a closer scrutiny of the pieces of documentary evidence, particularly the contracts of employment, revealed that respondents were hired for a fixed period and rehired if there are sufficient supply of raw materials and orders from petitioners' customers. Accordingly, respondents were paid on a weekly basis and upon expiration of their contract they were paid separation pay, financial assistance and 13th month pay were accorded to them every December. The NLRC further stated that since petitioner FRTC was engaged in plywood production and other wood products, the continuity of production thereof is dependent on the availability of lumber and customers' order. Hence, the management has the prerogative to employ workers on fixed term basis. Moreover, respondents knew from the very beginning that the employment offered to them was not permanent but only for a certain fixed period. The NLRC similarly pronounced that "it does not necessarily follow that where the duties of the employees consist of activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of time for the performance of such activities. There is, thus, nothing essentially contradictory between a definite period of employment and the nature of employee's duties." 16 IHTASa
Aggrieved, respondents moved for reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution dated 31 March 2009 but was denied in a Resolution dated 22 June 2009.
Respondents consequently filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 28 September 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the NLRC Resolution dated 22 June 2009 and reinstated the NLRC's prior Resolution dated 24 December 2008. The Court of Appeals held that: aHDTAI
The question as to whether the [herein respondents] were hired for functions necessary and desirable in [herein petitioners'] business is manifested in the fact that they were hired not only for two or three succeeding five-month contracts. Their over-all period of employment with [petitioners] ranged from 21 months to six years. This necessarily leads Us to conclude that the functions they have been performing in [petitioners'] employ were significant parts of the business. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Assuming arguendo that [respondents] were hired only on the dates claimed by [petitioners], the latter still cannot escape the fact that the continuous re-hiring of the [respondents] over a long period of time had converted their status into regular employees. Even with [petitioners'] claims, [respondents] are still revealed to have been in its employ for years, including the short breaks in service which jurisprudence regard as leave of absence without pay, . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, after having been in [petitioners'] employ for more than one year doing work that is necessary and desirable in its trade or business, there is no debate that [respondents] have acquired the status as regular employees.
As regular employees, [respondents] cannot be held to have been terminated because of "end of contract." Moreover, [petitioners] failed to provide proof that [respondents'] services were terminated for either just causes or authorized causes. Nor were the twin notice requirement observed when their services were terminated. CcAESI
xxx xxx xxx
With the declaration of [respondents] as regular employees who were unceremoniously and illegally terminated from service, We find them entitled to the awards granted by the [NLRC] in its Resolution dated [24 December 2008]. . . . . 17
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision but it was denied in a Resolution dated 7 February 2013.
Hence, this Petition wherein the core issue to be resolved is whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties. The resolution of this main issue will determine whether the termination of respondents' employment is illegal.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
Primarily, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and Court of Appeals all found that respondents are employees of petitioners and the latter are their employers. As such, this Court will no longer disturb the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and Court of Appeals on that matter.
Now, the remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) whether or not the respondents had attained regular status of employment; and (2) whether or not their dismissal from employment is legal.
In Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, 18 this Court made the following pronouncement: AIHTEa
Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the employee's right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of regular employment defined therein. The language of the law manifests the intent to protect the tenurial interest of the worker who may be denied the rights and benefits due a regular employee because of lopsided agreements with the economically powerful employer who can maneuver to keep an employee on a casual or temporary status for as long as it is convenient to it. In tandem with Article 281 of the Labor Code, Article 280 was designed to put an end to the pernicious practice of making permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them temporary or probationary appointments, ad infinitum. IATHaS
The two kinds of regular employees under the law are (1) those engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activities in which they are employed. The primary standard to determine a regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the business of the employer. Hence, the employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. 19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
In this case, as aptly held by the Court of Appeals, records revealed that respondents rendered services to petitioners for a number of years, to wit: Molina — six years, nine months and 24 days, that is from 2 March 2000 to 26 December 2006; Ruiz — six years, three months and 15 days, that is from 7 March 2000 to 22 June 2006; Lumagod — six years, five months and 15 days, that is from 16 June 2000 to 1 December 2006; Gelica — five years, nine months and 26 days, that is from 7 March 2002 to 2 January 2007; and Tude — one year, eight months and eight days, that is from 8 October 2004 to 16 June 2006. 20 Respondents' over-all period of employment with petitioners ranged from 21 months to six years. They were hired and re-hired continuously by the petitioners. From this, it is evident that the functions respondents were performing in petitioners' employ were necessary and desirable in the latter's business. Accordingly, respondents were, indeed, regular employees of petitioners. aSEDHC
Having said that respondents were regular employees of petitioners, their dismissal, therefore, to be valid must either be for a just or authorized causes, which is not obtaining in this case. Moreover, as held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners did not observe the twin notice requirement when respondents' services were terminated.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. TcIaHC
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy, concurring. Rollo, pp. 146-164.
2.Penned by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez with Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting. Id. at 166-168.
3.Penned by Presiding Commissioner Salic B. Dumarpa with Commissioners Proculo T. Sarmen and Dominador B. Medroso, Jr., concurring. Id. at 134-135.
4.Id. at 120-125.
5.Petition for Review on Certiorari (Appeal). Id. at 4.
6.CA Decision dated 28 September 2012. Id. at 146-147.
7.Id. at 147.
8.Id. at 148.
9.Id.
10.Penned by Labor Arbiter Henry F. Te. Id. at 111-117.
11.Labor Arbiter Decision dated 27 November 2007. Id. at 113-144 and 116-117.
12.Id. at 150.
13.Labor Arbiter Resolution dated 24 December 2008. Id. at 123.
14.Id. at 124.
15.Id. at 128-130.
16.Id. at 129-130.
17.Id. at 56-157 and 160-162.
18.471 Phil. 355 (2004).
19.Philips Semiconductor (Phils.), Inc. v. Fadriquela, supra at 369-370.
20.Rollo, pp. 153-154.