THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 195635. April 5, 2017.]
MONICA YEE HIERRO FONG, ET AL., petitioners,vs. RAYMUNDO YEE AHHI, SALVACION YEE AHHI FERNANDEZ, ET AL., respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 5, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 195635(Monica Yee Hierro Fong, et al. vs. Raymundo Yee Ahhi, Salvacion Yee Ahhi Fernandez, et al.). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated November 15, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01270. DETACa
On September 8, 1994, Monica Yee Hierro Fong, Pacifico Yee Hierro, Wenceslao Yee Hierro, Rosario Yee Hierro Pesayco (Rosario), Roberto Yee Hierro, Rita Yee Hierro Saquian, Mercedes Yee Wong Te, Celia Yee Wong Ferrer, Fermonio Yee Wong, Arthur Yee Villanueva, and Franklin Yee Villanueva (collectively, the petitioners) filed a complaint for partition, annulment of sale and donation, recovery of ownership, and possession with damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique against Raymundo Yee Ahhi (Raymundo), Salvacion Yee Ahhi Fernandez, Alberto Yee Ahhi, and Helen Kwok Ahhi (collectively, the respondents). The complaint involves two parcels of land situated in T. Fornier Street, San Jose, Antique, previously covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. 7533 and 7624, containing an area of 511 square meters and 411 sq m, respectively (subject properties). 3
Maria Se Totong (Maria) was the registered owner of one-half of each of the subject properties, while the other half portions were registered pro-indiviso under the names of her six children, namely: Arturo, Amado Sr., Adela, Nicolas, Eugenia, and Felipe, all surnamed Hierro. 4 The petitioners are the children of Arturo, Adela, and Eugenia, while the respondents are the children of Amado, Sr. 5
The petitioners claimed that:
After the deaths of Maria in May 1957 and of her eldest son Arturo in 1960, her next eldest surviving son, Amado Sr., following Chinese tradition, took over the complete management and control of the family businesses, including the possession of the subject properties. Amado Sr. and his two sons, Amado Jr. and Raymundo, continued with the exclusive possession and management of the family business enterprise to the exclusion of the other family members. 6
In 1993, petitioner Rosario claimed from the respondents the respective shares of the other members of the family in the subject properties. Despite a series of negotiations, the matter was not settled. In January 1994, the petitioners discovered several documents of conveyance ceding varying interests over the subject properties in favor of Amado Jr. and Raymundo, which documents are fictitious and void. 7
On the other hand, the respondents claimed that the petitioners no longer have any valid claim to the subject properties. On September 5, 1951, Arturo sold his share in the subject properties to Amado Sr. 8 On May 23, 1966, Adela sold one-half of her share in the subject properties to Amado Jr. in consideration of P6,000.00 through a deed of donation. 9 Consequently; in an effort to settle the dispute between the family members, Amado Jr. bought the shares of the other five families in consideration of P12,000.00 each as evidenced by the following: (1) extra-judicial settlement and sale of the subject properties on January 25, 1971; (2) affidavit of adjudication and sale on January 29, 1971; and (3) waiver of rights and interests in the subject properties on May 21, 1971. 10
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision dated November 2, 2005, the decretal portion of which reads: HEITAD
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the [petitioners'] verified AMENDED COMPLAINT dated January 22, 1996 and likewise dismissing the [respondents'] COUNTERCLAIM asserted by them in their verified original ANSWER dated January 15, 1995.
No cost.
SO ORDERED. 11
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal to the CA, claiming that the RTC erred in failing to find the existence of an express trust between and among the parties; they contend that the subject properties are still held in common for the benefit of all the parties. 12
On November 15, 2010, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, 13 which upheld the RTC's disposition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 2 November 2005 x x x of the [RTC] of San Jose, Antique, Branch 11 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 14
The CA opined that there is no longer any co-ownership between the parties as regards the subject properties considering that the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have already conveyed their shares in favor of Amado Jr., the respondents' predecessor-in-interest. 15 The CA further ruled that the petitioners' allegations of fraud, which supposedly attended the execution of the documents of conveyance over the subject properties in favor of Amado Jr. and the respondents, deserve scant consideration. Moreover, the petitioners, other than their bare allegations, failed to adduce any evidence to prove such claim. 16
On the other hand, the CA found that the respondents presented sufficient proof of their ownership of the subject properties since 1971, the year of the conveyances, or for more than 20 years at the time of the filing of the complaint with the RTC. Accordingly, the CA ruled that the petitioners are guilty of laches in asserting their supposed right. 17
In this petition, the petitioners claim that the lower courts erred in recognizing the validity of the supposed conveyances of their shares in the subject properties in 1971. They claim that at the time of the conveyances, Amado Jr. was still a Chinese citizen and the transfer of the subject properties to him was contrary to the provisions of the 1935 Constitution. 18 They further maintain that the sale of their respective shares in the subject properties to Amado Jr. was fictitious and, hence, void. 19
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
Well-entrenched is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law; findings of fact of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, as in this case, are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court. 20 That the conveyances of the petitioners' respective shares in the subject properties in favor of Amado Jr. in 1971 were valid and not attended by fraud are findings of fact by the lower courts and, hence, binding and conclusive upon the Court. It is true that there are recognized exceptions 21 to this rule, but the petitioners failed to show that any of the exceptions is present in the instant case to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower courts. aDSIHc
The petitioners' claim that the conveyances of their respective shares in the subject properties to Amado Jr. in 1971 were void since the latter was still a Chinese citizen at that time is untenable. The sale of real estate to a foreigner disqualified to hold title thereto divests the vendor of the title to such real estate and has no recourse against the vendee despite the latter's disability on account of alienage to hold title to such real estate. It is only the State that is entitled to raise the disability of the vendee to hold such real property in an escheat proceeding. 22
Amado Jr. became a Filipino citizen, through naturalization, on June 21, 1976. Accordingly, whatever constitutional infirmities that may have attended the conveyances of the petitioners' share in the subject properties in 1971 are already of no consequence; the disability of Amado Jr. had already been removed when he was naturalized in 1976. 23
Furthermore, the CA correctly ruled that the petitioners' claim is already barred by laches. The principle of laches or stale demands ordains that the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 24 The transfer of the petitioners' shares in the subject properties to Amado Jr. was concluded in 1971. For more than 20 years, the petitioners never instituted any action to assert their claim. It was only in September 1994 that they instituted their complaint with the RTC sans any explanation for their delay. Clearly, the petitioners' claim is already barred by laches. On this point, the CA's disquisition is instructive, viz.:
[The petitioners'] silence and inaction absolutely bar them from contesting the validity of the questioned donation and sale.
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting for decades, [the petitioners] can no longer defeat the better right arising from the Torrens titles issued in the name of the present transferee of the property, unless and until anyone succeeds in overcoming the presumption of good faith in securing their titles. ATICcS
To grant [the petitioners'] relief when they have not even offered any justifiable excuse for their inaction would be unjust. It is certainly beyond our comprehension how they could have remained silent for more than twenty (20) years. x x x. 25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated November 15, 2010 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R, CV No. 01270 is AFFIRMED."
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 17-40.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting, with Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos and Edwin D. Sorongon concurring; id. at 42-51.
3.Id. at 43.
4.Id. at 44.
5.Id. at 20; 76-77.
6.Id. at 44.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 77-78.
9.Id. at 78.
10.Id. at 79-91; 132-146.
11.Id. at 45.
12.Id. at 47.
13.Id. at 42-51.
14.Id. at 51.
15.Id. at 48.
16.Id. at 48-49.
17.Id. at 49-51.
18.Id. at 27-28.
19.Id. at 28-31.
20.See Castillo v. CA, 329 Phil. 150, 158 (1996); Samala v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 563, 568 (2004).
21. Such as: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record; (8) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the findings of the RTC; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties (Montecillo v. Pama, 567 Phil. 486, 490-491 (2008).
22.See Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 96 Phil. 447,452 (1955).
23.Id. at 453.
24.Galicia v. Manliquez vda. de Mindo, 549 Phil. 595, 608 (2007).
25.Rollo, p. 49.