FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226996. August 28, 2019.]
RONNIE FIGUEROA y FLORES, RAMON GO y PURUGANAN, FRANK GAJIS y RAMIREZ, ERNESTO CANTERE y ANINON AND ARMANDO AMBROCIO y DEL PILAR, petitioners, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 28, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226996 (Ronnie Figueroa y Flores, Ramon Go y Puruganan, Frank Gajis y Ramirez, Ernesto Cantere y Aninon and Armando Ambrocio y Del Pilar v. People of the Philippines)
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision 2 dated October 6, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated August 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33646.
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed Decision and Resolution of the CA.
We find no compelling reason to deviate from the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC) and the CA. As correctly ruled by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Hans Anton Tan y Cheng (Tan), Frank Gajis y Ramirez (Gajis), Ernesto Cantere y Aninon (Cantere), Ronnie Figueroa y Flores (Figueroa), Ramon Go y Puruganan (Go), and Armando Ambrocio y Del Pilar (Ambrocio) just happened to conveniently be in the same place and at the same time, by mere coincidence, when the shootout occurred.
We find Evelyn Jao's (Evelyn) positive identification of the perpetrators and her narration of the events more consistent and worthy of belief. During the trial, Evelyn identified the man, who drove the Honda City as Cantere. She also identified the man, who sat beside their driver, blindfolded them, brought them to a room, and guarded them, as Gajis. She identified the person, who sat next to her, grabbed her by the neck, took her wrist watch, and grabbed Aaron Tao's (Aaron) identification card, hearing aid, and school bag, as Go. The man, who drove the vehicle that bumped their car, was identified as Ambrocio. 4 The Chinese-looking man, the men called Dr. Tan, was identified as Tan. Another man outside the room was identified as Figueroa. 5 Consequently, weighed against the straightforward and positive testimony of Evelyn, the self-serving denials and alibis of Tan, Gajis, Cantere, Figueroa, Ambrocio, and Go deserve scant consideration.
Robbery was consummated the moment Go, together with his other co-conspirators, unlawfully took Evelyn's wrist watch, Aaron's identification card, hearing aid, and school bag through violence and intimidation. We find it difficult to believe that, as being suggested by petitioners, only Go committed the crime of robbery. It must be noted that Go, Cantere and Gajis were all inside the Honda City car when Go inquired about the personal belongings of the victims. In such a cramped and small space, where six people were confined, Cantere and Gajis could easily have knowledge of what their co-conspirator was doing. It is more believable to consider that, though their acts in furtherance of the crime of robbery may be different from each other, their acts indicate a joint purpose and a concurrence of sentiments. The scheme they employed to ensure possession of the vehicle and custody over the victims manifest their intention to rob the victims.
The fact that Evelyn did not actually witness the moment when the Honda City car was stripped of its accessories does not negate her claim that the men who took them were the same people who took the accessories of the car. It is more consistent with human experience to believe that the men responsible for their kidnapping were the same people responsible for stealing the accessories of the Honda City car because they were in possession of the vehicle from the moment control over the vehicle was forcible taken from the victims until they were released. The victims should not be faulted for failing to present a prior inventory of the contents of the vehicle because no ordinary person would ever anticipate nor expect to become a victim of robbery.
Nonetheless, there is a need to modify the imposable penalty for robbery punishable under Article 293 6 the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 294 (4) 7 of the same Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term shall be within the range of the penalty prescribed by the Code, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusiontemporal in its medium period [twelve (12) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months, and twenty (20) days]. The minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code, or within the range of prisioncorreccional in its maximum period to prisionmayor in its medium period [four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. Noticeably, the indeterminate penalty imposed by the lower court of four (4) years and (2) months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prisionmayor, as maximum, is not within the range prescribed by law. Thus, the indeterminate penalty shall be modified to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prisionmayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusiontemporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 6, 2015 and the Resolution dated August 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33646 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The indeterminate penalty imposed is modified to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of prisionmayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusiontemporal as maximum. The award of actual damages in the amount of P89,069.12 is sustained.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-27.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam (Former Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., concurring; id. at 93-105.
3.Id. at 117-119.
4.Id. at 66.
5.Id. at 67.
6 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 293.
Art. 293. Who are Guilty of Robbery — Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.
7. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 294 (4).
Art. 294. Robbery with Violence against or Intimidation of Persons-Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The penalty of prisiónmayor in its medium period to reclusióntemporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.