FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 210069-70. June 20, 2018.]
THELMA FIGUEROA, PABLO FIGUEROA, IRENE CARRASCOSO AND FERNANDO CARRASCOSO III, petitioners,vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, WILFREDO C. MALDIA, CRESENCIO R. SELISPARA, DELIA LADAO, CARMINDA G. UROT, FILOMENA NERI, RENE GALLO, LILIA S. CAPISTRANO, ERNA G. MAAGAD, CELSO BARBERAN, ANGELITO CARBONILLA, PAUL CUBERO, OSCAR TAGAYUMA, CESAR MAGALLANES, HUBERT QUIBLAT, MILO JUSTINIANO, VENANCIO B. REYES AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJune 20, 2018which reads as follows: DHITCc
"G.R. Nos. 210069-70 (Thelma Figueroa, Pablo Figueroa, Irene Carrascoso and Fernando Carrascoso III v. Land Bank of the Philippines, Wilfredo C. Maldia, Cresencio R. Selispara, Delia Ladao, Carminda G. Urot, Filomena Neri, Rene Gallo, Lilia S. Capistrano, Erna G. Maagad, Celso Barberan, Angelito Carbonilla, Paul Cubero, Oscar Tagayuma, Cesar Magallanes, Hubert Quiblat, Milo Justiniano, Venancio B. Reyes and Social Security System).
On appeal before this Court is the Decision 1 dated August 22, 2012 and Resolution 2 dated November 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01641-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 00742-MIN.
The antecedents follow.
On March 5, 1997, respondent Land bank of the Philippines (LBP) approved petitioners Thelma and Pablo Figueroa's (Spouses Figueroa) loan application in the amount of P25,000,000.00 and their Credit Line in the amount of P5,000,000.00. The terms of the credit facilities provided that the loans shall be funded through respondent Social Security Services (SSS) Tourism Loan Program to avail of the lower interest rates and better loan conditions. 3 The two loans were secured by properties covered by Title Nos. T-16699 and T-51226 and the improvements erected thereon, which includes a hotel and restaurant. 4
Petitioners Irene and Fernando Carrascoso III (Spouses Carrascoso) were likewise granted a Credit Line of P5,000,000.00, which was released by LBP from May 18, 1998 to July 27, 2000. This loan was partially secured by a property covered by Title No. KOT-P-3055, including the improvements thereon in the name of Spouses Figueroa. 5
Spouses Figueroa and Spouses Carrascoso, however, reneged on their obligations. Their accounts were lodged to past due status on December 27, 2000. 6 The LBP sent a final demand letter to Spouses Carrascoso on November 15, 2002 and to Spouses Figueroa on May 9, 2003. 7
Despite extensions given by LBP, Spouses Figueroa and Spouses Carrascoso (heretofore collectively referred to as petitioners), refused to settle their obligation and/or to comply with LBP's restructuring plan. 8
Due to the long and overdue obligation of the petitioners and considering that the numerous negotiations proved futile, LBP filed on April 21, 2005 separate Applications for Extra-judicial Foreclosure with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bukidnon, Malaybalay City on the mortgaged properties securing the loan obligations of the petitioners. 9
On June 2, 2005, petitioners filed a Complaint for Injunction, Accounting and Damages 10 against LBP, its officers, and SSS. They prayed, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) commanding LBP to desist from proceeding with the foreclosure, until after LBP has clarified how they handled the petitioners' loan accounts.
On July 13, 2005, SSS filed its Answer; 11 while the LBP filed its Answer, 12 on August 10, 2005. The LBP, stated among others, that the TRO sought by the petitioners has no legal and factual basis and should, together with the complaint, be both denied.
On August 1, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution 13 denying the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a TRO. The RTC ruled, among others, that the petitioners were unable to prove they have a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and that they evidently failed to pay their obligations and the LBP, by law, has the right to cause the extra-judicial foreclosure of their properties. cEaSHC
Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration 14 thereto was likewise denied in the RTC's Resolution dated October 18, 2005. 15
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari16 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00742-MIN, assailing the RTC's two aforementioned Resolutions.
Since there was no order to hold in abeyance the proceedings before the RTC pending the CA's resolution of the Certiorari case, the pre-trial/preliminary conference was set on March 22, 2006.
Meanwhile, LBP and SSS filed their Pre-trial Briefs on March 17 17 and 21, 18 2006, respectively.
During the rescheduling of the preliminary conference on August 9, 2006, LBP moved for the dismissal of the case due to petitioners' failure to file their pre-trial brief. 19 In the interest of substantial justice, however, the RTC gave petitioners another chance to file their pre-trial brief. 20 Thus, the pre-trial was moved, yet again, to October 19, 2006 due to petitioners' non-filing of their pre-trial brief. 21
On August 25, 2006, petitioners filed their pre-trial brief. 22
On October 18, 2006, the RTC issued an Order 23 cancelling the scheduled pre-trial on October 19, 2006 because the presiding Judge as well as the public prosecutor and PAO lawyers will be attending the Dialogue of the Pillars of Juvenile Justice System to be held in Cagayan de Oro City. The RTC reset the pre-trial on November 16, 2006.
However, a day before the scheduled pre-trial or on November 15, 2006, the petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceeding 24 claiming that a Petition for Declaration of State of Suspension of Payments with Approval of Proposed Rehabilitation Plan had been filed with the RTC, Branch 9 and among those claims listed therein was the loan subject of the pending case. The Motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order 25 dated November 15, 2006. The pre-trial was postponed to November 23, 2006.
Upon motion of the petitioners, 26 with LBP's concurrence, the pre-trial was moved again to February 7, 2007 and March 8, 2007.
On March 8, 2007, upon petitioners' motion, the pre-trial was reset on June 14, 2007. 27
To give way to settlement, the June 14, 2007 pre-trial was moved to August 23, 2007, 28 and later to November 15, 2007. 29
During the November 15, 2007 scheduled pre-trial, petitioners again requested for the resetting of the pre-trial on February 6, 2008. Sensing that petitioners are engaging in dilatory tactics, LBP registered its objection to the request. LBP manifested that it shall be constrained to move for the dismissal of the case if further resetting should be made. 30 The pre-trial, was thus, moved to February 6, 2008. 31
Unfortunately, petitioners and their counsel failed to appear at the pre-trial on February 6, 2008. Their counsel advanced the excuse that he was mistakenly informed that the scheduled hearing has been canceled due to a festival in the locality. 32 Consequently, LBP moved for the dismissal of the case.
On March 12, 2008, the RTC issued an Order 33 dismissing the case for failure of the petitioners and their counsel to appear at the scheduled preliminary conference pursuant to Rule 18, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, on March 26, 2008, the RTC issued another Order, 34 dismissing petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its March 12, 2008 Order.
Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an Appeal 35 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 01641-MIN.
On November 3, 2010, the CA ordered the consolidation of the petitioners' appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 01641-MIN and their petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 00742-MIN, considering that it involves the same parties and arises from the same transaction. 36
On August 22, 2012, the CA rendered its assailed Decision, and disposed the case as follows:
The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal (CA-G.R. CV No. 01641-MIN) and affirmed the RTC's Order dated March 12, 2008. The CA ruled, among others, that: the petitioners and their counsel transgressed procedural rules — the pre-trial rules in particular; the petitioners, without sufficient explanation, belatedly filed their pre-trial brief which caused the cancellation of the pre-trial not once, but twice; and, due to the pattern of delay on the part of the petitioners, the relaxation of the rules cannot be justified.
The CA likewise dismissed petitioners' certiorari petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 00742-MIN), and ruled that the same had been mooted by the dismissal of the main case. Nonetheless, the CA reasoned out that petitioners' reliance on the case of Ponciano Almeda and Eufemia P. Almeda v. CA and PNB37 was misplaced.
Their motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the CA in its November 18, 2013 Resolution, 38 petitioners filed this instant petition.
The petition is denied.
We tackle the following issues for the resolution of this appeal: (1) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the petitioners' case based on an issue not raised on appeal; (2) whether or not petitioners complied with the rules on pre-trial embodied in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court; and (3) whether or not the petitioners are entitled to a TRO.
We shall rule on the issues seriatim.
Petitioners argue that their "belated filing of the pre-trial brief" is not among the reasons cited by the RTC in dismissing the case. As such, this should not have been the basis of the CA in affirming the RTC's March 12, 2018 Order, which dismissed their complaint.
We disagree.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
Sec. 8. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
We held in Spouses Lehner and Ludy Martires vs. Menelia Chua: 39
An appellate court is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal in the following instances, among others: (a) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; (b) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; (c) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and (d) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned, is dependent. 40
Collectively, these instances concur in the circumstances of this case.
Here, there is no doubt that the fact of petitioners' late filing of their pre-trial brief is closely related to petitioners' principal issue raised in their appeal with the CA, which reads: "the trial court gravely erred in strictly applying the Rules and in dismissing the case for failure of the plaintiffs-appellants and their counsels to appear in the preliminary conference." It also has a bearing in the CA's determination on what prompted the RTC in deciding against the liberal application of procedural rules, the pre-trial rules in particular. Further, this is consistent with the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal. 41
At any rate, the records show that petitioners violated the rules on pre-trial for their failure to appear at the preliminary conference, which constitutes a sufficient ground for the dismissal of their action.
The applicable provision under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, states, viz.:
Section 2. Nature and purpose. — The pre-trial is mandatory. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Section 4. Appearance of parties. — It shall be the duty of the parties and their counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The non-appearance of a party may be excused only if a valid cause is shown therefor or if a representative shall appear in his behalf fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents.
Section 5. Effect of failure to appear. — The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphasis ours) SCaITA
From the foregoing, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then he may be declared non-suited and his case dismissed. If it is the defendant who fails to appear, then the plaintiff may be allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. 42 Thus, the plaintiff is given the privilege to present his evidence without objection from the defendant, the likelihood being that the court will decide in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant having forfeited the opportunity to rebut or present its own evidence. 43
By way of exception, the Rules provide that the non-appearance of a party and counsel may be excused if (1) a valid cause is shown; or (2) there is an appearance of a representative on behalf of a party fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. What constitutes a valid cause is subject to the court's sound discretion and the exercise of such discretion shall not be disturbed except in cases of clear and manifest abuse. 44
Here, the preliminary conference for the civil case filed by petitioners on June 25, 2005 was initially set on March 22, 2006. 45 The LBP and the SSS filed their pre-trial briefs on March 17 and 21, 2006, respectively. The pre-trial was reset on August 9, 2006 46 and was again reset on October 19, 2006 due to petitioners' failure to submit their pre-trial brief. 47 In the interest of substantial justice, the RTC allowed the petitioners to submit, albeit belatedly, their pre-trial brief. Another resetting of the pre-trial was moved to November 15, 2006, by reason of the presiding Judge's and the court staff's attending the Dialogue of the Pillars of Juvenile Justice System in Cagayan de Oro City. 48 On November 16, 2006, upon motion of petitioners' counsel, the pre-trial was rescheduled on February 7, 2007. From then on, the preliminary conference was reset for several times, i.e., June 14, 2007, August 23, 2007, and November 15, 2007, again upon motion of petitioners' counsel. At the November 15, 2007 setting, the LBP's counsel registered a vigorous objection to another resetting and manifested that a motion to dismiss would be filed if further resetting is made. This notwithstanding, petitioners' counsel requested for another postponement on February 6, 2008. Unfortunately, on the latter date, petitioners and their counsel did not appear at the preliminary conference "due to an honest miscommunication that the hearing on the said date was cancelled due to a festival celebration."49
This Court finds petitioners' reasoning rather specious. For one thing, the mere holding of a "festival celebration" is not sufficient to abate court proceedings, especially so in this case, where the petitioners themselves, through their counsel, were the ones who moved for the postponement of the preliminary conference — the last being on February 6, 2008. Clearly, they were aware that the proceedings would pushed through on the scheduled date. For another thing, nowhere in the records does it appear that the RTC issued an order informing the parties that the preliminary conference set on February 6, 2008 was cancelled due to a festivity.
If, indeed, there was a "miscommunication" as to the scheduled preliminary conference, petitioners, more so, their counsel, could have exercised ordinary diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the hearing would resume on February 6, 2008. The mere invocation of an alleged "festival celebration" during that day hardly exculpate petitioners and their counsel from their failure to appear at the preliminary conference. Prudence dictates that they could have authorized a representative or substitute to appear on their behalf. They should have been more circumspect to ensure that the hearing would not have been left unattended in view of its adverse consequence, i.e., that the plaintiff's failure to appear at the preliminary conference will cause the dismissal of the case. Predicting the conduct of court proceedings, much less without any contingent measure, exhibits petitioners and their counsel's indifference towards the pre-trial rules.
Section 5 of Rule 18 is clear enough that an order of dismissal based on failure to appear at pre-trial is with prejudice, unless the order itself states otherwise. Here, the RTC's questioned Order dated March 12, 2008, did not specify that the dismissal is without prejudice. There should be no cause for confusion, and the RTC is not required to explicitly state that the dismissal is, indeed, with prejudice.
In affirming the RTC's and the CA's dismissal of petitioners' case for their disregard of the rules on pre-trial, We stress Our ruling in Absolute Management Corporation v. Metrobank, 50 on the importance of pre-trial, thus: aTHCSE
Everyone knows that a pre-trial in civil actions is mandatory, and has been so since January 1, 1964. Yet to this day its place in the scheme of things is not fully appreciated, and it receives but perfunctory treatment in many courts. Some courts consider it a mere technicality, serving no useful purpose save perhaps, occasionally to furnish ground for non-suiting the plaintiff, or declaring a defendant in default, or, wistfully, to bring about a compromise. The pre-trial is not thus put to full use. Hence, it has failed in the main to accomplish the chief objective for it: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. This is a great pity, because the objective is attainable, and with not much difficulty, if the device were more intelligently and extensively handled.
xxx xxx xxx
Consistently with the mandatory character of the pre-trial, the Rules oblige not only the lawyers but the parties as well to appear for this purpose before the Court, and when a party "fails to appear at a pre-trial conference, (he) may be non-suited or considered as in default." The obligation "to appear" denotes not simply the personal appearance, or the mere physical presentation by a party of one's self, but connotes as importantly, preparedness to go into the different subjects assigned by law to a pre-trial x x x. 51 (Emphasis ours)
In addition to the foregoing, this Court finds no cogent reason to liberally apply the rules considering that the petitioners and their counsel had not offered sufficient justification for their failure to appear at the preliminary conference. Accordingly, the RTC's and the CA's pronouncements declaring the dismissal of the petitioners' case in the court a quo are juridically unassailable.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the trial court had been very lenient and accommodating to petitioners. Recall that against LBP's motion to dismiss, the RTC, in the interest of justice, allowed the petitioners to file their pre-trial brief. Recall too that the RTC granted petitioners' several motions for the deferment of the preliminary conference for at least four times on the following dates: February 7, 2007, June 14, 2007, August 23, 2007, and November 15, 2007. Yet, on the last scheduled date of the hearing on February 6, 2008, (which once again was upon petitioners' motion), the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, based on the flimsy excuse that they thought the hearing was cancelled due to a festival celebration. Taken together, the facts at hand do not warrant a liberal construction of the rules.
Anent the last issue, which essentially challenged the RTC's denial of petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the TRO in its August 1, 2005 Resolution, We agree with the CA that such issue had already been rendered moot and academic by reason of the dismissal of the petitioners' main case.
In the case of Macario Diaz Carpio vs. Court of Appeals, Spouses Gelacio G. Oria and Marcelina Pre Oria, 52 this Court explained that:
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. 53
This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced. 54 cAaDHT
Considering that the RTC has already dismissed the main case, i.e., the June 2, 2005 Complaint for Injunction, Accounting and Damages, due to petitioners' and their counsel's failure to faithfully abide with the rules on pre-trial, there is nothing left for the CA to act upon. Upon its dismissal, the question of the propriety of issuing or not issuing a TRO or an injuctive writ necessarily died with it. Accordingly, there will be no more practical value in resolving the question of the non-issuance of an injunctive writ in this case.
From the perspective of this Rule 45 petition, the CA's finding is anchored on factual and legal bases. Thus, We find nothing in its questioned ruling that hints of any error that would justify its reversal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. the Decision dated August 22, 2012 and Resolution dated November 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01641-MIN and CA-G.R. SP No. 00742-MIN, are AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED."Leonardo-de Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Penned by Justice Renato C. Francisco, with Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap, concurring; Rollo, pp. 70-92.
2.Id. at 94-96.
3.Id. at 128 and 250.
4.Id. at 250.
5.Id. at 252.
6.Id. at 454.
7.Id. at 454-455.
8.Id. at 456.
9.Id. at 458.
10.Id. at 123-160.
11.Id. at 162-171.
12.Id. at 173-196.
13. Id. at 198-210.
14. Id. at 212-225.
15. Id. at 264-271.
16. Id. at 273-323.
17. Id. at 325-342.
18. Id. at 344-349.
19. Id. at 463.
20. Id. at 351 and 429.
21. Id. at 351.
22. Id. at 353-359.
23. Id. at 361.
24. Id. at 363-368.
25. Id. at 370.
26. Id. at 372-373.
27. Id. at 375-376.
28. Id. at 378-379.
29. Id. at 381-382.
30. Id. at 464-465.
31. Id. at 384-385.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Id. at 390.
34. Id. at 397-401.
35. Id. at 403-443.
36. Id. at 83.
37. G.R. No. 113412, April 17, 1996.
38. Rollo, pp. 94-96.
39. 707 Phil. 34 (2013).
40. Id. at 51.
41. Heirs of Loyola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 188658, January 11, 2017.
42. Daaco v. Yu, 761 Phil. 161, 168 (2015).
43. Tolentino, et al. v. Laurel, et al., 682 Phil. 527, 536 (2012).
44. Daaco v. Yu, supra.
45. Rollo, p. 80.
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 383.
49. Id. at 45.
50. 739 Phil. 474 (2014).
51. Id. at 481-482.
52. 705 Phil. 153 (2013), citing Osmeña III v. Social Security System of the Philippines, 559 Phil. 723, 735 (2007).
53. Id. at 163-164.
54. Phil. Savings Bank, et al. v. Senate Impeachment Court, et al., 699 Phil. 34 (2012), citing Sales v. Commission on Elections, 559 Phil. 593, (2007).