Fernandez v. Fernandez

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 222398. July 28, 2021.]

GIL C. FERNANDEZ, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NORMAMINA S. FERNANDEZ, LORDEGIL S. FERNANDEZ, GINA GERARDINE S. FERNANDEZ, and MARIA LOURDES CORAZON S. FERNANDEZ-TAPANG, petitioners,vs. BELEN FERNANDEZ and CITY SUPERMARKET, INC., respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 28, 2021,which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 222398(Gil C. Fernandez, substituted by his Heirs, Normamina S. Fernandez, Lordegil S. Fernandez, Gina Gerardine S. Fernandez, and Maria Lourdes Corazon S. Fernandez-Tapang v. Belen Fernandez and City Supermarket, Inc.). — This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2 dated May 8, 2015 and Resolution 3 dated January 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 135844. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the heirs of Gil C. Fernandez (Gil) assailing the Order 4 dated January 16, 2014 and Resolution 5 dated May 13, 2014 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City in Civil Case No. 2006-0342-D.

The civil case involved a parcel of land in Dagupan City denominated as Lot 15-C (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44012 and registered in the name of three (3) brothers as co-owners, namely, Oscar C. Fernandez (Oscar), Armando C. Fernandez (Armando), and Gil C. Fernandez (Gil), all of whom are now deceased. 6

On two separate occasions, Oscar and Armando sold their respective 1/3 shares in the subject property to respondents Belen Fernandez (Belen) and City Supermarket, Inc. (CSI), respectively. 7

In 2002, Gil also offered to sell the remaining 1/3 portion of the subject property to Belen. They then orally agreed on a purchase price of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). Belen subsequently made partial payments to Gil amounting to eight hundred thousand pesos (Php800,000.00). At this point, respondents occupied the subject property. 8

Sometime in the second quarter of 2006, Lordegil Fernandez, one of Gil's children, demanded from Belen the payment of rentals due his father based on a lease contract executed in 1985. Belen, however, refused to pay, claiming that her agreement with Gil for the purchase of the land included all rentals due. 9

On October 4, 2006, Belen filed a Notice of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City. This prompted Gil to file a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan City for legal redemption, recovery of possession, sum of money, and cancellation of adverse claim with damages against Belen and CSI (respondents). 10

Gil asserted that he never received notice regarding the sale of his brothers' shares in the subject property. Thus, under Article 1623 of the Civil Code, he was entitled to redeem the same. On his claim for sum of money and recovery of possession, Gil contended that Belen failed to pay the accrued rentals on the subject property since 1985. He also alleged that Belen failed to vacate the premises upon expiration of the lease in 2005 despite repeated demands to do so. 11

Trial then ensued. After Gil formally offered his evidence, respondents presented Belen as their witness. However, before Belen's cross-examination was completed, they filed an Omnibus Motion on November 19, 2013, praying, among others, for the dismissal of the case for lack of cause of action. According to respondents, Gil admitted that he was duly notified of the sale by his brothers Oscar and Armando. They also pointed out that Gil failed to exercise his right of redemption within the prescribed period. 12

In an Order 13 dated January 16, 2014, the RTC partially granted respondents' Omnibus Motion. The RTC reasoned that the co-ownership among Gil and his two brothers ceased to exist when Oscar and Fernando sold their shares in the subject property. Since the co-ownership was dissolved, Gil did not have the right to redeem. The RTC added that Gil failed to exercise such right since he did not tender or consign the redemption price within the prescribed period, as required by jurisprudence. However, since respondents occupied a portion of Gil's property, the RTC ruled that petitioners were entitled to the rentals due since 1985. CAIHTE

Both parties moved for partial reconsideration. 14

In a Resolution 15 dated May 13, 2014, the RTC partially reversed its Order. The trial court found that Gil and Belen entered into an oral contract of sale over the remaining 1/3 portion of the subject property and that Belen already paid Php800,000.00 out of the Php2,000,000.00 total purchase price. Accordingly, the RTC ordered petitioners to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Belen upon the latter's payment of Php1,200,000.00 representing the balance of the agreed purchase price.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. They ascribed grave abuse of discretion on the trial court for dismissing their complaint and ordering them to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment of the purchase price. 16

In a Decision 17 dated May 8, 2015, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that certiorari is not the proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC Order dated January 16, 2014 and Resolution dated May 13, 2014 are final and not interlocutory orders. Hence, petitioners should have appealed the case.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution 18 dated January 14, 2016.

Hence, this petition.

In a Resolution 19 dated March 2, 2016, this Court initially denied the petition for failure of petitioners to show that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their petition for certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 on June 13, 2016, praying, among others, that the petition be granted due course. In a Resolution 21 dated March 22, 2017, this Court reinstated the petition and ordered respondents to file their comment.

In their Comment 22 dated June 27, 2017, respondents argued that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy. They contended that the assailed order and resolution of the trial court disposed of the case completely as they resolved all of petitioners' causes of action. Thus, the proper recourse would have been to appeal.

In their Reply 23 dated August 3, 2017, petitioners insisted that certiorari is the proper remedy. They reiterated that the assailed orders of the RTC did not resolve all of their causes of action.

This case presents only one principal issue: Did the CA correctly dismiss the petition for certiorari filed by the heirs of Gil?

We rule in the affirmative.

The resolution of this principal issue hinges on whether the assailed order and resolution issued by the RTC are final. If they are, then the CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari since petitioners availed of the wrong remedy. Otherwise, the challenged orders are interlocutory in nature and may be assailed in a petition for certiorari upon showing that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the same.

The distinction between a final and an interlocutory order is settled in jurisprudence. A final order "disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined." 24 By contrast, an interlocutory order "deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered." 25 Put simply, if the order leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case, then the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. 26

One simple test is to examine the causes of action one by one. When each has been resolved, it follows that the order, resolution, or judgment that disposed of these issues is final. If not, it is merely interlocutory. DETACa

The complaint filed by Gil with the RTC raised the following causes of action: (a) legal redemption, (b) recovery of possession, (c) sums of money, (d) cancellation of adverse claim, and (e) damages.

Although these causes of action seem to be separate and distinct, they all stem from two (2) threshold issues, namely, the issue of legal redemption and the issue of ownership of the last 1/3 share in the subject property. In other words, these two threshold issues underpin the other causes of action. How they are resolved determines the necessity of inquiring into the other issues raised by the complaint.

If both threshold issues are resolved in Gil's favor, then he could become the sole owner of subject property after complying with the formalities of redemption. As the owner, he can recover possession of the subject property, collect rent thereon, cancel Belen's adverse claim, and pay for damages as a result. However, in the event that both threshold issues are decided against Gil, all of his causes of action would be susceptible to dismissal.

With these parameters in mind, we painstakingly studied the assailed order and resolution of the RTC. We agree with the CA and conclude that they are indeed final, and not merely interlocutory, in nature.

On the first threshold issue, the RTC held in its Order dated January 16, 2014 that Gil was not entitled to redeem his brothers' shares. The RTC found that the co-ownership among Gil and his two brothers was dissolved when Oscar and Fernando sold their shares in the subject property to Belen and CSI. At any rate, the RTC ruled that Gil failed to exercise such right since he failed to tender or consign the redemption price within the prescribed period. To quote the RTC:

It appears from the records that the plaintiff is a 1/3 [pro indiviso] co-owner together with his two (2) deceased brothers, Oscar C. Fernandez and Armando C. Fernandez of a parcel of land identified as Lot 15-C situated at AB Fernandez Ave., Dagupan City with an area of 229 square meters, more or less, covered by TCT No. 44012. That sometime in 1985, Oscar Fernandez executed a Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro, reserving his right to redeem the property within two (2) years from September 19, 1985 or until September 20, 1987. That upon the lapse and failure of Oscar Fernandez to redeem the property, defendant informed the plaintiff and Armando regarding the sale and requested for the owner's copy of TCT No. 44102 for the purpose of registering the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro. Plaintiff and Armando failed to exercise their right of redemption. That sometime [in] November 2002, the heirs of the late Armando Fernandez have likewise conveyed Armando's 1/3 undivided interest, rights and title through an Extrajudicial Partition and Sale [in favor] of City Supermarket, Inc. That during those period, defendant and plaintiff were also negotiating on the remaining 1/3 portion of the property, [in fact] plaintiff was paid initial amounts for the purchase of the same as evidenced by vouchers. That plaintiff through his [attorney]-in-fact, now claims that he had no notice of the said conveyances of the two shares of his late brothers until sometime [in] October 2006 when defendant filed a Notice of Adverse Claim.

Under the circumstances, it appears that what is more substantial and decisive in the case at bar is whether legal redemption is still possible in this case?

Article 1623 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

Plaintiffs' right to redeem would have existed only had there been [a] co-ownership among [the] siblings. But there was none. For this right to be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by a co-owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owner(s). However, by their own admission, plaintiff and his siblings were no longer co-owners when the 2/3 of the property was sold to defendants in 1985 and 2002 through a Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro and Extrajudicial Partition and Sale respectively executed by plaintiff's late brother Oscar Fernandez and the heirs of the late Armando Fernandez.

The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the property owned in common as his own because his share in it remain[s] intangible and ideal. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition. Here, the particular portions pertaining to plaintiff and his siblings had been ascertained and they in fact already took possession of their respective parts. Their respective shares were physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer ideal. Thus, the co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, plaintiffs' right to redeem any part of the property from any of his former co-owners, the late Oscar and Armando Fernandez was already extinguished. As legal redemption is intended to minimize co-ownership, once a property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community ceases to exist and there is no more reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. aDSIHc

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the defendants, plaintiff failed to deposit the redemption price with the Court, thus, failing to exercise the right of redemption within the prescribed period.

The general rule in redemption is that in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem makes manifestation of his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment, which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. Likewise, in several cases where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was definite finding of tender of payment having been made by the vendor. The tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price[;] otherwise[,] the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily imports a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price.

The rule that tender of payment of the repurchase price is necessary to exercise the right of redemption finds support in civil law. Article 1616 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides: "The vendor cannot avail himself of the right to repurchase without returning to the vendee the price of the sale. . ."

In view of the foregoing, the right of legal redemption does not exist or apply in this case.

Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the Court finds it not necessary to discuss the other causes of action, as they have become moot and academic except the complaint for sum of money. 27 (Citations omitted.)

On the second threshold issue, the RTC held that Belen and Gil entered into an oral contract of sale for the purchase price of Php2,000,000.00. The trial court also gave credence to respondents' claim that a total of Php800,000.00 had already been paid, leaving a balance of Php1,200,000.00. Thus, there was no need for Belen to pay rent as she, together with CSI, owned the subject property. As the RTC opined in its Resolution dated May 13, 2014:

[U]pon a judicious evaluation of the grounds relied upon by the defendant in her motion for partial reconsideration as well as to their reply to the comment/opposition to defendant's motion for partial reconsideration[,] this Court is compelled to partially reverse the assailed order particularly that portion ordering the defendant to pay the "reasonable" monthly rent from July 2006 up to the present at the prevailing market rental in the area during the said period.

By law, a contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. It is a consensual contract which is perfected by mere consent. Once perfected, the contract is generally binding in whatever form (i.e., written or oral) it may have been entered into provided the three (3) essential requisites for its validity prescribed under Article 1318 supra, are present. Foremost of these requisites is the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to the contract.

It is undisputed that the plaintiff and defendant had a previous verbal agreement for the purchase of the remaining 1/3 portion of the lot covered by TCT No. 44012 and that as per the evidence submitted before this Court[,] the plaintiff was able to collect from the defendant partial payment in the total amount of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00) (sic) from the agreed purchase price of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) (sic). Thus, the contract of sale was already indeed perfected as early as the year 2002 when plaintiff received the partial payment.

Equity and fairness dictate that plaintiff has to execute the necessary document regarding the sale of his share to defendant Belen Fernandez. Correspondingly, defendant Belen Fernandez has to perform her obligation as to their verbal agreement by paying the remaining balance of P1,200,000.0 (sic)28 (Citations omitted.)

Consequently, having found that a perfected contract of sale existed between Gil and Belen, the RTC ordered petitioners to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Belen upon payment of balance of the purchase price:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by plaintiff is hereby denied for utter lack of merit and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration by the defendant is hereby granted.

Accordingly, the plaintiff is hereby ordered to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Belen Fernandez upon payment by the latter of the amount of P1,200,000.00 (sic) balance of the agreed purchase price.

SO ORDERED. 29

Petitioners asserted that these rulings of the RTC did not dispose of the issues of recovery of possession, collection of unpaid rentals, cancellation of adverse claim, and award of damages.

Petitioners' argument is specious.

First, possession is just one of the rights arising from the right to ownership. 30 Gil's right to possession is anchored on his 1/3 share in the subject property. However, the RTC found that he sold the same to Belen. Evidently, in light of this finding, it would be useless for the RTC to discuss the issue of possession.

Second, rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it. 31 Much like the issue of possession, Gil's right to collect rent stemmed from his 1/3 share, which he sold to Belen. Again, there was no more need for the RTC to rule on this matter.

Third, Belen's adverse claim was declared to be amply supported in fact and law. There was thus no reason to cancel the same. ETHIDa

Finally, since the trial court effectively dismissed petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action, it follows that their claim for damages is likewise without basis.

Considering the foregoing, it is obvious that the assailed order and resolution disposed of the case completely. There was nothing left for the RTC to resolve since all of Gil's causes of action had been settled, albeit in favor of respondents.

Consequently, the proper recourse for petitioners was to appeal the RTC's order and resolution, which were rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. As Section 2 (a) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. —

(a) Ordinary appeal. — The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where law on these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

Petitioners, however, wrongly resorted to the remedy of certiorari. Under Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, certiorari will issue only when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

In Butuan Development Corporation v. CA, 32 we held that the remedies of certiorari and appeal are mutually exclusive, so much so that when the latter exists, certiorari will not issue even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion:

A party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the remedy of appeal. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availability of the special civil action of certiorari. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, ordinary appeal was indubitably available to petitioners. Hence, the CA was correct in dismissing their petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy.

It is true that time and again, we have relaxed procedural rules to privilege the interest of justice over mere technicalities. Courts, after all, can relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process. 33 Indeed, our overriding aim has always been to accord litigants the amplest opportunity for a proper, just, and complete disposition of their cases, free from the constraints of technicalities. 34 Even the Rules of Court, no less, enjoin us to liberally construe its provisions, with the objective of securing for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. 35

However, this liberal attitude is no reason for erring litigants to belittle and disregard procedural rules. 36 Liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. 37 While litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. 38

Here, petitioners have insisted in their submissions that certiorari, and not appeal, is the proper remedy. They proffered no explanation or special reasons to justify the relaxation of procedural rules. Confident in their chosen remedy despite their glaring error, they found no need to ask for liberality. We therefore find no reason to extend the same.

Accordingly, petitioners' erroneous resort to the remedy of certiorari, when appeal was clearly available to them, cost them their chance to have the RTC's final order and resolution reviewed by the appellate court. Since no appeal was filed, we note that the assailed order and resolution of the RTC have long since attained finality.

WHEREFORE, the present petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated May 8, 2015 and Resolution dated January 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 135844 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (J. Lopez, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2834 dated July 15, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-25.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Magdangal M. De Leon and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela; id. at 27-35.

3.Id. at 37-38.

4. Penned by Judge A. Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr.; id. at 97-103.

5.Id. at 104-105.

6.Id. at 28.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 28-29.

9.Id. at 29.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 29-30.

13.Id. at 97-103.

14.Id. at 31.

15.Id. at 104-105.

16.Id. at 31-32.

17.Id. at 27-35.

18.Id. at 37-38.

19.Id. at 118.

20.Id. at 119-134.

21.Id. at 136.

22.Id. at 184-206.

23.Id. at 224-235.

24.Jose v. Javellana, 680 Phil. 10, 19 (2012).

25.Id.

26.Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo, 672 Phil. 320, 334 (2011).

27.Rollo, pp. 99-102.

28.Id. at 104-105.

29.Id. at 105.

30. CIVIL CODE, Article 428. See E. Rommel Realty and Dev't. Corp. v. Sta. Lucia Realty Dev't. Corp., 537 Phil. 822, 823 (2006).

31. CIVIL CODE, Articles 441 (3) and 442. See Equatorial Realty Dev't. Corp. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 421 Phil. 709, 730 (2001).

32. 808 Phil. 443, 451 (2017).

33.Say v. Dizon, G.R. No. 227457, June 22, 2020.

34.Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng, 682 Phil. 593, 604 (2012).

35. RULES OF COURT, Rule 1, Section 6.

36.Magsino v. De Ocampo, 741 Phil. 394, 410 (2014).

37.Philippine Savings Bank v. Papa, 823 Phil. 725, 737 (2018).

38.De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial Corp., 734 Phil. 652, 663 (2014).