FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194922. January 30, 2019.]
ANTONIO FELICIANO, SR. [DECEASED], HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTERESTS NAMED: RAOUL, KRISTINE AND CATHERINE, ALL SURNAMED FELICIANO, AND SURVIVING SPOUSE [CONTINUING CO-PLAINTIFF] AND HEREIN CO-PETITIONER IN THIS PETITION, MARIETTA * N. FELICIANO, petitioners, vs.ANTONIO E. FELICIANO, JR. AND MA. ISABEL C. FELICIANO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 30, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194922 (Antonio Feliciano, Sr. [deceased], heirs and successors-in-interests named: Raoul, Kristine and Catherine, all surnamed Feliciano, and surviving spouse [continuing co-plaintiff] and herein co-petitioner in this petition, Marietta N. Feliciano v. Antonio E. Feliciano, Jr. and Ma. Isabel C. Feliciano). — This is a petition for review 1 assailing the June 23, 2010 Decision 2 and January 10, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76670. The CA reversed and set aside the March 2, 2000 Decision 4 of Branch 135 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City in Civil Case No. 93-2207 and sustained the validity of the Deed of Assignment subject of the case due to petitioners' failure to prove the existence of a resulting trust.
Petitioner Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano, Sr. (Feliciano, Sr.) married Norma Espinosa (Norma) in 1950. Respondent Antonio E. Feliciano, Jr. (Feliciano, Jr.) was born from this union. In 1952, however, the couple divorced and Feliciano, Sr. did not have the opportunity to see his son. 5
In 1964, while Feliciano, Sr. was in Africa as a missionary doctor, his mother informed him that his son, Feliciano, Jr., had been abandoned by Norma. Feliciano, Sr. immediately went home and invited Feliciano, Jr. to live with him. Thereafter, Feliciano, Jr. lived with Feliciano, Sr. except during the times when there were personal conflicts between father and son. 6
In the meantime, Feliciano, Sr. married Marietta Nousiainen (Marietta), a Canadian citizen, with whom he had three children. Sometime in 1988, Marietta purchased two condominium units from Marina Bayhomes, Asiaworld City in Parañaque City (Marina) on installment, payable in five years at a monthly amortization of P42,061.68. On December 12, 1989, however, Marietta paid the purchase price in full. 7
Afterwards, Marietta allegedly entrusted one of the units to Feliciano, Jr., upon the latter's request. 8 In 1992, Marietta executed a Deed of Assignment 9 over the unit in favor of Feliciano, Jr., in consideration of the amount of P2,268,000.00. That same year, Marina executed a deed of sale over the unit in favor of Feliciano, Jr. The latter paid taxes and other fees to facilitate the transfer of title in his name. Subsequently, Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 2061 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City in the name of Feliciano, Jr. 10 CAIHTE
On April 14, 1993, Feliciano, Jr. obtained a loan in the sum of P3,000,000.00 from Patrocino Margolles. 11 He executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 12 over the unit to secure the obligation.
When Marietta learned of the mortgage, she sent a letter to Feliciano, Jr. demanding reconveyance of the unit and for Feliciano, Jr. to clear its title of encumbrances. She likewise caused the annotation of an Adverse Claim over the title on May 10, 1993 and a lis pendens on July 13, 1993. 13
The parties having failed to reach a settlement on the matter, Marietta, joined by Feliciano, Sr., filed on July 5, 1993 a complaint for reconveyance with damages 14 against Feliciano, Jr. and his wife, Ma. Isabel C. Feliciano (Isabel). The complaint alleged that even if the CCT is in the name of Feliciano, Jr., petitioners remained to be the unit's absolute owners, being its original buyers. The CCT was issued in the name of Feliciano, Jr. by reason of the Deed of Assignment, but even if the deed stated that it was being executed in consideration of the sum of P2,268,000.00, no such consideration was actually given by Feliciano, Jr. to petitioners. Hence, the deed is void and of no effect. 15 Petitioners further alleged that respondents are actually mere trustees of the unit who violated the trust by mortgaging the unit without their permission. The mortgage was additionally made for an amount higher than the acquisition cost of the unit and in favor of Feliciano, Jr.'s aunt who knew of the existence of the trust. Thus, it is simulated and void. 16 Petitioners consequently sought an order from the RTC: 1) commanding respondents to reconvey the condominium unit, and in case of their refusal, ordering the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to cancel CCT No. 2061 and issue a new title in the name of petitioners; and 2) declaring the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage as simulated and void and authorizing the Register of Deeds of Parañaque City to cancel its registration. 17
In their answer with counterclaim, 18 respondents denied that they were mere trustees of the subject condominium unit. Instead, they claimed that they were its absolute owners for which they possess all the rights of an owner including the right to mortgage it. While respondents admitted that petitioners were the ones who originally purchased the unit, they alleged that even before a deed of sale was executed between Marina and petitioners, the latter already assigned their rights over the unit to Feliciano, Jr. for the consideration of P2,268,000.00, which the latter paid in cash. The Deed of Assignment was executed and signed by Marietta as assignor and Feliciano, Jr. as assignee, with the consent of both their spouses and Marina. Respondents claimed that petitioners did not have a cause of action against them since they already relinquished their interests over the unit. 19
On March 2, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision 20 in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendants Antonio E. Feliciano, Jr[.] and Ma.[]Isabel E. Feliciano to CONVEY the subject condominium unit designated [as] Unit G-119, Marina Bayhouse, Asiaworld City, E. Aguinaldo Boulevard, Para[ñ]aque, Metro Manila and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 2061 of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque to plaintiffs Antonio Feliciano, Sr. and Marietta N. Feliciano;
2. In the event that said defendants fail or refuse to convey the subject property, declaring the condominium title registered in the name of defendants deemed null and void and the Register of Deeds of Para[ñ]aque shall issue a new title thereof in favor of plaintiffs; and,
3. Declaring the deed of real estate mortgage over the subject condominium unit null and void.
SO ORDERED. 21 (Emphasis in the original.)
The RTC ruled that petitioners were able to prove by preponderant evidence that no money passed from respondents to petitioners as consideration for the execution of the Deed of Assignment since respondents do not appear to be in a financial position to pay petitioners the amount of P2,268,000.00. Respondents' allegation that part of the money was remitted by Norma, Feliciano, Jr.'s mother, was not supported by evidence. Instead, the RTC held that a resulting trust was established because the true intention of the parties when the Deed of Assignment was executed was to allow respondents to temporarily occupy the unit, subject to return or payment should Marietta demand it. 22 Petitioners' acts of having their adverse claim annotated on the condominium title and filing a complaint for reconveyance indicate their assertion of ownership over the unit. Respondents did not repudiate the trust nor performed acts adverse to it, but only claimed payment which was not substantiated. It is therefore respondents' equitable duty to convey the unit to petitioners. 23 DETACa
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. In its June 23, 2010 Decision, 24 the CA disagreed with the RTC's finding that a resulting trust existed between Marietta and Feliciano, Jr. It found that it was incumbent upon petitioners to prove the existence of a trust relationship, but the only evidence they presented to support the existence of a resulting trust were their own self-serving testimonies. Moreover, the CA held that Marietta failed to explain why she transferred the title of the property in Feliciano, Jr.'s name through the Deed of Assignment, when she could own a condominium unit in her name without violating the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring real properties in the country. Further, the existence of the Deed of Assignment was openly admitted by petitioners. If Marietta's purpose was merely for Feliciano, Jr. to temporarily use the unit, she could have allowed him to stay without granting full ownership or title of the property. Similarly, she could have easily executed an express trust over the unit so that the rights of the parties are clearly delineated. 25 The CA also found that, at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment, Feliciano, Jr. was already a licensed doctor of medicine, receiving not only income from Feliciano, Sr.'s three clinics but also monetary assistance from his mother. His financial capability to purchase the unit cannot therefore be an issue. 26
The CA moreover gave primacy to the intention of the parties, as evinced by the language of the Deed of Assignment, and the fact that it was a notarized document which carries the presumption of regularity. 27 Finally, it held that there are recognized exceptions to the establishment of an implied trust, one of which is contained in the last sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil Code, to wit: "x x x However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child." 28 In this case where Marietta paid the purchase price of the condominium unit and title is conveyed by deed of conveyance to Feliciano, Jr. over whom Marietta stood in loco parentis, a trust does not result, the presumption being that a gift was intended. The other exception to the creation of an implied trust, i.e., when the actual contrary intention of the parties is proved, is also present in this case. 29 The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the court a quo is herebyREVERSEDand SET ASIDE sustaining the validity of the Deed of Assignment as plaintiffs-appellees failed to prove the existence of a resulting trust.
SO ORDERED. 30 (Emphasis and italics in the original.)
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution 31 dated January 10, 2011.
Hence, the present petition where petitioners insist that from the facts and nature of the transaction, a resulting trust was created by operation of law. Thus, Feliciano, Jr., as the trustee, and his wife Isabel, should return under equity the unit to Marietta, as the cestui que trust, to prevent unjust enrichment since they acquired the unit worth P2,268,000.00 for free and enjoyed its use and rental income since September 1992 to the prejudice of Marietta. 32 Petitioners also criticize the CA Decision for evaluating the validity of the Deed of Assignment instead of inquiring on the nature of the transaction between the parties, which induced a resulting trust. 33 They likewise deny the application of Article 1448 of the Civil Code which exempts from the creation of an implied trust the conveyance of title by a legitimate or illegitimate parent to his child, arguing that Feliciano, Jr. is neither a legitimate nor illegitimate child of Marietta. 34
In their comment, 35 respondents maintain that the petition must be summarily dismissed for failure of petitioners to attach a certification of non-forum shopping. 36 On the merits, they assert that petitioners' verbal allegations do not suffice to overcome the legal presumption of the existence of a lawful and valid consideration for the Deed of Assignment. Marietta is moreover estopped from claiming that she did not receive any payment from respondents after she admitted executing the Deed of Assignment and having it notarized thereafter. 37 The Deed of Assignment is a notarized document which has in its favor the presumption of regularity and should be sustained in full force and effect absent complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaws or defects provided by law. 38 Further, the CA correctly held that no implied or resulting trust was established, as petitioners failed to prove its existence. 39 Also, since the unit formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains of Marietta and Feliciano, Sr. and the latter is Feliciano, Jr.'s biological father, the conveyance of title over the unit through the Deed of Assignment signed by Feliciano, Sr. negates the existence of an implied trust under Article 1448 of the Civil Code. 40 aDSIHc
We deny the petition.
First, we rule on the perceived failure of petitioners to attach to the petition a certificate of non-forum shopping. Respondents allege that such failure is cause for the outright dismissal of the petition. We perused the record, however, and found that such requirement had been complied with after all. Indeed, attached to the record is a Jurat41 signed on February 7, 2011 by Edna May Grecia-Lazaro, Consul at the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Ontario, Canada with the accompanying one-page "Verification" and "Non-Forum Shopping" 42 signed by Marietta and one of her children, Christine, supposedly on behalf of Feliciano, Sr. who has died. The certificate of non-forum shopping contains the standard recitals and appears to have been filed on the same day as the petition. It is of no consequence that the certificate had been signed by only one of the petitioners. We have held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances — as where petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action — the rule requiring all petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping may be relaxed. The requirement of strict compliance with the provisions on certification against forum shopping merely underscores its mandatory nature to the effect that the certification cannot altogether be dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not prohibit substantial compliance with the rules under justifiable circumstances, as in this case. 43
Given this, We are baffled by petitioners' statement in their reply, explaining the non-submission of a certificate of non-forum shopping and submitting one which was signed, not by petitioners, but by their son who is not a party to the case. 44 However, since We already found substantial compliance with the said requirement, the Court will no longer belabor this matter.
On the merits, petitioners' arguments fail to persuade.
Petitioners mainly argue that the Deed of Assignment is void for lack of consideration and failure to reflect the true agreement of the parties regarding the subject condominium unit. According to petitioners, they merely allowed Feliciano, Jr. to temporarily stay in the unit and did not intend to relinquish their title over it by the execution of the deed. Moreover, they claim that, contrary to the terms of the deed, no consideration actually passed between the parties, thereby giving rise to a resulting trust.
On the other hand, respondents rely on the recitals of the Deed of Assignment and the deed of absolute sale executed by petitioners in Feliciano, Jr.'s favor to prove their ownership over the unit. They claim that petitioners were not able to present competent evidence to overcome the legal presumption that the Deed of Assignment was supported by sufficient consideration. Likewise, respondents assert that the CA was correct in ruling that petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a trust relationship.
We agree with respondents.
It must be borne in mind that the subject Deed of Assignment is a notarized document. Settled is the rule that a document acknowledged before a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. 45 A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; it must be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it shall not have presented strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on account of some flaw or defect provided against by law. 46 We have also consistently held that a public document, executed with all the legal formalities, is entitled to a presumption of truth as to the recitals contained therein. Mere preponderance of evidence will not suffice to overthrow a certificate of a notary public to the effect that a party executed a certain document and acknowledged the fact of its execution before him. The evidence must be so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude all reasonable dispute on the falsity of the certificate. When the evidence is conflicting, the certificate will be upheld. 47
Here, petitioners failed to present clear, strong and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of truth accorded by law to the notarized Deed of Assignment. While petitioners assert that the Deed of Assignment does not embody the true intent and agreement of the parties, they failed to present sufficient proof to refute its contents. The only evidence they proffered were their own testimonies, unsupported by any independent evidence that would have established the real intent of the parties. Their self-serving testimonies do not amount to the clear and convincing evidence required by law to dispute the said presumption. 48
Likewise, petitioners were unable to overcome the disputable presumption under Section 3 (r), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that there was sufficient consideration to support a contract, i.e., the Deed of Assignment in this case. To overcome this presumption, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. 49 The presumption cannot be overthrown by the bare, uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners that no such consideration was given. ETHIDa
Petitioners questioned the financial capacity of both Feliciano, Jr. and his mother, Norma, to purchase the condominium unit, but with scant effort. Fact is, petitioners even disclosed that Feliciano, Jr. criticized Marietta for not being as rich as his mother. 50 On the part of respondents, they were able to present another witness, Patrocino Margolles, who testified that she personally facilitated the transfer of the money used as consideration for the Deed of Assignment in July or August 1992, from Norma. 51 We also note, as found by the CA, that at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment, Feliciano, Jr. was already a licensed doctor of medicine. He was also receiving 75% to 80% of the income from Feliciano, Sr.'s three clinics with an approximate value of P120,000.00. Hence, Feliciano, Jr.'s financial capability could not be an issue. 52 As it stands, therefore, petitioners were unable to trounce the presumption that the Deed of Assignment was executed for value.
We likewise find no reason to disturb the CA's finding that petitioners were unable to prove the existence of a resulting trust. A trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. 53 Trusts may either be express or implied. A resulting trust is a form of implied trust, arising from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction, whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his title for the benefit of another. 54
In this case, petitioners claim that a resulting trust as contemplated in Article 1448 of the Civil Code exists between Marietta and Feliciano, Jr. since it was Marietta who purchased the condominium unit with her own money, but it was registered in the name of Feliciano, Jr. They claim that a resulting trust was established in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer. 55
As a rule, the burden of proving the existence of a trust is on the party asserting it. Such proof must be clear and must satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its elements. 56 The Civil Code authorizes the admission of parole evidence to prove the existence of a trust, but such evidence has to be trustworthy and cannot rest on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations. 57 Here, as held by the CA, the only evidence to support the claim that a resulting trust existed and was contemplated by Marietta and Feliciano, Jr. were petitioners' self-serving testimonies. 58
Moreover, to prove the existence of a resulting trust, intent, as inferred from the acts or conduct of the parties, is always an indispensable element. 59 In this regard, we concur with the CA's finding that Marietta was unable to adequately explain why she transferred the title of the property in Feliciano, Jr.'s name for value through the execution of the Deed of Assignment if she merely intended a trust to be established. If her purpose was merely to allow Feliciano, Jr. to temporarily use the property, she could have done so without ceding ownership. She could have easily executed an express trust over the unit so that the rights of the parties are clearly delineated. 60 This, she did not do. Instead, Marietta opted to surrender her rights, title and interest over the unit in favor of Feliciano, Jr. These circumstances negate the existence of a resulting trust.
In sum, since petitioners were unable to rebut the presumption that the contents set forth in the Deed of Assignment contain the true agreement of the parties and that the deed itself was supported by sufficient consideration, their argument that a resulting trust was created may not be upheld. Consequently, the petition must fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 23, 2010 Decision and the January 10, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 76670 are AFFIRMED. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Also referred to as "Marrietta" in some parts of the record.
1. Rollo, pp. 10-82.
2. Id. at 110-129; penned by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Stephen C. Cruz.
3. Id. at 134-137.
4. Id. at 102-109.
5. Id. at 111.
6. Id.
7. Rollo, p. 112.
8. Id.
9. Rollo, pp. 99-100.
10. Id. at 112.
11. Id. at 113.
12. Id. Annotated at the back of the title under Entry No. 93-3677.
13. Rollo, p. 113.
14. Id. at 84-90.
15. Id. at 85.
16. Id. at 86-87.
17. Id. at 87-88.
18. Id. at 92-97.
19. Id. at 93-95.
20. Supra note 4.
21. Rollo, pp. 108-109.
22. Id. at 107-108.
23. Id. at 108.
24. Supra note 2.
25. Rollo, pp. 123-124.
26. Id. at 125.
27. Id. at 126-127.
28. Art. 1448 of the Civil Code states in full:
Art. 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the beneficiary. However, if the person to whom the title is conveyed is a child, legitimate or illegitimate, of the one paying the price of the sale, no trust is implied by law, it being disputably presumed that there is a gift in favor of the child.
29. Rollo, p. 128.
30. Id. at 129.
31. Supra note 3.
32. Rollo, p. 26.
33. Id. at 49-50.
34. Id. at 64-65.
35. Id. at 143-158.
36. Id. at 143-145.
37. Id. at 147-149.
38. Id. at 151.
39. Id. at 153-155.
40. Id. at 155-156.
41. Id. at 75.
42. Id. at 76.
43. Fernandez v. Villegas, G.R. No. 200191, August 20, 2014, 733 SCRA 548, 558-559.
44. Rollo, pp. 208-214.
45. Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164968, July 3, 2009, 591 SCRA 562, 571-572; Naranja v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160132, April 17, 2009, 586 SCRA 31, 42.
46. Rosaroso v. Soria, G.R. No. 194846, June 19, 2013, 699 SCRA 232, 243.
47. Id.
48. Rosaroso v. Soria, supra at 245.
49. Surtida v. Rural Bank of Malinao (Albay), Inc., G.R. No. 170563, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 507, 520.
50. Rollo, p. 31.
51. Id. at 116.
52. Id. at 125.
53. Pigao v. Rabanillo, G.R. No. 150712, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 546, 560. Citation omitted.
54. Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan v. Laigo, G.R. No. 175073, August 15, 2011, 655 SCRA 366, 378.
55. Rollo, pp. 120-121.
56. The elements of a resulting trust are: (a) an actual payment of money, property or services, or an equivalent, constituting valuable consideration; and (b) such consideration must be furnished by the alleged beneficiary of a resulting trust (Tong v. Go Tiat Kun, G.R. No. 196023, April 21, 2014, 722 SCRA 623, 635-636).
57. Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan v. Laigo, supra at 380.
58. Rollo, p. 123.
59. Estate of Margarita D. Cabacungan v. Laigo, supra at 380.
60. Rollo, pp. 123-124.