THIRD DIVISION
[OCA IPI No. 14-4298-RTJ. April 26, 2021.]
EVERGLORY METAL TRADING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.HON. MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, BRANCH 42, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 26, 2021, which reads as follows:
"OCA IPI No. 14-4298-RTJ (Everglory Metal Trading Corporation v. Hon. Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes, the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42). — The Court resolves this Complaint 1 filed by Everglory Metal Trading Corporation (Everglory), through its representative Alexander Sze Hung, against respondent Presiding Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes (respondent Judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), City of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42, for the following charges: (i) Gross Ignorance of the Law, Procedure, and Jurisprudence; (ii) Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2; Sections 1 and 2, Canon 14; Section 3, Canon 5; and Section 6, Canon 6), Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canon 4 of the Canon of Judicial Ethics; and (iii) violations of Canon 1, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Factual Antecedent
On August 16, 2013, Colorsteel Systems Corporation (Colorsteel) and Jose Rey S. Batomalaque (Batomalaque) filed a Complaint 2 for patent infringement and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, against Everglory, which alleged that the latter infringed on the industrial design patents of tile roofing panel registered in the name of Batomalaque. The case was raffled to the court of respondent Judge and thereafter docketed as "IPR Civil Case No. 005."·3
On August 29, 2013, summons and a copy of the complaint were served to Everglory, giving it 15 days, or until September 13, 2013 to file an answer. 4 Subsequently, Everglory, after filing two motions for extension of time to file an answer, filed its Answer with Ground for the Outright Dismissal of the Complaint and Compulsory Counterclaim5 on October 11, 2013. It sought the dismissal of the complaint based on lack of cause of action, citing that the registrations of the industrial designs of Colorsteel and Batomalaque did not per se grant them exclusivity over the same. Moreover, the industrial design must be new or original, as established by a Registrability Report, in order to be entitled to protection against infringement under Republic Act No. 8293. 6
During a hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on September 13, 2013, the case was called for the reception of Colorsteel and Batomalaque's evidence in relation thereto, and Batomalaque was called to the witness stand. Atty. Darwin Cano (Atty. Cano), the counsel of Everglory, objected to the admissibility of Batomalaque's Judicial Affidavit 7 due to its lack of a notarial certificate in the jurat portion. Respondent Judge called for a recess to allow Batomalaque to amend the said Judicial Affidavit. Upon resumption of the hearing, Atty. Cano again objected to the admission of the judicial affidavit due to an alleged defect in the attestation particularly the omission of the word "neither" — but respondent Judge, instead of ruling on the objection, directly asked Batomalaque if such omission was a mere typographical error. 8
The hearing was reset on September 20, 2013, with the resumption of Batomalaque being presented as a witness. Atty. Cano, upon citing the applicable provision in the Judicial Affidavit Rule, requested respondent Judge to rule on the objections he raised regarding the questions and answers contained in Batomalaque's Judicial Affidavit. However, respondent Judge merely noted his objections and admitted all exhibits, but emphasized that the said admission was not necessarily for the purpose for which such evidence were submitted. Respondent Judge allowed Everglory to manifest its objections or opposition in writing, and set two hearing dates (October 11 and 25, 2013) to allow Everglory to present its evidence. 9
Due to an Orange Rainfall Advisory from PAGASA, the October 11, 2013 hearing was moved to October 25, 2013. On such date, respondent Judge, motu proprio and in open court, issued a verbal order: (i) expunging several pleadings filed by Everglory, including its motions for extension and its answer, from the record for being prohibited under A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC, also known as the "Rules of Procedure for Intellectual Property Rights Cases" (IPR Rules); (ii) terminating the preliminary injunction hearing, without Everglory having presented its evidence; and (iii) submitting the principal case and the application for preliminary injunction for decision. 10
On the same date, Everglory filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the Verbal Order, with a Motion to Apply the Regular Rules of Civil Procedure under the Rules of Court, 11 instead of the IPR Rules. Everglory, however, filed another Motion for Reconsideration 12 upon receipt of a written copy of the October 25, 2013 Order, and moved to set its presentation of evidence relative to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction for hearing. 13
In a Resolution 14 dated December 4, 2013, respondent Judge: (i) denied Everglory's motion for reconsideration on the October 25, 2013 Order; (ii) held in abeyance the resolution of the principal case and the application for a writ of preliminary injunction; and (iii) ordered Colorsteel and Batomalaque to present additional evidence on the identity of the alleged designer and the assignee of the subject industrial design due to an inconsistency in the submitted exhibits. 15
On February 11, 2014, Everglory filed a Petition for Certiorari16 under Rule 65, with prayer for injunctive relief, before the Court of Appeals (CA) docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942. It argued that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion and alleged bad faith in the issuance of the Orders dated October 25 and December 4, 2013, as the same amounted to the deprivation of its constitutional right to due process. 17
Meanwhile, during the hearing of Colorsteel and Batomalaque's motion to present additional evidence on March 28, 2014, respondent Judge allowed Everglory to file its comment or opposition within 10 days from such date, and also allowed Colorsteel and Batomalaque to file its reply within a period of three (3) days. On the next hearing, Everglory sought the suspension of the proceedings based on judicial courtesy, as there was a pending petition for certiorari filed with the CA. Nevertheless, respondent Judge allowed Colorsteel to present its evidence since the CA had yet to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO), and that she was mandated under the IPR Rules to conduct a summary and expeditious proceeding, without prejudice to the right of the parties to comment. 18
On March 25, 2014, Everglory filed a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition 19 against respondent Judge, alleging that her acts and Orders demonstrated strong bias against it. In a Resolution 20 dated April 21, 2014, respondent Judge denied the motion to inhibit, and declared the principal case and the application for a writ of preliminary injunction submitted for resolution. The very next day, the CA issued a TRO for a period of 60 days (or until June 21, 2014), enjoining respondent Judge from proceeding with IPR Civil Case No. 005 pending its decision on the Petition for Certiorari. 21
On May 20, 2014, Everglory filed another Motion for Reconsideration, 22 this time on the denial of its motion for inhibition, and also sought to have the order submitting the principal case and the injunction case for resolution recalled citing the principle of judicial courtesy. On June 4, 2014, respondent Judge issued an Order ad Cautelam23 setting the hearing for the above Motion for Reconsideration on July 2, 2014. 24
In a Decision 25 dated June 25, 2014, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari filed by Everglory, and found that respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she ordered Everglory's motions and answer expunged from the records and declared the case submitted for decision without giving Everglory the chance to present its evidence. Accordingly, the CA nullified the pertinent orders issued by respondent Judge and held:
Public respondent RTC is DIRECTED to set the case for hearing for the presentation of [Everglory]'s evidence, and thereafter, to decide the case on the merits with dispatch, in accordance with the regular civil procedure under the Rules of Court. 26
Colorsteel and Batomalaque assailed the CA's Decision on the Petition for Certiorari by filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA, and thereafter a Petition for Review before the Court (docketed as G.R. No. 215921). On the other hand, Everglory filed Supplemental Arguments in Support of the Motion for Reconsideration relative to the motion for inhibition, due to the CA's finding of bad faith in its Decision. 27
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration on the voluntary inhibition, Everglory filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on August 7, 2014. Everglory claimed that respondent Judge's gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and abuse of discretion amounting to violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Canons of Judicial Ethics were demonstrated by her apparent impatience, annoyance, and discourtesy towards Atty. Cano, Everglory's counsel, such as when she refused to rule on his objections relative to Batomalaque's Judicial Affidavit. After suggesting to have the Judicial Affidavit notarized to cure a defect, respondent Judge also declared an omission in the attestation to be a mere typographical error over the objections of Atty. Cano. 28 Also, during the September 20, 2013 hearing, respondent Judge exhibited animosity towards Atty. Cano in open court, which insulted and humiliated him, viz.:
Atty. Cano:
Yes your Honor, if I may inquire from the Court, when may we raise our objections?
Court:
You did not learn that in your law school?
Atty. Cano:
No, your Honor, but . . .
Court:
You open the Rules of Court, sa evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
You just say yes or no, you want a second call that you may know the procedure[,] as to when you may raise your objection?
Atty. Cano:
As I understand your . . .
Court:
Yes or no?
Atty. Cano:
We can proceed your Honor.
Court:
No, that is still not a yes or no. The judge propounded a question, and in the TSN, it will show that the defendant's counsel is not responsive, now tell me is there something wrong with your ears?
Atty. Cano:
None your Honor.
Court:
Alright, with your brain?
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Question No. 4, no basis, ganon na lang. O sige, continue.
Atty. Cano:
Objection to Q and A No. 6, our objection is the question is inadmissible because it is irrelevant and immaterial. The question . . .
Court:
Huwag mo na basahin ang question. Babasahin ko rin naman yan.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Cano:
A little explanation.
Court:
No more little, little, because I have a little time. Next.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Cano:
The Q and A Number 13, the question is inadmissible and no basis.
Court:
No basis, one more time you will see me loose (sic) my temper for the first time. 29
Another indication of bias according to Everglory is the issuance of the Orders dated October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013 expunging the pleadings it had filed from the records, which it considered a violation of its due process since these prevented it from presenting its defenses on the application for the writ of preliminary injunction and the principal case. It also averred that respondent Judge misapplied the IPR Rules, as Section 3, Rule 1 states that the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply when the case involves a complex issue — such as the determination of the novelty or originality of the industrial designs. 30
Everglory further argued that respondent Judge misapplied Section 4 (f), Rule 3 of the IPR Rules when she denied its Motion for Reconsideration on the October 25, 2013 Order, as the prohibited pleading referred to therein is a motion for reconsideration involving a final order or judgment. Also, it alleged that respondent Judge cannot whimsically expunge its answer, and the two motions for extension to file the same, from the records as the IPR Rules states that a motion for extension of time to file an answer for meritorious reasons is not a prohibited pleading. Claiming to have pleaded meritorious grounds in its motions, such as the time required to wait for three Registrability Reports from the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), Everglory contended that respondent Judge should not have simply brushed aside its motions. 31
Moreover, the partiality of respondent Judge towards Colorsteel and Batomalaque was shown when she allowed them to present additional evidence even after the case was submitted for decision at that time. Worse, respondent Judge did not really allow Everglory to present controverting evidence to such additional evidence. 32
Lastly, Everglory averred that respondent Judge violated the principle of judicial hierarchy when she proceeded to hear Colorsteel and Batomalaque's presentation of evidence despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari with the CA. It further assailed the issuance of the Order ad Cautelam on June 4, 2014, which was in defiance of the CA's 60-day TRO ending on June 21, 2014. 33
Subsequent to the filing of the present complaint, Everglory also filed the following: (i) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, 34 with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, dated December 15, 2014 before the CA against the orders in connection with the denial of the motion to inhibit (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138410); and (ii) a Petition for Certiorari, 35 with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, dated December 18, 2014 before the CA against the Order dated November 19, 2014 that declared the principal case and injunction case submitted for decision (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 133942); (iii) a Petition for Review 36 under Rule 43 dated January 5, 2015 to assail the Resolution dated December 3, 2014 that granted the injunctive relief sought by Colorsteel and Batomalaque in IPR Civil Case No. 005 and decided the case on its merits (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138582); and (iv) a Petition for Indirect Contempt 37 dated January 21, 2015 before the CA which sought to hold respondent Judge liable for willful disobedience to the CA Decision dated June 25, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133942 (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138756).
In her Comment 38 dated October 24, 2014, respondent Judge maintained, inter alia, that her order to expunge Everglory's belatedly filed answer and other motions from the records, and to submit the case for resolution, was pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 39 of the IPR Rules and in keeping with the policy that the proceedings therein should be summary. She also alleged that in deference to the TRO issued by the CA, she did not include or resolve any substantive matter in the Order ad Cautelam, but merely reset the hearing on Everglory's motion for reconsideration to July 2, 2014, which was beyond the covered 60-day period. While she acknowledged that the CA Decision set aside her October 25, 2013 and December 4, 2013 Orders, she emphasized that the CA did not directly order her inhibition and instead directed her to decide the case on the merits in accordance with the regular procedure under the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge also pointed out that there was still a pending motion for reconsideration on the CA Decision filed by Colorsteel and Batomalaque. 40
In her defense, respondent Judge contended that: (i) the present complaint should not be given due course due to a pending judicial review before the CA involving her October 25, 2013 Order and December 4, 2013 Resolution, under the principle of judicial courtesy; (ii) she neither transgressed nor ignored the authority of the CA when she proceeded to hear the infringement case as the TRO had ceased upon resumption; (iii) she was not biased when she actively participated in the trial because the IPR Rules demand that a Judge be inquisitorial, rather than the traditional posture in adversarial proceedings; (iv) her refusal to inhibit herself from the case was to preserve the impression that a Judge cannot easily be cowered by the filing of an appellate review or an administrative case, and also to prevent further delay in the disposition of the case; (v) there was basis for her to deny the motions for extension of time as Everglory did not invoke its meritorious grounds in its affidavit as required under the IPR Rules; and (vi) she no longer allowed Everglory to present evidence during the October 25, 2013 hearing pursuant to Section 4, Rule 4 of the IPR Rules. 41
Anent her remarks towards Atty. Cano during the September 20, 2013 hearing, respondent Judge explained that it was not her intention to humiliate or embarrass him, and that she only wanted to maintain order in the court and respect in the authority she represents. She admitted to having used strong words against Atty. Cano, but only as a way of reining him in to follow and observe the IPR Rules. Also, she resorted to rebuking him in order to keep herself from citing him in contempt, as he was very adamant that the regular procedure under the Rules of Court should govern to the point of constantly interrupting her. Accepting her lapse in judgment, respondent Judge apologized and conceded that as a Judge, she should have been more circumspect and not lose her composure. She explained that her vulnerability might have been brought about by her extraordinary volume of work, as she was at that time the Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Pampanga, the designated Acting Judge in Branch 60, RTC-NCJR, Makati City, as well as a Pairing Judge in Branch 61, RTC-NCJR, Makati City. 42
In her Supplemental Comment 43 dated December 11, 2014, respondent Judge manifested that she had resumed hearing IPR Civil Case No. 005 on November 19, 2014, and that she had issued a Resolution dated December 3, 2014, which decided the case on its merits and granted injunctive relief in favor of Colorsteel and Batomalaque, in keeping with the policy under the IPR Rules that the cases governed by the same shall be summary in nature.
On March 24, 2015, Everglory filed a Supplemental Complaint 44 against respondent Judge and stated that respondent Judge resumed hearing IPR Civil Case No. 005 and thereafter declared the principal case and injunction case submitted for resolution without first allowing Everglory to present its evidence, contrary to the Decision of the CA. Everglory also manifested that it had filed a Motion to Enforce and Compel Obedience to the Court of Appeals June 25, 2014 Decision and November 20, 2014 Resolution, wherein it pointed out that the November 19, 2014 Order essentially resurrected her two previous orders which were set aside in the CA Decision.
In her Comment 45 dated June 10, 2015 to the Supplemental Complaint, respondent Judge asserted that she acted in good faith when she resumed hearing the case on November 19, 2014 and issued the Resolution dated December 3, 2014, contending that such was in accordance with the IPR Rules. Furthermore, she claimed that her decision to observe the IPR Rules instead of the CA's directive to apply the regular rules was due to her honest belier and confidence that it was the IPR Rules which should be applied to the patent infringement case. In addition, respondent Judge stressed that the Supplemental Complaint must be dismissed for being improper and premature, as the issue involved — which is her interpretation of the applicable rules of procedure — is determined through the exercise of her judgment which is assailable by available judicial remedies, and not through an administrative complaint. 46
In its Decision dated September 10, 2015, the CA, in the consolidated cases docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 138410 and 138582, nullified the Orders dated April 21, 2014 and October 1, 2014 (which relate to the denial of respondent Judge on the motion to inhibit), as well as the Resolution dated December 3, 2014. The CA also found that respondent Judge's behavior towards Atty. Cano showed her disdain, which was evident in her rulings. The CA noted her use of intemperate and insulting language, which impelled it to declare that "considering the circumstances of the case, it was more prudent for the judge to inhibit." Additionally, the CA concluded that the insistence of respondent Judge to not allow Everglory to present its evidence constituted deprivation of due process, and that the issues involved in the infringement case were so complex that it necessitated the application of the regular rules of procedure under the Rules of Court. 47
Finally, respondent Judge filed a Counter-Manifestation 48 dated March 31, 2016, in reply to a Manifestation dated January 27, 2016 filed by Everglory. She stressed that the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 215921 (which affirmed the CA Decision dated June 25, 2014) should not be taken into consideration in resolving the instant administrative case against her. Likewise, she argued that the CA Decision dated September 10, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 138410 and 138582 should not be taken against her in the instant case because the assailed orders dealt with her disposition of the case based on her interpretation of the facts and applicable law. Respondent Judge emphasized that it is settled that a judge's erroneous interpretation of the law or appreciation of evidence does not necessarily render an erring Judge administratively liable because only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause an injustice may be subject to sanction. As regards her conduct towards Atty. Cano, respondent Judge reiterated that her remarks were not for the purpose of humiliating him. Rather, her use of wry humor was done to admonish the erring lawyer and diffuse the existing tension during the proceedings brought about by his own disrespectful demeanor. 49
Report and Recommendation of the
In a Report 50 dated December 16, 2020, the OCA recommended that: (i) the administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Code of Judicial Conduct, and the CPR against respondent Judge be dismissed for being judicial in nature; and (ii) respondent Judge, being an officer of the court, be sternly warned against the use of intemperate language in court. 51
The OCA found that the inquiry into the correctness of respondent Judge's orders and the underlying wisdom for each decision is a judicial issue which is best threshed out through the appropriate judicial remedies under the Rules of Court, and not by way of an administrative complaint. Moreover, the OCA held the view that the CA Decision dated June 25, 2014 (as affirmed by the Court in G.R. No. 215921) did not automatically render respondent Judge administratively liable, as grave abuse of discretion alone is not a ground for disciplinary proceedings. 52
However, the OCA found that respondent Judge failed to observe the proper decorum expected of a magistrate. Regardless of any reason she had stated, a Judge is expected to act with propriety and integrity, and must at all times be temperate in her language. Considering that the present case is respondent Judge's first administrative offense and that she had candidly admitted her mistake and apologized, the OCA found that a warning is sufficient under the circumstances. 53
Issues
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether grounds exist to hold respondent Judge administratively liable.
Our Ruling
Upon judicious review of the voluminous records of the case, the Court resolves to adopt the recommendation of the OCA and dismiss the charges of gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Code of Judicial Conduct, and the CPR against respondent Judge.
Time and time again, the Court has reiterated the principle that while it has supervision over all courts and court personnel, it cannot, in exercising its supervisory powers in administrative proceedings, disturb the Judges' evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case and the interpretation of applicable laws, unless the actions of the latter are administratively actionable. Disciplinary proceedings against Judges do not complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies. 54 Even if the Judge committed an error in the performance of his duties, such error does not render him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or had deliberate intent to do an injustice. 55
Before its amendment on November 16, 2020, Section 3, Rule 1 of the IPR Rules provides:
SEC. 3. Applicability of the regular rules. —·When the court determines that the civil or criminal action involves complex issues, it shall issue a special order that the regular procedure prescribed in the Rules of Court shall apply, stating the reason therefor.
Where applicable, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily to proceedings under these Rules.
In the above-cited provision of the IPR Rules, it is clear that the duty to determine whether an action involves complex issues, which would then call for the application of the regular procedure prescribed under the Rules of Court, devolves on the court. Verily, the Judge is called to determine what set of procedural rules apply to any given case governed by the IPR Rules. As stated by the OCA, the issue of whether a particular rule of procedure or law applies to a subject matter or case is generally regarded as one which is judicial in nature. A judicial question is raised when the determination of the question involves the exercise of a judicial function; that is, the question involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. 56
In seeking to faithfully comply with the IPR Rules, respondent Judge issued several orders which were unfavorable to Everglory, and which the latter deemed sufficient to hold her liable for gross ignorance of the law, gross misconduct, and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, among others. The Order dated October 25, 2013, which caused the belatedly-filed answer of Everglory to be expunged from the records, was issued according to respondent Judge's own interpretation of Section 4, Rule 4 57 in relation to Section 4 (f), Rule 3 58 of the IPR Rules — in clear exercise of judicial function. Hence, any error which may be ascribed thereto can be corrected by availing judicial remedies, which Everglory already did in its various petitions filed before the CA and this Court. As aptly put by the OCA:
As earlier mentioned, the inquiry into the correctness of respondent Judge's orders and the underlying wisdom for each decision is evidently a judicial issue which is best threshed out before the appropriate judicial remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an administrative complaint. Indeed, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should instead be assailed through available judicial remedies. Indeed, in the present complaint, it is of record that herein complainant for several times had availed of judicial remedies either by filing petitions for certiorari against the orders of respondent Judge before the Court of Appeals, and eventually the Supreme Court thru a petition for review. By resorting to judicial remedies, complainant validated the view that most of the issues it brought against respondent Judge were essentially judicial in nature. 59 (Emphasis supplied)
Prescinding from the above, the Court concurs with the finding of the OCA that respondent Judge failed to observe proper decorum through the use of intemperate and insulting language against the counsel of Everglory. The records show that respondent Judge's remarks against Atty. Cano, particularly during the September 20, 2013 hearing, are not befitting of a Judge, who should exercise judicial temperament at all times, and are insulting regardless of her intention in uttering them. In a relevant case, the Court explained:
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language. 60
Aside from the use of intemperate language — which respondent Judge readily admitted — Everglory failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that the issuance of any order or resolution in IPR Civil Case No. 005 was motivated or accompanied by fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause an injustice on the part of respondent Judge. Hence, the charges for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct, which would subject respondent Judge to administrative sanction for the issuance of any assailed order or resolution in IPR Civil Case No. 005 should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law, and Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Code of Judicial Conduct, and the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for being judicial in nature. Furthermore, respondent Presiding Judge Maria Amifaith S. Fider-Reyes is found liable of conduct unbecoming of a Judge for her use of intemperate and insulting language, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-136.
2.Id. at 137-144.
3.Id., Vol. III, at 1985.
4.Id., Vol. I, at 175-177.
5.Id. at 188-209.
6.Id., Vol. III, at 1985-1986.
7.Id., Vol. I, at 165-168.
8.Id., Vol. III, at 1986.
9.Id. at 1986-1987.
10.Id. at 1987.
11.Id., Vol. I, at 596-602.
12.Id. at 630-643.
13.Id., Vol. III, at 1987.
14.Id., Vol. I, at 648-663.
15.Id., Vol. III, at 1988.
16.Id., Vol. II, at 665-720.
17.Id., Vol. III, at 1988.
18.Id.
19.Id., Vol. II, at 1089-1115.
20.Id. at 1160-1170.
21.Id., Vol. III, at 1988-1989.
22.Id., Vol. II, at 1171-1186.
23.Id. at 1188-1200.
24.Id., Vol. III, at 1989.
25.Id., Vol. II, at 1202-1214; penned by Associate Justice Hakim S Abdulwahid, with Associate Justices Romeo F. Barza and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles, concurring.
26.Id. at 1213.
27.Id., Vol. III, at 1989-1990.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 1990-1991.
30.Id. at 1991-1992.
31.Id. at 1992.
32.Id. at 1992-1993.
33.Id. at 1993.
34.Id., Vol. II, at 1264-1322.
35.Id. at 1324-1342.
36.Id. at 1344-1418.
37.Id. at 1420-1444.
38.Id. at 1223-1234.
39. SEC. 4. Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period stated above, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the allegations of the complaint, as well as the affidavits and other evidence on record, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit additional evidence x x x.
40.Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 1994-1995.
41.Id. at 1995-1996.
42.Id. at 1996-1997.
43.Id., Vol. II, at 1236-1238.
44.Id., Vol. III, at 1455-1474.
45.Id. at 1791-1804.
46.Id.
47.Id. at 2000-2001.
48.Id. at 1862-1868.
49.Id. at 2001-2003.
50.Id. at 1985-2005.
51.Id. at 2004-2005.
52.Id. at 2003-2004.
53.Id.
54.Cruz v. Judge Iturralde, 450 Phil. 77, 85 (2003).
55.Monticalbo v. Judge Maraya, Jr., 664 Phil. 1, 8-9 (2011), citing Balsamo v. Judge Suan, 458 Phil. 11, 24 (2003).
56.Heirs of Zoleta v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 816 Phil. 389, 409 (2017), citing Gonzales v. Climax Mining Ltd., 492 Phil. 682 (2005).
57.Supra note 39.
58. SEC. 4. Prohibited pleadings. — The following pleadings are prohibited:
xxx xxx xxx
f) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings or other written submissions, except for the answer for meritorious reasons; x x x.
59.Rollo, Vol. III, p. 2003.
60.Tormis v. Paredes, 753 Phil. 41, 54 (2015).