SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 233644. November 17, 2021.]
ROMEO K. EULLARAN, JR., petitioner,vs. SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., DS-SCANMAR CREWING SERVICES GMBH/MS. SARAH N. CRISTOBAL, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated17 November 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 233644 (Romeo K. Eullaran, Jr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., DS-Scanmar Crewing Services GMBH/Ms. Sarah N. Cristobal). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the April 26, 2017 Decision 2 and the August 18, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136499, which set aside the April 15, 2014 Decision 4 and May 28, 2014 Resolution 5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sixth Division finding herein petitioner Romeo K. Eullaran, Jr. (Eullaran) entitled to full disability benefits.
The Antecedent Facts
On April 10, 2012, Eullaran was hired by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. (Scanmar), in behalf of DS-Scanmar Crewing Services GMBH (DS-Scanmar) as Able Seaman on board the vessel "Cape Campbell," with a basic salary of US$583.00 for nine (9) months +/- 1 month upon mutual consent of both parties. 6 This was evidenced by the Contract of Employment entered into between Eullaran and Scanmar. 7 After being subjected to the usual pre-employment medical examination (PEME), Eullaran was declared fit for sea duty 8 and was deployed on April 15, 2012. 9
In July of 2012, Eullaran began suffering occasional headaches for which he was prescribed medication after being sent to a doctor in Japan. On September 30, 2012, Eullaran's headaches were accompanied by vomiting. After undergoing medical examination, Eullaran was found to have "occlusive hydrocephalus." 10 As shown in the Medical Report 11 dated October 9, 2012, Eullaran underwent a Computerized Axial Tomography scan which revealed a "posterior fossa cystic mass accompanied by hydrocephalus," while a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan revealed an "extraaxial posterior fossa mass, non-communicating with the IVth vent, absent of Gadolinium enhancing mass lesions, suggestive of an arachnoid cyst or other chronic cystic processes." 12
Eullaran was repatriated on October 9, 2012 and sent to the company-designated doctor who diagnosed him with a "posterior fossa arachnoid cyst with obstructive hydrocephalus," and recommended that he undergo "ventriculoperitoneal shunting and suboccipital craniectomy for cyst marsupialization" for the management of his condition. 13 The company doctor likewise stated in the same report that "[an] arachnoid cyst is not work-related." The recommended surgical operation was done on October 17, 2012. 14
Eullaran sought the opinion of Dr. Rogelio P. Catapang, Jr. (Dr. Catapang), a doctor of his personal choice, who issued a Medical Report 15 dated February 15, 2013, stating that:
Physical examination revealaed a well-developed, well-nourished ambulatory patient. Post operative scar parieto-lateral area of the right head. Patient has a depressed area at the occipital area; no neurological deficits, no seizure episodes noted. Patient was advised to continue Vitamin B complex; but still complains of dizziness.
Mr. Eullaran [sic] continues to complain and suffer from dizziness and headache. The symptoms are worse [sic] by strenuous activities and weather changes. He has difficulty in performing pre-injury job requirement operating some machines and lifting heavy objects. Mr. Eullaran claimed that he can no longer perform these functions because he no longer has the strength.
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Mr. Eullaran has lost his pre[-]injury capacity and is no longer capable of working on his previous occupation because of the injuries sustained and the permanent sequelae of said injury. It will be to his best interest to refrain from heavy labor as this is likely to cause him more harm than good. Mr. Eullaran is therefore now permanently UNFIT in any capacity to resume his sea duties. His present condition, he will not be able to perform his pre[-] injury work, because of the physical demands it entails. He is unfit for strenuous work. (Emphasis supplied)
Eullaran asked respondents for the payment of disability benefits, sickness allowance, and reimbursement of medical expenses. Respondents, however, denied payment as they viewed Eullaran's case as not being compensable. CAIHTE
In his Position Paper 16 submitted to the Labor Arbiter, Eullaran argued that while "posterior fossa arachnoid cyst with obstructive hydrocephalus" is not included in the list of occupational diseases under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of the Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), the same is disputably presumed as work-related under Section 20 (B), and that respondents failed to rebut the said presumption. 17 He also argued that from his repatriation on October 9, 2012 until his last medical evaluation with the company doctor on June 3, 2013, totalling 234 days, he has been unable to resume his customary work, which should entitle him to full disability benefits. 18
Meanwhile, respondents maintained their contention that Eullaran is not entitled to disability benefits as the company-designated physician declared his illness as being non work-related, and that such illness was a pre-existing condition. 19
The Labor Arbiter 20 rendered a Decision 21 dated November 5, 2013 finding petitioner entitled to full disability benefits, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered ordering respondents Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. and DS-Scanmar Crewing Services GMBH, to jointly and severally pay complainant, the sum of US$60,000.00 or its peso equivalent prevailing at the time of payment.
All other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
In ruling for Eullaran, the Labor Arbiter stated that the respondents failed to overturn the legal presumption that his illness was work-related. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that the company-designated physician failed to offer any explanation as to why Eullaran's illness was considered as not work-related. 22 She further stated that assuming arguendo that Eullaran's illness was pre-existing, it would not deprive him of his entitlement for disability compensation. The Labor Arbiter also noted that respondents repeatedly hired and deployed Eullaran, and even declared him fit for sea duty in all his pre-employment medical examinations. 23
Respondents appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which denied the respondents' appeal in its Decision 24 dated April 26, 2017. The NLRC ruled that respondents failed to substantiate their defense that Eullaran's illness was not work-related. A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondents, which the NLRC also denied in its Resolution 25 dated May 28, 2014.
Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the respondents' appeal in its Decision 26 dated April 26, 2017, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed April 15, 2014 Decision and May 28, 2014 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission Sixth Division in NLRC LAC No. (OFW-M) 01-000004-14 (NLRC OFW Case No. (M) 02-02414-13) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for disability benefits, sickness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In ruling in favor of the respondents, the CA stated that the evidence presented by both parties sustains the conclusion that Eullaran's condition was not work-related, and therefore, not compensable. The CA held that Eullaran failed to prove, by substantial evidence, the work-relatedness of his claims and his compliance with the parameters that the POEA-SEC provides for disability benefit claims. Eullaran's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution 27 dated August 18, 2017. DETACa
Seeking recourse from the CA Decision and Resolution, Eullaran filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari28 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on October 9, 2017. Respondents filed their Comment 29 on January 29, 2018, while Eullaran filed his Reply 30 on June 1, 2018.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits.
Our Ruling
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
At the outset, this Court notes that only questions of law may be raised and resolved by this Court on petitions brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, because the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty-bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality and respect. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this general rule, such as the instant case, where the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 31
It is settled that the entitlement of a seafarer on overseas employment to disability benefits is governed by law, by the parties' contracts, and by the medical findings. By law, the relevant statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2 (a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation. By contract, the material contracts are the POEA-SEC, which is deemed incorporated in every seafarer's employment contract and considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government, the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement, if any, and the employment agreement between the seafarer and the employer. 32
Section 20 (A) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, which is the rule applicable to this case since petitioner was employed in 2012, governs the procedure for compensation and benefits for a work-related injury or illness suffered by a seafarer on board sea-going vessels during the term of his employment contract, to wit:
SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
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2. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, serious dental, surgical' and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seafarer is declared fit to work or to be repatriated. However, if after repatriation, the seafarer still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
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4. Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work-related.
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6. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid.
Based on the above-quoted provision, there are two elements that must concur for an injury or illness to be compensable. First, that the injury or illness must be work-related; and second, that the work-related injury or illness must have arisen during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. 33
The 2010 POEA-SEC defines a "Work-Related Injury" as an "injury arising out of and in the course of employment," while a "Work-Related Illness" is defined as "any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." Meanwhile, Section 32-A provides:
SECTION 32-A. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES. —
For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Illnesses not listed in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC Contract are disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption. This disputable presumption, however, does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim. Concomitant with this presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish compensability of illnesses not included in the list of occupational diseases. 34 Otherwise stated, while the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be work-related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated. Thus, the burden is placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. 35
As correctly held by the CA, the disputable presumption provision in the POEA-SEC does not allow a seafarer to just sit down and wait for the company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness. On the contrary, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent company. 36
A perusal of the evidence submitted by petitioner fails to establish that his affliction is work-related. As observed by the CA, petitioner's allegations to prove that his medical condition is work-related consists mostly of generalizations not bolstered by evidence on record. aDSIHc
Petitioner largely anchors his claim on the argument that the cause of arachnoid cysts, the basis of his claim for disability benefits, remains unknown. Petitioner cites medical literature to establish such uncertainty. He thus posits that based on the evidence submitted, a reasonable inference can be drawn therefrom, which would lead to the conclusion that his condition is work-related. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that there exists overwhelming medical evidence that the illness stems from congenital malformation and other related causes.
Pertinent to the discussion, the CA in its Decision cited a description of arachnoid cysts by the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences of the United States National Institutes of Health, an agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, which states:
Arachnoid cysts are sacs filled with cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) that are located between the brain or spinal cord and the arachnoid membrane, one of the three membranes that cover the brain and spinal cord. Arachnoid cysts can be primary or secondary. Primary arachnoid cysts are congenital (present at birth), resulting from abnormal development of the brain and spinal cord during early pregnancy. Secondary arachnoid cysts are less common, and result from head injuries, meningitis, tumors, or as a complication of brain surgery. Signs and symptoms depend on the location and size of the cyst and may include headache, nausea and vomiting, seizures, hearing and visual disturbances, vertigo, and difficulties with balance and walking. Although many affected individuals develop symptoms in the first year of life, some never develop symptoms. Whether and how to treat the condition depends on the location and size of the cyst. When treatment is recommended, it may include placing a shunt to drain the fluid; surgically removing the cyst membranes; or opening the cyst so the fluid can drain into the CSF.
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The exact underlying cause of arachnid cysts is unknown. Primary arachnoid cysts, which are congenital (present at birth), are due to developmental abnormalities of the brain and spinal cord during the early fetal period. Secondary arachnoid cysts, which occur snore rarely, are associated with head injury, hemorrhage, meningitis, tumors, or a complication of brain surgery. 37 (Citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing, it can be seen that while the exact underlying cause of arachnoid cysts remains unknown, it may possibly be a result of genetics, or may also be associated with head injury, haemorrhage, meningitis, tumors, or a complication of brain surgery.
Petitioner argues that "in the performance of his duties as an Able Seaman, it is quite commonplace for him to accidentally bump his head or to have suffered from minor head injuries or even haemorrhage or any other disorders which could have either triggered or aggravated his arachnoid cyst." 38 Unfortunately for petitioner, there is a glaring absence of any evidence which shows that occurrences such as those mentioned indeed took place.
The CA also correctly noted that the PEME declaring petitioner fit for sea duty could not have disclosed his actual condition as the examinations were not exploratory in nature. Consequently, petitioner's reliance on the PEME to establish that he had not been suffering from any such ailment prior to working on board respondents' vessel is misplaced.
Petitioner enumerated the following duties and responsibilities assigned to him while on board the ship, to wit: "stands watch as part of the bridge team at sea, at port and during maneuvering"; "assists Bosun in rigging cargo equipment, safety equipment and maintenance of the same as assigned; reports directly to the Bosun for work assignment"; "assigned as part of emergency team as indicated in Station Bill." 39 He argues that due to the "physically challenging and demanding" work "requiring his full physical and mental capacities," it is "not farfetched to conclude that his work contributed, aggravated, and exacerbated his ailment." 40
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, claims by petitioner that the working conditions are "stressful" and his duties "strenuous" are self-serving and not bolstered by any evidence on record. Bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of compensability. 41 The probability of work-connection must at least be anchored on credible information and not merely on uncorroborated self-serving allegations as bare allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability. 42
To be sure, this Court is not unaware of its statements in previous cases, taking judicial notice of the working environment that seafarers, in general, have to deal with. Such judicial notice, however, is nothing more than an acknowledgment of the general perils encountered by seafarers on board the vessel. It does not sufficiently prove work-relatedness of a particular illness or injury, much less, prove entitlement to compensation. 43 ETHIDa
Finally, while petitioner may be correct in stating that the yardstick in employees' compensation is mere probability, not certainty, 44 this Court has nonetheless held, in the case of Status Maritime Corporation v. Spouses Margarito Delalamon, 45 that:
In their petition before the CA, the respondents vaguely claimed:
The work of the Chief Engineer, including the daily routines in the vessel's engine department, necessarily expose[d] him to these factors emanating therefrom, in all kinds of weather conditions.
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[T]he job of a chief engineer is strenuous and stressful. Moreover, [Margarito] was exposed to hostile working condition and environment. He was exposed to unhealthy diet on the board the vessel, extreme hot and cold weather and likewise he was exposed to hazardous chemicals and substances that are stored in the engine room of the vessel. x x x. At the very least, these general statements surmise mere possibilities but not the probability required by law for disability compensation. Mere possibility will not suffice and a claim will still fail if there is only a possibility that the employment caused or aggravated the disease. Even considering that the respondents have shown probability, their basis is, nonetheless incompetent for being uncorroborated. Probability of work-connection must at least be anchored on credible information and not on self-serving allegations. 46 (Emphasis supplied)
In fine, this Court finds that the CA did not err in ruling that petitioner failed to prove, by substantial evidence, the work-relatedness of his claim and his compliance with the parameters that die POEA-SEC provides for compensability of disability benefit claims.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2017 and the Resolution dated August 18, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 136499 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." (Perlas-Bernabe, J., on official leave;Hernando, J., designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2855 dated November 10, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 34-60.
2. Id. at 13-26; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes with Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Renato C. Francisco, concurring.
3. Id. at 28-30.
4. Id. at 220-228; penned by Commissioner Isabel G. Panganiban-Ortiguerra with Presiding Commissioner Joseph Gerard E. Mabilog and Commissioner Nieves E. Vivar-De Castro, concurring.
5. Id. at 240-243.
6. Id. at 14.
7. Id. at 113.
8. Id. at 114-116.
9. Id. at 14.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 118.
12. Id. at 14-15.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 139.
16. Id. at 79-110.
17. Id. at 87.
18. Id. at 103.
19. Id. at 141.
20. Hon. Vivian H. Magsino-Gonzalez.
21. Rollo, pp. 232-238.
22. Id. at 236.
23. Id. at 237.
24. Id. at 220-228.
25. Id. at 240-243.
26. Id. at 13-26.
27. Id. at 28-30.
28. Id. at 34-60.
29. Id. at 659-667.
30. Id. at 670-684.
31. Gamboa v. Maunlad Trans, Inc., G.R. No. 232905, August 20, 2018.
32. Id.
33. Licayan v. Seacrest Maritime Management, Inc., 773 Phil. 648, 657 (2015), citing Centennial Transmarine, Inc. v. Quimbao, 763 Phil. 411, 423 (2015).
34. Id., citing DOHLE-PHILMAN Manning Agency, Inc. v. Gazzingan, 760 Phil. 861, 878 (2015).
35. Espere v. NFD Internatinal Manning Agents, 814 Phil. 820, 838 (2017).
36. Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc., 676 Phil. 313, 327 (2011).
37. "Arachnoid Cysts." National Institutes of Health. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Last Updated: 14 Dec. 2017. Web Accessed: November 5, 2021.
38. Rollo, p. 51.
39. Id. at 50.
40. Id. at 51.
41. Covita v. SSM Maritime Services, Inc., 802 Phil. 598, 612 (2016), citing Status Maritime Corporation v. Spouses Delalamon, 740 Phil. 175, 197 (2014).
42. Razonable v. Torm Shipping Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 241620, July 7, 2020.
43. Id.
44. GSIS v. Astrid Corrales, 578 Phil. 784, 799 (2008).
45. Supra note 41.
46. Id. at 196-197.