FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 225687. November 21, 2018.]
ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES JOSE FRANCIA AND MAURA RIVERA, REPRESENTED BY THEZA FRANCIA-ARUPO, petitioners, vs.EDWARD TAN, HEIR OF TAN CHAY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 21, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 225687 — Estate of Deceased Spouses Jose Francia and Maura Rivera, represented by Theza Francia-Arupo vs. Edward Tan, heir of Tan Chay
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision 2 dated September 23, 2015 and the Resolution 3 dated July 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98090, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. SC-4234.
The facts showed that respondent Edward Tan (Edward) is the heir and administrator of the estate of his father, Tan Chay. During his lifetime, Tan Chay purchased a parcel of land (subject land) from the spouses Jose Francia and Maura Rivera (Spouses Francia), the grandparents of petitioner Theza Francia-Arupo (Theza). The subject land was covered by Certificate of Title (COT) No. 3644, the original decree of which was Registration No. 221331 of the Register of Deeds (RD) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. By virtue of the sale, however, COT No. 3644 was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 12308 was issued to Tan Chay. Upon Tan Chay's death, Edward became a co-owner of the subject land. 5
On October 18, 2002, Edward filed with the RTC an action for Quieting of Title which was later on amended to include Reconveyance of Real Property, impleading Theza, the RD and the Estate of the Spouses Francia. 6 Edward alleged, among others, that: (1) sometime in March 2001, he learned that the subject land was being claimed by Theza as the alleged co-owner of Spouses Rivera, through a petition for reconstitution; (2) on September 24, 2002, his counsel went to the RD of Santa Cruz, Laguna to verify the existence of the title on file and/or to secure a certificate of no record due to its destruction during the outbreak of World War II; (3) the RD refused to issue the same due to the existence of a Reconstituted Title No. 221331, now bearing Original Certificate of Title (OCT) RO-11519 exactly covering the subject land, in the name of Spouses Francia; (4) OCT No. RO-11519 is void due to the existence of TCT No. 12308 in the name of Tan Chay; and (5) OCT No. RO-11519 constituted a cloud upon Tan Chay's title since it was procured through fraud, deceit and other illegal machinations. 7
Theza, countered among others, that: (1) she, together with her mother acquired the subject land through succession from her father, Victoriano Francia, who in turn, inherited it from his parents, Spouses Francia; (2) they have been in actual and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1920 up to March 1996; (3) Edward has no cause of action because he has no blood relationship with Tan Chay; (4) the RTC has no jurisdiction to cancel a reconstituted title issued pursuant to the trial court's Order dated April 22, 1993; 8 and (5) Edward's action is barred by prescription or laches. ASEcHI
On July 22, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Edward, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11519 is hereby declared null and void;
2. The Register of Deeds of Santa Cruz, Laguna is hereby ordered to cancel the reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11519 issued in the name of Spouses Jose Francia and Maura Rivera;
3. Defendant Theza Francia Arupo is hereby ordered to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-11519 to the Register of Deeds of Santa Cruz, Laguna for cancellation upon finality of this decision, to turn over to the heirs of the deceased Tan Chay, represented by the plaintiff, Edward L. Tan, the peaceful possession of the subject property, to pay the plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as reasonable attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED. 9
On appeal before the CA, Theza argued that the RTC erred in: (1) allowing Edward to prosecute his complaint despite failure to implead the indispensable parties, i.e., other supposed co-owners, of the subject land; (2) in canceling OCT No. RO-11519, considering that the trial court's Order of reconstitution dated April 22, 1993 had long been final and executory; and (3) in finding that Edward's action is not barred by prescription and laches. 10
On September 23, 2015, the CA denied the appeal, and affirmed the RTC's decision. The CA ruled among others, that: failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action; res judicata is not applicable in respect to the RTC's Order of reconstitution dated April 22, 1993; and prescription or laches has not set in so as to bar Edward from filing an action for quieting of title and reconveyance of real property.
Her motion for reconsideration, having been denied by the CA in its July 7, 2016 Resolution, Theza filed this petition, raising substantially the same issues which she argued before the CA.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
First, We disagree with Theza's claim that Edward's complaint before the trial court should have been dismissed for non-joinder of parties, specifically the non-inclusion of the "other supposed co-heirs" of the subject land.
In this case, Theza and the intestate estate of Spouses Francia were impleaded in Edward's action for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance of Real Property. However, nowhere in the records is it shown that Theza posed her objection or raised any issue regarding the un-impleaded alleged heirs of Spouses Francia either in her Answer or in any motion or pleading before the trial court. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Considering that Theza did not raise her objection as to the non-inclusion of the alleged co-heirs of Spouses Francia, either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, said objection is deemed waived.
Significantly, Section 11, Rule 3, of the Rules, provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis ours)
In Macababbad, Jr., et al. v. Masirag, et al., 11 we explained: ITAaHc
[T]he proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed. [Citations Omitted]
Indeed, the rule prohibits dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any stage of the action. Here, the RTC did not issue any order, either motu proprio or upon motion of Theza or Edward, directing the joinder of the alleged "other supposed heirs," of the subject land. Had there been such an order and had there been non-compliance with the same, it would have been a ground for dismissal of the action. These circumstances, however, are not present in this case. As correctly held by the CA:
[N]o objection to the claimed non-joinder was posed before the trial court by [Theza] and the matter was not even slightly mentioned in any of her Answers. Neither did the RTC direct the inclusion of the other purported co-owners of the subject land. In the absence of any objection by [Theza] or order from the trial court, the alleged non-joinder would not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint. Thus, there exists no bar in the adjudication by the RTC of [Edward's] complaint. 12
Second, we give short shrift to Theza's assertion that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to cancel OCT No. RO-11519 on the ground that the order reconstituting the same had long become final and executory.
We have ruled that "when the owner's duplicate certificate of title has not been lost, but is, in fact, in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void, because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be made only in case of loss of the original certificate." 13 Thus, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is jurisdictional. 14 In this case, the title covering the subject land, was neither lost nor destroyed, but was in fact canceled by the RD when TCT No. 12308 was issued, by virtue of a sale, in favor of Tan Chay, Edward's father. We agree with the factual findings of the RTC on this matter:
[Edward] sufficiently proved that a title covering the subject lot exists by presenting Transfer Certificate of Title 12308 in the name of Tan Chay, which was issued pursuant to the alleged purchase in fee simple by Tan Chay from the [Spouses Francia], the grandparents of [Theza] x x x. [Theza], in her Answer did not specifically deny the said allegation of [Edward] but merely alleged that she has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truthfulness of the said allegation. [Theza] failed to present any proof to refute the allegation of purchase of the subject lot by Tan Chay. Hence, the validity of the TCT 12308 over the reconstituted title of [Theza] will be upheld by this Court.
Regrettably, the April 22, 1993 Order issued by this Court is void and the resultant reconstituted title is likewise void. 15
Accordingly, the trial court which issued the order of reconstitution never acquired jurisdiction over the same, and its judgment rendered thereafter is null and void, which may be attacked anytime. Notably, a decision that is null and void for want of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, as in this case, is not a decision in contemplation of law; hence, it can never become final and executory. 16
Lastly, there is no merit in Theza's argument that Edward's action is barred by prescription and laches since she and her predecessors-in-interest are now the absolute owners of the subject land by virtue of acquisitive prescription. CHTAIc
By jurisprudence, 17 the prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance, is either four (4) years from discovery of the fraud, which is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the original certificate of title; or ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of title, if based on an implied or constructive trust. These rules, however, apply only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property, as in this case, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible. 18
Here, the records show that the real owner of the subject land, Tan Chay and his co-heirs, including Edward, and their caretakers were in actual possession of the subject land since February 1934. Thus, prescription and laches are inapplicable. So too, based on Section 47 19 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 20 the trial court correctly held that the subject land cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription since the same is covered by a valid registered title, in the name of the owner, Tan Chay.
Based on the foregoing, we find no cogent reason to depart from the rulings of both the RTC and the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 23, 2015 and the Resolution dated July 7, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98090, which affirmed the Decision dated July 22, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. SC-4234, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., designated Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-30.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of the Court), concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) and Stephen C. Cruz; id. at 38-45.
3.Id. at 34-35.
4. Rendered by Presiding Judge Iluminado M. Dela Peña; id. at 369-374.
5.Id. at 46-47.
6.Id. at 68-78.
7.Id. at 74-75.
8.Id. at 323-324.
9.Id. at 374.
10.Id. at 380.
11. 596 Phil. 76, 96-97 (2009), citing Commissioner Domingo v. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004).
12.Rollo, p. 42.
13.Sebastian v. Sps. Cruz, et al., 807 Phil. 738, 745 (2017), citing Sps. Paulino v. Court of Appeals, et al., 735 Phil. 448, 459 (2014), citing Hilado v. Chavez, 482 Phil. 104, 133 (2004).
14.Camitan v. Court of Appeals, 540 Phil. 377, 384 (2006).
15.Rollo, p. 373.
16.Sps. Santos, et al. v. Heirs of Dominga Lustre, 583 Phil. 118, 130 (2008).
17.D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. v. Panes, et al., 612 Phil. 93, 109 (2009).
18.Sps. Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, 551 Phil. 932, 935 (2007).
19. Sec. 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. — No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
20. AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved June 11, 1978.