FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205843. November 21, 2018.]
ESTATE OF ARNULFO SISON, REPRESENTED BY VICENTE P. SISON, petitioner, vs.MARIE ARNULFA CASTILLO SISON, REPRESENTED BY ERLINDA C. RUGA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 21, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 205843 (ESTATE OF ARNULFO SISON, represented by VICENTE P. SISON, Petitioner, v. MARIE ARNULFA CASTILLO SISON, represented by ERLINDA C. RUGA, Respondent.) — This appeal challenges the dismissal of the petitioner's petition for certiorari by the Court of Appeals (CA) through the decision promulgated on September 7, 2012, 1 as well as the denial of the ensuing motion for reconsideration under the resolution promulgated on February 12, 2013. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are summed up by the CA as follows:
x x x on 25 May 1995, private respondent Marie Arnulfo (sic) Castillo Sison, represented by her mother and natural guardian Erlinda C. Ruga, filed a case for Support and Alimony against Arnulfo Sison, Sr., who she claimed to be her putative father before RTC, Branch 38, Manila docketed as 95-74005. On 30 January 1996, a Decision was issued by the Court based on a Compromise Agreement entered into by respondent Erlinda C. Ruga and Arnulfo Sison, which reads:
"COMPROMISE AGREEMENT"
COMES NOW PARTIES, unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submit the following Compromise Agreement:
1. That defendant Arnulfo C. Sison Sr. admit(s) his obligations to support Marie Arnulfa Sison;
2. That he is offering a monthly support of P2,250.00 beginning February 1, 1996 subject to adjustment as circumstances may warrant payable on or the fifth (5th) day of every month;
3. That beginning February 1, 1996, Erlinda C. Ruga will no longer disturb Mr. Sison, Sr. However, failure of defendant to comply with the payment of any support that may be henceforth due and demandable, shall also entitle plaintiff to the issuance of ex-parte writ of execution. TIADCc
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing Compromise Agreement be approved and judgment be rendered thereon accordingly.
Manila, January 30, 1996.
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By: (SGD.) |
Erlinda C. Ruga(sic)CASTILLO SISON,(sic) and |
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(SGD.) |
Arnulfo C. Sison Sr. |
which Court finds to be conformable to law, morals and public policy.
WHEREFORE, the above-quoted compromise agreement is hereby approved and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance therewith, the parties being enjoined to abide strictly and faithfully with the terms thereof.
SO ORDERED.
After several motions filed by private respondent to increase and fix the system of giving support, on 8 February 2002, the Court issued an Order increasing the amount to P6,000.00 starting February 2002, thus:
WHEREFORE, the monthly support for the child Marie Arnulfo (sic) is hereby increased from P2,500.00 to P6,000.00 starting this month of February 2002 and defendant is directed to deposit the same with the Branch Clerk of this Court not later than 28 February 2002 and the accruing monthly rental, within first five (5) days of the month.
On the ground that petitioner Sison has not complied with the Order of the Court dated 8 February 2002, upon motions for issuance of Writ of Execution, on 25 March 2003, the Court issued an Order granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution and the corresponding writ of execution was issued on April 10, 2003.
As per Report of Sheriff Luisito G. Gallardo, the writ was partially satisfied and petitioner promised to settle the remaining obligation. Considering the failure of petitioner settle the remaining amount, Sheriff Gallardo levied upon the petitioner's real property located in Uyao, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. Thereafter, upon motion of the private respondent, the Court ordered the sale of the property and the auction sale proceeded after due notices and publication. As the private respondent was the highest bidder, the corresponding certificate of sale was issued thereto and the sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro on 7 June 2007. After the lapse of the redemption period, private respondent moved for the issuance of the corresponding Deed of Consolidation and Possession, for the Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution for the consolidation of the property in her name and the issuance of an alias writ of execution on the unpaid support in arrears.
Meanwhile, on 5 May 2009, new counsel for the petitioner filed an entry of appearance with Omnibus Motion: A. to Quash the (a.1) writ of execution dated April 10, 2003; (a.2) levy on April 29, 2003; and (a.3) the Sheriff's Sale on September 15, 2006; and B. to subject plaintiff to DNA test.
An Opposition thereto was filed by the private respondent and a Rejoinder with Notification and Opposition to Motion to Consolidate was filed by the petitioner.
On 30 June 2009, the court issued as Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court rules this wise:
Granting the Motion for Issuance of Deed of Consolidation and Possession and for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution filed by the plaintiff for being timely and meritorious.
Accordingly, let the Alias Writ of Execution issued to be implemented in strict compliance with the Rules by the present Deputy Sheriff of this Court, in order to pave the way for the eventual consolidation of ownership in favor of the purchaser at the auction sale of the subject real property.
With the aforestated approval of plaintiff's pleas, the Omnibus Motion to Quash the a) Writ of Execution dated April 10, 2003; b) Levy on April 29, 2003; c) Sheriff's Sale on September 15, 2006; and d) to subject plaintiff to DNA test are necessarily denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 05 November 2009, thus: AIDSTE
Wherefore, premises and finding that the arguments raised in the present Motion for Reconsideration and for Declaration of Nullity of compromise Agreement and the Judgment Thereon for Dealing with the Subject of Filiation and/or Support which is prohibited under Article 2035 of the Civil Code are reiterative of those duly considered and definitively resolved in the assailed Order with nothing substantially new or compellingly persuasive to justify a reversal or even a modification of the resolution, said Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied, for lack of merit. 3
Dissatisfied, the petitioner brought its petition for certiorari in the CA to set aside the orders dated June 30, 2009 and November 5, 2009 of the RTC.
The CA, through the now assailed decision promulgated on September 7, 2012, dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Observing that the points raised by the petitioner were succinctly addressed by the RTC in its order dated November 5, 2009, the CA disposed:
WHEREFORE, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Orders dated 30 June 2009 and November 5, 2009, are AFFIRMED. 4
The petitioner sought reconsideration, 5 but the CA denied its motion for reconsideration on February 12, 2013.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues, namely:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CONTRAVENED THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN THEY DID NOT DECLARE AS VOID THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT FOR BEING CONTRARY TO ART. 2035 OF THE CIVIL CODE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED THEIR JURISDICTION WHEN THEY DID NOT DECLARE AS VOID THE WRIT OF EXECUTION DATED APRIL 10, 2003, THE LEVY ON APRIL 29, 2003 AND THE SHERIFF'S SALE ON SEPTEMBER 15, 2006 FOR LACK OF NOTICE AND DUE PROCESS TO HEREIN PETITIONER.6
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The petitioner argues that the CA and the RTC both disregarded Article 2035 of the Civil Code and judicial precedents interpreting the provision to the effect that paternity and future support could not be the subject of a compromise agreement; that the deceased, Arnulfo Sison, had declared in the Omnibus Motion that had been filed during his lifetime that he did not recognize the respondent as his daughter; and that he had only been compelled to sign the Compromise Agreement because the respondent's mother and representative herein had been causing trouble and disturbing his family that had led to his wife's suffering a heart attack.
The petitioner's argument is untenable.
A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties make reciprocal concessions in order to resolve their differences and thus avoid litigation, or in order to put an end to one already commenced. 7 Like any other contract, a compromise agreement must comply with the requisites stated in Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is established. Also, the terms and conditions of the compromise agreement must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. 8 AaCTcI
In here, that the Compromise Agreement executed on January 30, 1996, was perfected by the mutual consent of the petitioner and the respondent. It is basic rule that the approval of a compromise agreement had the effect of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion. 9 The suggestion that Arnulfo Sison was only compelled to sign due to the insistence of the respondent's mother cannot be dignified and equate it to a vitiation of consent or coercion as to invalidate the compromise agreement. Considering that none of the exceptions was established by the petitioner, the validity and efficacy of the Compromise Agreement could no longer be set aside.
Likewise, the petitioner cannot be allowed to seek refuge in its belatedly raised issue of the Compromise Agreement being legally prohibited by Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The prohibition of a compromise against future support under Art. 2035 of the Civil Code has no application herein. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was correct in ruling that the discord pertained principally to present support which the law allows to be the subject of amicable settlement and mediation. Incidentally, the fact of filiation is not at issue as the same had been put to rest by the voluntary settlement made personally by the defendant, Mr. Arnulfo C. Sison, Sr. at the time he was in full possession of his sound mind and good health.
We also dismiss the claim being proferred by the petitioner that Arnulfo C. Sison, Sr. did not have adequate legal representation that led to the issuance of the February 8, 2002 order, and that the writ of execution based on the said order was heard sans proper notice to Arnulfo C. Sison, Sr. The petitioner maintained that the RTC had been notified of the death of his counsel because at the time that the March 25, 2003 order had been issued, the RTC already had possession the order resetting the hearing for the writ of execution with the note: "Atty. Eduardo Palad is dead since 2001 (sic)."
Clearly, the petitioner was negligent in the conduct of his litigation and cannot pass the blame to the court to monitor the changes in the circumstances of the parties and their counsel. 10 Having known that Atty. Palad had died in 2001, the petitioner should have forthrightly engaged new counsel to adequately represent their interests. Litigants who are represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their cases. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence. The circumstances of this case plainly show that petitioner only has himself to blame. 11
Finally, it has long been established that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law, thus:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Emphasis supplied)
Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari and the factual findings of the CA, when supported by evidence, shall bind the Court. Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules, the exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may evaluate and review the facts of the case. In any event, even in such cases, this court retains full discretion on whether to review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. 12
The issues raised by herein petitioner are questions of fact that requires a review of the evidence presented. The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again. 13
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the September 7, 2012 decision and February 12, 2013 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113144.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner. SDHTEC
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2606 dated October 10, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Additional Member per Special Order No. 2607 dated October 10, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-24; penned by Associate Justice Leoncia R. Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justice Rosmari Carandang and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario.
2.Id. at 7-8.
3.Id. at 11-16.
4.Id. at 23.
5.Id. at 162-170.
6.Id. at 34.
7.Tankiang v. Alaraz, G.R. No. 181675, June 27, 2009, 590 SCRA 480, 493.
8.Rivero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141273, May 17, 2005, 458 SCRA 714, 735.
9.Inutan v. Napar Contracting and Allied Services, G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015, 775 SCRA 523, 538.
10.Mojar v. Agro Commercial Security Service Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 187188, June 27, 2012, 675 SCRA 323, 333-334.
11.Ampo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 169091, February 16, 2006, 482 SCRA 562, 568.
12.Pascual v. Burgos, G.R. No. 171722, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 189, 191.
13.Alicer v. Compas, G.R. No. 187720, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 473, 480.