FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 200719. February 6, 2019.]
ESTATE OF VICENTE S. MARUYA AND DESDEMONA E. MARUYA, REPRESENTED BY DORIVIC E. MARUYA, COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATES, petitioners, vs.MELLIE ROSE C. AQUISAP AND JEORGE N. AQUISAP, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated February 6, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 200719 (Estate of Vicente S. Maruya and Desdemona E. Maruya, represented by Dorivic E. Maruya, Court-Appointed Administrator of the Estates v. Mellie Rose C. Aquisap and Jeorge N. Aquisap). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 seeking to set aside the Decision 2 dated May 11, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00353-MIN, which granted Mellie Rose C. Aquisap and Jeorge N. Aquisap's (respondents)' petition for annulment of judgment of the Order 3 dated November 29, 1999 issued by Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3602.
On March 11, 1958, Manderi Climaco sold to spouses Vicente and Desdemona Maruya (spouses Maruya) a parcel of unregistered land with an area of 616.5 square meters in Poblacion, Malita, Davao del Sur. The spouses Maruya took possession of the property and declared it in Desdemona's name for taxation purposes. Since then, Desdemona had been continually paying the real estate taxes. 4
The spouses Maruya allegedly gave the property to Gregorio Alfeche, Sr. (Alfeche, Sr.) and his family, sometime in 1968, as a token of gratitude for his lengthy political service to the spouses. Alfeche, Sr., thereafter built a residential house on the property and occupied it for more than 30 years. 5
After Alfeche, Sr.'s death, his heirs obtained a homestead patent over the property. Subsequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22409 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Digos, Davao del Sur in the name of the heirs of Gregorio Alfeche, Sr., represented by Gregorio Alfeche, Jr. 6
On December 4, 1997, the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 over the land in favor of respondents. Respondents took possession of the property and became its occupants. 8 CAIHTE
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1997, the Estate of the spouses Maruya, represented by Marvin Maruya (petitioner), filed a complaint for reconveyance of real property, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as Civil Case No. 3602, against the heirs of Gregorio Alfeche, Sr., represented by Alfeche Jr., with the RTC of Digos City, Davao del Sur. 9 Petitioner alleged that the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. applied for homestead patent despite knowing that the spouses Maruya, the real owners of the property, merely tolerated their occupation. 10 Petitioner prayed that OCT No. P-22409 in the name of the heirs of Alfeche, Sr., represented by Alfeche, Jr., be cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title be issued in the name of petitioner. 11
The sheriff was not able to serve the summons to Alfeche, Jr. because he was no longer residing in Sitio Samtalica, Poblacion, Malita, Davao del Sur, and his sister, a certain Minda Alfeche-Felicilda, allegedly represented that Alfeche, Jr. transferred to an unknown address. 12
Petitioner filed a motion for leave to serve summons by publication, 13 which was granted by the RTC in its Order 14 dated August 28, 1998. Accordingly, summons was served upon Alfeche, Jr. through publication. 15
On January 27, 1999, petitioner moved to declare the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. in default. The motion was granted by the RTC in its Order dated February 16, 1999. 16
On November 29, 1999, the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioner. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs ordering the defendant:
1. to revert the ownership of the real property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22409 to the Estate of Vicente and Desdemona Maruya;
2. to pay P100,000.00 as actual damages;
3. to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages;
4. to pay P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. to pay P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; x x x
6. [o]rdering the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. P-22409 covering the above x x x real property involved, and that the same defendant Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur to issue another Transfer Certificate of Title to cover the same property in favor of and in the name of the herein plaintiffs; and
7. to pay for the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 17
The above judgment became final and executory, and pursuant to it, OCT No. P-22409 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-60569 was issued in the name of petitioner. 18
When respondents applied with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Digos City, for the transfer of OCT No. P-22409 to their names in April 2005, they learned about the RTC Order dated November 29, 1999 and the cancellation of OCT No. P-22409. 19 Respondents then filed a petition for annulment of judgment of the RTC Order before the CA. During the preliminary conference, counsel for petitioner manifested that the property was sold to spouses Merle Go and Go King Hock. By virtue of the sale, TCT No. 60569 was cancelled and TCT No. 61268 was issued. 20
In its assailed Decision, 21 the CA granted respondents' petition and annulled the RTC Order dated November 29, 1999. It ruled that, "[h]aving failed to serve the summons on defendants a quo properly, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the Heirs of Gregorio Alfeche, Sr. Consequently, all proceedings conducted before the court a quo should be deemed void." 22 The estate of the spouses Maruya filed a motion for reconsideration, which was subsequently denied in a Resolution 23 dated January 26, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00353-MIN. DETACa
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner alleges that the RTC's finding on the propriety of service of summons by publication should be accorded with the presumption of regularity. 24 The RTC was convinced with the positive steps taken by the Sheriff as enumerated in the latter's Report, which was the reason why the RTC allowed service of summons by publication. 25
Furthermore, it avers that the RTC Order in Civil Case No. 3602 had already attained finality. As a result, the title of the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. was cancelled and the Register of Deeds had issued a new title in its favor. Hence, the petition for annulment of judgment has no leg to stand on. 26
Lastly, it claims that the sale between the heirs of Alfeche, Sr., as vendors, and respondents, as vendees, is null because it violated the restrictions imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, 27 which prohibited any disposition of the property within five years from the grant of the patent. As such, respondents have no right over the property and consequently, are not considered real parties in interest to question the RTC Order in Civil Case No. 3602. 28
We first discuss respondents' capacity to file the action for annulment of judgment before the CA. Petitioner argues that respondents are not real parties in interest as they do not have any right over the property, given that the sale between the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. and them is void.
We agree with petitioner's position.
Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court defines a real party in interest as "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." 29 Interest in a proceeding, therefore, means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the judgment of the case. When the plaintiff in an action is not a real party in interest, the case can be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action. 30
In the present case, respondents claim interest as purchasers for value of the property from the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. Although they concede that the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. were barred from transferring ownership of the land within the prohibited five-year period, they, however, argue that what was sold and transferred were the rights and interest over the property, which obligated the heirs of Alfeche, Sr., as registered owners, to transfer ownership once the restriction provided by Commonwealth Act No. 141 lapses. 31
OCT No. P-22409 states the restrictions imposed by Commonwealth Act No. 141, to wit:
x x x [G]ayon pa man na sasailalim sa mga tadhana ng Seksyon 118 na nagtatakda bukod sa iba pa, na ang lupaing natamo ay hindi maaring mapasaiba at hindi sasailalim sa pataw na sagutin sa loob ng limang (5) taon mula sa petsa ng patente, at sa mga Seksyon 119, 121, 122 at 124 ng Batas Komonwelt Blg. 141 x x x. 32
Relatedly, Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:
Sec. 118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period; but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations. (Emphasis supplied.)
The foregoing provision is explicit in its restriction against the alienation, transfer, conveyance of any homestead within the prohibitory period of five years from the grant of patent. Such prohibition is mandatory for the sole purpose of promoting the public policy of preserving and keeping with the patentee's family the property which the State has gratuitously given them. 33 aDSIHc
In Manzano v. Ocampo, 34 we ruled that the mandatory prohibition likewise applies to those transactions entered into within the five-year period even if the execution of the formal agreement will be made after the lapse of the prohibitory period, thus:
The law prohibiting any transfer or alienation of homestead land within five years from the issuance of the patent does not distinguish between executory and consummated sales; and it would hardly be in keeping with the primordial aim of this prohibition to preserve and keep in the family of the homesteader the piece of land that the state had gratuitously given to them, to hold valid a homestead sale actually perfected during the period of prohibition but with the execution of the formal deed of conveyance and the delivery of possession of the land sold to the buyer deferred until after the expiration of the prohibitory period, purposely to circumvent the very law that prohibits and declares invalid such transaction to protect the homesteader and his family. To hold valid such arrangements would be to throw the door wide open to all possible fraudulent subterfuges and schemes that persons interested in land given to homesteaders may devise to circumvent and defeat the legal provision prohibiting their alienation within five years from the issuance of the homesteader's patent. 35 (Citation omitted.)
As a legal consequence, all transactions entered into in violation of Section 118 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141 are considered void ab initio, to wit:
Sec. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the property and its improvements to the State. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the present case, the homestead patent was granted upon the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. on December 23, 1994 and the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into between the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. and respondents on December 4, 1997, or within the prohibited five-year period. The Deed of Absolute Sale is, therefore, considered void and produced no legal effect that could transfer rights from the heirs of Alfeche, Sr. to respondents. Respondents' claim that it was only the rights over the property that was transferred to them is of no moment. The Deed of Absolute Sale explicitly stated that the vendors "CEDE, SELL, TRANSFER and DELIVER, by way of ABSOLUTE SALE" the land to the vendee. 36 In other words, the Deed of Absolute Sale was a consummated sale at the time of its execution.
Considering that respondents' alleged interest has no legal basis, they cannot assail or seek annulment of the RTC Order dated November 29, 1999. The CA, therefore, erred in taking cognizance of the proceedings despite respondents' lack of cause of action. If at all, respondents' right is limited to claiming the purchase price and interest from the seller of the property in appropriate proceedings. 37
In view of the jurisdictional infirmity of the CA proceedings, we need not resolve to the other issues raised in the petition.
Relevantly, considering that there were allegations that the homestead patent was illegally transferred within the prohibitive period and petitioner fraudulently resorted to the service of summons by publication in the reconveyance case to cancel OCT No. P-22409, we find it appropriate to furnish the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Office of the Solicitor General with copies of this Resolution so that the State may be afforded an opportunity to investigate whether the existing title was acquired through the use of fraud. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated May 11, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00353-MIN is REVERSED.
Let copies of the Resolution be furnished the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and the Office of the Solicitor General. TIADCc
SO ORDERED." Del Castillo, J., official on leave; Jardeleza, J., designated as Acting Working Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2636 dated January 31, 2019.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 38-50.
2.Id. pp. 13-26; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Melchor Quirino C. Sadang.
3. CA rollo, pp. 34-37.
4.Rollo, pp. 14, 56.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7. CA rollo, pp. 121-122.
8Rollo, p. 14.
9.Id. at 14-15.
10. CA rollo, pp. 19-20.
11.Id. at 21-22.
12. Id. at 39.
13. Id. at 51-52.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Rollo, p. 15.
16. Id.
17. CA rollo, p. 36.
18. Rollo, p. 16.
19. CA rollo, p. 115.
20. Rollo, p. 16.
21. Supra note 2.
22. Rollo, p. 25.
23. Id. at 27-29.
24. Id. at 43.
25. Id. at 45.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Otherwise known as "The Public Land Act."
28. Rollo, pp. 46-49.
29. RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2.
30. Goco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157449, April 6, 2010, 617 SCRA 397, 405.
31. CA rollo, p. 191.
32. Id. at 123.
33. Tingalan v. Melliza, G.R. No. 195247, June 29, 2015, 760 SCRA 514, 523-524.
34. G.R. No. L-14778, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 691.
35. Id. at 697-698.
36. CA rollo, p. 121.
37. See Santos v. Roman Catholic Church of Midsayap, et al., 94 Phil. 405, 412 (1954).
38. See Republic v. Heirs of Alejaga Sr., G.R. No. 146030, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 361, 373.