THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 196266-67. October 3, 2018.]
ESTATE OF THE LATE PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, ROGACIANA HERNAEZ AND LUISA HERNAEZ AND ALL THEIR HEIRS (OTHER THAN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT HEIRS) AS REPRESENTED BY JUDICIAL CO-ADMINISTRATOR WILFREDO GAYARES, petitioners, vs. BONIFACIO PEÑA, LOURDES MONCERA, SPOUSES DANIEL BELBAR AND PRESENTACION H. BELBAR, AND RODOLFO H. MONCERA, * respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated October 3, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. Nos. 196266-67 — (Estate of the late Primitivo Hernaez, Rogaciana Hernaez and Luisa Hernaez and all their heirs (other than the private respondent heirs) as represented by judicial co-administrator Wilfredo Gayares, petitioners, v. Bonifacio Peña, Lourdes Moncera, Spouses Daniel Belbar and Presentacion H. Belbar, and Rodolfo H. Moncera, respondents.) — Generally, court approval is necessary to validly dispose of adecedent's estate. However, this is not intended to impair the substantive right of heirs to dispose of whatever right, interest, or participation they may have in the decedent's property.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 15, 2010 Decision 2 and March 17, 2011 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 02710 and 02757. The Court of Appeals modified the October 9, 2006 4 and February 21, 2007 5 Omnibus Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. No. 903. It declared the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment valid and binding between the parties of these contracts. ICHDca
In 1999, Lourdes Hernaez-Moncera (Lourdes), an heiress of the late Rogaciana Hernaez-Moncera (Rogaciana), filed a petition for the intestate settlement 6 of Rogaciana's, Primitivo Hernaez's (Primitivo), and Luisa Hernaez's (Luisa) estates (the Hernaez Estates). The Hernaez Estates covered three (3) lots: (1) Lot No. 717 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-51548, (2) Lot No. 1316 covered by TCT No. 51546, and (3) Lot No. 2685 covered by TCT No. 51547. These lots were then subjects of a case before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 142913, filed by the estate of the late Salvador Serra Serra against the Hernaez Estates. 7
On June 8, 2000, 8 some of the heirs of the Hernaez Estates, namely, Presentacion Belbar (Presentacion), Wilfredo Gayares (Wilfredo), Lolita Gayares (Lolita), Julieta Fortaleza (Julieta), and Rosauro Fortaleza (Rosauro), through Lourdes, executed a Memorandum of Agreement 9 with Bonifacio Peña (Peña) and Rodolfo Ham (Ham). They agreed that Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro would share 40% of Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685 to Peña and Ham, who would provide financial assistance for all their cases concerning the three (3) lots. Thus:
1. That the FIRST PARTY agree to share the foregoing agricultural land with the SECOND PARTY in the sharing proportion of SIXTY PERCENT (60%) in their favor and FORTY PERCENT (40%) in favor of the SECOND PARTY[.] 10
On July 21, 2000, Lourdes, as the judicial administrator of the estate of Rogaciana and as attorney-in-fact of Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro, executed a Contract of Lease 11 over Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685 with Peña for 15 years, from 2001 to 2016, renewable for another 10 years. 12 The Contract of Lease contained a stipulation that it should be submitted to the intestate court for approval. 13 TCAScE
On January 4, 2001, the petition for the intestate settlement of the Hernaez Estates was archived, with the parties' agreement, and was revived upon Lourdes' motion on April 15, 2002. 14 On April 24, 2002, in a separate cadastral case, the Regional Trial Court ordered the annotation of the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease on the titles of Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685. 15
Lourdes and Wilfredo were appointed as joint regular administrators of the Hernaez Estates by the Regional Trial Court on July 21, 2003. 16
Peña filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene 17 in the intestate settlement, claiming that he was the assignee of a 1/3 share of Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685, and a lessee of all these lots for 15 years. This motion was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its January 23, 2006 Order, 18 which stated that he should file a separate civil action for recovery. 19
On May 30, 2006, Presentacion and her husband, Daniel Belbar (Daniel) (collectively, the Belbar Spouses), executed a Memorandum of Agreement 20 with Peña, wherein Peña was assigned their 1/3 share in Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685 for P5,000,000.00. On June 2, 2006, Rodolfo Moncera (Rodolfo), an heir of Rogaciana, executed a Deed of Assignment, 21 assigning to Peña his 6.98-hectare share in Lot No. 717 for P1,750,000.00. 22
On July 20, 2006, Wilfredo filed an Omnibus Motion 23 to have the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment all declared void for being entered into without the authority of the intestate court. 24
On October 9, 2006, the Regional Trial Court issued an Omnibus Order, 25 partially granting the Omnibus Motion. It declared null and void the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, and ordered the cancellation of its annotation on TCT Nos. T-51546, T-51547, and T-51548. It found that the Contract of Lease had been entered into without the authority of the intestate court, which had the jurisdiction to approve any disposition of property under administration. 26 However, it denied the motion to declare the other contracts null and void. It found that the contracts had been entered into by the heirs in their individual capacities, and they had only disposed of their shares in the inheritance. 27 It denied the parties' motions for reconsideration in its February 21, 2007 Order. 28
Two (2) Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals. One was filed by Peña and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02710. 29 The other, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 02757, was filed by the Hernaez Estates and all theirs heirs other than Lourdes, the Belbar Spouses, and Rodolfo. 30 These petitions, which questioned the Regional Trial Court October 9, 2006 and February 21, 2007 Orders, were consolidated. 31
On December 15, 2010, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision, 32 granting Peña's petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 02710 and denying the Hernaez Estates' petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 02757. It modified the Regional Trial Court's Orders by holding that the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease was valid and binding. However, it affirmed the Regional Trial Court's findings that the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment were valid and binding. 33
In its Decision, the Court of Appeals found that the intestate court had the power to declare void the dispositions of properties of the Hernaez Estates made by their heirs. 34 It likewise stated that Peña was not denied due process when he was not allowed to intervene in the intestate proceedings despite being the lessee in the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease. It pointed out that even if his motion to intervene was denied, Peña's pleadings were still acted upon by the Regional Trial Court, without objection from the other parties. In its November 20, 2009 Order, the Regional Trial Court even granted his motion for reconsideration and allowed him to intervene. 35 ITAaHc
As for the issue of the validity of the contracts entered into by the heirs of the Hernaez Estates, the Court of Appeals held that while the rule is that the intestate or testate court's approval was necessary for the valid disposition of the decedent's estate, the heirs may still dispose of their ideal shares in the estate without judicial approval. Citing Escanlar v. Court of Appeals, 36 the Court of Appeals held that this was consistent with Article 533 of the Civil Code, which provides that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir at the moment of death of the decedent. During the period of indivision of a decedent's estate, the heirs, as co-owners, have full ownership of their respective shares, and may alienate their rights, interests, or participation in the estate. 37
The Court of Appeals found that Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro executed the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement and July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease; the Belbar Spouses executed the May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement; and Rodolfo executed the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment in their individual capacities as heirs to the Hernaez Estates. These contracts showed that what they had alienated were not specific portions of the Hernaez Estates, but rather their ideal undivided shares. Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro alienated their 40% share, the Belbar Spouses alienated their 1/3 share, and Rodolfo alienated his 6.98-hectare share. It was within these heirs' power to alienate their portions, and the contracts they entered into were binding between them and the other parties even without the intestate court's approval. 38
As stated in Liu v. Loy, 39 a contract over properties of an estate entered into by an heir is binding between the parties. However, the contract would be subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings. 40 The Court of Appeals further cited Opulencia v. Court of Appeals, 41 in which this Court held that the lack of approval from the probate court in that case did not invalidate the contract executed by the heir, since the heir had the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of the share in the estate. 42
Finally, the Court of Appeals found that Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, Rosauro, Daniel, and Rodolfo were estopped from backing out from their representations in their respective contracts with Peña and Ham, from whom they had received considerations. It found that "neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract . . . entered into with all the [requisite] formalities and with full awareness of its consequences." 43
The Hernaez Estates filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals December 15, 2010 Decision, which was denied in its March 17, 2011 Order. 44 CHTAIc
On April 14, 2011, as represented by Wilfredo, the Hernaez Estates and all their heirs, excluding those who were impleaded, namely, Lourdes, the Belbar Spouses, and Rodolfo (petitioners) filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari45 before this Court, praying for an additional 30 days, or until May 15, 2011, within which to file their Petition for Review. The motion was granted by this Court in its July 20, 2011 Resolution. 46
On May 13, 2011, petitioners filed their Petition for Review on Certiorari 47 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court, assailing the Court of Appeals December 15, 2010 Decision and March 17, 2011 Resolution.
In their Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioners claim that the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease was null and void since the contract itself stipulated that it must be submitted to the intestate court for approval, which was not done. They point to the provision in the Contract of Lease that states, "[t]his Contract shall be submitted to the Intestate Court for approval," and argue that this is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the contract. 48 Moreover, they argue that the Contract of Lease, which exceeds one (1) year, is not a mere act of administration under Article 1878 of the Civil Code. They claim that the 15-year period of the lease, renewable for another 10 years, was in the nature of a disposition of Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685. As a disposition of the properties of the Hernaez Estates, the Contract of Lease needs to be approved by the intestate court; otherwise, the dispositions are null and void. 49
Further, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the issue of compliance with the provision in the Contract of Lease was not raised in the petition before the Regional Trial Court or in the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, but was raised only in the Motion for Reconsideration. 50 They claim that they did not have to raise this as an issue in the Regional Trial Court or in their Petition for Certiorari since it was Peña who assailed the declaration of the Regional Trial Court that the Contract of Lease was void. They aver that they raised the approval provision in their Omnibus Comment/Opposition to Peña's Motion for Reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. 51
Second, they assert that the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease and June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement were spurious documents, executed by Lourdes without the authority of Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro. They state that the Special Power of Attorney — which was notarized and recorded as Doc. No. 466, Page No. 95, Book No. 17, Series of 2000 and in which Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro appointed Lourdes as their attorney-in-fact — was non-existent and not attached to the Contract of Lease. Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro all deny executing any power of attorney in favor of Lourdes to enter into any contracts with Peña. 52 EATCcI
They affirm that no Special Power of Attorney, recorded as Doc. No. 466, Page No. 95, Book No. 17, Series of 2000, has been submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court of Bacolod City. They emphasize that Lourdes is a recidivist, and has already been criminally charged by Wilfredo for falsification of public document before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City. 53
Since the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease and June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement had not been executed with authorities from Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro, they subsequently did not receive any consideration from these contracts. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, they could not be estopped from questioning the validity of these contracts. 54
Finally, petitioners argue that the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment were unauthorized dispositions of the properties of the Hernaez Estates under administration. They claim that the Court of Appeals incorrectly cited Liu v. Loy, arguing that the intestate court's approval is still necessary for any disposition of estate property to take effect against third parties. 55 Further, they allege that Peña acted in bad faith and with the motive of obtaining the properties under administration, to the prejudice of the heirs. 56 They contend that the contracts violated Rule 89, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, which requires, among others, that the administrator apply for authority to sell the whole or a part of the estate to the intestate court, and submit a written notice to the heirs. They point out that these contracts likewise violate Rule 89, Section 7, which lays down the requisites for the sale of real estate by an administrator of the estate. 57 They cited Dillena v. Court of Appeals, 58 in which this Court ruled that "property under administration needs the approval of the probate court," and "any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is null and void." 59
On October 13, 2011, Peña filed his Comment to the Petition, 60 praying for the dismissal of the Petition for Review.
In his Comment, Peña claims, first, that Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro executed the contracts with him so that they could finance their then-pending case in G.R. No. 142913. 61 For him, the validity of the contracts was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court when it denied Wilfredo's application for temporary restraining order and writ of injunction to restrain Peña from cultivating, harvesting, and performing similar activities in Lot Nos. 717, 1316, and 2685. 62 He alleges that the Regional Trial Court held in its February 20, 2007 Order that the contracts, being in the nature of public documents, are presumed to be valid. 63
Second, Peña claims that when the Contract of Lease was executed, it could not yet be submitted to the intestate court for approval since another condition of the contract was that Peña be in actual possession of the leased premises. It was only in 2006, when this Court's Decision in G.R. No. 142913 became final and executory, that took possession of the properties. 64
Third, he points out that in their Petition for Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals, the Hernaez Estates did not raise the issue of the validity of the Contract of Lease. 65 DHITCc
Finally, Peña asserts that the alleged spuriousness of the contracts are questions of fact that cannot be reviewed in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 66 Moreover, Lot Nos. 1316 and 2685 have already been sold by their original owners to a certain Erlina Jocson-Manzanero during the lifetimes of Primitivo, Rogaciana, and Luisa. 67
On September 13, 2013, Lourdes filed her Comment 68 to the Petition for Review. In her Comment, she claims that she was fooled into signing the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement and July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease in exchange for small cash advances. She denies receiving any consideration as stated in these contracts, and claims that they are fraudulent and void. 69 Attached to her Comment is a sworn affidavit 70 from Arturo Moncera Gargarita, Sr., Lourdes' relative, who claims that Peña offered to finance her pending Supreme Court case, docketed as G.R. No. 142913, in exchange for her signature on these contracts.
The filing of Comments by Rodolfo, the Belbar Spouses, and Ham was dispensed with as this Court was later informed that they were all deceased. 71
Upon Peña's motion 72 and in compliance with this Court's September 2, 2013 Resolution, 73 Wilfredo clarified that the special power of attorney subject of the falsification case 74 that he filed against Lourdes is different from the one that served as her authority to sign the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement and July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease. 75
The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not the approval of the intestate court is a prerequisite for the valid disposition by heirs of their shares in the properties of an estate.
The Petition for Review is denied.
Heirs may dispose of their shares in the properties of an estate without the approval of the intestate court. The foundation of this principle is Article 777 of the Civil Code, which provides: cEaSHC
Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Even if a decedent's properties are under administration, the heirs as the succeeding owners of the properties may dispose of them. In Palicte v. Hon. Ramolete: 76
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even while the property is under administration. (Barretto v. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem v. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent's property even while it is under administration with more reason should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the presence of an administrator. 77
Generally, court approval is necessary to validly dispose of a decedent's estate, pursuant to Rule 89, Section 7 of the Rules of Court. 78 However, this is not intended to impair the substantive right of heirs to dispose of whatever right, interest, or participation they may have in the decedent's property. 79
Dillena v. Court of Appeals80 and Liu v. Loy, 81 which were both cited by petitioners, are irrelevant. Dillena and Liu are concerned with the disposition of properties under administration by the court-appointed administrator of an estate, without judicial approval. In both cases, this Court held that the administrator of an estate already subject of a testate or intestate proceeding cannot enter into any transaction without the court's prior approval.
Here, respondent Lourdes did not sign the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease and June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement in her capacity as a judicial administrator of the Hernaez Estates, but as the attorney-in-fact of petitioners. Clearly, as heirs, petitioners may validly dispose of their shares in the Hernaez Estates even without the approval of the intestate court.
Moreover, the alleged spuriousness of the Special Power of Attorney in favor of respondent Lourdes is a question of fact, 82 which has already been passed upon by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. These courts' findings concerning respondent Lourdes' power to sign contracts on behalf of petitioners are conclusive on this Court. 83 Notably, even when respondent Lourdes herself sought to have this Court declare the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease and June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement null and void, she only raised the issue of lack of consideration without raising her own alleged lack of authority to act on petitioners' behalf. 84 CTIEac
Similarly, the Belbar Spouses and Rodolfo entered into the May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment, respectively, as heirs of the Hernaez Estates. They were likewise entitled to dispose of their portions in the Hernaez Estates. The contention that the June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment between Rodolfo and respondent Peña stipulated the assignment of 6.98 hectares of Lot No. 717 of the property covered by TCT No. T-51548 85 does not affect the validity of the disposition. Even when an agreement purports to sell a concrete portion of a co-owned property, the sale does not become void. 86
As for the July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, it should be noted that the lack of consent of all co-owners to a lease over common property does not render the lease void. Thus, even if the Contract of Lease was only entered into by respondent Lourdes, for herself and on behalf of Presentacion, Wilfredo, Lolita, Julieta, and Rosauro, all other co-heirs are entitled to their shares in rentals from the lease. 87
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the parties to the June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment were estopped from reneging on their own acts and representations under these contracts:
Further, Presentacion Belbar, Wilfredo Gayares, Lolita Gayares, Julieta Fortaleza, Rosauro Fortaleza, Lourdes Moncera, Daniel Belbar and Rodolfo Moncera are estopped from backing out of their representations in their various memorand[a] of agreements and contract of lease with Pe[ñ]a and Ham, from whom they had received considerations as payment thereof. They could not renege on their own acts and representations, to the prejudice of Pe[ñ]a and Ham, who have relied on them. It is well-entrenched that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract [which] he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its consequences. 88
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The December 15, 2010 Decision and March 17, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 02710 and CA-G.R. SP No. 02757 are AFFIRMED. The June 8, 2000 Memorandum of Agreement, July 21, 2000 Contract of Lease, May 30, 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, and June 2, 2006 Deed of Assignment are VALID and BINDING between the parties subject of the outcome of the probate proceedings pending before the Regional Trial Court.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* In its October 20, 2014 Resolution, this Court noted petitioners' confirmation of the deaths of respondents Rodolfo H. Moncera, and the Spouses Daniel and Presentacion Belbar. In its December 5, 2016 Resolution, this Court noted petitioners' manifestation of the death of Rodolfo Ham, and granted their motion to drop his name as one of the respondents (seerollo, pp. 807 and 876).
1. Rollo, pp. 10-66.
2. Id. at 67-81. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3. Id. at 84-86. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Socorro B. Inting and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A. Hormachuelos and Edwin D. Sorongon of the Eighteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
4.Id. at 208-210. The Omnibus Order was penned by Judge Henry D. Arles of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental.
5.Id. at 235-236. The Omnibus Order was penned by Judge Henry D. Arles of Branch 61, Regional Trial Court, Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental.
6.Id. at 89-92.
7.Id. at 69.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 180-181.
10.Id. at 180.
11.Id. at 182-185.
12.Id. at 69-70.
13.Id. at 184.
14.Id. at 101.
15.Id. at 70.
16.Id. at 70 and 108.
17.Id. at 124-127.
18.Id. at 136-137.
19.Id. at 70.
20.Id. at 187-190.
21.Id. at 191-193.
22.Id. at 70-71.
23.Id. at 158-179.
24.Id. at 71.
25.Id. at 208-210.
26.Id. at 209-210.
27.Id. at 208-209.
28.Id. at 72 and 235-236.
29.Id. at 285-324 and 68.
30.Id. at 237-284.
31.Id. at 68-69.
32.Id. at 67-81.
33.Id. at 80-81.
34.Id. at 74-75.
35.Id. at 76.
36. 346 Phil. 158 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
37.Rollo, p. 77.
38.Id. at 77-78.
39. 453 Phil. 232 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
40.Rollo, p. 78.
41. 355 Phil. 124 (1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
42.Rollo, pp. 79-80.
43.Id. at 80.
44.Id. at 84-86.
45.Id. at 3-9.
46.Id. at 399-400.
47.Id. at 10-66.
48.Id. at 39.
49.Id. at 40.
50.Id. at 41.
51.Id. at 42-43.
52.Id. at 44.
53.Id. at 44-45.
54.Id. at 45.
55.Id. at 47-48.
56.Id. at 50.
57.Id. at 51-52.
58. 246 Phil. 645 (1988) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
59.Rollo, pp. 53-55.
60.Id. at 426-463.
61.Id. at 431-432 and 121.
62.Id. at 858.
63.Id. at 451-455. There is no complete copy of the alleged Regional Trial Court February 20, 2007 Order in the rollo.
64.Id. at 456-457.
65.Id. at 458-459.
66.Id. at 459.
67.Id. at 460-461.
68.Id. at 667-674.
69.Id. at 667.
70.Id. at 675-676.
71.Id. at 807 and 876.
72.Id. at 652-657.
73.Id. at 664-666.
74.See rollo, pp. 615-623.
75.Rollo, pp. 684-688.
76. 238 Phil. 128 (1987) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third Division].
77.Id. at 133.
78. RULES OF COURT, Rule 89, Sec. 7 states:
Section 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. — The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:
a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem proper;
c) If the court requires it, the executor or administrator shall give an additional bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that such executor or administrator will account for the proceeds of the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance;
d) If the requirements in the preceding subdivisions of this section have been complied with, the court, by order stating such compliance, may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber, in proper cases, such part of the estate as is deemed necessary, and in case of sale the court may authorize it to be public or private, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. The executor or administrator shall be furnished with a certified copy of such order;
e) If the estate is to be sold at auction, the mode of giving notice of the time and place of the sale shall be governed by the provisions concerning notice of execution sale;
f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor or administrator for such real estate, which shall be as valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his lifetime.
79.Acebedo v. Hon. Abesamis, 291 Phil. 182 (1993) [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
80. 246 Phil. 645 (1988) [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
81. 453 Phil. 232 (2003) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
82.See Philippine National Oil Company v. National College of Business and Arts, 516 Phil. 643 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing, Third Division].
83.See Spouses Bautista v. Silva, 533 Phil. 627 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
84.Rollo, p. 667.
85.Id. at 191.
86.See Lopez v. Vda. De Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601 (1944) [Per J. Bocobo, First Division]; Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 748 Phil. 587 (2014) [Per J. Perez, First Division].
87.Wheelers Club International, Inc. v. Bonifacio, Jr., 500 Phil. 497 (2005) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
88.Rollo, p. 80.