SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 248150. March 23, 2022]
CDR. JOHN B. ESPLANA, petitioner, vs.FIELD INVESTIGATION BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN-MOLEO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated23 March 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 248150 (CDR. John B. Esplana v. Field Investigation Bureau, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-MOLEO). — Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision 2 dated 11 September 2018 and the Resolution 3 dated 28 June 2019 of the Court of Appeals in (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 153901, which denied the petition for review filed by petitioner Cdr. John B. Esplana (Esplana) and the motion for reconsideration, respectively. The CA Decision affirmed the Consolidated Decision 4 dated 19 July 2017, and the Consolidated Order 5 dated 06 November 2017, of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), finding Esplana guilty of Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from service.
Antecedents
An anonymous complaint, citing Commission on Audit (COA) Audit Observation Memorandum No. PCG-2015-018 (AOM 15-018) dated 15 April 2015, reported supposed anomalies in the utilization of funds of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), particularly with respect to the liquidations of cash advances and reimbursements of expenses submitted in Calendar Year 2014. As indicated in AOM 15-018, PCG's General Ledger showed that cash advances granted to 21 Special Disbursing Officers (SDOs) totaled P689,640,806.06 as of 31 December 2014, with total liquidations of P633,612,786.45. The cash advances were authorized, recommended, and approved by VAdm. Rodolfo D. Isorena (Commandant), Capt. Joeven L. Fabul (Deputy Chief for Comptrollership), Cdr. John B. Esplana (Internal Auditor), and Rogelio Caguioa (Accounting Head). COA's verification of relevant disbursement vouchers showed, however, that they lacked the required office orders duly designating the respective recipients as SDOs. Some business establishments were not in the address indicated in their Sales Invoices/Cash Invoices/Official Receipts (SI/CI/ORs). Also, some establishments located denied the issuance of the attached SI/CI/ORs. 6
Consequently, an investigation was conducted by the Field Investigation Bureau-Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices (FIB-MOLEO). It found that the cash advances were irregularly issued or released. The FIB-MOLEO reiterated COA's observation that pertinent disbursement vouchers lacked the documentary support in terms of indicating the duly designated SDOs for Special Cash Advances (SCAs), in violation of COA Circular No. 97-002 requiring heads of agencies to grant SCAs only to duly designated disbursing officers or employees, and only for purposes such as agency field office's current operating expenditures, or field activity, when it is impractical to pay the same by check. 7
The FIB-MOLEO averred that respondents violated Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1445, 8 Republic Act No. (RA) 9184, 9 as well as other rules and regulations in the grant, utilization, and liquidation of cash advances. For instance, COA Circular No. 97-002 and PD No. 1445 require an official or employee to first settle or make a proper accounting of all the official's previous cash advances, before any additional ones are allowed him/her. The FIB-MOLEO's examination of various Reports of Disbursement showed, however, that SCAs were released on a daily or monthly basis without a prior liquidation of outstanding ones. On the other hand, RA 9184 requires all procurements, as a general rule, to be done through a competitive bidding. The SCAs, however, were utilized for the payment of goods acquired through emergency procurement despite a lack of proper justification for their exemption from the mandated procurement mode. 10 CAIHTE
Twenty-one (21) complaints were filed by the FIB-MOLEO against the above PCG officials for processing, authorizing, and disbursing SCAs to the concerned SDO notwithstanding the attendant irregularities in documentary support, fund utilization, and liquidation. 11
Accordingly, the FIB-MOLEO recommended the filing of several information for Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification and 11 counts of violation of RA 3019, in relation to RA 9184, against Esplana and the other responsible officers. It also recommended that Esplana and the others be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. 12
In his counter-affidavit, 13 Esplana claimed that his duties primarily involved matters related to internal control and largely advisory in nature. His mandate does not include the audit of the office's various transactions. He was included in some of the charges despite lack of participation in the transactions. Esplana contended that he did not have the power to approve, authorize or recommend disbursements, including cash advances. He further explained that he signed the disbursement vouchers (DVs) only after ensuring the propriety of supporting documents. Since he was not in a position to determine the necessity of cash advances, Esplana limited his checking to the authorities and limitations in the amount of cash advances for each special SDO. 14
Also, Esplana issued procedures and reminders to ensure the protection of the Coast Guard assets and resources, like the submission of specimen signatures of the authorized signatories to prevent the occurrence of forgeries in the preparation of Purchase Orders; and instruction for the accountable officers to liquidate their cash advances. Esplana averred that he had no custody of the funds or property, and his functions do not include the determination of which purchases should go through competitive bidding. He posited that the complaints failed to allege or describe any particular act that constitute grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He was simply lumped together with other officers of the PCG simply due to the appearance of his name as Coast Guard Internal Auditor on some of the DVs. 15
Esplana filed a supplemental counter-affidavit 16 stressing that his signatures in the DVs subject of the complaint, and the signatures of other duly designated CGIA (Coast Guard Internal Audit), were superfluities and not necessary in the disbursement transactions. 17
Ruling of the OMB
In the Consolidated Decision 18 dated 19 July 2017, the OMB found Esplana and the other responsible officers guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposed on them the penalty of dismissal. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are found GUILTY of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and are meted the penalty of DISMISSAL, with the same accessory penalties of forfeiture of benefits and privileges and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
PROVIDED, that if the penalty of dismissal can no longer be enforced due to respondents' separation from service, the alternative penalty of a FINE in the amount equivalent to respondents' salary for ONE YEAR shall be imposed, payable to the Office of the Ombudsman, and may be deductible from respondents' retirement benefits, accrued leave credits, or any receivables from their office, in addition to the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of eligibility and perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
SO ORDERED.19
The OMB ruled that Esplana directly participated in the continuous release of irregular SCAs by affixing his signature in several DVs showing his recommendation and approval of disbursements of public funds. It added that, the disinterest by which the canvassing, disbursements and liquidations were processed and approved, indicates a common understanding or acquiescence to disregard requirements laid down by law and regulations not only for the disbursement of public funds but also for the procurement of supplies. Such circumstances lead to the conclusion that respondents (Cdr. Esplana, et al.) conspired to violate RA 9184. Further, Esplana, et al., consistently allowed SCAs and disbursed PCG funds despite incomplete documentation. In addition, the failure to ensure PCG the maximum benefits of competitive bidding clearly manifests their conscious and deliberate evasion of transparency and public accountability. 20
On 13 October 2017, Esplana was dismissed from the service.
Esplana filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration, 21 alleging that the administrative complaint against him should be dismissed as the only evidence presented against him was the appearance of his signature in the disbursement vouchers under the heading "Fiscal Control." He claimed that the procedure for all disbursement transactions to pass through his office, is contrary to the directive under Administrative Order No. 278, which expressly detaches certain functions from the Internal Audit service, including the pre-audit of vouchers, counter-signature of checks, and all other activities related to operations. He also averred that it is humanly impossible for him to pre-audit all the documents. Thus, Esplana merely relied on his subordinates to check the regularity of the documents.
On 06 November 2017, the OMB issued a Consolidated Order modifying its Decision with respect to Esplana's criminal liability, dismissing without prejudice the criminal case for malversation of public funds through falsification, and dismissing several complaints for violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019. 22 However, the Office of the OMB maintained the finding that Esplana is guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. DETACa
Esplana filed a petition for review before the CA. 23
Ruling of the CA
On 11 September 2018, the CA denied Esplana's petition for review and affirmed the Consolidated Decision dated 19 July 2017 and Order dated 06 November 2017 of the OMB. 24 The CA ratiocinated that as Internal Auditor, Esplana had the duty to ascertain the extent of compliance and to review the systems established to ensure that government policies, plans and procedures are faithfully complied with. Moreover, he was responsible in determining the extent to which the assets and other resources of the institutions are accounted for, and safeguarded from losses of all kinds. 25
The CA found that the subject DVs failed to indicate the duly designated SDOs for the SCAs, in violation of the requirement that heads of agencies shall grant SCAs only to duly designated disbursing officers or employees. This notwithstanding, Esplana affixed his signature on the Fiscal Control portion. His signature was necessary before the checks for SCAs were prepared and payments effected. The CA concluded that by signing without verifying that the requirements are already complete, Esplana voluntarily turned a blind eye to the established rules governing cash advances. 26
In addition, the CA enunciated that there is no evidence to warrant a deviation from competitive bidding. The Certificates of Emergency Purchase submitted by the SDOs are not sufficient to justify the resort to an alternative mode of procurement. Said certificates were self-serving and wanting any proof to establish the existence of any emergency. Yet, Esplana repeatedly signed the disbursement vouchers, the SCAs were repeatedly approved and public funds were released. As an Internal Auditor, Esplana's responsibility involved ensuring that every transaction is compliant with the law he is mandated to follow. 27
In finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct, the CA declared that Esplana, together with the other officials, repeatedly approved the SCAs and released the funds corresponding thereto without compliance with the requirements of applicable laws. Esplana grossly disregarded the law and was manifestly remiss in his duties in strictly observing the directives of the various law governing cash advances. 28
As to Serious Dishonesty, the CA observed that Esplana's act of signing the vouchers that led to the approval of the SCAs despite knowledge of the attendant irregularities constitutes concealment and distortion of truth that equates to serious dishonesty. 29
Finally, anent the administrative offense of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, the CA declared that the questioned conduct tarnished the image and integrity of his public office, and prejudiced public service. 30
Esplana moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 31 dated 28 June 2019.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by Esplana.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for consideration of the Court:
I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the ruling of the Honorable Office of the Ombudsman finding the existence of substantial evidence to dismiss petitioner Esplana for alleged acts amounting to Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
II. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the ruling of the Honorable Office of the Ombudsman that petitioner Esplana was guilty of Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the service and in ordering his dismissal. 32
Ruling of the Court
We GRANT the Petition.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing questions of law which involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; its function is not to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Accordingly, findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court. 33
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the rule, including: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 34
The Court finds that the circumstances in this case and the evidence adduced warrant the application of the exception rather than the general rule. Thus, an examination of the probative value of the evidence is warranted.
The resolution of this case hinges on the determination of whether there is substantial evidence to hold Esplana administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
After an assiduous examination of the records of the case, the Court finds no substantial evidence to hold Esplana administratively liable. The Court elucidates.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that one is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.35 In cases before the OMB, jurisprudence instructs that "the fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of fact by the OMB when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by the OMB are not adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts." 36
It should be noted that Esplana was administratively charged, together with other responsible officers of the PCG, because of (1) the release of SCAs to SDOs without proper and competent documentary support such as authorities duly designating the SDOs for SCAs, in violation of COA Circular No. 97-002; (2) proper liquidation of previous cash advances before additional ones are allowed, in violation of PD 1445; and (3) failure to conduct competitive bidding in the procurement of supplies, in violation of Section 10, Article IV of RA 9184.
SDOs were duly authorized and the
Esplana explained that before signing the DVs in the Fiscal Control portion, he verified and checked the completeness of the supporting documents. When the DVs reached his office, the same had been approved by the Chief Accountant, certifying that the documents were in order. Specifically, before affixing his signature, Esplana made sure of the presence of the following requirements:
1. The Special Order for the requesting SDO;
2. Bureau of Treasury Confirmation Letter to establish the amount of bond and whether the cash advances requested are within the maximum allowed by the bond; and
3. Certification/Clearance from the Chief Accountant.
Here, the evidence showed that the receiver of the SCAs were duly designated as SDOs. In the several Extracts prepared by the Chief of Coast Guard Staff, attached in this petition and which were likewise submitted in evidence by Esplana before the OMB, it can be seen that Special Orders were given, duly authorizing the SDOs to receive SCAs, to Cdr. Rommel Supangan, 37 Cdr. William M. Arquero, 38 Cdr. Jude Thaddeus M. Besinga, 39 Cdr. Wilfred A. Burgos, 40 Capt. Angelito G. Gil, 41 Cdr. Allen J. Dalangin, 42 Cdr. Ferdinand M. Velasco, 43 Cdr. Roben N. de Guzman, 44 Cdr. George Villareal Ursabia, 45 Cdr. Ivan Roldan, 46 and RAdmin. Cecil R. Chen. 47
Likewise, there are Certifications 48 issued by the Chief Accountant of the PCG showing that the respective SDOs have completely liquidated the SCAs granted them. This runs counter to the allegation of respondent that no proper liquidation of cash advances was made prior to the grant of additional cash advances.
The OMB's Consolidated Decision merely made a general statement that in performing their functions, Esplana and the other responsible officers voluntarily disregarded established rules of procurement, employed fraud in the purchase of supplies, and effectively compromised the integrity and efficiency of the government service. This general statement cannot be the substantial evidence required by law to hold Esplana administratively liable.
On the contrary, Esplana was able to refute the irregularities hurled against him, submitting competent and relevant evidence, showing how he discharged his functions as Internal Auditor of the PCG with diligence and due regard to established CGIA rules and procedures. He submitted the Special Orders designating the SDOs and the Certifications from the Chief Accountant which established that the concerned SDOs were duly authorized, and the SCAs were properly liquidated by them.
Resort to Alternative Methods of
Esplana is also being faulted for the failure of the SDOs to resort to a competitive bidding in the procurement of supplies.
Section 10, Article IV of RA 9184 provides that "[a]llprocurement shall be done through competitive bidding except as provided for in Article XVI of this Act." Under Section 48, Article XVI, the procuring entity may resort to any of the alternative methods of procurement which include shopping allowed under Section 52 and negotiated procurement under Section 53 thereof, in order to promote economy and efficiency.
The Court, however, finds no evidence linking Esplana in the procurement process. There is no iota of evidence showing his participation in the bidding of supplies. He is not a member of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC). As Esplana asserted, which respondent did not refute, the determination of the methods of procurement is not within the function of the CGIA. TIADCc
At any rate, the concerned SDOs were able to justify their resort to alternative modes of procurement through a Certificate of Emergency Purchase. While competitive bidding is the general rule and alternative methods are mere exceptions, the SDOs resorted to negotiated procurement and shopping because of the urgency and exigency of the situations then presented to them.
Moreover, respondent failed to point out the specific overt act performed by Esplana and the other responsible officers in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit a violation of RA 9184. 49 The facts are wanting in detail as to the specific act committed by Esplana with his co-respondents to show their community of design to commit the alleged irregularities in the disbursements of the SCAs.
Withal, finding no substantial evidence that Esplana committed any irregularities in approving the SCAs to duly authorized SDOs, the Court finds that the instant administrative case has no leg to stand on. There is no reasonable ground to believe that Esplana is responsible for the irregularities complained of.
Grave Misconduct
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross neglect of duty by a public officer. The misconduct is considered to be grave if it also involves other elements, such as corruption or the willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must be evident. 50 Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. 51
In this case, there is a dearth of evidence to prove the Esplana unlawfully and wrongfully used his position to procure some benefit for himself or for another person. 52 There is no clear and convincing evidence that Esplana affixed his signature in the DVs which paved the way for the release of the SCAs to the SDOs for personal or selfish ends. It was not proven either that there was a willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. As fully explained above, Esplana acted assiduously in making sure that the documents were complete prior to signing the DVs. AIDSTE
Equally telling is the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. De Guzman, 53 where the Court held that in addition to the lack of public bidding, there must be an independent finding that petitioners have deliberately resorted to negotiated procurement to benefit themselves or some other person for them to be held liable for grave misconduct.
As found by the Court, there is no evidence as to Esplana's specific participation in the procurement process in the PCG. It was not alleged, much less proved, that the failure of the SDOs to make procurement through a competitive bidding was deliberately done in order to benefit Esplana or some other person.
Serious Dishonesty
Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness and disposition to betray. 54 It is the concealment or distortion of truth in a matter of fact relevant to one's office or connected with the performance of his or her duty. It is a serious offense, which reflects on the person's character and exposes the moral decay which virtually destroys his or her honor, virtue and integrity. 55
The offense is qualitied as serious dishonesty if any one of the following circumstances is present:
1. The dishonest act caused serious damage and grave prejudice to the government;
2. The respondent gravely abused his/her authority to commit the dishonest act;
3. Where the respondent is an accountable officer, the dishonest act directly involves property, accountable forms, or money for which she/he is directly accountable and the respondent shows an intent to commit material gain, graft, and corruption;
4. The dishonest act exhibits moral depravity on the part of respondent;
5. The respondent employed fraud and/or falsification of official documents in the commission of the dishonest act related to his/her employment;
6. The dishonest act was committed several times or in various occasions;
7. The dishonest act involves a Civil Service examination irregularity or fake Civil Service eligibility such as, but not limited to, impersonation, cheating, and use of crib sheets; and
8. Other analogous circumstances. 56
None of the above circumstances are present in this case.
To illustrate, acts or omissions considered as dishonesty include: making untruthful statements in the Personal Data Sheet, causing another person to take and pass the Career Service Professional Examination on his or her behalf, 57 using fake or spurious civil service eligibility, 58 and using one's position to make his or her "clients" believe that he or she could give them undue advantage — over others without the same connection — by processing their claims faster. 59 Intent to deceive and defraud, is evidently present in the enumerated cases. 60
Here, intent to deceive and defraud are obviously wanting in the alleged irregularities complained of. All the supporting documents were proper and complete before Esplana signed the DVs. In fact, the Chief Accountant had approved the DVs before Esplana signed the same.
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
In Pia v. Gervacio, 61 the Court explained that acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. 62
The following act or omissions have been treated as conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service: misappropriation of public funds; abandonment of office; failure to report back to work without prior notice; failure to safe-keep public records and property; making false entries in public documents; falsification of court orders; a judge's act of brandishing a gun; and threatening the complainants during a traffic altercation. 63
The complaints filed against Esplana indubitably failed to establish that his act, which was regularly done, tarnished the image and integrity of the CGIA, and the PCG, as a whole.
Withdrawal of the criminal
It appears that Cdr. Dalangin filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to Remand the case to the Hon. OMB for the Conduct of Reinvestigation. Thus, a reinvestigation was conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. AaCTcI
In the Consolidated Resolution 64 dated 30 April 2019, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, as approved by Hon. Samuel R. Martires of the OMB, the criminal complaints against Esplana, Isorena, Fabul, Caguioa and Arquero for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 were dismissed. The OMB's Consolidated Resolution dated 19 July 2017, and its Consolidated Order dated 06 November 2017 were reversed and set aside.
Accordingly, per Motion to Withdraw Informations filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 65 dated 6 September 2019 granting the same and the Informations and Amended Informations were withdrawn.
In its Consolidated Resolution, the Office of the Special Prosecutor ruled that all SDOs were able to prove that their SCAs were validly authorized through Special Orders and covered by their respective fidelity bonds per Bureau of Treasury Confirmation Letters. The SDOs had liquidated their cash accountabilities per Certification issued by the PCG Chief Accountant, Caguioa, in addition to the validation by Esplana that all SDOs had liquidated their respective cash advances.
With the withdrawal of the criminal information, Esplana invokes the case of Larin vs. Executive Secretary66 (Larin) wherein the Court dismissed the administrative case on the basis of the reversal of Larin's conviction in the criminal case. The En Banc held:
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability.6 However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this Court upon a categorical and clear finding that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a case, there is no more basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit. 67
In Larin, the administrative case was filed on the basis of the conviction by the Sandiganbayan of petitioner Aquilino T. Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and his co-accused of the crimes of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. When the case reached the Court, Larin's conviction in the criminal cases was set-aside. 68
Here, the administrative and criminal cases were simultaneously filed arising from the same set of questioned transactions. Settled is the rule that the mere dismissal of the criminal cases does not ipso facto absolve Esplana from administrative liability considering that the evidence required in the administrative proceedings is only substantial evidence. 69
However, the Court would not hesitate to recognize the import and weight of the dismissal of the criminal informations against Esplana considering the clear ruling by the Office of the Special Prosecutor therein that, after reinvestigation, all SDOs were able to prove that their SCAs were validly authorized through Special Orders, and covered by their respective fidelity bonds per Bureau of Treasury Confirmation Letters; and that the SDOs had liquidated their cash accountabilities per Certification issued by the PCG Chief Accountant. Otherwise stated, there is nothing irregular in the acts of Esplana in signing the DVs to facilitate the grant of SCAs to the SDOs.
These are the same findings of the Court in this petition. The same evidence was submitted and duly scrutinized by the Court. The same conclusion was reached by the Court. It can be said, therefore, that the dismissal of the criminal informations further strengthens the conclusion that Esplana cannot be held administratively liable for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for lack of substantial evidence.
Final Note
A "[p]ublic office is a public trust [and] [p]ublic officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to be mere rhetoric, and should not be taken lightly considering that those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. 70
The Court is not unaware of quite a number of dishonest, defiant, and corrupt men in the government service. However, the evidence obtained herein does not count Cdr. John B. Esplana who has devotedly served the country for 22 years. He is a multi-awarded officer having received various awards and commendations. There is nothing on records that he has ever been administratively charged with any act of irregularity or impropriety. While the Court is emphatic that it does not condone the wrongdoing of public officers and employees, neither will it close its eyes to recognize the officers' and employees' laudable length of service in the government, their unblemished records, and their numerous awards and commendations they meritoriously earned and deserved, as in the case of Esplana.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 11 September 2018 and the Resolution dated 28 June 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153901 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the administrative complaint against petitioner Cdr. John B. Esplana is DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby reinstated to his former government position without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of back salaries and other accrued benefits from the date of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. EcTCAD
Further, the Court resolves to:
1. NOTE the entry of appearance dated 16 November 2021 of Atty. Herschel F. Magracia of Dacanay & Magracia Law Offices as collaborating counsel for petitioner, and GRANT counsel's prayer that all Court processes be sent to her at Unit 408, Puso ng Maynila Building, United Nations Avenue, A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila;
2. NOTE the manifestation dated 16 November 2020 of counsel for petitioner, stating that in the decisions promulgated by the Court of Appeals [CA] (a) dated 30 October 2020 in the related cases docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 153856 entitled, "VDAM. Rodolfo D. Isorena, Capt. Joeven L. Fabul, Commo, Enrico Efren A. Evangelista, Capt. Angelito G. Gil and Capt. Ramon S. Lopez vs. Field Investigation Bureau, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-MOLEO," and CA-G.R. SP No. 153963 entitled, "Rogelio F. Caguioavs. Office of the Ombudsman, Field Investigation Bureau," and (b) dated 14 October 2020 in "Captain Rommel A. Supangan vs. Field Investigation Bureau, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-MOLEO," the CA has exonerated the officers from administrative liability due to lack of substantial evidence and the absence of irregularities in the procurement process resorted to; and that the same rationales in the said cases may be applied in the instant case; and
3. NOTE the notice of change of firm name dated 28 October 2020 of counsel for petitioner, to COO Dizon and Lardizabal, and address to, 41st Floor, GT Tower International, 6813 Ayala Avenue corner H.V. Dela Costa Street, Makati City, and GRANT counsel's request that copies of all notices, orders, resolutions, pleadings, motions and other papers in this case be sent to the aforesaid new address.
SO ORDERED." (Perlas-Bernabe, SAJ, on official leave.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-48.
2.Id. at 49-64-A; penned by Associate Justice Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig.
3.Id. at 65-68.
4.Id. at 235-307.
5.Id. at 328-388.
6.Id. at 49-50.
7.Id. at 50.
8. Entitled "Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the Philippines," approved 11 June 1978.
9. Entitled "An Act Providing for the Modernization, Standardization and Regulation of the Procurement Activities of the Government and for Other Purposes," approved on 10 January 2003.
10.Rollo, pp. 50-51.
11.Id. at 51.
12.Id. at 51.
13.Id. at 80-113.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 51-52.
16.Id. at 186-188.
17.Id.
18.Id. at 235-307.
19.Id. at 304-305.
20.Id. at 276-304.
21.Id. at 308-322.
22. Entitled "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," approved on 17 August 1960.
23.Rollo, p. 49.
24.Id. at 49-64-A.
25.Id. at 55-64.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29.Id.
30.Id.
31.Id. at 65-68.
32.Id. at 9-10.
33.UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Asgard Corrugated Box Manufacturing Corp., G.R. No. 244407, January 26, 2021 [Per J. Carandang].
34.Soliva v. Tanggol, G.R. No. 223429, January 29, 2020 [Per J. Carandang]; emphasis supplied.
35.Office of the Ombudsman v. De Zosa, 751 Phil. 293 (2015) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
36.Id., citing Hon. Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung, 575 Phil. 538, 557 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario].
37.Rollo, pp. 141-142; Extract dated February 14, 2012.
38.Id. at 146-149; Extract dated January 29, 2013.
39.Id. at 150-156; Extract dated February 15, 2012.
40.Id. at 157-160; Extract dated April 5, 2013.
41.Id. at 161-162; Extract dated July 18, 2016.
42.Id. at 163-165; Extract dated January 14, 2013.
43.Id. at 166-169; Extract dated January 26, 2012.
44.Id. at 172-173; Extract dated January 30, 2013.
45.Id. at 174-176; Extract dated March 19, 2012.
46.Id. at 177-180; Extract dated February 12, 2016.
47.Id. at 181-183; Extract dated February 20, 2012.
48.Id. at 143, 148, 152, 158, 162, 165, 169, 173, 176, 180, 183.
49.See Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, 790 Phil. 367 (2016) [Per J. Bersamin].
50.Bagaoisan v. Officeof the Ombudsman for Mindanao, Davao City, G.R. No. 242005, June 26, 2019 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe], citing Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao v. Martel, 806 Phil. 649, 662 (2017) [Per J. Mendoza].
51.Id., citing Office of the Ombudsman v. Mallari, 749 Phil. 224, 249 (2014) [Per J. Mendoza].
52.See Domingo v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 236050, June 17, 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].
53. 819 Phil. 282 (2017), as cited in Aguito v. 168 Security, Inc., G.R. No. 221884, November 25, 2019 [Per J. Carandang].
54.Supra note 34.
55.Id.
56. Section 3, CSC Resolution No. 06-0538 or the Rules on the Administrative Offense of Dishonest; See also Panarigan v. Civil Service Commission-Regional Office (CSCRO)No. III, G.R. No. 238077, 17 March 2021.
57.Nasser v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 235848 (Notice), 05 March 2018.
58.Civil Service Commission v. Cayohit, 457 Phil. 452, 460 (2003) [Per Curiam].
59.Japson v. Civil Service Commission, 663 Phil. 665, 677 (2011) [Per J. Nachura].
60.Supra note 34.
61. 710 Phil. 196 (2013) [Per J. Reyes].
62.Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas v. Castro, 759 Phil. 68 (2015) [Per J. Brion].
63.Catipon v. Japson, 761 Phil. 205, 221-222 (2015) [Per J. Del Castillo].
64.Rollo, pp. 582-637.
65.Id. at 650-653.
66. 345 Phil. 962 (1997) [Per J. Torres, Jr.].
67.Id.
68.Id.
69.Ganzon vs. Arlos, 720 Phil. 104 (2013) [Per J. Bersamin].
70.Field InvestigationOffice of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Castillo, 794 Phil. 53 (2016) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].