Ermita+¦o v. Paglas

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 174436. November 11, 2013.]

JUANITA ERMITAÑO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ISABELO ERMITAÑO, petitioner, vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2013, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 174436 (Juanita Ermitaño, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Isabelo Ermitaño vs. Lailanie M. Paglas). — For resolution is petitioner's Partial Motion for Reconsideration 1 of this Court's Decision dated January 23, 2013, which modified the September 8, 2004 Decision and August 16, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 77617, by deleting the award of attorney's fees and litigation expenses to respondent and ordering her to pay petitioner P108,000.00 as and for unpaid rentals.

Citing the case of Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, 2 petitioner contends in her present Motion that, in addition to the principal amount of P108,000.00, respondent should likewise be held liable to pay 12% interest per annum on the said amount reckoned from the time of judicial demand until full payment thereof.

In her Opposition to the Petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, 3 respondent argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to award the relief prayed for as the issue on interest was never raised by petitioner in both her petitions filed with this Court and the CA.

The Court finds the Motion partly meritorious. IDAESH

Contrary to respondent's claims, a perusal of the records on hand would reveal that petitioner prayed for the award of interest on the accrued rentals that she claims to be entitled to in both her petitions filed with the CA and this Court. 4 The same is true with respect to her Appeal Memorandum 5 filed with the RTC. It is true that the issue on interest was not specifically assigned as an error in petitioner's petitions filed with the CA and this Court. However, this Court has held, time and again, that an appellate court has a broad discretionary power in waiving the lack of assignment of errors in specific instances, one of which is when matters are not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice. 6 In the instant case, there is no dispute that respondent breached her obligation to pay a sum of money to petitioner. A necessary consequence of such breach is the payment of interest on the principal sum due. To deprive petitioner of such interest, on the sole ground that she failed to assign as an error the absence of such an award in her petition, would certainly be unjust.

Even granting that petitioner did not specifically pray for the award of interest, this Court has likewise held that even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 7 The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for. 8

Furthermore, the Court notes that respondent skirts the issue by harping on the Court's alleged lack of jurisdiction over the issue on interest without ever raising any defense or argument why petitioner's prayer for interest on the principal amount awarded should not be granted. The Court finds this as an indirect and implied admission that petitioner's prayer for the award of interest is meritorious.

Nonetheless, the Court finds incorrect petitioner's contention that the rate of interest should be uniformly pegged at 12% from the time of judicial demand until the amount due is fully paid. CIDaTc

In Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, 9 which was cited by petitioner, the Court laid down the guidelines regarding the manner of computing legal interest, to wit:

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 10

Applying the above guidelines, this Court would have granted a uniform interest rate of 12% on the principal amount due, from the time of judicial demand until full payment thereof, if petitioner would have been more conscientious and vigilant in specifically raising this issue in her assignment of errors. Considering that this Petition was decided on January 23, 2013, the case awarding such rate of interest would have become final and executory as early as March 2013. As it is now, the proceedings in the instant petition is overtaken by the recent case of Nacar v. Gallery Frames and/or Felipe Bordey, Jr., 11 wherein this Court, in its Decision dated August 13, 2013, modified the imposable interest rates on the basis of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, which took effect on July 1, 2013, thus: DcSACE

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

And in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. 12

Applying the new guidelines to the instant case, 12% interest rate per annum shall, therefore, be imposed on the principal amount due from the time of judicial demand, i.e., from the time of the filing of the complaint, until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, from July 1, 2013, until full satisfaction of the monetary award, the interest rate shall be 6% per annum. aASEcH

WHEREFORE, the Partial Motion for Reconsideration is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of this Court, dated January 23, 2013, is hereby MODIFIED by DIRECTING respondent to pay an interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum on the amount of P108,000.00, representing unpaid rentals, computed from the time of the filing of the complaint until June 30, 2013 and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full satisfaction thereof.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 211-216.

2. G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.

3. Rollo, pp. 231-236.

4. See rollo, pp. 33, 81.

5. Records, p. 27.

6. General Milling Corporation v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 193723, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 256, 264, citing Diamonon v. Department of Labor and Employment, 384 Phil. 15, 23 (2000); Kulas Ideas & Creations v. Alcoseba, G.R. No. 180123, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 217, 231.

7. Prince Transport v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011, 639 SCRA 312, 330; Raquel-Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 174986, 175071, and 181415, July 7, 2009, 592 SCRA 169, 192.

8. Id.

9. Supra note 2.

10. Id. at 95-97. (Italics in the original)

11. G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013.

12. Emphasis supplied.