Empas v. Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 246176. December 7, 2021.]

ROMEL M. EMPAS, petitioner,vs. MARIWASA SIAM CERAMICS, INC./REGINA CO SETENG, KAJOHDET* SANGSUBAN, ANDREW V. MANZANILLA, JOSEPH A. ENRIQUEZ and EMILIE B. MARAMAG, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated December 7, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 246176 (Romel M. Empas v. Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc./Regina Co Seteng, Kajohdet Sangsuban, Andrew V. Manzanilla, Joseph A. Enriquez, and Emilie B. Maramag). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Romel L. Empas (Empas) assailing the Decision 1 dated August 30, 2018 and Resolution 2 dated December 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases of CA-G.R. SP No. 152230 and CA-G.R. SP No. 152248.

The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-04-00699-14-B filed by Empas against Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. (MSCI) and its officers Regina Co Seteng, Kajohdet Sangsuban, Andrew V. Manzanilla, Joseph A. Enriquez, and Emilie B. Maramag.

Empas alleged that he was hired by MSCI as production operator on September 5, 2003 with a Php473.00/day salary. According to him, on February 6, 2014, Ricardo Panis (Panis), a contractual employee from Bituin Manpower Agency, Inc. strangled him while he was working on a machine. In a separate incident, Panis had allegedly been sabotaging his equipment while he was on break and, after warning the latter that he would report him should he do it again, Panis suddenly choked him. As he struggled to free himself from Panis' grip, he saw that his assailant's lip was bleeding. 3

Empas testified that on February 7, 2014, his shift leader, Rio Claveria, handed him a notice of disciplinary action, which he answered on the same day. He claimed that, five days after or on February 12, 2014 he was no longer allowed to enter the premises. Then, on February 18, 2014, he received his disciplinary memorandum which apprised him of the termination of his services owing to the February 6, 2014 incident. 4

For its part, MSCI countered that Empas refused to receive the notice to explain but submitted his explanation nonetheless in which he admitted his participation in the incident. A formal investigation was thereafter conducted wherein Empas and Panis were instructed to submit their respective sworn statements, including Panis' medical certificate. 5

The lone witness, Reymar Sunaz (Sunaz), also an employee of MSCI, submitted his statement, claiming that he witnessed Empas and Panis fighting over the machine trouble of the "reject tile catcher." Sunaz claimed that he witnessed Empas climb down from the sorting table and approach Panis at the palletizing area where he yelled at him for the accumulation of reject tiles on the catcher that clogged the wrapping machine. This started the altercation between the two. Soon therafter, Empas punched the right side of Panis' face. To avert subsequent punches, Panis held Empas' right hand and pressed his arm against Empas' nape. When they separated, Empas picked up a tile to throw at Panis, but when the latter moved closer, Empas threatened to hit his leg instead. 6 ICHDca

As stated in the Memorandum dated February 12, 2014, Sunaz's statement was made the basis of Empas' termination from employment. 7

In its Decision 8 dated December 12, 2016, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of Empas and declared MSCI guilty of illegal dismissal. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal and hereby ORDERED to immediately reinstate complainant to his former position without prejudice to his seniority rights and benefits. Further, respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay complainant the following:

1. Full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement which to date amounts to P392,552.16.

2. Unpaid wages from Jan. 26, 2014 to February 11, 2014 amounting to P6,150.00.

3. 10% attorney's fees of P39,870.21.

SO ORDERED. 9

On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA ratiocinating that engaging in a fight within company premises is a valid ground for dismissal. According to the NLRC, Empas' infraction is considered a violation of the company policy defining quarreling or fighting as a serious offense and the act of inflicting bodily harm on a colleague as a grave offense. 10 As to the award of separation pay, the NLRC agreed with the LA that Empas' service record sufficiently meets the criteria for the award. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent-appellant's appeal is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Labor Arbiter Edgar B. Bisana dated December 12, 2016 is REVERSED and set aside. A NEW ONE is entered DISMISSING the complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.

However, for equitable considerations, Mariwasa is ordered to extend to complainant-appellee separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, computed as follows:

9/2003-2/2014 = 10 years

In addition, Mariwasa is ordered to pay appellee his unpaid wages from January 26 to February 11, 2014 amounting to Six Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P6150.00).

SO ORDERED. 11

Both parties sought for reconsideration, but the NLRC only partially granted MSCI's motion by reducing the financial assistance to P61,000.00, viz.:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, complainant-appellee's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. On the other hand, respondent-appellants' Motion for Partial Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED to the effect that the award of financial assistance in favor of appellee is reduced as follows:

9/2003-2/2014 = 10 years

SO ORDERED. 12

The parties thereafter filed their respective petitions for certiorari before the CA. According to MSCI, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered MSCI to pay Empas separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent to one half of a month's salary for every year of service despite its earlier decision finding Empas guilty of serious misconduct and dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On the other hand, Empas maintained his innocence and imputed grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC for upholding the validity of his dismissal and in ruling that he is not entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, damages, and attorney's fees.

In its Decision 13 dated August 30, 2018, the CA modified the NLRC Decision in that it deleted the award of separation pay and affirmed the dismissal of Empas. According to the CA, the award of separation pay to a validly dismissed employee is a mere act of clemency which may not be so easily granted to anyone by reason alone of length of service. 14 Thus, it disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 31, 2017 and June 22, 2017, respectively, are MODIFIED in that the award of separation pay by way of financial assistance in the amount of P61,490.00 is hereby EXPUNGED. Meanwhile, the penalty of dismissal against Rommel M. Empas as inscribed in the above-mentioned Decision and Resolution is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 15

Issues

I.

Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC that petitioner's acts are tantamount to serious misconduct.

II.

Whether the CA erred when it deleted the award of separation pay.

III.

Whether the CA erred when it ruled that petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, damages and attorneys fees.

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit. TCAScE

At the outset, it must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which its labor officials' findings rest. As such, the findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 16

However, if the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC are conflicting, as in this case, the reviewing court may delve into the records and examine for itself the questioned findings. 17 The exception, rather than the general rule, applies in the present case since the LA held that petitioner was illegally dismissed while the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment, albeit with differing stances as to petitioner's entitlement to separation pay.

To reiterate, petitioner was dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct, i.e., engaging in a fight within company premises and inflicting injuries on a co-worker. Petitioner insists that his dismissal was without factual and legal basis as he merely acted in self-defense and there was no proof that the fighting led to any disruption of work nor created a hostile environment in the workplace. He also argues that the absence of malice or unlawful intent on his part to physically hurt Panis contradicts the finding of serious misconduct.

The Court is not persuaded.

Misconduct is generally defined as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 18 Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services of an employee on the ground of serious misconduct committed in connection with or relative to the performance of his duties, viz.:

Article 297. [282] Termination by Employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In labor cases, misconduct, as a ground for dismissal, must be serious that is, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. 19 For an employee's termination to be justified on the ground of serious misconduct, the following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. 20

Here, MSCI found that (a) Empas was on work duty and inside company premises when he got involved in an altercation with Panis, a co-employee; (b) the altercation stemmed from a work-related matter; and (c) the physical injuries sustained by Panis were caused by punches thrown at him by Empas. During the investigation, Sunaz, the lone witness and co-employee of Empas and Panis, stated that it was Empas who approached Panis and initiated the fight. According to MSCI, the actions taken by Empas constitute serious misconduct.

To support its claim, MSCI referred to its Employee's Handbook, particularly pages 41 21 and 45 22 thereof, which expressly provides that quarreling or fighting while on duty or within company premises is classified as a serious offense. Meanwhile, inflicting bodily harm within company premises, for any reason, constitutes a grave offense. Both offenses are punishable by dismissal or termination of employment. 23

The contention of Empas that he merely acted in self-defense and tried to free himself from choking deserves scant or no consideration at all. Bare and self-serving allegations, without more, do not suffice. As correctly explained by the NLRC, it is elementary that allegations are not proof, thus, contentions and averments in pleadings do not constitute facts unless they are in the nature of admissions or proven by competent evidence. 24

His claim of having served the company for more than 10 years with a clean record also fails to convince as it contradicts MSCI's disciplinary record showing that in 2007, he was also involved in a quarrel/fight with another co-worker. MSCI averred that, despite being reprimanded for a similar incident in the past, Empas ignored the same and committed another serious/grave violation of the company's rule on orderliness and good conduct. 25

Even assuming, for the sake of discussion, that there is merit to Empas' claim that his records are clean as he was not the aggressor during the 2007 incident, it will neither affect nor mitigate his present liability for the altercation that transpired and injuries sustained by Panis. Previous infractions at work have no bearing insofar as his present conduct is concerned since the law does not distinguish between a habitual and first time offender, only that the elements of serious misconduct are present. cTDaEH

From the Court's perspective, the work-relatedness of and wrongful intent behind Empas' violent conduct cannot be questioned. In his written explanation to MSCI, Empas himself admitted his participation or involvement in the incident. The attack was clearly unfounded as Panis had said or done nothing to sufficiently provoke the attack. As found by MSCI during their investigation and based on the consistent statements of Panis and Sunaz, the altercation began when Empas approached Panis and accused him of damaging his (Empas') work equipment. Undoubtedly, the attack was directly related to the work performed by Empas and Panis, thus, fundamentally rooted on workplace dynamics.

In Technol Eight Philippines Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 26 Amular got into a fistfight with his teamleader outside company premises and after work hours. During theinvestigation, it was found that Amular confronted his team leaderbecause the latter made remarks regarding his questionable behaviorat work. He was then dismissed from employment on the ground ofserious misconduct which prompted him to file a complaint for illegaldismissal. The LA, NLRC and CA ruled in favor of Amular and heldthat the penalty of dismissal was too harsh and disproportionate to theact committed. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court disagreedwith the findings of the CA and the labor tribunals. The Court ruled in this wise:

The CA misappreciated the true nature of Amular's involvement in the mauling incident. Although it acknowledged that Amular committed a misconduct, it did not consider the misconduct as work-related and reflective of Amular's unfitness to continue working for Technol. The appellate court's benign treatment of Amular's offense was based largely on its observation that the incident happened outside the company premises and after working hours; did not cause a disruption of work operations; and did not result in a hostile environment in the company.

The records of the case, however, gives us a different picture. Contrary to the CA's perception, We find a work-connection in Amular's and Ducay's assault on Mendoza. x x x The motivation behind the confrontation, as We see it, was rooted on workplace dynamics as Mendoza, Amular and Ducay interacted with one another in the performance of their duties.

The incident revealed a disturbing strain in Amular's and Ducay's characters — the urge to get even for a perceived wrong done to them and, judging from the circumstances, regardless of the place and time. 27

In Stanfilco v. Jose Tequillo, 28 respondent therein was dismissed from employment for mauling a co-worker and consuming intoxicating beverages within company premises during work hours. The NLRC and CA both ruled in his favor and found that he was illegally dismissed from employment. According to the CA, respondent's act of mauling a co-worker was not work-related, and at most amounted only to simple misconduct. On appeal, the Court reversed the CA and considered respondent's violent act as serious misconduct since it was work-related and violated the code of discipline imposed by petitioner on its employees. The Court also found respondent ill-suited to remain in petitioner's employ as the former's perverse attitude would put his fellow workers at risk of physical harm every time he feels wronged, viz.:

From the Court's perspective, the work-relatedness of and wrongful intent behind Tequillo's violent conduct cannot be questioned. Tequillo himself admitted that he mauled Gayon out of emotional disturbance, which was ultimately caused by petitioner's refusal to provide the former employee with a productivity incentive. The attack was clearly unfounded, as it remains undisputed that petitioner's refusal to furnish said incentive was due to Tequillo's failure to meet his work quotas. Worse, Gayon had said or done nothing to sufficiently provoke the attack. Therefore, while it may be remains undisputed that petitioner's refusal to furnish said incentive was due to Tequillo's failure to meet his work quotas. Worse, Gayon had said or done nothing to sufficiently provoke the attack. Therefore, while it may be true that Tequillo acted out of resentment towards petitioner, the same resentment was essentially attributable to his own work-related neglect. It follows, then, that the attack was connected to the substandard performance of Tequillo's duties, and that it was fundamentally rooted in his confounded notion of workplace dynamics.

Further, there exists a substantial basis to believe that Tequillo is capable of repeating his violent act. As mentioned above, the attack occurred because he did not receive a productivity incentive. This shows that Tequillo may be irked without reason and that he possesses an egregious disposition that is detrimental not only to petitioner, but to his co-employees. Verily, to allow him to remain in petitioner's employ would put his fellow farm workers at risk of physical harm every time he feels wronged. Taken together, these show that Tequillo's violent act amounted to serious misconduct. The incident disturbed the peace in the farm and breached the discipline expected by petitioner from its employees. That Tequillo is ill-suited to continue working is shown by his perverse attitude and by the possibility that the attack may be repeated. On the other hand, his wrongful intent is shown by the arbitrary and unfounded manner in which he attacked Gayon. Hence, all the requisites of serious misconduct are present in this case.

While it is true that our labor laws are primarily intended to give maximum aid and protection to labor, 29 the same should not be construed nor applied in a manner that undermines the valid exercise of management prerogative. The validity of management prerogative in the discipline of employees was sustained by this Court in Philippine Airlines v. National Labor Relations Commission: 30 "In general, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations." 31

Notably, this is not the first time that Empas engaged in violent behavior and violated MSCI's company rules thereby negating his claim that he had no previous derogatory record. This reveals his undeniable propensity to behave aggressively and resort to violence when circumstances are not in his favor. To allow him to remain in MSCI's employ will not only be a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe, but also risks repetition of the same at the expense of the employer. Thus, taking the circumstances collectively, the Court is convinced that MSCI had sufficient and valid reason for terminating Empas' services, as his continued employment would be patently inimical to its interest. Moreover, it is evident from the circumstances that the decision to terminate Empas was exercised in good faith and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing his rights. This valid exercise of management prerogative must be upheld. cSaATC

On the matter of separation pay, Empas argues that the CA erred when it deleted the separation pay previously granted by the NLRC. To reiterate, the NLRC found Empas liable for serious misconduct and upheld the validity of his dismissal, but ordered MSCI to grant him separation pay by way of financial assistance in the amount of P122,890.00 which, upon motion by MSCI, was reduced to P61,000.00. According to Empas, the charge of serious misconduct is not tantamount to moral depravity nor reflective of his moral character and thus, at the very least, entitles him to separation pay. 32

Once more, this Court is not persuaded.

Generally speaking, an employee is not entitled to separation pay when the dismissal is based on any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the Labor Code. Although the Court has, in some cases and by reason of equity, granted separation pay to erring employees, this remains to be the exception and will depend on the circumstances of each case and the corresponding ground for termination. In the leading case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 33 the Court clarified that separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character, viz.:

We hold that henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the ground of social justice. 34

When the act or behavior in question is classified as serious misconduct, an employee may be dismissed without separation pay notwithstanding his years of service. The employer need not even delve into whether or not the cause for dismissal is reflective of the moral character of the dismissed employee so long as it can prove that the act or behavior constitutes serious misconduct, as in this case.

In San Miguel Corporation v. Lao, 35 the erring employee had served the company for 27 years before he was dismissed for serious misconduct. The Court deleted the award of retirement benefits and separation pay ratiocinating that an employee whose employment was terminated for a just cause would not be so entitled as a matter of right to the payment of separation benefits, viz.:

Exceptionally, however, separation pay is granted to stand as a "measure of social justice" even when the employee is validly dismissed for cause so long as it is not for serious misconduct or those other causes that reflect on his moral character.

In Soco vs. Mercantile Corporation of Davao, separation pay was granted to an employee who had been dismissed for using the company vehicle for a private purpose. In Tanala vs. National Labor Relations Commission the payment of separation pay to an employee who had been dismissed for quarreling with a fellow worker outside the company premises was sustained. Likewise, in Filipro, Inc. vs. NLRC, an award of separation pay was decreed in favor of an employee who had been validly dismissed for preferring certain dealers in violation of company policy. The Court, however, disallowed the grant of separation pay to employees dismissed for serious misconduct or for some other causes reflecting on his moral character. 36

In Naguit v. San Miguel Corporation, 37 the erring employee lost all his retirement benefits, which could have reached millions due to his long years of service. In so ruling, the Court took note of the fact that the dismissed employee persisted in his arrogance and showed no remorse for his actions, i.e., inflicting injury upon a co-worker.

In Etcuban Jr. vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., 38 the erring employee challenged the legality of his dismissal and argued that the penalty imposed was too harsh and not commensurate to the infraction committed, considering that he had been in respondent company's employ for 15 years and it was his first serious offense. The Court upheld the ruling of the NLRC and the CA and explained that when the offense falls in the category of serious misconduct, there is no distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. As to the length of service rendered, the Court held that years of service should all the more be taken against the erring employee in light of the finding of the lower tribunals that his violation of an established company rule was shown to be willful and characterized by a wrongful attitude, viz.: cHDAIS

The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment.

Also, the Court agrees with respondent's contention that if petitioner's long years of service would be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, it will actually become a prize for disloyalty, perverting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of all undesirables. In addition, where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees, the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent. In the present case, all the more should petitioner's years of service be taken against him in light of the finding of the lower tribunals that his violation of an established company rule was shown to be willful and such willfulness was characterized by a wrongful attitude. Moreover, petitioner has never shown any feelings of remorse for what he has done, considering that the lower tribunals found no justification on his part in inflicting injury upon a co-employee. To make matters worse, petitioner even exhibited a seemingly arrogant attitude in insisting to remain silent and rejecting requests for him to explain his side despite having been given numerous opportunities to do so. 39

Having sufficiently established that Empas' employment was validly terminated for just cause as the infractions he committed were willful and in clear violation of MSCI's Employees' Handbook and constitute Serious Misconduct, as well as the fact that there was no violation of his right to procedural due process, the CA correctly deleted the grant of separation pay. Aside from the fact that it is devoid of basis in fact and in law, petitioner has not successfully demonstrated any reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution of the appellate court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review on certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated August 30, 2018 and Resolution dated December 11, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 152230 and CA-G.R. SP No. 152248 are hereby AFFIRMEDin toto. The complaint for illegal dismissal is dismissed, as Romel M. Empas is deemed to have been validly dismissed for a just cause and, hence, is not entitled to any separation pay.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Also referred to in some parts of the rollo as "Kojohndet" or "Kajohndet."

1. Penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz with Associate Justices Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles and Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, concurring; rollo, pp. 226-236.

2.Id. at 241-242.

3.Id. at 227.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 227-228.

6.Id. at 228.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 165-168.

9.Id. at 168.

10.Id. at 207.

11.Id. at 212-213.

12.Id. at 224.

13.Id. at 226-236.

14.Id. at 234.

15.Id. at 235.

16.Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, 554 Phil. 524, 541 (2007).

17.Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 485 Phil. 248, 277 (2004).

18.Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. v. KMM-Katipunan, 815 Phil. 425, 435 (2017).

19.Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corp. v. Alcon, 746 Phil. 172, 181 (2014).

20.Sy v. Neat, Inc., 821 Phil. 751, 770 (2017).

21.Rollo, p. 122.

22.Id. at 124.

23.Id. at 267.

24.Id. at 209.

25.Id. at 103-104.

26. 632 Phil. 261 (2010).

27.Id. at 271.

28.Stanfilco v. Tequillo, G.R. No. 209735, July 17, 2019.

29.Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 186 Phil. 324, 329 (1980).

30. 392 Phil. 50 (2000).

31.Id. at 56-57. See Deles, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 384 Phil. 271, 282 (2000); and China Banking Corp. v. Borromeo, 483 Phil. 643, 662 (2004).

32.Rollo, p. 29.

33. 247 Phil. 641 (1988).

34.Id. at 649.

35. 433 Phil. 890 (2002).

36.Id. at 898-899.

37. 761 Phil. 184 (2015).

38. 489 Phil. 483 (2005).

39.Id.