Edradan v. Sealanes Marine Services, Inc.
This is a civil case decided by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in 2019. The case concerns a seafarer, Danilito L. Edradan, who filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits and sickness wages against his employer, Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., and the vessel's manning agent, Spliethoff Beheer BV, under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Edradan claimed that he suffered from hearing loss during his employment on the vessel "Traveller," but the respondents argued that he did not comply with the mandatory reporting requirement of undergoing a post-employment medical examination within three working days upon his return. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents and held that Edradan's failure to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement resulted in the forfeiture of his right to claim disability benefits. The Court noted that the rationale for this requirement is to make it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury and to prevent unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage of time.
ADVERTISEMENT
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205581. July 24, 2019.]
DANILITO L. EDRADAN, petitioner, vs.SEALANES MARINE SERVICES, INC., SPLIETHOFF BEHEER BV AND CHRISTOPHER DINO C. DUMATOL, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 24, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 205581 (Danilito L. Edradan v. Sealanes Marine Services, Inc., Spliethoff Beheer BV and Christopher Dino C. Dumatol). — We stress in this case the mandatory nature of the requirement for a seafarer to submit to a post-employment medical examination within three working days from his repatriation. The omission of this requirement will bar the filing of a claim for disability benefits.
Petitioner filed a complaint for permanent disability benefits and sickness wages under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) against respondents. 1 He alleged that on March 31, 2008, he was contracted by respondents to serve as Able Seaman on board the vessel "Traveller" under a ten-month contract approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). 2 "Traveller" is among the vessels covered by a CBA between respondents and Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), of which petitioner is a member. Sometime in the last week of December 2008, or two months before the expiration of his contract, petitioner claimed that he experienced pain and sudden loss of hearing in his left ear. He reported his condition to the Master but the latter ignored it and merely advised him to rest. 3 After his repatriation on February 20, 2009, he reported to respondents and requested treatment for his left ear, but his request was denied. He was simply told to apply for another job as he was no longer fit to resume his duties as a seafarer. 4 On February 23, 2009, petitioner consulted Dr. Rimando C. Saguin, who, after thorough medical examination, confirmed that he was suffering from severe hearing loss on the left ear and moderate hearing loss on the right ear. 5 Petitioner claimed that he continuously sought medical treatment and examination from Dr. Saguin. On October 21, 2009, Dr. Saguin confirmed that petitioner was suffering from "Mild to moderate sensoneural hearing losts (sic) (L) and mild sensoneural hearing lost (sic)." 6 As a result of his condition, petitioner had lost his capacity to obtain further sea employment. Consequently, petitioner claimed permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$80,000.00 as provided in the CBA, as well as sickness wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 7
Respondents countered that petitioner is not entitled to receive disability benefits because he did not suffer any illness or injury, and actually completed the term of his contract. 8 Moreover, under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), a claim for disability compensation is premised on a disability resulting from an illness or injury suffered on board the vessel during the term of the contract, and that it is the company-designated physician who must determine that petitioner's illness has rendered him partially or totally disabled. 9 However, petitioner failed to submit himself to a medical examination within three working days following his repatriation. 10 Even assuming that he suffered an illness during his contract, it is not work-related. 11 In order for deafness to be compensable, the nature of employment must be related to industrial operations where excessive noise of high frequencies is produced. 12 During his employment, petitioner was provided with Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) or specialized clothing for protection against health and safety hazards. 13 Under the POEA-SEC, mild to moderate hearing loss is not compensable. 14 Finally, petitioner's hearing loss could be the natural deterioration of his sense of hearing considering that he is already 47 years old. 15 CAIHTE
On February 19, 2010, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision 16 ordering respondents to pay petitioner the sum of US$88,000.00, or the equivalent amount in Philippine Peso at the prevailing exchange rate, representing total permanent disability benefits and attorney's fees. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) issued a Resolution dated April 29, 2011 affirming the findings of the LA. 17 Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. 18 Hence, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a temporary restraining order and injunction 19 before the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 121294.
On September 28, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision 20 granting the petition. It held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing petitioner to recover permanent disability benefits in the absence of factual proof of entitlement. 21 Specifically, petitioner failed to establish that the illness he suffered can reasonably be linked to the performance of his work as a seafarer on board the vessel "Traveller" or to prove that it was aggravated as a result of his exposure to his line of work. Petitioner did not elaborate on the nature of his work on the vessel and the kind of noise he was exposed to. 22 Instead, he merely relied on the sweeping diagnosis of Dr. Saguin, who is not even a specialist on ear treatment but an orthopedic surgeon, and the medical certificate the latter issued, which did not even declare that petitioner's illness was work-related and work aggravated. 23 The medical certificate merely stated that petitioner was no longer suitable to perform the work of a seafarer, nothing more. Moreover, petitioner's failure to have himself examined by the company-designated physician precludes him from availing of the permanent disability benefits provided by law. 24 Finally, petitioner cannot claim permanent disability benefits on account of his hearing loss under the purported Dutch CBA, which he even failed to attach. 25 It was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that he is entitled to permanent disability benefits, but he failed to do so. 26
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. 27
This Court is not a trier of facts, and only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari. Judicial review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the labor officials' findings rest. However, when there are conflicting findings by the LA, the NLRC and the CA, such as in this case, the exception rather than the general rule applies. 28 The Court may delve into the record and resolve factual issues when there is insufficient or insubstantial evidence to support the findings of the tribunal or court below, or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts submitted by the parties. 29 This case constitutes an exception inasmuch as the CA's findings contradict those of the LA and the NLRC.
At issue is whether or not petitioner is entitled to permanent disability benefits resulting from a hearing loss he purportedly developed while working as a seaman in respondents' ship.
A seafarer's right to disability benefits is a matter governed by law, contract and medical findings. 30 By law, the Labor Code provisions on disability apply. By contract, Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2000 (otherwise known as POEA-SEC), the CBA, if any, and the employment agreement bind the seafarer and his employer. To determine whether petitioner is entitled to disability benefits, We refer to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC which contains the minimum requirements prescribed by the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers. Thus:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS. —
xxx xxx xxx
B. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS
The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Upon sign-off from the vessel from medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. DETACa
For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
Under the above provision, the requirements for compensability are: (1) the seafarer must have submitted to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days upon return; (2) the injury must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract; and (3) the injury must be work-related. 31
Here, the LA ruled that petitioner's hearing loss existed during the term of his employment contract. Since he was found fit to work after undergoing pre-employment medical examination, any illness or medical condition he subsequently suffered can logically be concluded as having been sustained during the term of the contract. 32 Moreover, he presented a medical certificate three days after his repatriation, showing that he was suffering from severe hearing loss. He could not have suffered this hearing problem three days following his contract completion. 33 The LA also excused petitioner's non-compliance with the requirement of undergoing a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return after finding that respondents refused to provide petitioner medical attention on the pretext that he had completed his contract. 34
Likewise, the NLRC held that petitioner's disability occurred during the effectivity of his employment contract. It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of an illness, rather, it is enough that the employment had contributed to the development of the disease. 35 The NLRC concluded that petitioner was not afforded medical assistance by respondents, as in fact a medical certificate was issued barely two days from repatriation, 36 and respondents failed to dispute petitioner's averment that he sought medical intervention from the master of the vessel, and then to respondents after repatriation, but he was denied medical attention. 37
The CA, on the other hand, held that petitioner is not entitled to disability benefits since he failed to prove that his illness was work-related and that he did not submit himself for examination by the company-designated physician within three working days from his return.
We agree with the CA.
The post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days after the seafarer's return is a mandatory requirement, failure to comply with which shall result in the forfeiture of the seafarer's right to claim disability benefits.
The rationale for this requirement is that reporting the illness or injury by the seafarer within three working days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury. To ignore the rule might open the floodgates to unlimited claims for disability benefits, and will cause unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage of time. 38
Moreover, the provision mandated a period of three working days within which the seafarer should report so that the company-designated physician can promptly arrive at a medical diagnosis. The company-designated physician has either 120 or 240 days, depending on the circumstances, within which to complete the medical assessment of the seafarer; otherwise, the disability claim shall be granted. 39 aDSIHc
In this case, petitioner was not examined by the company-designated physician. He claimed that he went to respondents' office to seek medical attention, but the latter refused to provide him proper and adequate medical attention for an unknown reason. 40 On the other hand, respondents argued that petitioner was not medically repatriated, but completed the term of his contract. After his repatriation, he neither reported nor called respondent's office. 41 It was only seven months later that respondents heard of him again, when they received summons in relation to the complaint he filed. 42
A perusal of the record reveals that petitioner did not seek medical attention from respondents within three days from his repatriation. Petitioner alleged that after repatriation "he immediately reported to his employer for his medical treatment but the latter told him to apply for a new job as he is no longer fit to resume his duties on board as seafarer and disregarded his plea for medical attention." 43 However, he did not mention the date and time he allegedly went to respondent's office, the persons he spoke with, whether he came with a companion considering that he was supposedly already suffering from hearing loss at the time, and other details that would have otherwise convinced a reasonable mind of the truth of his claim. His general statements do not suffice.
We have ruled that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case before quasi-judicial bodies, where the quantum of evidence required to establish a fact is substantial evidence. Petitioner's unsubstantiated assertion that he requested for a post-employment medical examination from respondents does not come close to approximating the said quantum of proof. 44
Moreover, the Court cannot give credence to the medical certificates presented by petitioner.
Petitioner alleged for the first time in his reply to respondents' position paper that he underwent a thorough medical examination and continuously sought medical treatment and examination from Dr. Saguin. In the course of examination, the latter issued two medical certificates. The first one dated February 23, 2009 45 diagnosed petitioner with "Severe sensorial hearing loss and Moderate sensorial hearing loss (R)," while the second one dated October 21, 2009 46 diagnosed petitioner with "Mild to moderate sensoneural hearing losts (sic) (L) and mild sensoneural hearing lost" (sic). Both medical certificates indicated that petitioner "cannot perform as seafarer in any capacity because of exposure to loud sound as his condition will deteriorate," and classified the disability as "total permanent."
In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, 47 We noted that the medical certificates relied upon by the employee to claim disability benefits and sickness allowance should not be taken at face value as they were not supported by diagnostic tests and/or procedures that would adequately refute the normal results of the earlier tests administered to him in a foreign clinic referred by his employer.
Similarly, in Ison v. Crewserve, Inc., 48 We refused to give credence to the two medical reports rendered by the employee's physicians. The first medical report provided no justification for the assessment of the disease and the impediment grade. The second medical report, on the other hand, contained no supporting proof but was merely based on the findings of past examinations done by the company-designated physician as well as the statements made by the employee.
Here, petitioner failed to adduce evidence of diagnostic tests and/or procedures he underwent to support the findings in the medical certificates issued by Dr. Saguin. There was likewise no proof that his purported medical condition was closely monitored by the doctor that would enable the latter to arrive at an accurate prognosis. Moreover, as correctly noted by CA, the medical certificates indicate that Dr. Saguin's specialization is in the field of orthopedics and not ear injuries or diseases. 49 Consequently, he does not have the proper training and qualification to treat and evaluate petitioner's purported hearing condition. ETHIDa
The Court notes finally that petitioner's diagnosis does not even entitle him to compensation under the POEA-SEC, which only compensates seafarers suffering from complete loss of sense of hearing on both ears, loss of two external ears, complete loss of sense of hearing in one ear, loss of one external ear, and loss of one-half of an external ear. 50 Compensation and disability benefits under the POEA-SEC cannot be awarded to ailments or injuries not falling within its purview. 51
Strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation, and mere probability — not the ultimate degree of certainty — is the touchstone or test of proof in compensation proceedings. Still, it cannot be gainsaid that awards of compensation cannot rest in speculations or presumptions. 52 Absent any showing that adequate tests and reasonable findings support petitioner's claim, it cannot be granted.
The Court is well aware of the principle that, consistent with the purposes underlying the formulation of the POEA-SEC, its provisions must be applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the seafarers, for it is only then that its beneficent provisions can be fully carried into effect. This exhortation cannot, however, be taken to sanction the award of disability benefits based on flimsy evidence and/or even in the face of an unjustified non-compliance with the mandatory reporting requirement under the POEA-SEC. When the language of the contract is explicit and leaves no doubt as to the intention of its drafters, the rule is settled that courts may not read into it any other intention that would contradict its plain import. 53 While We sympathize with petitioner's plight, We are constrained to deny his claims for disability benefits and sickness allowance absent proof of compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 20 (B), paragraph (3) of the POEA-SEC.
We no longer find occasion to rule on whether petitioner's alleged hearing loss was work-related and whether it existed during the term of his employment contract since he failed to establish his medical condition by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 28, 2012 and Resolution dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
The notice of change of address of Atty. Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of Carrera & Associates Law Office, counsel for petitioner, requesting that copies of all notices, orders, resolutions, pleadings, motions and other papers issued/filed in this case be furnished to their new address at Unit 2-D Dahlia Tower, Suntrust Parkview Condominium, Natividad Lopez Street, Ermita, Manila, is NOTED and GRANTED. cSEDTC
SO ORDERED." Del Castillo, J., on official leave; Jardeleza, J., designated as Acting Working Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2680 dated July 12, 2019.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 29.
2.Id.
3.Rollo, p. 30.
4.Id.
5.Id.; CA rollo, p. 180.
6.Rollo, p. 30; CA rollo, p. 181.
7.Rollo, p. 30.
8.Id.
9.Rollo, pp. 30-31.
10.Id. at 31.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16. CA rollo, pp. 65-73.
17.Id. at 31-38.
18.Id. at 39-41.
19.Id. at 3-30.
20.Rollo, pp. 28-42; penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Celia Librea-Leagogo and Danton Q. Bueser.
21.Id. at 40.
22.Id. at 36.
23.Id. at 36-37.
24.Id. at 37.
25.Id. at 40.
26.Id.
27.Rollo, pp. 3-27.
28.Paredes v. Feed the Children Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 184397, September 9, 2015, 770 SCRA 203.
29.Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. Remo, G.R. No. 181112, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 327.
30.C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, G.R. No. 193679, July 18, 2012, 677 SCRA 296, 309.
31.Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. v. de Leon, G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017, 816 SCRA 547.
32. CA rollo, p. 214.
33.Id. at 215.
34.Id. at 216.
35.Id. at 35.
36.Id. at 34.
37.Id.
38.De Andres v. Diamond H Marine Services and Shipping Agency, Inc., G.R. No. 217345, July 12, 2017, 831 SCRA 129.
39.Id.
40.Rollo, p. 21.
41.Id. at 56.
42.Id. at 57.
43.CA rollo, p. 150.
44.Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Heirs of the Late Enrique C. Calawigan, G.R. No. 187337, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 300, 314.
45.CA rollo, p. 180.
46.Id. at 181.
47.G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 300.
48.G.R. No. 173951, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 481.
49.CA rollo, pp. 180-181.
50.Sec. 32, POEA-SEC.
51.Loadstar International Shipping, Inc. v. Heirs of the Late Enrique C. Calawigan, G.R. No. 187337, December 5, 2012, 687 SCRA 300, 316.
52.Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 185352, August 10, 2011, 655 SCRA 300, 311.
53.Id. at 312.
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