Ebdane v. Philippine Society of Sanitary Engineers, Inc.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 229953. June 19, 2017.]

HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, in his official capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, and the BOARD OF MASTER PLUMBERS, petitioners,vs. PHILIPPINE SOCIETY OF SANITARY ENGINEERS, INC. and ENGR. FRANCISCO S. BRAVO, in his personal capacity as a registered sanitary engineer, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated19 June 2017which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 229953 — (Hermogenes E. Ebdane, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Professional Regulation Commission, and the Board of Master Plumbers v. Philippine Society of Sanitary Engineers, Inc. and Engr. Francisco S. Bravo, in his personal capacity as a registered sanitary engineer)

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 23, 2016 1 Decision and February 13, 2017 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93418, which dismissed the appeal of petitioners Hermogenes E. Ebdane (Ebdane), Professional Regulation Commission, and the Board of Master Plumbers (BMP), and National Master Plumbers Association of the Philippines (NMPAP), a case involving the legality of Sections 301 (2a), 302 (3g), 302 (9) and 303 (8) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the National Building Code. HTcADC

In 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, also known as the National Building Code of the Philippines (NBCP). Pursuant thereto, on October 29, 2004, Acting Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued the corresponding Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) for the NBCP.

On April 28, 2005, respondents Philippine Society of Sanitary Engineers, Inc. (PSSEI) and Engr. Francisco S. Bravo (Bravo) filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (RTC) a petition for injunction and declaratory relief against petitioners and NMPAP. It sought to enjoin the DPWH from implementing certain provisions of the new IRR. They alleged that the contested provisions were unconstitutional as these deprived sanitary engineers from practicing their profession without due process.

PSSEI pointed out that Section 302 (3g) thereof mandated that only master plumbers could prepare sign and seal "plumbing documents." The new IRR made the plumbing documents different from the sanitary documents. In effect, master plumbers, who are mere tradesmen with only a high school diploma, would be able to install and supervise all plumbing work to the exclusion of sanitary engineers, who are college degree professionals. PSSEI emphasized that before the new IRR was promulgated, sanitary engineers were responsible for the installation and supervision of all forms of sanitary works, including plumbing installations.

PSSEI also alleged that the IRR violated the doctrine of separation of powers because the executive branch expanded the definition of plumbing practice under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1378 and diminished the definition of sanitary engineer practice under R.A. No. 1364. Likewise, it argued that there was a defective publication of the new IRR, which rendered it null and void.

For their part, petitioners stated that the new IRR merely defined and delineated the responsibilities of both sanitary engineers and master plumbers. They insisted that there was nothing in R.A. No. 1364 which authorized sanitary engineers to prepare and sign plumbing documents, although under R.A. No. 1378, master plumbers are expressly permitted to prepare the preparation of plans, installation and supervision of plumbing works. As to the issue of defective publication, the petitioners argue that PSSEI did not present any evidence to prove this allegation.

During trial, PSSEI presented Engrs. Erlinda G. Mendoza, Antonio A. Avila, Clemente G. Pangilinan, Bravo, Flordeliza Villaseñor, and Vinci Nicholas R. Villaseñor to prove that sanitary engineers are allowed by practice and by law to sign and prepare sanitary documents, which necessarily included plumbing documents and permits. On the other hand, petitioners presented Engr. Alberto J. Azarcon, Jr. as its witness. CAIHTE

The RTC Ruling

In its February 6, 2009 Decision, 3 the RTC declared Sections 301 (2a), 302 (3g), 302 (9) and 303 (8) of the new IRR null and void. It held that under R.A. No. 1364, sanitary engineers are allowed to design, direct, and manage all forms of water collection and distribution systems, which logically included the basic system of plumbing. The trial court explained that petitioners cannot deprive sanitary engineers of their legal duty to practice plumbing works. It continued that to allow master plumbers, whose minimum qualification is a high school diploma, to sign public documents exclusively, would deprive sanitary engineers of the practice of their profession and may place public health at peril. The RTC also observed that the new IRR usurped the legislative power under R.A. Nos. 1378 and 1364 by changing the definitions of sanitary engineering practice and plumbing practice. Lastly, it agreed with respondents that the publication of the new IRR was defective because the prescribed preformatted application for ancillary sanitary and plumbing permits was not published.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 before the CA chiefly arguing that the assailed sections of the new IRR did not deprive sanitary engineers of the practice of their profession and that the new IRR is not null and void due to the defect in its publication.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed August 23, 2016 Decision, the CA ruled that the petitioners resorted to a wrong mode of appeal. It pointed out that petitioners merely raised questions of law regarding the unconstitutionality of the assailed provisions of the new IRR. The CA opined that these questions of law should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 directly filed with the Supreme Court. By resorting to a wrong mode of appeal under Rule 41, petitioners' appeal was dismissed.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its assailed February 13, 2017 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE APPEAL OF THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS RAISED PURELY QUESTIONS OF LAWS.

Petitioners argue that their appeal before the CA did not raise purely questions of law because they also raised questions of fact. They pointed out that they introduced several issues, including (1) whether the published copy of the IRR was complete such that the general public had adequate notice of the various provisions therein; and (2) whether the testimonies of PSSEI's witnesses do not deserve belief or acceptance by the CA. Petitioners insist that these issues raised questions of fact because these would require an examination of the parties' evidence. aScITE

The Court's Ruling

The case must be remanded to the CA.

Judgments of the RTCs in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the CA in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the RTC in the exercise of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only questions of law. 4

There is a question of law when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain set of facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without reviewing or evaluating the evidence. Meanwhile, there is a question of fact when there is doubt as to the truth or falsehood of facts. The question must involve the examination of probative value of the evidence presented. 5

The primordial issue in this case is to determine whether the issues raised before the CA involves purely questions of law. In Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 6 the Court held that appellant's assignment of errors before the appellate court should be considered in order to determine the nature of the questions elicited therein. The issues advanced by the DPWH in its appellant's brief are:

1.

THE RTC ERRED IN FINDING THAT SECTIONS 301 (2), 302 (3G), 302 (9) AND 303 (8) OF THE REVISED IRR-NBC UNJUSTLY DEPRIVE PETITIONERS-APPELLEES OF THE PRACTICE OF THEIR PROFESSION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

2.

THE RTC ERRED IN FINDING THAT "THE NEW IRR-NBC IS A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS." 7

On the other hand, the issues raised by NMPAP in its appellant's brief are as follow:

I.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING SECTIONS 301 (2a), 302 (3G), 302 (9) AND 303 (8) OF THE NEW IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND THAT IT UNJUSTLY DEPRIVES SANITARY ENGINEERS OF THEIR PROFESSION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. DETACa

II.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING SECTIONS 301 (2a), 302 (3G), 302 (9) AND 303 (8) OF THE NEW IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

III.

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING SECTIONS 301 (2a), 302 (3G), 302 (9) AND 303 (8) OF THE NEW IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF DEFECT IN ITS PUBLICATION. 8

After a judicious study of the issues presented, the Court finds that the mixed questions of law and fact were raised in the appeal before the CA. Certainly, some of the issues stressed by the petitioners were questions of law such as: whether the assailed provisions of the new IRR were unconstitutional as these deprived sanitary engineers of their profession without due process of law; and whether the assailed provisions were usurpation of legislative powers. These issues could be settled without reviewing or evaluating the evidence presented by the parties.

Nevertheless, there are some issues raised by the parties which constituted questions of fact. First, the NMPAP indicated in its appellant's brief an assignment of error raising the question of whether the assailed provisions of the IRR were void on the ground of defect in its publication. To show whether the assailed IRR was correctly published, the court must look into the evidence of the case. The NMPAP assailed the factual finding of the RTC that the non-publication of the ancillary public and sanitary permits of the new IRR would render it null and void. 9 It underscored that these forms were not required to be published because these were mere formalities to the substantive matters that were contained in the main body of the published government issuance. 10 In its appellant's brief, the DPWH echoed this argument alleging that the RTC erred in finding that the new IRR was defectively published. 11

Evidently, before the CA can adjudicate this specific issue on publication, it must examine the records of the case to determine whether the ancillary forms of the new IRR were substantive matters that should have been published so as to uphold or negate its validity. HEITAD

Second, in its Reply to Petitioners-Appellees' Brief, 12 the DPWH argued that "[a]ppellees' reliance on the testimony of its witnesses is misplaced as what they offered were mere verbal testimonies that they were not provided copies of transcripts of the DPWH Review Committee hearings, and that there was not enough time to discuss their concerns." It continued that "[d]enial of due process cannot be made to rely upon the testimony of two (2) unreliable sanitary engineers as witnesses. Surely, to question the validity of an IRR as important as herein IRR-NBC impressed with public interest, and promulgated under the guidance of the police power of the State requires more stringent proof that [sic] verbal testimonies offered by appellees." 13

Although these arguments were raised only in their reply, the DPWH nonetheless questioned the RTC's appreciation of the PSSEI's testimonial evidence. Accordingly, a review of the testimonial evidence presented before the trial court would entail a determination of facts which should have been addressed by the CA.

In fine, as the appeal raises mixed questions of law and fact, it must be adjudicated by the CA on the merits. To narrowly view the issues presented would deprive the parties of their right to be heard before the proper tribunal. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard. 14

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits. The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resolve the same with DISPATCH.

SO ORDERED. (Carpio, J.,on official leave;Peralta, J.,Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017)."

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, with Associate Justices Normandie B. Pizarro and Samuel H. Gaerlan, concurring; rollo, pp. 36-46.

2.Id. at 48-50.

3. Penned by Presiding Judge Dominador Ll. Arquelada, Sr.; id. at 51-63.

4.MacawiwiliGold Mining and Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 245, 257 (1998).

5.Villamor, Jr. v. Umale, 744 Phil. 31, 44 (2014).

6.Supra note 4.

7.Rollo, pp. 100-101.

8.Id. at 142-143.

9.Id. at 163.

10.Id. at 164.

11.Id. at 114.

12.Id. at 181-209.

13. Id. at 183.

14. Hadji-Sirad v. Civil Service Commission, 614 Phil. 119, 134 (2009).