Dunuan v. Civil Service Commission

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 239598. November 11, 2021.]

JOAN C. DUNUAN, petitioner,vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANGELO F. LUIS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 239598 — JOAN C. DUNUAN, petitioner, versus CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANGELO F. LUIS, respondents.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Joan C. Dunuan (Dunuan) assailing the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 152183:

1. Decision 2 dated January 24, 2018 which affirmed respondent Civil Service Commission's (CSC) Decision 3 dated April 10, 2017 and Resolution 4 dated August 7, 2017; and

2. Resolution 5 dated May 23, 2018 which denied Dunuan's Motion for Reconsideration 6 (MR) dated February 11, 2018.

The Facts

Dunuan was charged with committing the administrative offenses of serious dishonesty, falsification of official documents, violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, and insubordination. Material portions of the Formal Charge are quoted below:

"After an investigation conducted pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 1101502, otherwise known as the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, this Office finds a prima facie case against you for the Administrative Offenses x x x, committed as follows:

1. That you are an employee of the Municipal Government of Baggao, Cagayan;

2. That during calendar year 2011, you failed to accomplish and submit your Daily Time Record;

3. That a Memorandum was issued by Mayor Leonardo C. Pattung on May 30, 2013 requiring you to submit the same;

4. That despite the lapse of time and the directive of Mayor Pattung, you still failed to submit your DTRs for calendar year 2011;

5. That for the period January to December 2012, you accomplished and submitted your Daily Time Record however, a perusal of the same revealed material discrepancies vis-à-vis your monthly biometrics printout;

6. That the foregoing acts constitute the administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty; Falsification of Official Documents, Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Insubordination.["]7 (Italics in the original)

The antecedent facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:

The instant case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit dated September 24, 2014 for Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Insubordination and Violation of Reasonable Rules and Regulations filed by respondent Angelo F. Luis against petitioner Joan C. Dunuan before the Civil Service Commission Regional Office II (CSCROII). It was alleged that from the year 2011 until May 30, 2013, petitioner, an Administrative Assistant I of the Municipal Government of Baggao, Cagayan, failed to accomplish and submit her Daily Time Records (DTRs) nor filed any leaves of absence for the days that she did not report for work. Her biometric printouts from the years 2011 to 2013 showed that she incurred several absences, tardiness and undertime 8 x x x[.]

xxx xxx xxx

In a Memorandum Order No. 50 dated May 30, 2013, Municipal Mayor Leonardo C. Pattung ordered petitioner to submit her DTRs and explain her failure to report to office from May 16, 2013 to May 30, 2013. In another Memorandum Order No. HR-2014-017 dated July 17, 2014, Mayor Pattung again called the attention of petitioner regarding the latter's unauthorized absences for the month of May 2013 and her failure to submit DTRs for the months of June, July and December 2013. Then again, in Memorandum Order No. HR-2014-153 dated August 19, 2014, petitioner was required to explain her refusal to submit her DTRs for the months of February to July 2014.

Further, in a Special Program Evaluation and Assessment as Requested (SPEAR), a personnel audit report conducted on February 12-13, 2014, by the CSC at the Local Government Unit (LGU), Baggao, Cagayan, it was noted that there were inconsistencies between the entries in petitioner's DTR and her biometric printout for the month of January 2013. It was also observed that the dates in petitioner's approved travel orders did not coincide with the dates that she indicated "Official Business" (OB) in her DTRs. The CSCROII then directed the LGU of Baggao, Cagayan to file an administrative case against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner's biometric printout for the period of January to August 2014 showed that she continuously incurred 98 unauthorized absences and 69 times of tardiness and undertime. Despite these, petitioner received her salary in full without any deductions from 2011 to 2014.

In her counter-affidavit, petitioner averred that the CSCROII cannot take cognizance of the case since a similar administrative case against her was still pending before the Office of the Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan. She thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

In a Resolution dated December 9, 2014, CSCROII found a prima facie case against petitioner for Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents, Insubordination and Violation of Reasonable Rules and Regulations and directed her to submit her answer.

In her answer, petitioner denied having falsified her DTRs. The entries in the DTRs that she submitted were verified by the Municipal Mayor, hence, presumed to be correct. It is the entries in the biometric printouts which are not accurate and prone to human intervention. Further, considering that the payroll was not attached to the complaint, there is no proof that she received her salaries even if she failed to submit her DTRs.

During the pre-hearing conference, petitioner through counsel, reiterated that the CSCROII lacks jurisdiction over the case in view of the pendency of a similar case before the Office of the Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan.

Meanwhile, the Office of the Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan issued a Certification dated February 27, 2015, stating that no formal charge has been filed against petitioner nor is there a pending case against her.

In a Resolution dated March 9, 2015, the CSCROII denied petitioner's motion and ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution dated April 22, 2015.

During the scheduled hearings on April 22, 2015, July 21, 2015, August 20, 2015, October 2, 2015, November 5, 2015, and December 9, 2015, petitioner and [her] counsel failed to appear. In a Resolution dated January 8, 2016, the CSCROII noted petitioner and her counsel's repeated failure to attend scheduled hearings and ruled that further hearings be dispensed with. Petitioner was then directed to file her Position Paper and Formal Offer of Evidence and was warned that failure to comply with the said order will be considered as a waiver of the right to submit the same and the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. 9

Furthermore, Dunuan did not file a position paper and submit supporting evidence. 10 However, she filed a motion to dismiss asserting that she had severed her employment with the government in October 2015 when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Vice-Mayor 11 of Baggao, Cagayan for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. Thus, Dunuan claimed that the CSC had lost jurisdiction over her person. 12

The decision of the CSC

In its Decision 13 dated August 4, 2016, the CSC Regional Office II (CSC ROII) found Dunuan guilty of serious dishonesty for falsifying her Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the year 2012, and sentenced her to suspension of three (3) months, without pay, with a stern warning of a harsher punishment in case of a repetition of the same or similar acts. The CSC ROII applied the mitigating circumstance of first offense in imposing the penalty of suspension instead of dismissal.

The CSC ROII held that there was substantial evidence to prove that Dunuan committed falsification of public document as the entries in her DTRs contained numerous discrepancies with the biometric printouts for the year 2012. 14 Ms. Mylene Pattung, Human Resource Management Officer of the Municipal Government of Baggao, Cagayan, testified that the DTRs are prepared by the employees themselves, based on the printouts generated from the biometrics machine. Mr. Allan Balganion, Administrative Aide at the Information and Communication Technology Office in Baggao, Cagayan, also testified that he is the one tasked with the duty of printing the employees' printouts from the biometrics machine. He identified the printouts in the name of Dunuan and attested that said printouts were generated from the biometrics machine.

The CSC ROII dismissed the charges of insubordination and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for Dunuan's alleged failure to submit her DTRs for the year 2011 as this was not established by the prosecution during the administrative hearings. 15

The CSC ROII did not give credence to Dunuan's defense that the commission had lost jurisdiction after she filed her COC for Vice Mayor, because she was already deemed resigned from her position as Administrative Assistant I. Citing the case of Pagano v. Nazarro, Jr., 16 involving a government employee who filed a COC for an elective post after the filing of a case against her, the CSC ROII held that resignation does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability against a government employee. It is not a means to evade administrative liability. 17

Both Dunuan and private complainant (herein named respondent) Angelo Luis (Luis) filed MRs of the CSC ROII Decision. Luis insisted that the proper penalty to be imposed on Dunuan was dismissal from service with perpetual disqualification from office as there were no mitigating circumstances. 18 Luis also claimed that Dunuan should have been found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and insubordination and not only serious dishonesty. 19

On the other hand, Dunuan reiterated in her MR that the CSC ROII had no jurisdiction over her as she had been deemed resigned from her position as Administrative Assistant I when she filed her COC for Vice Mayor. Dunuan manifested that she had been proclaimed as the winning candidate, and was already performing her duties as Vice Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan. She also asserted that the CSC ROII should not have given credence to the biometric printouts because they were unreliable and prone to mistake, as they were not direct printouts from the biometric machine but were manually encoded and printed from a computer file. Dunuan alleged that the DTRs which were signed and approved by Mayor Leonardo C. Pattung (Mayor Pattung) as her direct superior, had greater weight in evidence and had a presumption of regularity. Dunuan also alleged that irregularities were committed which were prejudicial to her interest as she was not allowed to testify. 20

The CSC ROII denied both MRs in its Resolution 21 dated October 11, 2016. The CSC ROII maintained that there was substantial evidence to hold Dunuan liable for serious dishonesty for falsifying her DTRs 22 and that the penalty of three (3) months suspension was correctly imposed. 23 The CSC ROII also sustained its ruling that Dunuan's resignation did not divest the CSC of jurisdiction over the case. 24 Lastly, the CSC ROII held that Dunuan's claim that she was not allowed to testify had no basis. In fact, she was the one who failed to attend several scheduled hearings and neglected to submit a position paper and supporting evidence. 25

Dunuan and Luis separately filed appeals of the CSC ROII Decision and Resolution, which were treated as petitions for review by the CSC Central Office (CSC CO). 26 The CSC CO issued a Decision dated April 10, 2017, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review x x x filed by [Dunuan], former Administrative Assistant I, Municipal Government of Baggao, Cagayan, is DISMISSED while the Petition for Review filed by [Luis] x x x is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, [the Decision of the CSC ROII] is hereby MODIFIED to the extent that Dunuan is found GUILTY of the administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty, Falsification of Documents, Insubordination, and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. Accordingly, she is meted the penalty of dismissal from service with the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations and forfeiture of retirement benefits, except terminal/accrued leave benefits and personal contributions to the GSIS, if any. 27 (Emphasis in the original)

The CSC CO affirmed the CSC ROII's finding that Dunuan committed the offense of serious dishonesty and falsification of official document when she falsified her DTRs for the year 2012. 28 The CSC CO held that Dunuan failed to prove that the entries in the biometric printouts were erroneous and merely proffered conjectures and speculations. In addition, the CSC CO also found Dunuan guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for her failure to submit her DTRs on time and insubordination for Dunuan's failure to comply with the verbal instructions of her immediate superior to submit to the Personnel Section her DTRs for the period of 2011 to May 2013. 29

Dunuan filed an MR dated May 9, 2017 reiterating her previous allegations. Dunuan also alleged that her right to due process was violated because she was not furnished a copy of Luis' appeal, thus, she was not given the opportunity to submit an answer or comment thereto. 30 The CSC CO denied Dunuan's MR in its Resolution dated August 7, 2017.

Undaunted, Dunuan filed a Petition for Review of the CSC CO's Decision and Resolution before the CA dated September 6, 2017. 31

The CA Decision

The CA affirmed the Decision and Resolution of the CSC CO. The CA held that in administrative proceedings the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of — all of which, were afforded to Dunuan. While she was not furnished a copy of Luis' appeal before the CSC CO, she was able to file an MR of the CSC CO's Decision. Upon denial of her MR, she was also able file a petition for review before the CA. The CA affirmed the finding of guilt against Dunuan and the imposition of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with its accessory penalties. 32

Dunuan filed an MR of the CA Decision which was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated May 23, 2018.

The Petition

Dunuan filed the instant Petition on July 19, 2018 putting forth the following issues:

I.

Whether or not the Decision/Resolution of the [CSC CO] can be enforced or implemented against an elective officer through a Memorandum issued by the Department of the Interior and Local Government.

II.

Whether or not the counter-appeal filed by [Luis] [may] be given due course in the Resolution of the case sans notice or copy furnished to [Dunuan].

III.

Whether or not the evidences presented are sufficient to indict [Dunuan] with an Administrative Offense of Serious Dishonesty.

IV.

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance shall apply to the computation of penalty meted to [Dunuan].33 (Emphasis in the original)

Dunuan manifested that she had been removed from office as Vice Mayor on October 30, 2017 as the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) implemented the CSC CO's Decision and Resolution which imposed upon her the penalty of dismissal from service with its accessory penalties. 34 Dunuan asserted that her removal was illegal as it was not based on any of the grounds under Section 60 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). Dunuan reiterated that Luis' counter-appeal was not a valid basis for the CSC CO's Decision as she was not furnished a copy thereof. 36 Dunuan argued that the three-month suspension meted on her by the CSC ROII was already final as there had been no valid appeal therefrom. 37

Dunuan also repleaded her argument that the DTR enjoys the presumption of regularity and should have been given more credence over the biometric printouts which were prone to human editing before printing. 38 Assuming arguendo that she committed the acts complained of, Dunuan claimed that the CSC ROII correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of first offense in imposing the penalty of three-month suspension, instead of outright dismissal. 39 She also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) or temporary restraining order (TRO) "to preserve the statusquo and to avert grave injury and prejudice and gross and irreparable damages." 40 Finally, Dunuan manifested that Luis had already died. 41

The Comments

The CSC CO, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment 42 arguing that the Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the issue of Dunuan's removal from the vice-mayoralty post as she failed to implead the DILG as a party in the petition. Furthermore, the act of the DILG had no relation to the merits of the case, thus, Dunuan should have challenged the DILG's act in a separate certiorari petition. Nevertheless, the CSC CO acknowledged that there was merit in Dunuan's position that her removal was illegal based on the case of Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya v. Martinez43 where the Court ruled that elective officials may only be removed by a proper court. The CSC CO also asserted that Dunuan was afforded due process as she was able to file an MR of the CSC CO's Decision even if she was not furnished a copy of Luis' appeal. 44 The CSC CO maintained that there is substantial evidence to charge Dunuan of the acts imputed against her and that the maximum penalty of dismissal was properly imposed. 45 The CSC CO also asserted that Dunuan was not entitled to any injunctive relief. 46

Atty. Lorebette G. Grandea (Atty. Grandea), counsel for Luis, also filed a Comment 47 manifesting that Luis died on December 2, 2018. Nevertheless, Atty. Grandea still commented on the Petition by repleading Luis' previous allegations.

Dunuan filed separate Replies to the Comments. 48 Thereafter, Dunuan filed a Manifestation/Supplemental Averments to Support the Petition 49 and attached thereto a copy of the Resolution 50 of the Municipal Trial Court of Baggao, Cagayan (MTC) in Criminal Cases Nos. 6172-6176 for falsification of public documents, which were based on the same antecedents as the instant administrative case.

The dispositive portion of the MTC Resolution states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Dunuan's] motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence is GRANTED.

The instant cases against [Dunuan] are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 51 (Emphasis in the original)

The MTC reasoned that the DTRs that were submitted by the prosecution were mere photocopies, thus, there would be no way to verify if the DTRs were authentic. The prosecution was likewise unable to present the biometric machine, server, or hard drive from which the biometric printouts were generated. According to the MTC, this was fatal to the case of the prosecution because with the loss of said evidence, the MTC could not determine whether the biometric printouts had been modified or altered. The MTC held that the prosecution was unable to prove with moral certainty that the accused committed falsification of official documents. 52

Thus, Dunuan alleges that since the criminal cases against her were already dismissed, the instant administrative case should likewise be dismissed. 53

The MTC Resolution also noted that Dunuan had been elected Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan in the 2019 elections. 54

Issues

1. Whether the Court may rule on the issue of Dunuan's removal from office by the DILG;

2. Whether Dunuan's acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 6172-6176 should likewise result in her exoneration in the instant administrative case; and

3. Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the Decision of the CSC CO.

The Court's Ruling

The CA Decision is affirmed with modification.

Dunuan's removal from office

As noted in the MTC Resolution, Dunuan was elected by the voters of Baggao, Cagayan as its Mayor in the May 2019 elections. This, despite the fact that she had been removed as Vice Mayor by the DILG on October 30, 2017.

It is already settled that local elective officials may be removed from office only by a proper court under Section 60 of the LGC, 55 by the Ombudsman under Section 21 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, 56 or by the electorate through the power of recall, under Section 69 57 of the LGC.

While Section 119 in relation to Section 120, Rule 24 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 58 (RRACCS) provides that the decisions of the CSC CO shall be immediately executory and the filing and pendency of a petition for review or certiorari before the court shall not stop the execution of the decision of the Commission unless the court issues a restraining order or an injunction, this cannot be interpreted to apply to Dunuan, who was already elected Vice Mayor at the time that the CSC CO's Decision was promulgated. The petition before the CA was still pending at the time, thus, there was yet no order of removal from a "proper court." Thus, Dunuan's removal from office was illegal.

As to the proper remedy, Dunuan should have sought a WPI or TRO before the CA to invalidate the premature execution of the Decision of the CSC CO and to reinstate her as Vice Mayor. To recall, Dunuan filed her Petition for Review before the CA dated September 6, 2017. The DILG implemented the Decision of the CSC CO on October 30, 2017, removing Dunuan from office as Vice Mayor. Thus, Dunuan should have pursued available remedies from the CA, where the case was still pending at the time of her removal.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 59 A preliminary injunction may be granted by the court where the action is pending, if the case is pending before the CA, or Supreme Court, it may be issued by said court or any member thereof. 60 The following conditions must be met to warrant the grant of a prayer for WPI/TRO:

x x x (1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. x x x 61

Based on the above conditions, the applicant must not only establish a clear legal right which has been materially violated, there must also be the element of urgent necessity to protect said right. Notably, Dunuan did not mention in her pleadings before the Court whether she sought any relief from the CA immediately or within a reasonable period after her removal from the office of Vice Mayor. The CA Decision and Resolution likewise do not mention of any interim reliefs sought by Dunuan. It was only before this Court that Dunuan prayed for the issuance of a WPI or TRO when she filed the instant Petition on July 19, 2018 or about eight (8) months after her removal from office. To the mind of the Court, Dunuan's belated pursuit of remedy against her removal from office creates doubt as to the element of urgency.

Moreover, Dunuan did not explicitly pray to be reinstated in the office of the Vice Mayor in her Averments in Support of the Prayer for WPI/TRO. She merely reiterated that she had been illegally removed from office and made a general assertion that "there is clearly an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of a [WPI] to preserve the statusquo and to avert grave injury and prejudice and gross and irreparable damages to petitioner." 62

Nevertheless, the issue of Dunuan's entitlement to any interim relief due to her removal from office is already moot and academic as her term for Vice Mayor has already ended and she had, in fact, been elected as Mayor of Baggao, Cagayan, in the May 2019 elections. Due to these supervening events, the issue has become moot and academic as there ceases to be justiciable controversy as to the particular issue so that a resolution or declaration thereon would be of no practical value. 63 Thus, any declaration as to whether Dunuan should have been reinstated to the position of Vice Mayor is already a moot point due to the supervening events of the expiration of the term of Vice Mayor and Dunuan's subsequent election as Mayor.

The dismissal of the criminal

Dunuan argues that her acquittal in the criminal case should result in the dismissal of the instant administrative case. The manifestation is not well taken. A single act or omission of a public officer may violate two or more distinct and related provisions of law, and give rise to separate criminal, civil, and administrative liabilities. 64 A public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for acts committed while in public service, and these cases may be filed separately, alternately, simultaneously, or successively. 65 The dismissal of one case does not necessarily foreclose the institution or continuation of the other remedies. In Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 66 the Court explained:

The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against petitioner or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. The Regional Trial Court, in dismissing the criminal complaint, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction. The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. 67

Based on the above disquisition, the MTC's dismissal of the criminal cases based on "insufficiency of evidence" 68 is not binding in the instant administrative case. The quantum of proof required in criminal cases is more stringent than in administrative cases. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary for conviction for a criminal offense, which is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. It requires only moral certainty and not absolute certainty. 69 In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 70 Now, since the dismissal of the criminal case is only because the quantum of evidence had not been met, then Dunuan is not completely absolved in the instant administrative case.

Dunuan was not denied due

Dunuan also maintains that she was denied due process as she was not furnished a copy of Luis' counter-appeal to the CSC CO. Alternatively, Dunuan asserts that CSC ROII's decision which imposed a three-month suspension is already final as there was no valid appeal therefrom due to lack of service.

Dunuan conveniently forgets that she herself filed an appeal of the CSC ROII Decision's before the CSC CO. Thus, she cannot claim that she was denied due process or that there was no valid appeal of the CSC ROII's Decision. As correctly held by the CA, the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply an opportunity to be heard or present one's side, which was afforded to Dunuan. While Luis failed to furnish her a copy of his appeal, Dunuan herself filed an appeal and she was also able to file an MR of the CSC CO's Decision. Thus, she cannot claim that there was a denial of due process as she was able to present her side and to avail of the remedies available to her.

On this score, and despite the fact that none of the parties raised this matter as an issue, the Court notes that Luis did not have legal personality to appeal the Decision of the CSC ROII to the CSC CO. In administrative cases, the private complainant is not a party adversely affected by the decision; he or she is a mere witness for the government as no private interest is involved as the offended party is the government. 71 Section 4 (j), Rule 1 of the RRACCS defines the "[party adversely affected]" as the respondent against whom a decision in an administrative case has been rendered or to the disciplining authority in an appeal from a decision reversing or modifying the original decision. Thus, the appeal filed by Luis should not have been entertained by the CSC CO. In any case, Dunuan herself filed an appeal of the CSC ROII Decision to the CSC CO, which threw the whole case open for review by the CSC CO, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. 72

There is substantial evidence

The Court reiterates the general rule that questions of fact are beyond the scope of a Rule 45 petition, which is limited to questions of law. 73 The Court is not duty-bound to reexamine the evidence which has already been passed upon by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency. 74 Findings of fact of administrative agencies, such as the CSC, are binding on the Court when they are supported by substantial evidence. 75

The CA affirmed the CSC CO's Decision holding Dunuan liable for serious dishonesty, falsification of official documents, insubordination, and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal with its accessory penalties.

Dunuan maintains that there was insufficient evidence to hold her liable for falsification of official document and serious dishonesty. The CSC CO affirmed the CSC ROII's finding that there was substantial evidence that Dunuan committed falsification of her DTRs; this is a factual finding which cannot be disturbed now by the Court. The Court cannot supplant the findings of the CSC ROII as it had arrived at its decision after conducting hearings, reviewing the parties' submissions, and examining the evidence submitted before it. While there are recognized exceptions 76 to the general rule, Dunuan has failed to prove, or even allege, that any are existing as to this issue.

Dunuan insists on the presumption of regularity as to her DTRs. However, the presumption of regularity only stands when there is no evidence in the records that casts doubt on the regularity of the performance of official duty. 77 In the instant case, there was doubt as to the veracity of the DTRs as there were discrepancies between the times stated in the DTRs and the biometrics printouts. Dunuan did not even try to explain or justify the discrepancies. She merely claimed that the biometrics printouts were prone to human editing or error, yet she did not prove or even allege that the biometric printouts were indeed erroneous or spurious.

However, the Court deems it fit to modify the ruling as to the charges of insubordination and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations. The CA committed reversible error when it affirmed the CSC CO's decision holding Dunuan guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for failure to submit her DTRs on time and insubordination for failure to comply with Mayor Pattung's verbal directive to submit her DTRs for the year 2011 until May 2013. The CSC CO failed to cite any facts and specific evidence in support of such findings. The CSC ROII had already dismissed the said charges because the prosecution was not able to establish them during the administrative hearings before the CSC ROII. On appeal, the CSC CO reversed the CSC ROII's dismissal of the charges for insubordination and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations but the CSC CO did not explain how it arrived at its findings or cite specific evidence in support thereof.

Moreover, the Formal Charge accused Dunuan of failure to accomplish and submit her DTRs for the year 2011; yet, the CSC CO extended the coverage of the period until May 2013. A formal charge is a written specification of the charges against a public officer which shall contain, among other details, a brief statement of material and relevant facts relating to the alleged wrongdoing. 78 In Geronga v. Valera, 79 the Court held that in administrative cases, due process mandates that a person must be duly informed of the charges against him or her and that he or she cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with which he or she was not charged. 80 Thus, the CSC CO committed reversible error in finding Dunuan liable for alleged failure to submit DTRs committed beyond 2011 as the Formal Charge specifically limited the acts to 2011.

In fine, the Court upholds the findings of serious dishonesty and falsification of official document as there is substantial evidence proving Dunuan's culpability for said offenses. The charges of insubordination and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations are deleted.

The applicable penalty

Falsification of official document and serious dishonesty are grave offenses which are punishable by dismissal from service 81 which carries with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations. Nevertheless, Section 48 of the RRACCS states that in the interest of substantial justice, the disciplining authority, in this case, the Court, may motu proprio consider mitigating circumstances in the determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed. 82 In a number of cases involving falsification of DTR, the Court has tempered the harsh penalty of outright dismissal and instead imposed the penalty of suspension.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Sirios, 83 the employee was found guilty of falsification of public document and dishonesty when she falsified entries in her DTR to cover her absences and tardiness. The Court however, did not impose the penalty of dismissal and acknowledged that it was the employee's first offense and thus imposed only the penalty of suspension for three (3) months without pay.

Similarly, in De Vera v. Rimas, 84 also an administrative case involving falsification of DTR, the Court held that while the act was considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal, such an extreme penalty is not so swiftly inflicted when there are mitigating circumstances that could alleviate the culpability. Appreciating that it was the respondent's first offense, the Court imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.

In Re: Irregularity in the Use of Bundy Clock by Castro and Tayag, 85 the employees were found guilty of dishonesty for fraudulently punching in their time cards and violation of reasonable office rules and procedures for failure to secure travel authority. The Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of remorse and illness in imposing the less harsh penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.

Thus, the Court has exercised its sound discretion and tempered the harshness of the penalties imposable on erring employees when mitigating factors are present and when a lower penalty would suffice, instead of imposing automatic dismissal.

Guided by the applicable rules and the above judicial precepts, and considering that it is Dunuan's first administrative offense, the Court finds that suspension of six (6) months without pay is the appropriate penalty in the instant case. As Dunuan was removed from office as Vice Mayor on October 30, 2017, the period reckoned from her removal, until her assumption as Mayor in 2019 shall be counted as service of the period of suspension.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated January 24, 2018 and Resolution dated May 23, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 152183 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Joan C. Dunuan is found guilty of falsification of public document and serious dishonesty and imposed the penalty of SUSPENSION for six (6) months without pay with a STERN WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts shall warrant harsher penalty. The period during which petitioner Dunuan was removed from office as Vice Mayor shall be counted as service of the period of suspension.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-33, excluding Annexes.

2.Id. at 37-47. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia with the concurrence of Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Germano Francisco D. Legaspi.

3.Id. at 91-102. Penned by Commissioner Robert S. Martinez with the concurrence of Chairperson Alicia dela Rosa-Bala.

4.Id. at 105-110. Penned by Commissioner Robert S. Martinez with the concurrence of Chairperson Alicia dela Rosa-Bala and Commissioner Leopoldo Roberto W. Valderosa, Jr.

5.Id. at 48-49.

6.Id. at 50-55.

7. CSC Regional Office II Decision, p. 6, id. at 66.

8. From June 2011-December 2011 — 83.5 Absences and 52 Tardiness/Undertime; from January 2012-December 2012 — 147 Absences and 85 Tardiness/Undertime; for January 2013-November 2013 — 173.5 Absences and 116 Tardiness/Undertime, id. at 38-39, 45.

9.Rollo, id. at 38-41.

10. CSC ROII Resolution dated October 11, 2016, id. at 90.

11.Rollo, id. at 60.

12. CSC ROII Decision dated August 4, 2016, id. at 69.

13.Rollo, id. at 61-80. Penned by Acting Director IV, Atty. Neil S. Agustin.

14.Id. at 69-80.

15.Id. at 80.

16. G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 622, 628.

17.Rollo, p. 69.

18.Id. at 82.

19.Id. at 83.

20.Id. at 84-86.

21.Id. at 81-90.

22.Id. at 89.

23.Id. at 87-88.

24. See id. at 88-89.

25.Id. at 89-90.

26.Id. at 91.

27.Id. at 102.

28.Id. at 100-101, erroneously referred to as for the year 2013 in the CSC CO's Decision.

29.Id. at 100-102.

30.Id. at 106.

31.Id. at 15.

32.Id. at 44-47.

33.Id. at 16-17.

34.Id. at 18-20.

35.SEC. 60.Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. — An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:

(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;

(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;

(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;

(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;

(e) Abuse of authority;

(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay;

(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and

(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. (Approved on October 10, 1991)

36.Rollo, pp. 20-24.

37.Id. at 24.

38.Id. at 24-27.

39.Id. at 27-30.

40.Id. at 32.

41.Id. at 13.

42.Id. at 163-186.

43. G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 416.

44.Rollo, pp. 180-181.

45.Id. at 181-184.

46.Id. at 170-180.

47.Id. at 151-156.

48.Id. at 188-192, 193-201.

49.Id. at 205-210.

50.Id. at 211-221. Penned by Judge Sheila C. Gacutan-Labuguen.

51.Id. at 220.

52.Id. at 215-220.

53.Id. at 207.

54.Id. at 221.

55.Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya v. Martinez, supra note 43.

56.Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625 SCRA 299, 308.

57.SEC. 69.By Whom Exercised. — The power of recall for loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

58. CSC Resolution No. 1101502, promulgated on November 8, 2011.

59. RULES OF COURT, Rule 58, Sec. 1.

60.Id., Sec. 2.

61.Heirs of Melencio Yu and Talinap Matualaga v. Court of Appeals, Special Twenty-First Division (Twenty-Second Division), G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013, 705 SCRA 84, 95.

62.Rollo, p. 32.

63.Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration, G.R. No. 208660, March 5, 2014, 718 SCRA 212, 217.

64.Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 223972, November 3, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66807>.

65.Id.

66. G.R. No. 114683, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 17.

67.Id. at 21-22.

68.Rollo, p. 220.

69.People v. Claro, G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017, 822 SCRA 365, 375.

70.Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, supra note 66, at 22.

71.Ochoa, Jr. v. Dy Buco, G.R. Nos. 216634 & 216636, October 14, 2020, accessed at <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66791>.

72. See Barcelona v. Lim, G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014, 724 SCRA 433, 461.

73.Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) v. Villafuerte, G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018, 880 SCRA 305, 321.

74.Id.

75.Barcelona v. Lim, supra note 72, at 458.

76.Heirs of Antonio Feraren v. Court of Appeals (Former 12th Division), G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 569, 574-575, reads:

x x x However, there are recognized exceptions to this rule, to wit:

(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;

(b) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;

(d) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(e)When the findings of facts are conflicting;

(f) When in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(g)When the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court;

(h) When the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(i) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;

(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; or

(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. (Emphasis and italics in the original)

77.People v. Luna, G.R. No. 219164, March 21, 2018, 860 SCRA 1, 35.

78.Section 20. Issuance of Formal Charge; Contents. — After a finding of a prima facie case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person complained of, who shall now be called as respondent. The formal charge shall contain a specification of charge/s, a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of witnesses, a directive to answer the charge/s in writing, under oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his/her answer whether or not he/she elects a formal investigation of the charge/s, and a notice that he/she may opt to be assisted by a counsel of his/her choice. (RRACCS, Rule 5)

79. G.R. No. 160846, February 22, 2008, 546 SCRA 429.

80.Id. at 446.

81. RRACCS, Rule 10, Sec. 46.

82. Rule 10.

83. A.M. No. P-02-1659, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 35.

84. A.M. No. P-06-2118, June 12, 2008, 554 SCRA 253.

85. A.M. No. P-10-2763, February 10, 2010, 612 SCRA 124.