Don Mariano Transit Corp. v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 215605. January 12, 2015.][formerly UDK-15188]

DON MARIANO TRANSIT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD AND SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 12, 2015which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 215605 [formerly UDK-15188] (Don Mariano Transit Corporation v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board and Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications). — The petitioner's motion for an extension of seven (7) days within which to file a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction is GRANTED, counted from the expiration of the reglementary period.

After a judicious review of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition and AFFIRM the July 17, 2014 and October 29, 2014 Resolutions 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 136060 for failure of Don Mariano Transit Corporation (petitioner) to show that the CA committed any reversible error in denying outright its petition for certiorari on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

As correctly ruled by the CA, petitioner prematurely elevated its case before it by way of a petition for certiorari, considering its own admission that its appeal is still pending before the Department of Transportation and Communications. Absent the existence of any exception to the aforesaid doctrine, 2 the petition must necessarily be dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as in this case.

The Court of Appeals is DELETED as party respondent in this case pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo (Vol. 1), pp. 53-56 and 57-67, respectively. Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.

2. The exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are as follows: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. (See Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. [SAMELCO II] v. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 78, 89; citations omitted.)