Department of Education, Region II, Nueva Vizcaya v. Laurenciano

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 220790. September 29, 2021.]

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, REGION II, NUEVA VIZCAYA, petitioner, vs. FLORIDA LAURENCIANO AND VILLAMOR DULZA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 220790 (Department of Education, Region II, Nueva Vizcaya, petitioner v. Florida Laurenciano and Villamor Dulza, respondents.).

This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the February 12, 2015 Decision 1 and September 28, 2015 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96381. The CA affirmed the August 10, 2010 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30 (RTC), in Civil Case No. 1060, which nullified the Alias Writ of Execution 4 and Special Alias Writ of Demolition 5 issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya (MTC), in Civil Case No. 55, an action for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages filed by the Department of Education, Region II, Nueva Vizcaya (petitioner).

The Antecedents

Sometime in 2004, petitioner filed before the MTC a civil case for forcible entry with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against Martiniano Laurenciano, Florida Laurenciano (Florida), Rolando Dulza, and Aida Dulza (collectively, defendants), docketed as Civil Case No. 55. On September 5, 2005, the MTC rendered a Decision 6 in favor of petitioner and ordered defendants and all persons claiming under them, to vacate the land and to surrender its possession to petitioner.

The defendants subsequently appealed to the RTC. Their appeal was, however, dismissed by the RTC via its November 16, 2005 Order 7 for failure to submit the requisite memorandum. On even date, the RTC issued an Entry of Judgment 8 declaring its said order final and executory.

On December 9, 2005, the MTC granted petitioner's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal in view of defendants' failure to post the required supersedeas bond. The writ was implemented but some structures and improvements built by defendants were not removed. Petitioner thus filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which the MTC granted on October 5, 2006. 9

Later, on November 20, 2008, petitioner learned that defendants were again occupying the land subject of Civil Case No. 55. This prompted petitioner to file on February 17, 2009, a Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution in Civil Case No. 55, which the MTC granted. Consequently, the MTC issued an Alias Writ of Execution dated April 7, 2009. 10

In the Sheriff's Return dated May 6, 2009, the sheriff reported that he duly served the alias writ of execution upon defendants on April 28, 2009. Defendants, however, refused to surrender their possession of the land to petitioner. The sheriff also reported that defendants had built a fence around the land. 11

Hence, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a special alias writ of demolition, which the MTC granted in its Order dated July 2, 2009. On July 22, 2009, the MTC issued a Special Alias Writ of Demolition. 12

On July 23, 2009, Florida and Villamor Dulza (Villamor) [collectively, respondents], filed before the RTC a Petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, docketed as Civil Case No. 1060. Respondents sought to annul the September 5, 2005 Decision of the MTC, as well as the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 7, 2009, and the Order dated July 2, 2009, issued by the same court, granting the second motion for the issuance of a special alias writ of demolition. According to respondents, the MTC had no jurisdiction when it issued the alias writ of execution and the special alias writ of demolition because Villamor, who was one of the persons who re-entered the land, was not impleaded as a party defendant in Civil Case No. 55. Respondents claimed that the original respondents in Civil Case No. 55 were no longer occupying the land. 13

The RTC Ruling

In its August 10, 2010 Decision, 14 the RTC maintained the September 5, 2005 MTC Decision but nullified the orders of the said court granting the issuance of the April 7, 2009 alias writ of execution and the July 22, 2009 special alias writ of demolition. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is partially granted. The Decision dated September 5, 2005 is hereby MAINTAINED whereas the Orders granting the issuance of Alias Writ of Execution and Order of Demolition dated July 2, 2009 as well as the Alias Writ of Execution dated April 7, 2009 and the Special Writ of Demolition dated July 22, 2009 are hereby SET ASIDE AND ANNULLED.

SO ORDERED. 15

The RTC denied respondents' plea to annul the September 5, 2005 MTC Decision holding that Villamor was a relative of the original defendants in the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 55), and thus, was also bound by the final and executory decision of the MTC.

The RTC, however, declared that the subsequent re-entry of respondents was another act of dispossession which gave rise to a separate cause of action from Civil Case No. 55. According to the RTC, said MTC decision was already fully executed in 2006, after the implementation of the first Writ of Execution dated December 9, 2005, and the Writ of Demolition dated October 5, 2006. Thus, it nullified the alias writ of execution and the special alias writ of demolition subsequently issued by the MTC, finding the same to have been improvidently issued.

Petitioner appealed to the CA and ascribed error on the part of the RTC in setting aside the orders granting the issuance of the writs, the alias writ of execution and the special alias writ of demolition, despite the final and executory nature of the MTC decision.

In the meantime, on March 25, 2011, petitioner filed before the RTC a separate action for indirect contempt against respondents and all persons claiming rights under them, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 63.

The CA Ruling

In its February 12, 2015 Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1060. The CA held that the MTC decision had already been fully implemented when the MTC issued the original writ of execution and writ of demolition in 2005 and 2006, respectively. The CA upheld the finding of the RTC that the subsequent alias writ of execution and special alias writ of demolition, both issued in 2009, pertained to another act of dispossession, which thus gave rise to a separate cause of action than that of Civil Case No. 55. The CA ruled that the implementation of the original writs effectively terminated Civil Case No. 55 and caused the MTC to lose its jurisdiction over said case.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in its September 28, 2015 Resolution.

The Issue

Undaunted, petitioner filed the present petition before the Court and raises the following lone issue, viz.:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ITS 12 FEBRUARY 2015 DECISION WHICH AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE RTC BAMBANG, NUEVA VIZCAYA, BR. 30[,] IN ANNULLING THE ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION, WRIT OF DEMOLITION[,] AND SPECIAL WRIT OF DEMOLITION ISSUED BY THE MTC OF KASIBU, NUEVA VIZCAYA[,] DESPITE THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY NATURE OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SAID MTC. 16

Petitioner asserts that the MTC had the authority to issue the alias writ of execution and special alias writ of demolition in view of its general and supervisory control over the execution of Civil Case No. 55. Petitioner contends that the writs issued in 2009 were necessary for the preservation of the finality of the September 5, 2005 Decision of the MTC. Finally, petitioner argues that the Rule 47 petition filed by respondent before the RTC should have been dismissed outright by the CA for failure to comply with the stringent requirements under the Rules of Court.

On April 6, 2016, the Court issued a Resolution 17 requiring respondents to file their comment. Failing to do so, the Court issued a Show Cause Resolution 18 dated September 25, 2017, wherein it reiterated its directive for the submission of respondents' comment and required respondents' counsel, Atty. Essex L. Silapan (Atty. Silapan), to show cause why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt for their failure to file a comment.

On January 5, 2018, the Court received a Letter-Explanation 19 from respondents' counsel, Atty. Silapan, in compliance with the Show Cause Resolution. In said letter, Atty. Silapan explains that the filing of a comment was already moot and academic because respondents had already surrendered possession of the land subject of Civil Case No. 55 and had vacated the same in favor of petitioner, as shown by the attached RTC Order 20 dated July 31, 2014.

On February 21, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution 21 treating Atty. Silapan's letter as respondents' comment to the instant petition, and ordering petitioner to file a reply thereto.

Petitioner, in its Reply, 22 maintains that the RTC erred in setting aside the writs and the orders granting the same, since the MTC did not lose its jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, petitioner contends that the justification supposedly attached by Atty. Silapan in his letter pertained to the indirect contempt case (Civil Case No. 63) and not to the Rule 47 petition (Civil Case No. 1060) from which the instant petition arose. Petitioner thus argues against the case being moot and academic, especially because the issue of the propriety by the RTC in setting aside the writs remained an unresolved justiciable controversy.

The Court's Ruling

The existence of an actual case or controversy is a condition precedent for the court's exercise of its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. 23 On the other hand, an issue becomes moot and academic when any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value such that there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the claim. 24 It is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. 25

Respondents averred that the instant petition was rendered moot and academic by the voluntary surrender of their possession of the land. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that a justiciable controversy remained unresolved — whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision that annulled and set aside the MTC orders granting the writs, the alias writ of execution, and the special alias writ of demolition.

In order to determine whether the petition before this Court has indeed become moot and academic by virtue of respondents' voluntary surrender of their possession of the land, the relief herein sought by petitioner must be examined in the light of the action for forcible entry, where the principal relief sought is the summary restoration of physical possession over the subject property to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof. 26

In the instant petition, petitioner prayed for the reversal of the CA decision and resolution and the dismissal of the Rule 47 petition in Civil Case No. 1060. If granted, this would entail the validity of the issuance by the MTC of the alias writ of execution, special alias writ of demolition, and the orders granting said writs, which were all necessary to restore petitioner's possession of the land after respondents re-entered the same. Clearly, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in the instant petition is the restoration of its possession of the land.

Respondent averred that as early as August 2014, petitioner had been restored of its possession of the land and submitted in evidence the Order dated July 31, 2014, issued by the RTC in the contempt case (Civil Case No. 63). In said order, respondents were directed to file their comment to petitioner's motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition. Respondents, however, did not file their comment thereto, and argued that it meant their acquiescence to petitioner's right of possession. Petitioner, in its reply, did not deny the fact of possession and merely contended that the Order dated July 31, 2014 pertained to the contempt case (Civil Case No. 63) it filed against respondents and not to the forcible entry case (Civil Case No. 55). Thus, to the Court's mind, petitioner has indeed been restored of its possession of the property in question.

In view of the restoration of petitioner's possession of the land, there is no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the claim. Certainly, there are instances when the Court may pass upon issues, albeit supervening events had rendered the petition moot and academic, viz.:

(1) when there is grave violation of the Constitution;

(2) when paramount public interest is involved;

(3) when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or

(4) when the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. 27

However, none of the circumstances are present in the case at bar. Hence, the fact that petitioner is now in possession of the land that is the subject of the writs of execution sought by petitioner to be declared valid in the present petition, means there is no longer an actual controversy to be resolved by the Court.

Atty. Silapan should be warned

On September 25, 2017, the Court issued a Resolution 28 requiring respondents' counsel, Atty. Silapan, to show cause why he should not be disciplined or held in contempt for failing to file a comment to the present petition. In response, Atty. Silapan submitted an undated letter-explanation which the Court treated as respondents' comment. However, in the same letter, Atty. Silapan lambasted Atty. Lapitan, the Court's Third Division Clerk of Court, and imputed bias against him in connection with the pending administrative cases Atty. Silapan had filed and which are pending before this Court. The exact words of Atty. Silapan were as follows:

WILFREDO V. LAPITAN

Sir:

xxx xxx xxx

x x x. The voluntary surrender by the Respondents of their possession of the subject land to the Petitioner already put the case to rest and rendered the petition for review on certiorari, filed much later on November 26, 2015, moot and academic. The notice you mailed to me, Sir, dated September 25, 2017, took too long, more than one and one half (1 and 1/2) years had already lapsed, before I received the same. Is this really how slow justice moves in this country. Or is the Supreme Court being selective in dealing with cases filed before it, as claimed by the President himself? Or, with due apologies, are you the one who is being particularly selective in dealing with my cases filed with the Court, Sir?

I am just wondering why you are patently biased against me via my cases pending in the Court. In the case of JOB G. LAPITAN vs. Atty. Essex L. Silapan and Atty. Virgil R. Castro, A.C. No. 9633, while you were still a Deputy Division Clerk of Court, you have personally signed and mailed court orders to me and to my co-respondent, knowing that the plaintiff is your namesake. Is this not inappropriate? Common sense and/or delicadeza dictates that you should have asked your superior Division Clerk of Court to do that, to avoid any suspicion that you were trying to scare us by letting us know that the plaintiff has somebody (a relative inside the Court?) to support him. By your obvious misconduct of impropriety, Sir, you have intentionally violated the provision of AM No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise known as the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL which provides in Section 3 thereof, that:

SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to influence their official acts or duties.

The Honorable Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is too busy, especially nowadays, to find time to remind you to observe proper decorum, Sir. You should have taken it upon yourself to obediently follow the proper norms in the judiciary instead of violating the same for the sake of someone, who is related to you?

In A.C. No. 11450 (Atty. Essex L. Silapan vs. Atty. Desiderio A. Perez), the Respondent had already filed three motions for extension of time to submit his comment with counter-charge, the last of which was on January 7, 2017, but until today, he has not filed his comment with counter-charge. The Respondent, obviously, cannot come up with an answer with a fabricated counter-charge to the complaint that was filed against him as far back as July 8, 2016. The complaint is clear and simple. It is supported by documentary evidences. Why can't the Division Clerk of Court just endorse the complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline for further investigation, instead of waiting for the counter-charge of the Respondent. If the Respondent truly has a legitimate counter-charge, he can file a complaint against me any time later. Or, are you encouraging and waiting for the respondent to file his counter-charge so that you can pin me down? Sorry, Sir, but at this point, that is my perception against you. You have given me all the reason to entertain that strong possibility. I am not ascribing any fault to the Supreme Court. I am pointing at you, Sir, as one of the termites who are slowly, but surely, eating away the good image of the Court. If a lawyer is treated the way you are treating me, how can good people of lesser stature expect justice from the Supreme Court?

Again, in this particular case, G.R. No. 220790, you are requiring me to COMPLY with the Resolution of April 6, 2016 to comment on the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the Petitioner, the submission of which expired on June 2, 2016. If I failed to comply with the said Order, Sir, the Court could just have simply granted the petition. If there is anyone who should complain against me for my failure, it should [be] the Respondents in that case, not you, Sir. Even a new lawyer knows that. It is very elementary. But, now, you are threatening to have me disciplined or held in contempt, Sir? You are acting as if you are the Supreme Court itself. Your interest to dig on the files of this case, which has been dormant for 1 and 1/2 years is a clear manifestation of your thirst for vengeance for Job G. Lapitan who, for your information, is a fugitive from justice as you can see in my attached letter to the Commission on Bar Discipline, to which you immediately endorsed the complaint for investigation since I am one of the Respondents. Unlike in A.C. No. 11450, which is taking you too long to endorse to the Commission on Bar Discipline because I am the Complainant. Is this not a classic example of selective justice? Beware of your actions, Sir. The innocent Chief Justice may be blamed again for your reckless indiscretion.

I am already old and ready to retire from my law practice, Sir. So please do not threaten me with being disciplined or held in contempt. That does not speak well for a Division Clerk of the Supreme Court. It only shows one's utter ignorance of the law and misplaced arrogance. And, I say this again, you are not the Supreme Court, Sir. Nonetheless, you must protect its integrity at all times. As for me, I have been doing that since I took my oath as a lawyer. 29 (emphases supplied; italics in the original)

In his first letter-explanation, Atty. Silapan accused Atty. Lapitan of intentionally violating the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel by signing a resolution in connection with an administrative case pending against him, where the complainant is one Job G. Lapitan. Without showing concrete proof of their relationship, Atty. Silapan alleged that Atty. Lapitan was a relative of Job G. Lapitan and was inclined to influence the case in favor of the latter. Atty. Silapan also alluded to Atty. Lapitan's supposed partiality in the present petition and even justified his failure to file a comment.

On February 21, 2018, the Court, in its Resolution, 30 required Atty. Silapan to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for imputing impropriety, with the use of vile language, to Atty. Lapitan. The Court also treated Atty. Silapan's letter as respondents' comment to the instant petition.

Subsequently, Atty. Silapan filed a formal Administrative Complaint dated January 29, 2018 against Atty. Lapitan for violation of Section 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, where he reiterated his allegations in the letter-explanation. The Court, in its March 7, 2018 Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint for failure to show a prima facie case against Atty. Lapitan. 31

On June 7, 2018, the Court received another undated Letter-Explanation 32 from Atty. Silapan in response to the Show Cause Resolution dated February 21, 2018. Atty. Silapan denied that he used vile language in his previous undated letter-explanation and questioned the authenticity of the Resolution dated February 21, 2018, issued by this Court. Atty. Silapan also requested that the allegations in his administrative complaint be considered as his answer or explanation to the show cause resolution. Moreover, Atty. Silapan continued to make baseless and sarcastic remarks towards Atty. Lapitan. For ready reference, the contents of Atty. Silapan's second letter-explanation addressed to Deputy Division Clerk of Court Atty. Misael Domingo C. Battung III (Atty. Battung) is herein reproduced, as follows:

ATTY. MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG III

SIR:

Please be informed that on April 23, 2018, the undersigned received the Notice informing those concerned that on February 21, 2018, the Court's Third Division issued a Resolution REQUIRING, among others, the undersigned to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for imputing impropriety, with the use of vile language, to the Division Clerk of Court, this Court, for allegedly signing the said Show Cause Resolution and for supposedly being patently biased against his cases with the Court.

Sir, according to the Oxford Thesaurus, the word vile simply means any of the following synonyms, to wit: base, bad, contemptible, degenerate, depraved, despicable, disgusting, evil, execrable, filthy, foul, hateful, horrible, immoral and many others.

With profuse apologies, Sir, may I please know what vile language I may have inappropriately used against the Supreme Court Third Division Clerk of Court? A careful review of the communications I addressed to him left me wondering what vile language I [may] have used to insult or debase his Honor. If he found it insulting that I accused him of being patently biased with my cases pending in the Supreme Court, the way he is handling those cases can speak for themselves.

On January 29, 2018, I filed an administrative complaint with the Supreme Court against the most Honorable Third Division Clerk of Court WILFREDO V. LAPITAN for violation of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL. Kindly consider the allegations in that complaint as my answer/explanation to your latest order, sir. Like most lawyers who are administratively charged before the Supreme Court, the most Honorable Wilfredo V. Lapitan should also answer the charge against him and should not hide behind his position in the Court. Chief Justice Sereno herself is under investigation by her own Court, no less, and the Philippine Congress, and she is bravely defending herself from the accusations against her. The fact alone that the complainant in A.C. No. 9633 (Job Lapitan y Gecobe vs. Atty. Essex L. Silapan and Atty. Virgil Castro) is his namesake, should have warned Honorable Wilfredo V. Lapitan that he could violate Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL, by personally signing the notice to the Respondents in that case himself when he was still the Second Division Deputy Division Clerk of Court. Even if he is not related to fugitive Job G. Lapitan, the fact that the Honorable Wilfredo V. Lapitan bears the same family name with the fugitive complainant in A.C. No. 9633 makes him a suspect and he could be liable for violation of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC. It would be more prudent for Honorable Wilfredo V. Lapitan to just answer the charge against him, instead of issuing more orders for the undersigned to comply with. In this connection, sir, may I please be furnished a copy of the Resolution of February 21, 2018, to be sure that there is really such a Resolution issued by the Third Division re this matter. I humbly believe that nothing is wrong with this request because practitioners are required to attach evidentiary documents to their pleadings in court and it would not be improper for the undersigned to want to see the evidence against him. Thank you, sir.

Incidentally, is filing a complaint for violation of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL, a contemptible act of imputing impropriety against the Hon. Wilfredo V. Lapitan, Sir?

If the Court believes in good conscience that I am guilty of the accusations of the most Honorable Wilfredo V. Lapitan, they can just impose the penalty that they want to impose on me, sir. What can an ordinary lawyer do against an Honorable Division Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, sir? The Court cannot even seem to order the Honorable LAPITAN to answer a simple complaint. He seems to be an untouchable. Indeed, this is a sad indication for ordinary lawyers like me, sir. Obviously, we have no chance to complain against a HIGH personnel of the Supreme Court. Pardon me sir, but what is the CODE for? 33

The Court notes that Atty. Silapan's allegations in the undated letter-explanations were unsupported by any piece of evidence. There was no concrete proof of partiality on the part of Atty. Lapitan because the latter merely issued the challenged resolutions as part of his ministerial duty as Division Clerk of Court.

Significantly, the first Show Cause Resolution dated September 25, 2017 issued by the Third Division, was actually signed by the Third Division Deputy Clerk of Court Atty. Battung. The resolutions issued by the Second Division in the administrative case involving a certain Job G. Lapitan were signed by the Second Division Deputy Clerk of Court Atty. Teresita Aquino Tuazon. 34

It bears emphasis that clerks of court are important officers in the judicial system. Their administrative functions are as vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice as their judicial duties. 35 Part of the duties of a Division Clerk of Court, such as Atty. Lapitan, is to sign notices of Court resolutions and supervise the preparation and service of notices of resolutions, orders, and other processes to parties or their counsels. 36 Sec. 7, Rule 11 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC) expressly authorizes the Clerk of Court or, in his absence, the Division Clerk of Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or Assistant Division Clerk of Court to sign the letter containing the minute resolution issued by the Court, thus:

Sec. 7. Form of notice of minute resolution. — A notice of a minute resolution shall be embodied in a letter of the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court notifying the parties of the action or actions taken in their case. In the absence of or whenever so deputized by the Clerk of Court or the Division Clerk of Court, the Assistant Clerk of Court or Assistant Division Clerk may likewise sign the letter x x x.

A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. 37 As such, Atty. Lapitan's name appears in all notices and resolutions issued by the Division of this Court where he is appointed, as a matter of standard form. His signature, or the signature of the Deputy Division Clerk of Court, on such notices, resolutions, or court processes, signify the veritableness of the Court's issuances. Certainly, the issuances, notices, and court processes are ultimately of the Court's. Clerks of court, such as Atty. Lapitan, only affix their signatures thereon as part of their ministerial duty. Atty. Silapan's disrespectful behavior towards Atty. Lapitan, through the letter-explanations filed before this Court, exhibited not only a lack of professionalism but also a profound disrespect towards this Court.

It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 38 Thus, lawyers must refrain from imputing baseless allegations to the court and judicial officers which give the appearance that these officers are influenced by factors outside of the merits of the case.

Furthermore, as officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court. 39 These are expressly stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which embodies the standards that members of the Bar are expected to always uphold and live up to.

Atty. Silapan's baseless accusations of impropriety against Atty. Lapitan which were done with utter disrespect, failed to adhere to the Code he swore to uphold as an officer of the Court. His letter-explanations replete with insults, sarcastic remarks, and diatribes against Atty. Lapitan, and the attacks on the latter's moral and intellectual integrity were completely unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

In Habawel v. Court of Tax Appeals, First Div., 40 the Court reminded members of the Bar to use only fair and temperate language in arguing a worthy position on the law, and to eschew harsh and intemperate language that has no place in the educated ranks of the legal profession.

Atty. Silapan also cannot justify his deliberate defiance of the Court's Resolution dated April 6, 2016, directing him to file a comment to the instant petition. Under Sec. 7, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the failure to file a comment may merit the filing of a disciplinary action against the disobedient party. It is a provision applicable to a petition for review before the Supreme Court, as provided in Section 2 (a), Rule 56 of the Rules of Court. 41

A Court's Resolution is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively. 42 A member of the Bar has a bounden duty to assist the courts in the speedy administration of justice. Indeed, a member of the Bar is, first and foremost, an officer of the Court who has the duty of preserving the proper and honest administration of justice. Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and their deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. 43

Atty. Silapan's failure to timely comply with the directive to file a comment and his recalcitrant attitude in justifying his actions constitute a defiance of the lawful orders of the Court itself. The mootness of the instant case does not excuse him from complying with the Court's directives. Furthermore, his contumacious conduct towards Atty. Lapitan, an officer of the Court, displays his deliberate betrayal of the oath he has sworn to uphold.

While the Court finds the foregoing transgressions of Atty. Silapan contemptuous, We are inclined to exercise temperance and judicial leniency towards him. Although his utterances were disrespectful towards Atty. Lapitan, the same only manifests his passion in handling his cases. As such, the Court would only issue a warning and remind him to always use fair and temperate language within the standard expected of a member of the Bar in all his pleadings, and to comply with the directives of the Court, consistent with his oath as a member of the Bar.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for being moot and academic. Further, Atty. Essex L. Silapan is hereby given a WARNING to always use fair and temperate language in his dealings with the Court and to ensure his timely compliance with the directives of the Court.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 29-35; penned by Associate Justice Melchor Q.C. Sadang, with Associate Justices Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.

2.Id. at 36-37.

3.Id. at 67-73; penned by Presiding Judge Vincent Eden C. Panay.

4.Id. at 52-53.

5.Id. at 54-55.

6.Id. at 38-44.

7.Id. at 45.

8.Id. at 50.

9.Id. at 30.

10.Id.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 30-31.

14.Id. at 67-73.

15.Id. at 72-73.

16.Id. at 15.

17.Id. at 100.

18.Id. at 105.

19.Id. at 106-107.

20.Id. at 108.

21.Id. at 110-111.

22.Id. at 112-117.

23.Oclarino v. Navarro, G.R. No. 220514, September 25, 2019.

24.Ocampo v. Rear Admiral Enriquez, 815 Phil. 1175, 1204 (2017).

25.Supra note 23.

26.De Guzman-Fuerte v. Sps. Estomo, 830 Phil. 653, 667 (2018).

27.Balag v. Senate of the Phils., 835 Phil. 451, 462 (2018).

28.Rollo, p. 105.

29.Id. at 106-107.

30.Id. at 110-111.

31.Id. at 121-124.

32.Id. at 125-126.

33.Id.

34.Id. at 122-123.

35.Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Ganzan, 616 Phil. 15, 23-24 (2009).

36. Section E (3), paragraphs 3.1.2 and 3.1.6, 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court.

37.Eizmendi, Jr. v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 215280, November 27, 2019.

38.Ret. Judge Alpajora v. Atty. Calayan, 823 Phil. 93, 110 (2018).

39.Id. at 109.

40. 672 Phil. 582, 601 (2011).

41.Thermochem, Incorporated v. Naval, 397 Phil. 934, 939-940 (2000).

42.Dimayuga v. Atty. Rubia, 835 Phil. 4, 10 (2018).

43.In re: Atty. Cipriano P. Lupeba, A.C. No. 12426, March 5, 2019.