SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 244146. June 16, 2021.]
JULIUS G. DELA CRUZ, AS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, JOCELYN D. EVANGELISTA, petitioner,vs. SPOUSES CEFERINO AND ESTELITA LOMBOY AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, 1respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 16 June 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 244146 (Julius G. Dela Cruz, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Jocelyn D. Evangelista v. Spouses Ceferino and Estelita Lomboy and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City). — In this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Julius G. Dela Cruz 3 (Julius) asks this Court to reverse and set aside the Decision 4 dated August 10, 2018 and Resolution 5 dated January 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 153700, which affirmed the September 1, 2016, 6 and June 15, 2017 7 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 217 (RTC-Branch 217) in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08672, dismissing his complaint for annulment of deed of sale and partition agreement; and annulment of title to real property and damages, against Spouses Ceferino and Estelita Lomboy (Spouses Lomboy) for failure to state a cause of action.
ANTECEDENTS
In an earlier complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Partition Agreement, Annulment of Title to Real Property and Damages filed by Julius against Spouses Lomboy on September 17, 2014 (First Complaint), 8 Julius alleged that his aunt Leonora G. Angeles (Leonora) and uncle, Ricardo C. Galguiera (Ricardo), were the registered owners of a real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30011 T-1505 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. In 1984, the property was partitioned into two lots, thus, TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411) and TCT No. 311412 (T-342610) were issued in the names of Ricardo and Leonora, respectively.
Julius narrated that on September 17, 2009, Ricardo sold to him the property covered by TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411). 9 Ricardo gave the owner's duplicate copy of the TCT to Julius, who then entrusted the title to Leonora for safekeeping. However, before Julius could cause the transfer of the title of the property in his name, he discovered that it had been subdivided into two lots — TCT No. 004-2011007425 10 was registered and retained in the name of Ricardo, and TCT No. 004-2011007426 11 was registered in the name of Estelita Lomboy. 12 It turned out that the new TCTs were issued by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale 13 dated December 9, 2010, and a Partition Agreement 14 dated March 2, 2011, both entered into between Ricardo and Estelita. 15 Julius asked his aunt Leonora for the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411), but the title could not be found. Thus, Julius instituted the First Complaint before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-09275-CV, and raffled to Branch 81 (RTC-Branch 81). 16
On January 20, 2015, the RTC-Branch 81 issued an Order dismissing the First Complaint for failure to state a cause of action against Spouses Lomboy. 17
On September 23, 2015, Julius instituted another complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Partition Agreement, Annulment of Title to Real Property and Damages 18 (Second Complaint), docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08672CV and raffled before RTC-Branch 217. 19 In the Second Complaint, Julius reproduced and repleaded his allegations in the First Complaint. He added that TCT No. 004-2011007426 was acquired by Spouses Lomboy through a forged deed of sale and partition agreement, and that the owner's duplicate of TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411), the mother title, was stolen to facilitate the transfer of the title in Spouses Lomboy's names. 20
On November 27, 2015, Spouses Lomboy filed a Motion to Dismiss 21 the Second Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Spouses Lomboy reiterated their arguments in their motion to dismiss the First Complaint and attached a Deed of Sale allegedly entered into by Julius and Ricardo on September 17, 2009, which they obtained from the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC). Spouses Lomboy averred that there is no perfected contract of sale between Julius and Ricardo as the Deed of Sale notarized and reported before the OCC does not bear Ricardo's signature, does not provide for any proof of identity of the parties to the instrument, and no witnesses signed in the deed. Even assuming that there was an existing contract of sale, Julius is precluded from establishing his cause of action against them under the rule of double sales. Moreover, the issue of the existence of a cause of action is barred by the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. Spouses Lomboy stressed that the First Complaint, which was dismissed by the RTC-Branch 81 in its January 20, 2015 Order, involved the same deed of sale and partition agreement subject of the Second Complaint. The RTC-Branch 81 not only ruled the failure to state a cause of action but also the complete absence of cause of action against Spouses Lomboy. Julius cannot now raise the same issue on the presence of his cause of action against Spouses Lomboy as the same had been settled in the January 20, 2015 Order.
On September 1, 2016, the RTC-Branch 217 granted Spouses Lomboy's motion, and dismissed the Second Complaint. 22 The RTC-Branch 217 held that the first element of a cause of action is absent as the Deed of Sale recorded in the OCC purportedly transferring the property to Julius failed to prove that there was a perfected sale transaction. The Deed of Sale was not signed by Ricardo and no witnesses affixed their signatures on the deed. The RTC-Branch 217 added that Spouses Lomboy are the rightful owners being the first registrants of the property in good faith. Further, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment applies. Both complaints pertained to: (1) a case for annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and Partition Agreement, annulment of title to real property and damages; and (2) the same subject matter, which is the real property covered by TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411). Julius is barred from raising the issue on the existence of his cause of action as the same had been finally decided in the January 20, 2015 Order of the RTC-Branch 81.
Julius filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC-Branch 217 in its Order 23 dated June 15, 2017. The RTC-Branch 217 maintained that Julius' complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause of action against Spouses Lomboy, to wit:
The Court did not err in ruling to grant the motion to dismiss of the defendants for failure of the plaintiff to state a cause of action against the defendants-spouses in his Complaint dated August 17, 2015.
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In view of the foregoing, and with due respect to the counsel for the defendants, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 1 September 2016 is hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 24
Aggrieved, Julius instituted a certiorari petition under Rule 65 before the CA.
On August 10, 2018, the CA issued its Decision 25 finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in granting Spouses Lomboy's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. 26 The CA ruled that Julius failed to sufficiently allege his ownership over the disputed property as he only attached in his complaint an unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Ricardo, and without Ricardo's signature. The allegations in the Second Complaint, which was copied from the First Complaint, focused primarily on the irregularity in the process of obtaining the property to his prejudice and that the alleged misdeed was committed by Spouses Lomboy in securing title over the property. The CA held that the Second Complaint did not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action against Spouses Lomboy. Consequently, the RTC-Branch 217 did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the Second Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the present Amended Petition is DENIED. The assailed September 1, 2016 and June 15, 2017 Orders of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08672 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the herein petitioner.
SO ORDERED. 27 (Emphasis in the original.)
The CA denied Julius' motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2019. 28 Hence, this recourse.
Julius avers that the RTC-Branch 217 and the CA incorrectly dismissed his Second Complaint for failure to state a cause of action when the grounds for dismissal pertain to factual matters to be proved by evidence. In particular, the dismissal was based on his alleged failure to establish his legal right over the disputed property because Ricardo did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale attached to the complaint and there were no witnesses who affixed their signatures on the deed. These are not grounds for a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a cause of action" but a ground for a demurrer to evidence, which is viable only after the presentation of evidence. Julius insists that the Second Complaint sufficiently alleged the "ultimate facts" for a civil case for annulment of title and recovery of property, namely: (1) that he is the owner of the property covered by TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 17, 2009; and (2) that Spouses Lomboy fraudulently caused the cancellation of the title and the issuance of a new TCT in their names by stealing the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411), and presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale and Partition Agreement with the forged signature of Ricardo.
On January 22, 2020, the Court issued a Resolution 29 requiring Julius to furnish the Court with a certified true copy of the Second Complaint within five (5) days from notice.
On October 28, 2020, Julius filed a Manifestation/Compliance with Motion for Extension of Time 30 stating that due to the quarantine restrictions, he was advised that it will take several days before the RTC-Branch 217 can provide the certified true copy of the Second Complaint. Julius attached his copy of the Second Complaint, 31 with an undertaking to submit the certified true copy once it becomes available. Since then, Julius filed series of motions for extension of time, stating that even after several follow-ups made with the RTC-Branch 217, the court is still in the process of looking for the requested file. On March 10, 2021, Julius submitted a Manifestation/Compliance, 32 stating that he finally received a certified true copy of the complaint on March 5, 2021, and appended the certified true copy of the Second Complaint.
RULING
Preliminarily, the Court GRANTS Julius' fifth motion for extension of thirty (30) days from February 25, 2021, within which to file compliance with the Resolution of January 22, 2020; and NOTES his manifestation/compliance dated March 8, 2021, with the Resolution of January 22, 2020, submitting the attached certified true photocopy of the complaint filed before the RTC-Branch 217.
As to the merit of the petition. We find error on the part of the RTC and the CA in granting Spouses Lomboy's motion to dismiss the Second Complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 33 In Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, 34 the Court laid down the parameters in dismissing a complaint because there was a failure to state a cause of action:
It is well to point out that the plaintiff's cause of action should not merely be "stated" but, importantly, the statement thereof should be "sufficient." This is why the elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other.35 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)
In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the Second Complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action for annulment of sale and partition agreement, and revocation of title against Spouses Lomboy. The averments in the complaint show Julius' demandable right as the owner of the real property covered by TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411) under a Deed of Absolute Sale entered into with Ricardo on September 17, 2009, and that the TCT issued to Spouses Lomboy was effected through fraudulent means and by virtue of a forged Deed of Sale and Partition Agreement, thus rendering their title to the property void. Indeed, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy are conclusions of law. 36 In the present case, however, the claim that Spouses Lomboy's title to the property is void because it was acquired through fraud and forgery was supported by the well-pleaded averment of circumstances showing its invalidity. The material allegations read:
4. [Leonora and Ricardo] were the registered owners of a real property x x x, and covered by [TCT] No. 30011 T-1505 x x x.
5. In 1984, the said real property was partitioned into two (2) lots, to wit:
a. Lot No. 69-B-3-A-1-A covered by TCT No. 311411 consisting of Two Hundred Twenty-Four (224) square meters was registered in the name of Ricardo Galguiera. The title to this property was subsequently administratively reconstituted in the year 2010 for which TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411) was issued.
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7. On 17th September 2009, Ricardo Galguiera sold to plaintiff, Julius G. Dela Cruz, the real property covered by TCT No. 311411. Such fact was known to the family of Ricardo Galguiera, which included the latter's niece, herein defendant, Estelita Lomboy. Moreover, to manifest his intent to sell the same, Ricardo Galguiera, turned over the possession of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 311411 to plaintiff Julius G. Dela Cruz, who in turn entrusted his aunt Leonora Angeles to keep the title on his behalf while he is out of the country. The sale transaction was witnessed by Modesta T. Herrera and Leonora Angeles' houseboy, Arnold De Guzman, who both affixed their signatures on the said Deed of Absolute Sale.
(A Copy of the said Deed of Absolute Sale dated 17th September 2009 is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex "D")
8. However, before plaintiff could cause the transfer of the title in his name, it was discovered that the real property covered by TCT No. 311411 had in fact been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots for which the following titles were apparently issued on 11th April 2011.
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10. A perusal of the new transfer certificates would show that the same were issued by virtue of: (1) a Deed of Sale dated 9th December 2010 allegedly entered into between Ricardo Galguiera and the defendants; and (2) a corresponding Partition Agreement dated 2nd March 2011 allegedly entered into between Ricardo Galguiera and defendant Sps. Lomboy.
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11. Appalled by this discovery, plaintiff instructed his Aunt Leonora to search for the duplicate original of TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411), being kept in the latter's cabinet, only to find out that the same could no longer be located.
12. Soon thereafter, it was discovered that Leonora's houseboy, Arnold de Guzman, connived with the defendants Sps. Lomboy in facilitating the transfer of the title to the latter's names, by stealing the owner's duplicate copy from Leonora's cabinet. To add insult to injury, Arnold de Guzman also served as an attesting witness in the Deed of Sale executed between Galguiera and the defendants, knowing fully well that the land covered by such sale was already sold to herein plaintiff. x x x.
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13. The act of Arnold de Guzman of surreptitiously obtaining the transfer certificate in Leonora's Angeles possession, in conjunction with the defendant's act of forging the Deed of Sale and Partition Agreement to make it appear that Ricardo Galguiera freely and voluntarily executed the same, enabled the defendants, Sps. Lomboy, to successfully transfer the title to their names.
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18. The title over the subject real property was acquired by defendants Sps. Lomboy by virtue of a stolen owner's duplicate of the Transfer Certificate of Title and a forged Deed of Absolute Sale which made it appear that Ricardo Galguiera sold to the defendants a portion of the property covered by TCT No. RT-2010009844 (311411). The signature of the late Ricardo Galguiera in the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale, as well as in the corresponding Partition Agreement was forged by defendants Sps. Lomboy as Ricardo Galguiera had absolutely no participation in the execution of the said documents. 37 (Emphases, underscoring, and italics in the original.)
Accordingly, it is erroneous for the RTC to dismiss the Second Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. It appeared that the RTC relied on the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale attached to the complaint was not registered, and on Spouses Lomboy's claim that there exists another deed reported to the Office of the Clerk of Court which contained certain irregularities in the execution. The RTC leaned on Spouses Lomboy's claim of good faith because the TCT of the property was clean and free from any encumbrance at the time of purchase. This is improper. An inquiry on the veracity of the defendant's allegations is not proper in resolving a motion to dismiss. 38 In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the inquiry on the sufficiency of the material allegations should be confined to the four corners of the complaint and no other. 39 If the allegations in the complaint furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that the defendant may raise. 40 To be exact, the non-registration of Julius' copy of the deed, the existence of another deed of sale, good faith, and clean title are matters of defense that must be pleaded in the answer. They require evidentiary proof and support that can better be threshed out not in a motion to dismiss but in a full-blown trial on the merits. 41 In like manner, Julius' allegation that fraud and forgery facilitated the transfer of title in the names of Spouses Lomboy is a factual issue that is best proved during trial. 42 The matters raised by the parties, indeed, are better ventilated in actual trial where evidence may be presented, refuted, and ultimately decided upon. Accordingly, the remand of this case to the RTC-Branch 217 is necessary.
FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 10, 2018 and Resolution dated January 14, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 153700 are REVERSED. The Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08672, is hereby REINSTATED and the case REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, for further proceedings with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED. (Lopez, J. Y., J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. In a Resolution dated December 10, 2019, the Court resolved to drop Hon. Santigo M. Arenas as party respondent to the case pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rollo, p. 230.
2.Rollo, pp. 14-47.
3. Represented by his Attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn D. Evangelista.
4.Rollo, pp. 49-57-D. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edwin D. Sorongon and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.
5.Id. at 58-59.
6.Id. at 214-225. Penned by Judge Santiago M. Arenas.
7.Id. at 226-229.
8.Id. at 50-51.
9.Id. at 50; and 71-73.
10.Id. at 74-76.
11.Id. at 78-80. Registered in the name of "ESTELITA DELA CRUZ LOMBOY MARRIED TO CEFERINO R. LOMBOY."
12.Id. at 50-51.
13.Id. at 83-84.
14.Id. at 85-86.
15.Id. at 51.
16.Id. at 51.
17.Id. at 51.
18.Id. at 241-256.
19.Id. at 50.
20.Id. at 51, 246.
21.Id. at 88-110.
22.Id. at 214-225.
23.Id. at 226-229.
24.Id. at 228.
25.Id. at 49-57-D.
26.Id. at 49-57.
27.Id. at 57-D.
28.Id. at 58-59. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the present Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 59, emphases in the original.)
29.Id. at 231-232.
30.Id. at 233-239.
31.Id. at 241-256.
32.Id. at 340-346.
33.Zuñiga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, 745 Phil. 171, 180 (2014).
34. 745 Phil. 171 (2014).
35.Id. at 180.
36.Abad v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 283 Phil. 500, 515 (1992).
37.Rollo, pp. 242-246.
38.Far East Bank v. Court of Appeals, 395 Phil. 701, 709 (2000).
39.Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay, 706 Phil. 378, 395 (2013).
40.Juana Complex I Homeowners Ass'n., Inc. v. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., 683 Phil. 415, 426 (2012).
41.Equitable Phil. Commercial International Bank v. CA, 469 Phil. 579, 589-590 (2004); Spouses Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372, 386 (2000); Robern Development Corp. v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 789 (1999).
42.Spouses Coronel v. Quesada, G.R. No. 237465, October 7, 2019.