FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 255977. November 11, 2021.]
MARIZON DELA CRUZ, petitioner,vs. GERARDO L. MENDOZA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated November 11, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 255977 — Marizon Dela Cruz v. Gerardo L. Mendoza
The petition must fail.
The acquittal of petitioner
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." A verdict of acquittal in favor of an accused, however, does not necessarily extinguish his or her civil liability. Manantan v. Court of Appeals1 explained the two kinds of acquittal recognized in our jurisdiction and their effects on the civil liability of the accused, thus:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Dayap v. Sendiong, 2 the Court further explained:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. (Emphasis supplied)
Here, petitioner was acquitted by the trial court because the transactions entered into by the parties were akin to a money market placement. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the money market transactions were in the nature of a loan which entailed the transfer of ownership of money so invested. As Gabionza v. Court of Appeals3 ordained, in a money market placement, the investor is a lender who loans his or her money to a borrower through a dealer. Here, respondent Gerardo L. Mendoza loaned his money to Flordeliza Marcelo and Tancio Construction through petitioner. When petitioner failed to return respondent's placement with the corresponding interest earned at the maturity date, the liability incurred by petitioner was only civil in nature. IDSEAH
Hence, while the prosecution failed to prove the elements of estafa, this does not mean that petitioner did not receive the P1,000,000.00 investment, let alone, dissolve her liability to return the said amount to respondent. Her civil liability may, therefore, still be proven through preponderance of evidence.
It means such quantum of evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. It is proof that leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence. 4
Petitioner is liable to pay
It is settled that the one who alleges payment has the burden of proving it. 5 Here, it is undisputed that respondent gave petitioner P1,000,000.00. Petitioner's claim that she had already returned to respondent even more than this amount is devoid of merit. On this score, we quote with concurrence the disquisition of the Court of Appeals, viz.:
On the items [petitioner] enumerated x x x, We can only give credence to [the] following as proof of payment:
Php50,000.00 as per Prudential Bank Peso Cash
Php500,000.00 as per Prudential Bank Peso Cash
Php7,500.00 as per Prudential Bank Peso Cash
Php25,000.00 as per Prudential Bank Peso Cash
Php200,000.00 as per Prudential Bank Peso Cash
All in all, these have a sum of Php782,500.00. We cannot give due course to the [other] amounts x x x, for being uncorroborated.
[Respondent] himself stated in his Reply Affidavit that he received certain amounts from [petitioner], consistent with [petitioner's] allegations. He narrated:
xxx xxx xxx
35. It should be noted that the deposit to my account made by [petitioner] on 02 November 2005 amounting to Pesos: Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) was in payment of the loan she secured prior to August 2005. Such loan was granted in lieu of the ties I had with [petitioner], as she was a former classmate. x x x
35.1 The amount she deposited on 26 September 2005 [Php50,000.00], 24 November 2005 [Php32,500], 27 March 2006 [Php200,000.00] were all monthly dividends that she promised would be delivered. 6
All told, since petitioner had in fact established that the amount of P782,500.00 had already been returned to respondent, petitioner's remaining liability should only be P217,500.00.
Interest
Nacar v. Gallery Frames7 decrees that in the absence of express stipulation regarding the interest rate, as in here, the twelve percent (12%) interest rate per annum in Eastern Shipping Lines v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Mercantile Insurance Company, Inc.8 applies until June 30, 2013. From July 1, 2013, the new interest rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall apply pursuant to BSP-MB Circular No. 799. Thus: aCIHcD
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. 9
Applying Nacar, the amount of P217,500.00 shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from July 25, 2006 or the date of extra-judicial demand to June 30, 2013; and thereafter, at six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. Further, the total monetary award due to respondent shall earn legal interest at six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 11, 2020 and Resolution dated February 22, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 111341 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Marizon Dela Cruz is ordered to pay respondent Gerardo L. Mendoza P217,500.00 with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum reckoned from July 25, 2006 until June 30, 2013, and thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum until finality of this resolution. This award shall further earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. 403 Phil. 298, 308-309 (2001).
2. 597 Phil. 127, 141 (2009).
3. See 586 Phil. 606, 621 (2008).
4. See Evangelista v. Spouses Andolong, 800 Phil. 189, 195 (2016).
5. See Gumabon v. Philippine National Bank, 791 Phil. 101, 117 (2016).
6.Rollo, pp. 56-57.
7. 716 Phil. 267 (2013).
8. 304 Phil. 236 (1994).
9.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, supra at 282-283.