FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 218377. May 14, 2021.]
ERNESTO DE VILLA, petitioner, vs.ESMERALDA EDEN MALLO AND SUSAN C. TAN, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated May 14, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 218377 (Ernesto De Villa, Petitioner, v. Esmeralda Eden Mallo and Susan C. Tan, Respondents). — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to partially appeal and modify the Decision 2 dated 19 November 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated 19 May 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96687. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision 4 dated 06 December 2010 of Branch 71, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68961.
Antecedents
The case emanated from a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Mortgage, Cancellation of Certificate of Title and Damages filed by Spouses Ernesto (Ernesto) and Pilar (Pilar) De Villa (collectively, Spouses De Villa) against respondents Esmeralda Eden Mallo (Mallo) and Susan C. Tan (Tan). 5
Per Complaint, Pilar (already married to Ernesto), together with her father Regino Cruz (Regino) and her other siblings, namely: Buenaventura Cruz (Buenaventura), Antonio Cruz (Antonio), Fernando Cruz (Fernando), Renato Cruz (Renato), and Celia Cruz (Celia), were co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118161. One half of the land belonged to Regino, and the other half belonged to the children in equal shares. An apartment was eventually erected on the property and covered by Tax Declaration No. B-018-12726. 6
Upon the death of Regino in 1993 and with Fernando having already died unmarried and without issue, Buenaventura, Antonio, Pilar, Renato, and Cely executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate and adjudicated among themselves in five (5) equal shares the other one-half of said land and apartment building. 7
After the settlement, the aforesaid co-owners verbally agreed that a specific portion of the property, with an area of 106 square meters (including part of the apartment building), would go to Pilar as her share. On 13 December 1993, Spouses De Villa leased a portion of the apartment to Luis Ablaza, Jr. for five (5) years from February 1994 to January 1999. Sometime in 1994, Spouses De Villa constructed a three (3)-unit apartment building behind the old apartment — two (2) units were leased out and the remaining unit was occupied by their son, Marlon De Villa (Marlon). 8
On 23 September 1998, Pilar, Buenaventura, Celia, Renato, and Mary Ngo Uy executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Atty. Andrew Ferrer (Atty. Ferrer) authorizing him to do the following specific acts: ISHaCD
To receive and acknowledge receipt from the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, and thereafter to take possession, the certificate of title of our respective shares in the parcel of land (as partitioned) located at Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118161.
To sell, transfer, mortgage and convey unto any third person/s or entity our respective shares in the aforementioned parcel of land and to sign, execute and deliver any and all papers and documents necessary to effect the foregoing undertaking. 9
The SPA was duly registered and inscribed on the title on 11 January 2000. 10
Pilar, however, executed a Revocation of the SPA given to Atty. Ferrer on 29 November 1999. The revocation was not inscribed on the title, but was entered in the Register of Deed's Primary Book on 14 December 1999. 11
Sometime in 1999, Atty. Ferrer, as attorney-in-fact, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Mallo for the sale of the entire property, including improvements, for a consideration of Php14,000,000.00. On 20 December 1999, Atty. Ferrer executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mallo for Php3,000,000.00. Consequently, TCT No. PT-111801 was issued in Mallo's name on 11 January 2000. 12
On 07 February 2000, Mallo executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Tan for Php4,000,000.00 as security for a loan. Upon Mallo's failure to pay her indebtedness, the property was foreclosed and sold at public auction on 22 August 2000, with Tan as the highest bidder. At the time of the mortgage and the foreclosure, Spouses De Villa and the tenants were still in physical possession of the property. On 10 September 2001, the Certificate of Sale was annotated on TCT No. PT-111801, and on 30 August 2004, TCT No. PT-125262 covering the entire parcel of land was issued in the name of Tan. 13
Spouses De Villa claimed they only learned about the Deed of Sale in favor of Mallo, the annotation in the title, and the new title issued to her, on 06 January 2000. 14 They filed the complaint for annulment of sale on 22 May 2002, 15 alleging the following: (1) they did not receive any amount as proceeds of the alleged sale; (2) at the time Atty. Ferrer entered into a MOA with Mallo, the SPA had already been revoked; 16 and (3) at the time of the sale to Mallo and mortgage to Tan, the property was occupied by Marlon and the Ablaza Pawnshop. 17
Mallo, in her Answer, denied all the material allegations in the complaint and maintained that she is the absolute owner of the subject property in question. 18 Mallo argued that the revocation of Atty. Ferrer's SPA is invalid and would not bind her, a third party, who relied on it in good faith, especially considering that said revocation was not annotated in TCT No. 118161. 19 Mallo opted not to present any evidence during trial. 20
For her part, Tan averred that Mallo offered the commercial property covered by TCT No. PT-111801 with Tax Declaration No. 018-12418 as collateral for a contract of loan. Tan and her brother went to the Assessor's Office of the Registry of Pasig and verified the title. Tan's brother also inspected the site. Since the title was clean, she granted the loan in the amount of Php4,000,000.00 and a Real Estate Mortgage was executed on 07 February 2000. The loan was payable in three (3) months. For Mallo's failure to pay her loan despite demand, Tan filed for extra-judicial foreclosure and the notice of Auction was set on 22 August 2000. On said auction date, Tan was awarded the Certificate of Sale as the highest bidder. After the one (1)-year redemption period, Mallo failed to redeem the property. Subsequently, a Writ of Possession dated 12 May 2003 was issued in favor of Tan. She thereafter caused the transfer of the title of the property and a new TCT No. PT-125262 was issued in her name. 21
Tan insisted that since the subject property is registered and covered by TCT No. PT-111801, she need not go beyond the certificate of title to determine the true owner and the condition of the property so as to guard or protect her interest. The law only requires her to look or rely on the entire TCT. Prior to the registration of the mortgage, there was nothing on the face of the title that there was a claim, lien or charge over the property. 22
After trial on the merits, the RTC issued a Decision in favor of Mallo and Tan and dismissed Spouses De Villa's complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that without proper annotation on the title, the revocation of the SPA does not prejudice Mallo, and that Tan is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith. 23
Dissatisfied, Spouses De Villa filed an appeal with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
On 19 November 2014, 24 the CA partially granted the petition, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The questioned Decision dated December 6, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 68961 is MODIFIED such that the Deed of Absolute Sale contracted by defendant-appellee Mallo with the agent, whose authority was already revoked by plaintiffs-appellants spouses, is declared unenforceable. The rest of the Decision stands.
SO ORDERED.25
In partially granting the Petition, the CA held that: (1) since the SPA was revoked, the Contract of Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mallo is unenforceable as to Spouses De Villa's share; (2) this notwithstanding, Tan is a purchaser in good faith and for value; and (3) hence, Spouses De Villa can no longer seek the reconveyance of the property. 26
The CA noted that the Spouses De Villa's revocation of the SPA in favor of Atty. Ferrer was by virtue of a public instrument, acknowledged by a notary public, and entered and filed with the Primary Entry Books of the Register of Deeds. Considering that under Articles 1919 (1) and 1920 of the Civil Code, an agency is extinguished by revocation expressly or impliedly, said revocation by Spouses De Villa is sufficient to terminate the principal-agent relationship between them and Atty. Ferrer. Pursuant to Article 1921 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that Mallo be notified of the revocation. Notice of said revocation to the Register of Deeds would suffice and third parties are constructively notified of said revocation. 27
Further, Mallo cannot invoke good faith or mere reliance on the annotation of the Certificate of Title, which contains the SPA. Settled is the rule that a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. If he does not make such an inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent's authority and his ignorance of that authority will not be any excuse. 28 Mallo's claim of good faith is negated by her failure to verify the extent and nature of Atty. Ferrer's authority, for she knew that she was merely transacting with an agent. Hence, she is not entitled to the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith and for value. 29
Necessarily, the CA pronounced that the absence of a contract of agency renders the contract of sale unenforceable under Article 1403 (1) in relation to Article 1316 of the Civil Code. Consequently, the sale contracted by Mallo with Atty. Ferrer as to Spouses De Villa's share in the subject property cannot be enforced by any action in court against the former or their successors-in-interest. Consequently, the title issued pursuant to said unenforceable contract of sale is null and void with regard to the 1/5 share of the Spouses De Villa in the property. 30
This notwithstanding, the CA ruled that Tan relied in good faith on the certificate of title of the property given to her as security. Since the law does not require a person dealing with registered land to go beyond the certificate of title to determine the liabilities attaching to the property, the void title became a valid title in the hands of Tan, an innocent purchaser for value. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC that Tan is a mortgagee/purchaser in good faith. 31
Since the subject property had already passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser in good faith, Spouses De Villa can no longer seek reconveyance of the property in issue. The CA held that the Spouses are entitled to be reimbursed of the value of their portion of the subject property by Mallo, who caused the transfer of the same to third persons. 32
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 19 May 2015. 33 During the pendency of the case, Pilar died. 34 Hence, this petition was filed solely by Ernesto.
Issue
Aggrieved by the CA's Decision, Ernesto is now before this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Tan is a purchaser in good faith. 35
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, We note that the issue of whether one is a purchaser or mortgagee in good faith generally cannot be entertained in a petition filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The ascertainment of good faith or the lack thereof, and the determination of negligence are factual matters that lay outside the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. 36 This rule, however, is subject to a number of exceptions, including when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant facts, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and when the judgment of the CA is premised on misapprehension of facts, 37 as in the case at bar. cCHITA
The Court expounds.
The sale to Mallo is
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign, or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 38
Further, in a catena of decisions, this Court had repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. 39
This Court has likewise clarified in Bulatao v. Estonactoc40 that while Article 493 of the Civil Code may not squarely cover the situations wherein a co-owner, without the consent of the other co-owners, alienate, assign or mortgage (1) the entire co-owned property; (2) a specific portion of the co-owned property; (3) an undivided portion less than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner; and (4) an undivided portion more than the part pertaining to the disposing co-owner, the principle of estoppel bars the disposing co-owner from disavowing the sale to the full extent of his undivided or pro-indiviso share or part in the co-ownership, subject to the outcome of the partition. Article 493 limits the effect of the alienation or mortgage to the portion that may be allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. DETACa
Prescinding from above, a co-owner may, without a doubt, alienate his undivided share in the co-owned property.
Here, since Pilar's co-owners authorized Atty. Ferrer to sell their undivided shares in the property and only Pilar revoked 41 her authorization, 42 the sale to Mallo is valid except as to Pilar's undivided share in the property. Mallo, therefore, became Pilar's co-owner from the perfection of the Deed of Absolute Sale on 20 December 1999.
Given the foregoing, We agree with the CA's pronouncement that the sale of the subject property is unenforceable as to Pilar's undivided share. 43
Tan is not a purchaser in good
In assailing the CA Decision, Ernesto averred that Tan is a buyer in bad faith due to the following reasons: (1) Tan was aware that the Spouses De Villa and Marlon occupied the subject property; (2) Tan knew that there were pawnshops and stores on the property; and (3) despite knowledge that Mallo is not in actual possession of the property in issue, Tan failed to ask Mallo how she acquired the property, nor did Tan ask the occupants to verify the Mallo's title. 44
We agree with Ernesto.
For a person to be considered a purchaser in good faith or innocent purchaser for value, 45 he or she should buy the property without notice that another person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and should pay a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. 46 A buyer who could not have failed to know or discover that the land sold to him was in the adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. 47 Notably, the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other (beneficiary of an) encumbrance for value. 48
As to registered and titled land, the purchaser has no obligation to inquire beyond the four corners of the title. To prove good faith, he must only show that he relied on the face of the title to the property, and such proof of good faith is sufficient. However, the rule applies only when the following conditions concur, namely: one, the seller is the registered owner of the land; two, the latter is in possession thereof; and three, the buyer was not aware at the time of the sale of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property. Absent any of the foregoing conditions, the buyer has the duty to exercise a higher degree of diligence by scrutinizing the certificate of title and examining all factual circumstances in order to determine the seller's title and capacity to transfer any interest in the property. 49
Verily, one cannot rely upon the indefeasibility of a TCT in view of the doctrine that the defense of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not extend to transferees who take the certificate of title in bad faith. 50
This Court further reiterates that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon him who asserts that status and it is not sufficient to invoke the ordinary presumption of good faith, that is, that everyone is presumed to have acted in good faith. 51 To be sure, similar to a buyer, the status of a mortgagee in good faith is never presumed but must be proven by the person invoking it. 52
With the foregoing principles in mind, We hold that Tan could not be considered as a purchaser in good faith and for value. Based on her own disclosures during the trial, she had actual notice of facts that should have put her on deeper inquiry into Mallo's capacity to mortgage and sell the property in issue.
Tan herself admitted before the lower court that she knew at the time of mortgage that the subject property was occupied not by Mallo but by Spouses De Villa and Marlon, to wit:
Q But it was only your brother who went to the property upon your instruction for him to tell whether or not the property was commercial area?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You filed a petition for writ of possession on the property that we are talking about?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are [sic] you filed that because there were occupants in that property, is that correct? But you were not able to remove all occupants from the property, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, the plaintiffs, the spouses De Villa, and their son Marlon De Villa are still in that property, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now after you had asked your brother Manuel Tan to inspect the property, he did not tell what was the condition of the property when he inspected it?
A It's livable. There are some stores, there are pawnshops there.
Q In other words, he told you that there were occupants in the property?
A Yes, sir.
Q You yourself did not go to the property, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q When your brother Manuel Tan went to the property he was not with the defendant Ms. Mallo?
A Ah, no, sir.
Q Did you not ask defendant Mallo how she was able to acquire the property that we are talking about now?
A Well, I did not ask her because she showed me the title and everything. . .
Q Only yes or no. So you did not asked [sic] her on how she acquired the property, is that correct?
A No, sir. 53
While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the actual possessor. 54 This, Tan failed to do. TaDCEc
Indeed, where a purchaser was fully aware of another's possession of the lot he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to be an innocent purchaser for value. 55 A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact that would create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. 56 Because Tan was a mortgagee in bad faith, her foreclosure on the mortgage and the subsequent public auction sale of the subject property, in which Tan was the highest bidder, are null and void with respect to the Spouses De Villa's share in the subject property. 57
All told, there is absolutely no doubt in the mind of the Court that Tan was not innocent purchaser of the subject property. In light of the foregoing, Tan merely stepped into the shoes of Mallo and acquired only the rights and obligations that the latter had over the property. Thus, even as Tan has been issued a certificate of title over the entire property, she only acquired what validly pertains to Mallo in the event of partition. Therefore, what Tan holds is only the share pertaining to the co-owner who did not consent to the sale and subsequent mortgage, i.e., petitioner, in trust for the latter pending partition. 58
Upon Pilar's death, her share
We note that upon the death of Pilar, the conjugal partnership of Pilar and Ernesto over her share in the subject property was automatically dissolved and terminated pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code and the successional rights of her heirs vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code. 59
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between the surviving spouse, Ernesto, on one hand, and the heirs of Pilar, on the other. 60 Hence, Pilar's share in the subject property will now be transmitted to Ernesto and her heirs.
Damages and Attorney's
Ernesto has asked this Court to order respondents to pay "minimal" damages in the amount of Php20,000.00, attorney's fees in the amount of Php200,000.00, appearance fee in the amount of Php2,000.00 per appearance, and the cost of suit. 61
In a normal setting, this Court would have entrusted to the trial court the determination of the proper amount to be paid and the period within which to pay. However, by doing so, this Court will merely prolong the proceedings and delay the relief to which the parties are duly entitled. As such, this Court finds it proper to set the award of damages and the date wherein respondents should tender the amount due based on the available evidence presented. 62
Admittedly, Spouses De Villa have failed to pray for and substantiate an award for actual damages. This notwithstanding, We find an award for nominal damages to be in order. 63
Nominal damages are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." 64 So long as there is a showing of a violation of the right of the plaintiff, an award of nominal damages is proper. 65 These damages are justified especially when common sense dictates that a pecuniary loss has indeed been suffered, but is incapable of precise computation. They are adjudicated, not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered, but for vindicating or recognizing their right to a property that has been violated or invaded, 66 as in this case. It is also settled that "the amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances." 67
In the case at bar, this Court recognizes that Spouses De Villa were unduly deprived of their ownership rights over their share in the property, and was compelled to litigate for its recovery, for almost nineteen (19) years. Clearly, this could have entitled them to actual or compensatory damages had they quantified and proved, during trial, the amounts which could have accrued in their favor, including commercial fruits such as reasonable rent covering the pendency of the case. Nonetheless, their failure to prove actual or compensatory damages does not erase the fact that their property rights were unlawfully invaded by respondents, entitling them to nominal damages. 68
Considering the length of time Spouses De Villa were deprived of their share in the property, We deem that Ernesto and Pilar's heirs are entitled to an award of Php75,000.00 as nominal damages. Moreover, respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the said amount, attorney's fees in the amount of an additional Php75,000.00 pursuant to Article 2208 (2), and the costs of the suit, 69 to be paid within sixty (60) days from the finality of this Resolution. 70 Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards reckoned from the finality of this Resolution is likewise imposed. 71
Given that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Mallo is unenforceable as regards the share of Spouses De Villa in the property, 72 and considering that Tan is not an innocent purchaser in good faith and for value, the Court finds merit in the instant Petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 19 November 2014 and the Resolution dated 19 May 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96687 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING NULL and VOID the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 December 1999 executed between Atty. Andrew Ferrer and Esmeralda Eden Mallo with respect to the share of Pilar De Villa; 73
2. DECLARING NULL and VOID the Real Estate Mortgage dated 07 February 2000 with respect to the share of Pilar De Villa; 74
3. DIRECTING the Register of Deeds of Pasig City to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-111801 in the name of Esmeralda Eden Mallo and to restore Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118161 with all its original annotations prior to the annotation of the sale to Esmeralda Eden Mallo and the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 118161; 75
4. DIRECTING the Register of Deeds of Pasig City to CANCEL any and all certificates of title traced from Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-111801, specifically Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-125262 in the name of Susan C. Tan; 76
5. DECLARING Susan C. Tan as co-owner of the subject property with respect to the undivided share of the other co-owners, namely Buenaventura Cruz, Celia Cruz, Renato Cruz and Mary Ngo Uy; 77
6. ORDERING respondents Esmeralda Eden Mallo and Susan C. Tan to pay petitioner Ernesto De Villa and Pilar's heirs the amounts of Php75,000.00 as nominal damages, Php75,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit; 78
7. ORDERING the reconveyance of the share of the property to petitioner Ernesto De Villa upon partition; 79 and
8. REMANDING the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine the exact extent of the respective rights, interests, shares, and participation of petitioner Ernesto De Villa and other co-owners over the subject property and, thereafter, effect a final division, adjudication, and partition in accordance with law. 80
The Writ of Possession issued in favor of Susan C. Tan and all proceedings relative thereto, are further SET ASIDE, considering that the latter's specific possessory rights to the said properties remain undetermined. 81
The total monetary award shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. CDHaET
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 21-38.
2.Id. at 7-16; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and Socorro B. Inting of the Seventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.
3.Id. at 17.
4.Id. at 59-65; penned by Judge Franco T. Falcon.
5.Id. at 7.
6.Id. at 7-8.
7.Id. at 44.
8.Id. at 8.
9.Id.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id. at 8-9.
13.Id. at 9.
14.Id.
15.Id. at 43.
16.Id. at 8-9.
17.Id. at 9-10.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 11.
20.Id.
21.Id. at 10.
22.Id. at 9.
23.Id. at 10, 63-65.
24.Id. at 7-16.
25.Id. at 16.
26.Id. at 11-16.
27.Id. at 11-13.
28.Id.
29.Id. at 13-14.
30.Id. at 14-15.
31.Id. at 15.
32.Id. at 16.
33.Id. at 17.
34.Id. at 22.
35.Id. at 30-32.
36.See Spouses Miles v. Lao, 821 Phil. 455 (2017); G.R. No. 209544, 22 November 2017 [Per J. Tijam].
37.See Spouses Belvis v. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, 24 July 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
38.Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 734 Phil. 623 (2014); G.R. No. 182839, 02 June 2014 [Per J. Brion].
39.Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid, 748 Phil. 587 (2014); G.R. No. 187987, 26 November 2014, 748 Phil. 587 (2014) [Per J. Perez].
40. G.R. No. 235020, 10 December 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
41.Rollo, p. 8.
42.See Mercado v. Allied Banking Corp., 555 Phil. 411 (2007); G.R. No. 171460, 27 July 2007 [Per J. Chico-Nazario]; Yoshizaki v. Joy Training Center of Aurora, Inc., 715 Phil. 609 (2013); G.R. No. 174978, 31 July 2013 [Per J. Brion].
43.Id.
44.Rollo, pp. 32-35.
45.See Heirs of Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081, 19 June 2019 [Per J. Caguioa]; Melendres v. Catambay, G.R. No. 198026, 28 November 2018 [Per J. Caguioa].
46.EEG Development Corp. v. Heirs of De Castro, G.R. No. 219694, 26 June 2019 [Per C.J. Bersamin].
47.Heirs of Spouses Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081, 19 June 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
48.Spouses Macadangdang v. Spouses Martinez, 490 Phil. 774 (2005); G.R. No. 158682, 31 January 2005 [Per J. Corona].
49.Supra at note 46.
50.Melendres v. Catambay, G.R. No. 198026, 28 November 2018 [Per J. Caguioa]; see also Spouses Sy v. De Vera-Navarro, G.R. No. 239088, 03 April 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
51.Id.
52.Dadis v. Spouses De Guzman, 810 Phil. 749 (2017); G.R. No. 206008, 07 June 2017 [Per J. Peralta].
53.Rollo, pp. 32-33, 54-56.
54.Magsano v. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., 797 Phil. 392 (2016); G.R. No. 215038, 17 October 2016 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe].
55.See Spouses Sy v. De Vera-Navarro, G.R. No. 239088, 03 April 2019 [Per J. Caguioa] and Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 652 (1998); G.R. No. 117384, 21 October 1998 [Per J. Romero].
56.Melendres v. Catambay, G.R. No. 198026, 28 November 2018 [Per J. Caguioa].
57.Games and Garments Developers, Inc. v. Allied Banking Corp., 763 Phil. 573 (2015); G.R. No. 181426, 13 July 2015 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].
58.Supra at note 54.
59.Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, 734 Phil. 623 (2014); G.R. No. 182839, 02 June 2014 [Per J. Brion].
60.Id.
61.Rollo, p. 35.
62.See Royal Plains View, Inc. v. Mejia, G.R. No. 230832, 12 November 2018 [Per J. J.C. Reyes, Jr.].
63.See Locsin v. Hizon, 743 Phil. 420 (2014); G.R. No. 204369, 17 September 2014 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].
64.Id.
65.Id. citing Almeda v. Cariño, 443 Phil. 182 (2003); G.R. No. 152143, 13 January 2003 [Per J. Mendoza].
66.Supra at 66.
67.Fontana Resort and Country Club, Inc. v. Spouses Tan, 680 Phil. 395 (2012); G.R. No. 154670, 30 January 2012 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro].
68.See Locsin v. Hizon, 743 Phil. 420 (2014); G.R. No. 204369, 17 September 2014 [Per J. Velasco, Jr.].
69.Id.; Spouses Tan v. Bantegui, 510 Phil. 434 (2005); G.R. No. 154027, 24 October 2005 [Per J. Panganiban].
70.Supra at note 62.
71.Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013); G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013 [Per J. Peralta].
72.Supra at note 42.
73.Supra at note 56; supra at note 58.
74.Supra at note 58.
75.See Spouses Sy v. De Vera-Navarro, G.R. No. 239088, 03 April 2019 [Per J. Caguioa].
76.Supra at note 56; supra at note 58.
77.Supra at note 58.
78.See Gabutan v. Nacalaban, 788 Phil. 546 (2016); G.R. Nos. 185857-58 & 194314-15, 29 June 2016 [Per J. Jardaleza].
79.Id.
80.Supra at note 58.
81.Id.