De Leon v. People

SECOND DIVISION

[UDK-15083. July 14, 2021.]

PATRICIA DE LEON, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARLYN P. TOMAS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated14 July 2021which reads as follows:

"UDK-15083 (Patricia De Leon v. People of the Philippines and Marlyn P. Tomas). — This resolves the petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 2 dated January 20, 2014 and Resolution 3 dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 34529.

The Antecedents

Sometime in 2006, petitioner Patricia De Leon (De Leon) borrowed money from private respondent Marlyn P. Tomas (Tomas). To secure the payment of the loan, De Leon issued fourteen (14) postdated checks in favor of Tomas totaling Six Hundred Fifty-Four Thousand Pesos (PhP654,000.00). 4

The checks were as follows: 5

 

Check Number	Date of Check	Amount
2553403	March 30, 2007	10,000.00
2553413	April 30, 2007	10,000.00
2553423	June 10, 2007	7,000.00
3113511	November 15, 2007	150,000.00
3113520	November 25, 2007	5,500.00
3113534	November 28, 2007	40,000.00
3113521	November 30, 2007	5,500.00
3113522	November 30, 2007	21,000.00
3113523	December 30, 2007	21,000.00
3113524	January 31, 2008	21,000.00
3113525	February 28, 2008	21,000.00
3113526	March 31, 2008	21,000.00
3113510	April 08, 2008	300,000.00
3113527	April 31, 2008	21,000.00

 

When Tomas encashed the checks, the drawee bank dishonored them for the reason "account closed." Tomas subsequently discovered that De Leon's bank account had been closed on October 31, 2007. Tomas notified De Leon orally of the dishonor and demanded that she pay the value of the checks within five (5) days, but such plea fell on deaf ears. Thus, on February 3, 2009, Tomas, through counsel, sent De Leon a demand letter reiterating her earlier request, but De Leon still failed to comply. 6

This prompted Tomas to file with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur fourteen (14) complaints against De Leon for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22. The cases were docketed as follows: 7

 

Check Number	Date of Check	Docket Number
2553403	March 30, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3769
2553413	April 30, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3770
2553423	June 10, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3771
3113511	November 15, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3772
3113520	November 25, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3773
3113534	November 28, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3774
3113521	November 30, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3775
3113522	November 30, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3776
3113523	December 30, 2007	Criminal Case No. 3777
3113524	January 31, 2008	Criminal Case No. 3778
3113525	February 28, 2008	Criminal Case No. 3779
3113526	March 31, 2008	Criminal Case No. 3780
3113510	April 08, 2008	Criminal Case No. 3781
3113527	April 31, 2008	Criminal Case No. 3782

 

De Leon pleaded not guilty to all charges. 8

De Leon contended that she had already paid the value of the checks. In fact, on account of her prior full payment, Tomas extended her a new loan. She asserted, however, that Tomas did not issue receipts for her payments. She also did not ask for the return of the checks. 9

In a Joint Judgment 10 dated July 18, 2011, the MCTC convicted De Leon of twelve (12) counts of violation of BP 22. The MCTC held that the prosecution was able to prove all elements of the offense vis-à-vis the dishonored checks dated June 10, 2007 onwards. However, for the checks dated March 30, 2007 and April 30, 2007, the MCTC found that the same were stale when presented for payment. Thus, the MCTC acquitted De Leon in Criminal Case Nos. 3769 and 3770. The dispositive portion of the MCTC Joint Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case Nos. 3769 and 3770[,] for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is hereby ACQUITTED. However, she is hereby ordered to pay the face value of Robinsons Savings Bank Checks Nos. 2553403 and 2553413 in the total amount of Twenty Thousand (Php20,000.00) Pesos with legal interest from October 31, 2009 until fully paid.

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 3780, 3781, and 3782, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Six (6) months for each count, or a total of Six (6) years. As civil indemnity, accused is hereby ordered to pay also the face value of the Twelve (12) checks in the total amount of Six Hundred Thirty[-]Four (Php634,000.00) Pesos with legal interest from October 31, 2009 until fully paid. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 11

On appeal, De Leon claimed that she was wrongly convicted by the MCTC since the prosecution failed to show the particular dates when the checks were presented for payment. Such failure engendered reasonable doubt as to whether the checks had become stale upon encashment. In addition, De Leon argued that, assuming she was indeed guilty, prevailing jurisprudence removed imprisonment as a penalty for violation of BP 22. Consequently, she should have been fined instead. 12

In a Judgment 13 dated October 26, 2011, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 27 affirmed De Leon's conviction. However, it modified the penalty by ordering that the prison term for each count be served simultaneously. The dispositive portion of the RTC Judgment states:

Wherefore, the assailed judgment convicting the accused is AFFIRMED and this instant Appeal is hereby DISMISSED. But the penalty imposed is hereby modified as follows: In Criminal Case Nos. 3771, 3772, 3773, 3774, 3775, 3776, 3777, 3778, 3779, 3780, 3781, and 3782, renumbered as Criminal Case Nos. 2011-0365 to 2011-0376[,] the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Six (6) months for each count, to be served simultaneously. As civil indemnity, accused is hereby ordered to pay to the private complainant the face value of the twelve (12) checks in the total amount of Pesos: Six Hundred Thirty[-]Four Thousand (P634,000.00) with legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from October 31, 2009 until fully paid. Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED. 14

Undaunted, De Leon appealed the RTC Judgment to the CA. However, in a Decision 15 dated January 20, 2014, the appellate court affirmed her conviction. The CA rejected De Leon's contention that there is uncertainty as to when the checks were actually presented for encashment. The appellate court reasoned that the checks did not bear or state the word "stale" on their faces. Thus, the presumption is that they were duly presented within reasonable time. The CA likewise rejected De Leon's argument that jurisprudence has eliminated the penalty of imprisonment for violations of BP 22, citing Administrative Circular No. 13-2001.

As to the penalty, however, the CA modified the RTC Judgment in that the prison sentences should be served successively instead of simultaneously. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 October 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Naga City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION in that the petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalties of imprisonment of six (6) months for each of the twelve (12) counts for Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to be served successively.

SO ORDERED.16

De Leon moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution 17 dated April 30, 2014.

Hence, this petition.

De Leon reiterates her argument that her conviction should be reversed on account of the uncertainty as to when the checks were presented for payment. She also asserts that imprisonment is no longer a proper penalty for violations of BP 22. 18

In its Comment 19 dated November 25, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the petition raises factual matters that are beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition. In any case, the OSG argues that De Leon's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As to De Leon's assertions, the OSG counters that the exact date of presentment of the checks is immaterial in proving De Leon's guilt. Lastly, the OSG asserts that the prison sentence imposed for each count should be served successively, citing Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

In her Comment 20 dated December 1, 2014, Tomas echoes the OSG's arguments. In addition, Tomas questions the statement of material dates averred in the petition. She points to an Entry of Judgment 21 dated June 7, 2014 issued by the CA. Tomas surmises that the CA would not have issued an entry of judgment if De Leon in fact timely filed her petition.

In a Resolution 22 dated June 29, 2015, we directed De Leon to file her reply. However, De Leon failed to comply with our directive despite notice. Hence, in the interest of speedy administration of justice, we dispense with the filing of the reply and proceed to resolve the case.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

At the outset, the petition is marred with the following procedural defects: (1) non-payment of docket and other lawful fees pursuant to Rule 45, Section 3 in relation to Rule 56, Section 5 (c) of the Rules of Court; (2) no proof of service on the Court of Appeals and adverse party pursuant to Rule 56, Section 5 (d) and Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court; (3) non-submission of a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed Resolution dated 30 April 2014 pursuant to Rule 45 Sections 4 (d) and 5 in relation to Rule 56, Section 5 (d) of the Rules of Court; (4) lack of verified statement of material date of filing of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45, Sections 4 (b) and 5 in relation to Rule 56, Section 5 (d) of the Rules of Court; and (5) non-submission of a soft copy of the petition in portable data format as required under A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC or the Efficient Use of Paper Rule.

On this score alone, we can dismiss the petition outright. But even if we resolve the case on the merits, we find that De Leon failed to sufficiently show any reversible error on the part of the appellate court. The CA correctly affirmed De Leon's conviction for twelve (12) counts of violation of BP 22.

This offense requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he or she does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 23

All the elements are present in this case.

As to the first and third elements, there is no dispute that in October 2006, De Leon issued twelve (12) checks in the aggregate amount of PhP634,000.00 as payment for the loan she obtained from Tomas. The checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank. Upon inquiry, Tomas discovered that De Leon's account had been closed since October 31, 2007.

As to the second element, De Leon evidently had knowledge that at the time the checks were issued, she did not have sufficient funds or credit to pay for their value. Since this element is difficult to establish, involving as it does a state of mind, Section 2 of BP 22 furnishes a legal presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds:

Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

Stated simply, the presumption becomes operative upon receipt of a written notice of dishonor and failure of the drawer or issuer to pay the value of the check within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice. 24 Conviction is therefore not automatic if a check bounces. The presumption being merely prima facie, the law gives the accused an opportunity to contradict it. 25

Here, Tomas sent De Leon the requisite notice of dishonor with a demand that the latter must pay the value of the checks within five (5) days from receipt. However, the demand went unheeded. Since the presumption under Section 2 of BP 22 was not controverted, the same has become conclusive.

With the presence of all the elements of the offense, we affirm De Leon's conviction.

As a last-ditch effort to exonerate herself, De Leon contends that there is uncertainty as to when the checks were presented to the drawee bank for payment. There is thus a possibility that they were dishonored for being stale, engendering reasonable doubt sufficient to warrant her acquittal.

We are not convinced.

Section 3 of BP 22 provides for another legal presumption of due presentment if the dishonored checks are introduced in evidence with the reason for their dishonor stamped on their faces, thus:

Section 3. Duty of drawee; rules of evidence. — x x x In all prosecutions under this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Here, the trial and appellate courts were in consonance that the checks were stamped with "account closed" as the reason for their dishonor. Consequently, the legal presumption under Section 3 of BP 22 — that the checks were duly presented and dishonored because De Leon closed her account with the drawee bank — has arisen. De Leon, however, failed to present controverting evidence to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, the presumption of due presentment is deemed conclusive against her. At any rate, it is standard banking practice to indicate if a check is dishonored for being stale, which is not the case here. Hence, there is sufficient proof that the checks were timely presented for payment.

As to the proper penalty, De Leon argues that imprisonment has been removed as a penalty for violation of BP 22.

We disagree.

In Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, 26 we clarified that imprisonment may still be imposed for violations of BP 22:

It is, therefore, understood that:

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

In Higa v. People, 27 we reiterated that Administrative Circular 12-2000 28 did not decriminalize violations of BP 22 or remove the alternative penalty of imprisonment. Rather, the circular merely establishes a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties under Section 1 of BP 22. 29 Judges are accorded the option, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to impose either a fine, imprisonment, or both, taking into account the peculiar circumstances of each case.

We also agree with the CA that the prison sentences should be served successively. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ARTICLE 70. Successive service of sentences. — When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit; otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been served out.

For the purpose of applying the provisions of the next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the penalties shall be determined in accordance with the following scale:

1. Death,

2. Reclusion perpetua,

3. Reclusion temporal,

4. Prision mayor,

5. Prision correccional,

6. Arresto mayor,

7. Arresto menor,

8. Destierro,

9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,

10. Temporary absolute disqualification,

11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow profession or calling, and

12. Public censure.

Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals the same maximum period.

Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (penal perpetua) shall be computed at thirty years.

This provision allows the simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. 30 The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. 31 Hence, where the accused is sentenced to two or more terms of imprisonment, the terms should be served successively. 32

On a final note, the RTC Judgment, which was affirmed by the CA, imposed a legal interest of 12% on the civil indemnity representing the aggregate amount of the dishonored checks. In light of recent jurisprudence, we modify the interest imposed.

Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames33 and Lara's Gift and Decors, Inc. v. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., 34 we rule that the amount of PhP634,000.00, which is the total value of the dishonored checks, shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaints until June 30, 2013 and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Resolution. The total amount shall further earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from its finality until payment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 20, 2014 and Resolution dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Patricia De Leon's conviction is AFFIRMED and she is sentenced to suffer the penalties of imprisonment of six (6) months for each of the twelve (12) counts for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, to be served successively.

Petitioner Patricia De Leon is ORDERED to pay private respondent the amount of PhP634,000.00, representing the total value of the worthless checks, which shall earn interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the filing of the complaints until June 30, 2013 and thereafter, at the rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until finality of this Resolution. The total amount shall further earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from its finality until full payment.

SO ORDERED." (J. Lopez, J., designated additional member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 2-17.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, with the concurrence of Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (a retired member of this Court) and Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro; id. at 26-37.

3. Penned by Associate Justice Manuel M. Barrios, with the concurrence of Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (a retired member of this Court) and Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro; id. at 38. Only an incomplete photocopy of the April 30, 2014 CA Resolution is attached to the petition.

4.Id. at 27.

5.Id.

6.Id. at 27-28.

7.Id. at 45-52.

8.Id. at 52.

9.Id. at 28.

10. Penned by Judge Laurence A. Puto, id. at 42-60.

11.Id. at 59.

12.Id. at 29.

13. Penned by Judge Leo L. Intia, id. at 18-25.

14.Id. at 25.

15.Id. at 26-37.

16.Id. at 36.

17.Id. at 38.

18.Id. at 9-15.

19.Id. at 79-92.

20.Id. at 96-105.

21.Id. at 110.

22.Id. at 123-124.

23.San Mateo v. People, 705 Phil. 630, 636-637 (2013).

24. See Resterio v. People, 695 Phil. 693, 705 (2012).

25. See Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 421 (1986).

26. Issued on February 14, 2001.

27. 793 Phil. 248 (2016).

28. Re: Penalty for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Issued on November 21, 2000.

29.Higa v. People, supra note 27, at 257.

30.In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete C. Lagran, 415 Phil. 506, 510 (2001).

31.Id.

32.Id.

33. 716 Phil. 267, 281-283 (2013).

34. G.R. No. 225433, August 28, 2019.