De Leon v. Duterte

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 252118. May 8, 2020.]

DINO S. DE LEON, petitioner,vs. RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT THROUGH SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedMAY 8, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 252118 (Dino S. De Leon v. Rodrigo Roa Duterte, President of the Republic of the Philippines, and the Office of the President through Salvador C. Medialdea, in his capacity as Executive Secretary). — This resolves the Extremely Urgent Petition for Mandamus filed on April 13, 2020 by Dino S. De Leon (petitioner) against President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President) and the Office of the President (OP) through Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea (collectively, respondents). In light of the Enhanced Community Quarantine (ECQ) brought about by the COVID-19 1 pandemic, the petition was lodged before this Court via electronic filing. HTcADC

In his petition, petitioner alleged that the President has been absent from several engagements due to health reasons and also had prolonged absences from public view. 2 He further averred that the President appeared incoherent during the COVID-19 live press conference on March 12, 2020. Thus, on the same date, petitioner filed a Freedom of Information (FOI) Request 3 under Executive Order No. 2 (2016) 4 with the OP. Seeking to be clarified on the status of the President's health, petitioner specifically asked for copies of the President's latest medical examination results, health bulletins, and other health records. In response to his request, the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) sent to him an electronic mail 5 dated March 13, 2020 stating that it is unable to provide the information requested. The MRO explained that the records requested are neither on file nor in its possession and that it shall accommodate petitioner's request as soon as the requested information becomes available for release. Petitioner allegedly failed to get a response from the MRO after further inquiry and follow-ups 6 on the availability of the requested health records.

Thus, by way of the present petition for mandamus, petitioner seeks to: (1) compel respondents to disclose all the medical and psychological/psychiatric examination results, health bulletins, and other health records of the President ever since he assumed the Presidency; and (2) compel the President to undergo additional confirmatory medical and psychological/psychiatric examinations, which shall be publicly disclosed in order to ensure the accuracy of the health records to be released. Petitioner anchors his alleged right to be informed on the basis of Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, 7 Article III, in relation to Section 28, 8 Article II, of the 1987 Constitution (Constitution).

From petitioner's standpoint, Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution is a self-executing command. It states:

Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner argues that the illnesses acknowledged by the President, i.e., Buerger's Disease, Barrett's Esophagus, Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease, and Myasthenia Gravis, together with migraine and spinal issues, 9 are serious illnesses within the ambit of Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution. He also asserts that these illnesses should be considered in addition to the psychological report submitted in the course of the trial court proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage involving the President. The report stated that the President has "Antisocial and Narcissistic Personality Disorder." For petitioner, the alleged illnesses and psychological disorders of the President provide sufficient basis to trigger the right of the Filipino people to be informed under Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

The petition lacks merit.

The outright dismissal of the petition is proper since on its face, the petition failed to set forth his material allegations to establish a prima facie case for mandamus. 10 Whether petitioner is actually and ultimately entitled to the reliefs prayed for is exactly what is to be determined by the Court after a judicious study of the petition and its annexes. Regrettably, petitioner fell short of making a prima facie case for mandamus by failing to establish a legal right that was violated by respondents.

Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he/she: (1) unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; or (2) unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the course of law. 11 It is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act compelled. 12

The writ of mandamus, however, will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his/her duty to do or which it is his/her duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which the latter is not entitled by law. 13 The writ will issue only if the legal right to be enforced is well defined, clear, and certain. 14

It bears stressing that for a petition for mandamus to sufficiently allege a cause of action, petitioner must satisfy the following elements: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal right; and (3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right. 15 The cause of action does not accrue until the party obligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with the duty. 16

After a punctilious evaluation of the petition, the Court finds that the averments and arguments in the petition failed to establish a prima facie case for mandamus, i.e., that the reliefs sought constitute ministerial duties on the part of respondents, and that there is a clear legal right on petitioner's part to demand the performance of these ministerial duties.

Petitioner seeks to avail himself of the writ of mandamus, but he himself cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on Section 12, Article VII wherein the proponent thereof, Commissioner Blas F. Ople, stated that: "We are called upon to be more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate means to take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right to know of the presidency." 17 It was also further expressed in the deliberations that "the state of health or analysis as to the actual condition of the President should be left to the President and his doctor" and that "the burden [is left] to the Office of the President to choose the appropriate means of releasing information to the public." 18

Furthermore, petitioner alleges the serious illnesses purportedly suffered by the President, together with the personality disorders which complicate the management of the President's illnesses. The Court quotes in part petitioner's allegations, to wit:

22. The President's public admission of having been diagnosed of Myasthenia Gravis, Buerger's Disease, GERD, and Barrett's Esophagus, in addition to claimed "spinal issues" and "daily migraines" of undisclosed causes, paint a picture of a President afflicted with various serious illnesses, which at the minimum will cause serious inconvenience to and prejudice the discharge of his official duties. aScITE

xxx xxx xxx.

24. These illnesses should be considered in addition to the fact that the President has been found to have personality disorders. x x x To recall, the President was diagnosed with what his psychologist x x x termed as "Antisocial Narcissistic Personality Disorder." The condition, as diagnosed by the former President of the International Council of Psychologists, is said to be characterized by "gross indifference, insensitivity and self-centeredness,"a"grandiose sense of self-entitlement and manipulative behaviors," and "pervasive tendency to demean, humiliate others and violate their rights and feelings."

xxx xxx xxx.

30. These disorders only serve to complicate the position of the President. Not only does he have to endure the painstaking process of managing the incurable diseases he claims to be afflicted with, but in doing so, he also has to manage the complications posed by these personality disorders. x x x 19 (Citations omitted)

However, the above-stated claims are merely based on what he perceived from the online news articles discussing the President's illnesses. Worse, these news articles are, as the Court has consistently ruled, characterized as "hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted." 20

The Court also deems it proper to emphasize that in the recent months, the President has been visibly holding regular cabinet meetings, belying petitioner's insinuation that the President is suffering from serious illnesses. Further, the President's regular televised addresses to the nation as regards the government's response to the COVID-19 pandemic show that the President has been actively performing his official duties. Apparently, petitioner's allegation that the President is seriously ill is unsubstantiated and is based merely on petitioner's surmises and conjectures regarding his perception of the declining health of the President.

Based on the allegations in the petition itself, petitioner failed to establish the existence of a clear legal right that was violated, or that he is entitled to the writ of mandamus prayed for.

Needless to state, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the Extremely Urgent Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED.

The Court further Resolved to NOTE the:

"a. Agenda Report that the electronic mail dated April 20, 2020, containing the resolution dated April 17, 2020 addressed to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, Malacañang Palace, San Miguel, Manila at [email protected], was returned unserved with notation "The recipient server did not accept our requests to connect." per Mailer Daemon;

b. Manifestation dated April 21, 2020 filed by the petitioner, stating that a copy of the petition was served on the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on April 13, 2020; that a copy was tendered at the OSG Building in Makati City; and that due to the letter of the OSG designating an official e-mail address where it may be served with copies of any process, order or resolution of the Court, the instant pleading and a copy of the filed petition was furnished the OSG's at its official e-mail address, [email protected];

c. Letter dated April 28, 2020 of Bryan Ezra C. Gonzales, Tagapamuno, Kabataang Tagapagtanggol ng Karapatan (KATAPAT), submitting almost 11,000 signatures in support of the instant petition and requesting, among others, that the petition be given due course." (2) HEITAD

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETAClerk of Court

(With Dissenting Opinions of Associate Justices Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa)

Separate Opinions

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

With the greatest respect for my most esteemed colleagues, I regret that I must emphatically disagree with the majority that this Petition of extreme transcendental importance setting foundational doctrines can be decided without so much as a comment from respondents or the Office of the Solicitor General.

Most constitutional controversies involve a choice of protecting the rights of the sovereign or upholding the privileges and immunities of incumbents discharging temporary political positions. Protecting the temporary incumbent in one of the most important public positions during an international pandemic not only undermines overall public confidence in his leadership, but also creates an atrocious precedent, which invites abuse in the future. Far worse will be the impression that this Court avoids a fully litigated procedure to give proper meaning to a constitutional provision through a motu proprio dismissal. It undermines our independence and makes this Court vulnerable to a charge that we have ceased to be a sentinel of the fundamental rights of the sovereign people and enrobed ourselves with the garments of servility.

The public is entitled to know whether there are moments that the President is even temporarily and involuntarily unable to discharge his duties, which may cause the entire Executive to be run under the command of unelected officials. In my view, the publication of a regular and official medical bulletin pertaining to the health of the Chief Executive, who is also the Commander-in-Chief and the Head of State, especially during a period of national emergency, is of such negligible burden for a President who ran under a platform of persistent and courageous transparency.

During a public emergency, ordinary people who unwittingly become victims of COVID-19 disclose so much information about themselves which, during normal times, are private. Yet, through our ruling in this case, we demand less of a sacrifice from a leader who is supposed to represent those who ask for his official medical bulletin. Any interpretation of the Constitution should not result in such an inequitable and absurd result and, without compelling reasons, protect one in power and in a position of public trust. It is axiomatic that the health of the President in a democratic and republican state is of genuine and serious public concern.

With great respect, dismissing this Petition outright and with such dispatch underestimates the incumbent of the Office of the President. Regardless of any controversy pending with this Court, he has, in the past, shown resilience. Through various statements, they have committed to follow the final and wise collective interpretation of the Constitution and the law by the Supreme Court. We cannot allow ourselves, through an abbreviated proceeding, to provide protection for the President that he does not need. We have to trust that our interpretation of the power of the sovereign people, as clearly articulated in the Constitution, will be respected.

That is an essential element of the rule of law.

Petitioner has made a prima facie case of the need for this Court to consider the issues he has raised. We cannot, without a comment, make a doctrinal pronouncement as to the propriety of a petition for mandamus visa-vis the rights and duties emanating from Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution. Sadly, through an ex parte resolution, the majority seems comfortable with addressing and settling a doctrinal issue without due process of law and full adversarial deliberation between the parties.

I

The Petition at hand is one of first impression. It tackles a constitutional provision that has never been brought before this Court to he tested or defined. There is no existing jurisprudence that can unequivocally point us to the proper and legal resolution of the issues presented. As such, this Court must take the necessary journey to address the issues touching on the fundamental characteristics of a democracy: the sovereign, its representative state, the freedom of information, and open discourse in society.

Before this Court is an Extremely Urgent Petition for Mandamus filed by Dino S. De Leon, which seeks, among others, to compel President Rodrigo Roa Duterte and the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, to disclose all medical and psychological examination results and other health records of the President since he assumed position. 1

The majority, without asking for a comment, dismissed the Petition for lack of merit 2 and held that "petitioner fell short of making a prima facie case for mandamus by failing to establish a legal right that was violated by respondents." 3

II

I convey my discomfort on how hastily this Court dismissed the petition without any responsive pleading from respondents. It is as if, this Court itself supplied the arguments for the ease and convenience of the government.

It is true that an outright dismissal of a petition is discretionary upon this Court. It has the authority to dismiss a petition through a minute resolution or a full resolution stating all the reasons behind its dismissal, and may do so with or without a comment from respondents. However, given the procedural, substantive, and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner, I believe that it would be prudent for this Court to at least require the respondents to file the usual comment without necessarily giving due course to the Petition.

Similar to my dissent in Reyes v. Commission on Elections, 4 I respectfully register my opposition here, as I do not believe that there can be a fair outright dismissal of the case without at least a comment from respondents.

In Reyes, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Commission on Elections' resolution, which ordered the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy for Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. This Court, without requiring respondents to comment, found that the Commission on Elections did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case and dismissed Reyes' petition outright. In my dissent from the majority, I stated:

A Comment is required so that there may be a fuller exposition of the issues from the point of view of the respondent. It is also required to prevent any suspicion that judges and justices litigate, not decide. This Court has expressed its disfavor of some judges, thus:

We cannot close this opinion without expressing our disapproval of the action taken by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo in filing his own motion for reconsideration of the decision of the respondent court. He should be admonished for his disregard of a well-known doctrine imposing upon the judge the duty of detachment in case where his decision is elevated to a higher court for its review. The judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must leave it to the parties themselves to argue their respective positions and for the appellate court to rule on the matter without his participation. The more circumspect policy is to recognize one's role in the scheme of things, remembering always that the task of a judge is to decide and not to litigate. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

It cannot be denied that the main Resolution, though brief, introduced a doctrine relating to Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution without fully threshing out all the issues presented by petitioner. Ultimately, the decision will stand as a precedent insufficient to address all the intertwining rights and duties involved in the subject constitutional provision and will effectively leave the provision nugatory. Moreover, it is against the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, 6 which requires more than an outright dismissal when a new doctrine is to be established. Rule 13, Section 6 (a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court states:

SECTION 6. Manner of Adjudication. — The Court shall adjudicate cases as Follows:

(a) By decision, when the Court disposes of the case on its merits and its rulings have significant doctrinal values; resolve novel issues; or impact on the social, political, and economic life of the nation. The decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall bear the signatures of the Members who took part in the deliberation. (Emphasis supplied)

I agree with the insights of my colleagues, Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier. While both Justices voted to dismiss the petition outright, both believe that a comment should have first been required since doctrine was introduced in resolving this novel issue. In light of this, it can no longer be said that a majority was reached.

The Petition brings to fore the constitutional right of the people to know the medical health of the President under Article VII, Section 12, as well as the fundamental right to information of the sovereign enshrined in Article II, Section 1 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution. I do not believe that this Court can automatically say that petitioner failed to establish a right and concomitantly, a duty on the part of the executive branch, without comment from respondents.

I disagree that, without comment from respondents, this Court can immediately decide that Article VII, Section 12, by itself or in relation to Article III, Section 7 and Article II, Section 1 — along with the very concept of a representative and republic form of government — cannot be the source of a right or ministerial duty mentioned in the Petition.

Notably, it must be emphasized that this is the first Petition brought before this Court that asks to define the boundaries of the constitutional right of the people emanating from Article VII, Section 12 of the Constitution. As such, this Court should not pass upon this opportunity. In fact, we have a responsibility to address the substantial issues raised once and for all. This is at the very heart of judicial power, which includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." 7

To resolve the matter without a comment sacrifices the impartiality of this Court by allowing considerations not present in the single pleading before us to dictate our action with our own interpretation of circumstances unaided by the perspectives of the respondents. I cannot agree with the conclusion that petitioner failed to establish a legal right, and that the relief sought does not constitute ministerial duties on the part of respondents. In effect, we produced an argument that should have been raised by the respondents. Such a posture is procedurally unacceptable and may leave an impression that the Bench has lost its independence.

Judicial independence is imperative for a court to discharge its functions. From this emanates the courage to "make decisions that may be unpopular but nonetheless correct." 9 This is the bedrock of our country's judiciary. It was stated in Borromeo v. Mariano: 10

A history of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The American people considered it necessary "that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government." It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people. 11 (Citations omitted)

This Court owes it to the people to remain steadfast in its role of protecting fundamental freedoms without any bias, prejudice, or partiality towards any of the parties. We must never take the position of an active combatant and must refrain from arguing for any party involved. It is the parties themselves who must fight for their respective positions and lay down their own defenses.

I am certain that if the government were requested to comment on the Petition, the argument raised in this Resolution dismissing the Petition would be more plainly stated and considered by both parties. We must resist the temptation to anticipate the actions of the other party, as this would only make us vulnerable to a charge that we are a servile court to the executive. We are not called to make arguments of our own making. Rather, we are called to hear the argument of respondents after they are properly given the opportunity to be heard.

A comment is essential to garner a full exposition of the issues from both parties. This will pave the way for a complete deliberation of the significant questions posed in the Petition and dissuade any thoughts of partiality on the part of the members of the Bench.

This Court must not elude its responsibility to address the substantive issues relating to a specific provision in Article VII as well as the fundamental right to information of the sovereign enshrined in various provisions in Article II and Article III of our basic law.

In my view, the outright dismissal of the Petition is highly irregular and constitutes a failure to carry out our responsibility to properly and accurately interpret Article VII, Section 12 of our Constitution in relation to the sovereign's right to information on their government's capability to represent them.

III

The Petition seeks for the disclosure of the President's health bulletins and medical records since he assumed office. 12 It insists that the Office of the President is obliged to do so, 13 citing Article VII, 14 Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. (Emphasis supplied)

What prompted petitioner to file this Petition were his observations with regard to: (a) the Presidents' recurrent cancellations of his engagements due to health concerns; (b) the various illnesses that the President himself publicly admitted; (c) the President's absences from the public view; and (d) the President's incoherence in the press conferences during the Enhanced Community Quarantine. 15 Attaching mostly news articles as his basis, petitioner elaborated on his reasons for filing:

xxx xxx xxx

5. The President's personal presence is often necessary in different engagements. However, on several occasions, he begged off from some engagements, often at the last minute, citing health reasons. Among other engagements where President Duterte had to beg off at the last minute were:

a. January 3, 2020 scheduled visits to victims of the December 15, 2019 earthquake in Malalag and Padada, Davao Del Sur;

b. November 4, 2019 closing ceremony of 35th Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Nonthaburi, Thailand;

c. November 4, 2019 3rd Regional Comprehensive, Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit in Nonthaburi, Thailand;

d. October 22 and 23, 2019 Emperor's Banquet and Prime Minister's Banquet after enthronement ceremony for Japanese Emperor Naruhito;

e. September 24, 2019 Armed Forces of the Philippines change of command;

f. August 26, 2019 National Heroes' Day rites in Luneta;

g. May 9, 2019 Hugpong ng Pagbabago campaign rally;

h. April 26, 2019 Belt and Road Forum's gala dinner;

i. April 22, 2019 Boao Forum of Asia Manila Conference;

j. April 12, 2019 PDP-Laban campaign rally in Marawi City;

k. March 15, 2019 awarding of certificates of land ownership and PDP-Laban campaign rally in Davao City;

l. November 30, 2018 Bonifacio Day ceremony;

m. November 14, 2018 ASEAN meetings with partner countries and working lunch;

n. October 3, 2018 Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation event in Malacañang;

o. June 30,2017 Independence Day ceremony;

p. September 8, 2016 ASEAN-US and ASEAN-India summits;

q. Photo-op of ASEAN leaders with US President Barack Obama, also during September 2016 Laos Conference;

r. November 20,2016 APEC family photo and APEC Economic Leader's Retreat;

s. November 19, 2016 APEC Gala Dinner hosted by Peru President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski;

t. November 11, 2016 Go Negosyo summit in Davao; and

u. February 11, 2016 speaking engagement at a medical association event when he was rushed to the hospital and stayed there overnight.

6. President Duterte has also personally and publicly admitted that he is suffering from the Following medical conditions:

a. Buerger's Disease;

b. Barrett's Esophagus;

c. Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease;

d. Spinal issues;

e. Daily migraines; and

f. Myasthenia gravis

7. Apart from the above, President Duterte has been observed to have prolonged absences from the public view:

a. August 11-18, 2019 (7 days);

b. May 14-20, 2019 (7 days);

c. April 29-May 4, 2019 (6 days);

d. June 20-26, 2017 (6 days); and

e. June 12-16, 2017 (5 days).

8. Throughout these periods of absence[s], there were no medical bulletins released, nor was there any detailed explanation from his office about the President's prolonged absence. On the contrary, even after figuring in a motorcycle accident, Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo refused to disclose the status of the President's health, citing "a lack of serious illnesses as stated by the Constitution."

9. Of late, the President has been seen as rather sickly and miserably incoherent in his press conferences, specifically over the period of the Enhanced Community Quarantine.

[10.] Thus, [o]n March 12, 2020, after hearing the latter's COVID-19 live press conference on the same date, Petitioner, as a citizen deeply worried about the health of the President, duly filed a Freedom of Information Request addressed to the Office of the President. To put the request in context, during said press conference, the President was not able to answer questions intelligibly. For example, he uttered incoherent gibberish when asked a question on the lack of testing kits:

. . . The kit can be distributed to the different health centers, but at this time kung kulang they can be brought to a testing station. . . to RITM.

Kokonti lang kasi . . . Eh the kit, is the kit, meron naming lumalabas pa. . . I think that. . . sabi ko nga. . . in every epoch, maybe merun nung una, Bubonic Plague, mga gago and tao no'n, tamang-tama lang. . .

Tapos yung sa Spanish Flu, right before the wars, kawawa yung mga tao. . . pero mas kawawa yung sa Middle East. . . The so-called Roman Empire. . . You have read the inquisition, kung may birth mark ka you are a witch, and you are burned at stake.

[11] Given the seeming confusion and through the FOI request, Petitioner sought to be clarified once and for all on the status of the health of the President. Thus, the FOI Request asked for copies of the latest medical examination results, health bulletins, and other health records of the President so that the public may be assured of the status of his health during the crisis. 16 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

xxx xxx xxx

It is clear from the foregoing that the Petition has enough allegations to raise a reasonable concern about the President's true state of health. The President's public admission of his illnesses, together with the other stated manifestations, suggests that his current health may possibly be failing which, in a way, could affect the faithful performance of his duties.

Moreover, the crucial issues relating to the President's present health conditions demand this Court's proper legal interpretation of Article VII, Section 12. The determination of whether his alleged ailments are the kinds that the public ought to know entails our construing of what comprises "serious illness" 17 under the Constitution. In consonance with this Court's "role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent," 18 it is our responsibility to settle this matter promptly and conclusively.

Hence, while we generally adhere to judicial hierarchy, I believe that the issues raised in this petition have transcendental importance. As such, it may be directly resolved by this Court.

Under the 1987 Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. 19 Nevertheless, the competence to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not exclusive and is shared with both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. 20

The original jurisdiction shared with the lower courts, 21 however, does not warrant an unbridled discretion as to the parties' forum of choice. 22 The doctrine on hierarchy of courts dictates the proper venue where petitions for extraordinary writs shall be brought. Accordingly, "[p]arties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed." 23

As a matter of judicial policy, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts prevents the over-clogging of this Court's dockets and precludes any unwarranted demands upon its time and consideration. In Aala v. Uy: 24

The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter [,]" it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first instance." 25 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The doctrine is a filtering mechanism which, according to Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communication, 26 allows the Court "to focus on more fundamental and essential tasks assigned to it by the highest law of the land." 27 Corollary, it works to:

. . . (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as the court better equipped to resolve factual questions. 28 (Citation omitted)

The doctrine guarantees that courts in every level efficiently and effectively carry out their designated roles according to their competencies. In Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC: 29

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. 30 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Nonetheless, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts "may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of the remedy within and calling the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction." 31 Simply put, it is "not an iron clad rule" 32 and admits of the following exceptions:

In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the Following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. 33 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

In cases concerning issues of transcendental importance, "the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence." 34 Hence, "[t]he doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection." 35

The importance of an informed public in a democracy 36 cannot be gainsaid. The right of the people to information "allow[s] the citizenry to form intelligent opinions and hold people accountable for their actions." 37 Given that the Petition accentuates an imminent threat to this constitutionally protected right, 38 an immediate recourse before this Court is undoubtedly warranted.

IV

The duty to disclose the President's health condition in case of serious illness 39 accords with the fundamental right of the people to information and with the very concept of a representative form of government.

Article II 40 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Philippines is a democratic and republican state:

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

Pertinent thereto is Article III, 41 Section 7, which reads:

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The freedom of information is the instrument that empowers the people. The right to information is so central to a representative government such as ours that it was integrated as an enforceable constitutional right. It was enunciated in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission: 42

The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy[.] In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time[,] access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making. . . by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. 43 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is the access to information that apprises the people of their leader's actions and gives the citizens an opportunity to shape the landscape they live in by making informed decisions. It makes them capable of exercising their rights and protecting the same against actions of the state. The access of a citizen to information is a basic requirement for the functioning of a democratic society.

In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 44 this Court explained the significance of the people's right to information in a democratic government setting. There, a group of media practitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus before this Court praying that they be given access by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to pertinent documents relating to loans of some Batasang Pambansa members which were allegedly granted due to the intervention of the First Lady Imelda Marcos. 45 In granting the petition, this Court upheld petitioners' right to information, explaining:

An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure [and] honesty in the public service[.] It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. 46 (Emphasis in the original)

In Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, 47 it was explained that the right to information is concomitant with the government's policy of full disclosure and transparency. In that case, petitioners sought to compel the Commission on Elections to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of various party-list groups for the May 2007 elections. This Court granted the petition, finding that the public has the right to be informed of who they were electing as representatives. Thus, it ordered the Commission to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors, or organizations accredited to participate in the 2007 elections. 48 In ruling for petitioners, this Court elucidated:

Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

The right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise. And, for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a government's acceptance of the limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry.

By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily unavailing. 49 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

As illustrated above, the people's right to information will only be effective if there is a willingness for transparency on the part of the government. Considering that the government is meant to serve the public, giving its citizens access to information is central in holding the public officials accountable for their actions and policies. Through the knowledge acquired by the public, they may gauge if their officials have proven themselves capable and efficient. The significance of Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution working hand in hand is highlighted in Sabio v. Gordon: 50

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional right. Armed with the right to information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit. 51 (Citation omitted).

However, the right to information is not absolute and should only be carried out when it concerns the public interest: 52

It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. 53 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing pronouncements, it is evident that the President's health (in case of any serious illness) is a matter of public concern and interest. Under Article VII, Section 12, it is imperative upon the government to ensure that the public is made aware of the President's true state of health. It is the right of the people to be informed, and much more to be assured, that the President they elected is the one leading the country at all times and is physically and mentally competent to do so.

Furthermore, as a public officer, the President has a limited reasonable expectation of privacy. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 54 it was explained that the right to privacy, like the right to information, is not absolute. It may be intruded upon when the person involved is a public figure and the information sought is of public concern:

A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character. Succinctly put, the right of privacy cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public interest. The interest sought to be protected by the right of privacy is the right to be free from "unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm of legitimate public concern." 55 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indubitably, the President cannot hide behind a claim of right to privacy. He must surrender to public scrutiny.

Neither can the President, as the incumbent, assert that he is immune from suit. In 1910, the doctrine of executive or presidential immunity emanated as a case law 56 in Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco. 57 In that case, the respondent, a Chinese national, was able to procure a writ of injunction before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, which prohibited the then Governor General and two (2) other high-ranking officials from deporting him to Amoy, China.

Claiming that the act complained of was done in their official capacity and in furtherance of public interest, the government officials involved filed a petition for a writ of prohibition before this Court in order to restrain the CFI Judge from proceeding with the case. In resolving Tiaco's accompanying claim for damages against the Governor General, who is also the government's "chief executive authority in all civil affairs," 58 this Court explained:

It may be argued, however, that the present action is one to recover damages against the Governor and the others mentioned in the cause, for the illegal acts performed by them, and not an action for the purpose of in any way controlling or restraining or interfering with their political or discretionary duties. No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law, to deport or expel the defendants, and the circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interfering with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts can not intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exercise of this authority. Happily, we are not without authority upon this question. This precise question has come before the English courts on several different occasions.

xxx xxx xxx

If it be true that the Government of the Philippine Islands is a government invested with "all the military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands until otherwise provided by Congress" and that the Governor-General is invested with certain important political duties and powers, in the exercise of which he may use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his superiors in his political character and to his own conscience, and the judicial department of the Government is without authority to interfere in the control of such powers, for any purpose, then it must follow that the courts cannot take jurisdiction in any case against him which has for its purpose the declaration that such acts are illegal and that he is, in consequence, liable for damages. To allow such an action would, in the most effective way possible, subject the executive and political departments of the Government to the absolute control of the judiciary. Of course, it will be observed that we are here treating only with the political and purely executive duties in dealing with the political rights of aliens. The conclusions herein reached should not be extended to cases where vested rights are involved. That question must be left for future consideration. . . . 59 (Emphasis supplied)

Although no explicit provision on presidential immunity is found in our present Constitution, this Court continued to acknowledge the existence of such privilege 60 in the following cases.

In the 1986 case of Saturnino v. Bermudez, 61 a Petition for Declaratory Relief which amounted to an indirect suit against the then sitting President was dismissed outright due to this Court's recognition that "incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure." 62 The rationale behind the principle was elucidated in Soliven v. Makasiar. 63 There, this Court dismissed petitioner Beltran's claim that the President cannot commence the criminal action since the latter's immunity from suit allegedly imposes a concomitant disability to file one. In ruling against petitioner, this. Court stated:

The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person. 64 (Emphasis supplied)

In Estrada v. Desierto, 65 this Court explained the extent of presidential immunity in order to resolve whether former President Joseph Estrada, after being ousted from office in 2001, was still within the ambit of the privilege with regard to several cases filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. 66 In dismissing Estrada's petition, this Court underscored that pertinent constitutional policies will be undermined if it upheld his assertion that "a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency." 67

Meanwhile, in resolving the constitutionality of certain presidential issuances questioned in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 68 this Court declared that it was inappropriate to implead the then President as party-respondent for the following reasons:

Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his [or her] tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he [or she] can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he [or she] be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his [or her] official duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his [or her] usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he [or she] remains accountable to the people but he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. 69 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the recent case of De Lima v. Duterte, 70 Senator Leila De Lima filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data, seeking to restrain incumbent President Duterte from making threats and public statements allegedly violative of her right to privacy, life, liberty, and security. This Court dismissed De Lima's Petition on account of the President's immunity from suit during his incumbency. 71

We have seen from the cases above, particularly in Forbes and De Lima, that the mantle of presidential immunity pertains to acts of the President. Unlike the cases cited, the Petition at hand is not directed to a particular action or deed committed by the incumbent. Petitioner, driven by apparent manifestations that raised reasonable concerns, merely seeks for the disclosure of pertinent medical records instrumental in determining not only the President's true state of health, but also his fitness to lead. Resultantly, under the given circumstances, the President cannot aptly invoke the protection afforded by the privilege.

At the same time, the President cannot hide behind his executive privilege, particularly, the executive's deliberative process privilege.

Executive privilege is "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public" 72 for the sake of national security and public interest. In explaining the necessity of executive privilege, this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez73 adapted the United States jurisprudence, stating:

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution[.] 74 (Citation omitted)

In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 75 the two (2) types of executive privilege were identified as: (1) presidential communications privilege, which are "communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations" 76 [;] and (2) deliberative process privilege, which pertains to "advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations" 77 comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. They were further differentiated, thus:

Presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President's unique constitutional role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. 78 (Citation omitted)

Presidential communications privilege allows the president confidentiality to protect state secrets, diplomatic relations, and national security. On the other hand, the deliberative process privilege ensures "a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties." 79 In Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, 80 this Court characterized deliberative process privilege by adapting United States jurisprudence in this wise:

As discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co, deliberative process covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the "obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news," the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. 81 (Citations omitted)

Through the principle of deliberative process privilege, free discourse and debate among government officials is preserved by removing the threat of such conversations being disclosed to the public. The privilege prevents deliberative communications from being stifled for fear of criticism for opinions different from the majority.

While executive privilege stands as an exception to the public's right to information and the government's duty to disclose, the President cannot avail of such exception. In Senate of the Phils. v. Ermita, 82 this Court enunciated that despite the constitutional nature of executive privilege, it remains to be the exception to the general rule. This Court stated:

From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. 83 (Emphasis in the original)

Even if executive privilege were invoked in this case, neither the privilege of presidential communication nor that of deliberative process would apply.

It is apparent that the President's current state of health does not involve a document related to state secrets, diplomatic relations, and national security, which removes it from the shield of confidential presidential communications.

Moreover, it does not form part of any decision-making process or deliberation of the executive branch. The information asked by petitioner is neither pre-decisional nor deliberative, the two (2) elements of deliberative process. For a communication to be pre-decisional, it must have been made in an "attempt to reach a final conclusion." 84 To be considered deliberative, it must reflect the exchange or discussion within a certain governmental agency. 85 Seeing as the information sought by petitioner does not satisfy any of the elements above, deliberative process privilege will not apply. Here, the information petitioner seeks does not touch the President's formulation of government decisions or policies, but merely inquires on the President's true and current state of health, which is a qualification required for one to hold the position of President.

It is, equally important to emphasize that in case of any serious illness or permanent incapacity, the President's functions cannot be simply delegated to any elected or unelected official — except to the Vice President. This is made clear in the line of succession laid down under Article VII, Section 8 of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President. (Emphasis supplied)

Any undue delegation would be unauthorized and unsanctioned not only by law, but by the very people that the government is meant to serve.

V

With the right of the people to know the President's health condition, Article VII, Section 12 cannot be discretionary on the President and his office, and the executive cannot be left to decide what would constitute serious illness and what would be the appropriate means of releasing the sought information to the public.

I encourage my colleagues to take caution when using Constitutional Commission deliberations as basis for interpreting the intent behind a certain provision. While the deliberations are useful in shedding light on the discussions of the framers for the wording of a certain provision, these exchanges are only between the people then present and do not necessarily reflect the insights of all the framers or people that ratified the basic law. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 86 it was held:

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the Constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers' understanding thereof. 87 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

As stated above, resort to other aids outside of the Constitution should only be done when its plain meaning is not available on its face. Its interpretation must begin with how its terms are couched. This was further explained in David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal: 88

To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. The Constitution is truly a public document in that it was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People: exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is, popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus:

We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained They are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum[.] 89 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Applying the principle of verba legis to the constitutional provision in question, it is apparent that Article VII, Section 12 does not state, whether impliedly or explicitly, that the President is given the discretion on when and how to inform the public of his health. The constitutional provision itself only states that "[i]n case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health." 90 The ordinary meaning of the terms used in the provision is a clear directive that it is needless to consult the Constitutional Commission's deliberations on the matter.

Even assuming that the deliberations were persuasive, they are not binding upon this Court. The exchanges among the framers neither dictate the intent of the people that ratified the basic law nor reflect the context in which we currently move in. The deliberations cannot control the interpretation of the constitutional provision as they have not considered the current crisis plaguing the country today which calls for a heightened scrutiny of our public officials. While the words of the law are static, their interpretation must he fluid to ensure that the rights of the people are protected no matter the situation.

In order to comply with the standards of the constitutional right to information, as well as the duty of the government to full disclosure and transparency, what the President may submit is a complete health bulletin from a doctor of his choice which enumerates and explains the diseases, medications, and treatments of the President. Only this can properly illustrate what the present condition of the President is.

Assuming that the President's previous extemporaneous announcements regarding his health could be considered sufficient compliance to the constitutional provision, which would render the demand for disclosure moot, this case can still be appropriately reviewed by this Court. In Mattel, Inc. v. Francisco91 this Court cited the instances and exceptional cases wherein it decided to resolve the issue presented despite it being moot:

Admittedly, there were occasions in the past when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had rendered those petitions moot and academic. After all, the "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Thus, in Constantino v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), Constantino, a public officer, and his co-accused, Lindong, a private citizen, filed separate appeals from their conviction by the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. While Constantino died during the pendency of his appeal, the Court still ruled on the merits thereof, considering the exceptional character of the appeals of Constantino and Lindong in relation to each other; that is, the two petitions were so intertwined that the absolution of the deceased Constantino was determinative of the absolution of his co-accused Lindong.

In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the petition sought to declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of Magdangal B. Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. While Elma ceased to hold the two offices during the pendency of the case, the Court still ruled on the merits thereof, considering that the question of whether the PCGG Chairman could concurrently hold the position of CPLC was one capable of repetition.

In David v. Arroyo, seven petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed assailing the constitutionality of the declaration of a state of national emergency by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. While the declaration of a state of national emergency was already lifted during the pendency of the suits, this Court still resolved the merits of the petitions, considering that the issues involved a grave violation of the Constitution and affected the public interest. The Court also affirmed its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules, and recognized that the contested actions were capable of repetition.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Ermita, the petition questioned the constitutionality of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's appointment of acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress was in session. While the President extended ad interim appointments to her appointees immediately after the recess of Congress, the Court still resolved the petition, noting that the question of the constitutionality of the President's appointment of department secretaries in acting capacities while Congress was in session was one capable of repetition.

In Atienza v. Villarosa, the petitioners, as Governor and Vice-Governor, sought for clarification of the scope of the powers of the Governor and Vice-Governor under the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. While the terms of office of the petitioners expired during the pendency of the petition, the Court still resolved the issues presented to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public.

In Gayo v. Verceles, the petition assailing the dismissal of the petition for quo warranto filed by Gayo to declare void the proclamation of Verceles as Mayor of the Municipality of Tubao, La Union during the May 14, 2001 elections, became moot upon the expiration on June 30, 2004 of the contested term of office of Verceles. Nonetheless, the Court resolved the petition since the question involving the one-year residency requirement for those running for public office was one capable of repetition.

In Albaña v. Commission on Elections, the petitioners therein assailed the annulment by the Commission on Elections of their proclamation as municipal officers in the May 14, 2001 elections. When a new set of municipal officers was elected and proclaimed after the May 10, 2004 elections, the petition was mooted but the Court resolved the issues raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition thereof and to enhance free, orderly, and peaceful elections. 92 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

As in the cases above, the Petition falls within the category of an exceptional case which, even if moot, should be resolved if only to finally "formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar." 93 The questions posed by petitioner do not merely concern him, but the entire nation as well.

VI

With the President's state of health in times of serious illness being of public concern, the duty to disclose under Article VII, Section 12 is not only imperative, but more so becomes ministerial. Accordingly, mandamus lies.

Rule 65, 94 Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Procedures 95 reads:

SECTION 3. Petition for Mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Emphasis supplied)

Mandamus is a directive by a court of law of competent jurisdiction pointed to some inferior court, tribunal, or person compelling the performance of a specific duty arising from official station or from the operation of law. 96 The remedy is of public character and cannot be "resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest." 97 It is the appropriate "recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is mandated by the Constitution." 98

Thus, in order to successfully invoke the writ, there must be a co-existence between petitioner's clear legal right and a concomitant duty "incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by law." 99 Apart from these, "there should [also] be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]"100 This means that mandamus can only be issued when the common "modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief." 101

In this case, petitioner's insistence on the disclosure of the President's health is grounded on the fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern, 102 which is a public right. 103 As a citizen, petitioner has the clear legal right to the relief he seeks since he is deemed "part of the general 'public' which possesses the right." 104

On the other hand, the government has the duty to protect and respect such right. Therefore, respondents "are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern." 105 The duty to disclose becomes ministerial upon them, and any contrary act on their part will enable the issuance of the writ of mandamus.

Also, in this case, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to acquire the information sought for. Petitioner alleged that after seeing the President's incoherence in the press conferences during the Enhanced Community Quarantine, 106 he was impelled to file a Freedom of Information (FOI) request before the Office of the President on March 11, 2020, 107 the relevant portions of which read:

xxx xxx xxx

 

Gentlemen:

Given President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's ("President Duterte") intermittent cancellation of his public engagements, as well as the various sicknesses that he himself has mentioned in public, it is but proper that the public should be informed of the health condition of the country's chief executive and commander-in-chief.

Thus, as a concerned citizen of the Republic, I am writing to make a Freedom of Information (FOI) request pursuant to Executive Order No. 2, series of 2016. Specifically, I am requesting to request [sic] for complete information and full disclosure on the status of the health of President Duterte. I also would like to request for a certified copy of President Duterte's latest personal medical examination results, health bulletins, and other health records. This request is being made for the purpose of invoking Article VII, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that in times of serious illness, the public shall be informed of the state of the President's health. 108 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

On March 13, 2020, the Office of the President (through the Malacañang Records Office or MRO) replied to petitioner's letter request via electronic mail, saying:

xxx xxx xxx

Dear Mr. De Leon:

We refer to your Freedom of Information (FOI) request dated 11 March 2020 requesting for certified copy of medical examination results and health records of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte.

Please be informed that the requested information is not among the records available on file nor in the possession of this Office. Hence, our inability to provide the requested information.

We shall gladly accommodate your request once the requested information becomes available for release.

Thank you.

From,109 (Emphasis supplied)

Nothing in the foregoing exchanges shows that petitioner's request had been explicitly denied by the MRO. Moreover, it is unclear whether petitioner would be able to acquire the information he seeks. Petitioner asked for an update on his requested information on separate dates, 110 but to no avail. Thus, he was left with no other option but to seek judicial recourse.

Furthermore, even an appeal 111 in accordance with the Office of the President's "People's Freedom of Information Manual" would be unavailing because there is no adverse or unfavorable action 112 on the part of the MRO, which, if ever, would warrant further recourse with the FOI Appeals Authority. 113 It is evident from the MRO's reply that it did not have the information being sought for. Moreover, its statement that it would accommodate the request as soon as the information "becomes available for release" 114 is vague and effectively left petitioner with no definite course of action. Hence, there is nothing to appeal.

In view of the foregoing, I cannot agree with the majority's decision to dismiss the Petition outright without a comment from respondents. Given the current crisis brought about by the pandemic, the country is faced with unprecedented times and the government is brought to a test no other administration has faced. Even the public, particularly those affected by COVID-19, may it be a person confirmed or suspected to be carrying the virus, must waive their right to privacy and disclose their medical condition to deter the spread of the virus. This also holds true for the President, as his health is critical to the people's confidence in his leadership. If anything, divulging such information would only stand to strengthen the support and trust of the people in him.

The President should maintain fealty to the people he represents. The Constitution, in my view, requires that upon demand and, even on his own, respondent should publish a regular and official medical bulletin from doctors of his own choice. Anything short of this violates the constitutional proscription against the right of the people to matters of public concern. It is suggestive of obfuscation and an intent to hide the true state of his health.

It is in times like these when the people must demand a higher standard from their public officials. It is during crises and national emergencies when this Court must be most vigilant in order to protect the rights of the public. Sadly, the majority has neglected this duty. To say the least, it is inexplicably and perilously obsequious.

Emphatically, I disagree.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that respondents be required to COMMENT on the Petition and that this Court give DUE COURSE to the Petition to have a full exposition of the arguments from both parties.

CAGUIOA,J., dissenting:

In his Extremely Urgent Petition for Mandamus, petitioner seeks to compel respondents to: (1) publicly disclose all the medical and psychological/psychiatric examination results, health bulletins, and other health records of the President ever since he assumed the presidency; (2) submit the President to additional medical and psychological/psychiatric examinations; and (3) publicly disclose the results of such confirmatory medical and psychological/psychiatric examinations of the President. 1 Petitioner cites as basis Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.

Consonant with the foregoing is the general right to information granted under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The majority resolves to dismiss the petition outright for lack of merit, on the reasoning that petitioner fails to present a justiciable controversy, and to establish a clear legal right that was violated by respondents, and upon which the remedy of mandamus may lie. 2 The majority also holds that compliance with Section 12, Article VII is discretionary on the part of the President. 3

I disagree with this peremptory outright dismissal of a Petition that legitimately tenders a matter of great constitutional and political importance, especially made urgent by the present health crisis the Country is facing. As Filipinos are literally facing death in the face, they deserve more from the Court than this almost cursory manner of disposition of a crucial issue. I therefore submit this Dissenting Opinion if only to highlight the uncharted and heretofore unresolved important legal and Constitutional issues that ought to have been considered and resolved by the Court through a full-blown decision.

Indeed, even without giving due course to the Petition, prudence dictated that respondents be first required to Comment on the Petition. This would have allowed the Court to better comprehend the facts and allegations relevant to the application for enforcement of Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court should not be deciding cases with undue haste especially when their nature and complexity require a more in-depth study. 4 There is simply nothing to lose in allowing respondents to argue their position before us — on the contrary, the Court has more to gain from a comprehensive discussion brought about by the contending views and arguments of both parties. In fact, respondents might just have been eager to argue their views on Section 12, Article VII. Again, I believe it important, if not crucial, that the Court directly address the issues this Petition presents so that it — the Court — can discharge its Constitutional duty after giving the parties the opportunity to be heard.

To require a Comment from the respondents is neither a needless and an embarrassing and humiliating exercise nor a course of action that may be contrary to what our tripartite system of government enjoys, as suggested during deliberations. To hold otherwise would be a gross misappreciation not only of the court processes provided under the rules, but more importantly, of the role that the Court fulfills in the Constitutional order.

In requiring a Comment, the Court is not automatically giving weight to the Petition itself. In fact, a Comment may be required even without giving due course to the petition. And even in cases which may otherwise be dismissed outright (such as where the issues involved are already well established and fine-tuned by solid existing jurisprudence), the Court still has the prerogative to require a Comment from the respondent for a more thorough discussion and a more complete disposition of the case. To be sure, a Comment merely allows the respondent to explain his or her side and answer the claims and arguments raised against him or her, which thereby also allows the Court to have a better appreciation of the case at hand. What more in this case where there is a novel issue that the Court has never previously ruled upon? As Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen opined during the deliberations, requiring a Comment allows for a fuller exposition of the issues from the point of view of the respondents and prevents any suspicion that judges and justices litigate, and not decide.

It is within this milieu that it becomes truly perplexing how the majority could reach a decision to dispense with a Comment from respondents and giving short shrift to the Petition. This Court's preemption of the normal process given to a petition that unquestionably presents novel issues unnecessarily and unfortunately impacts on the public's perception of the Court's impartiality.

That the Country is currently facing a national crisis brought about by a world-wide pandemic should be the proper backdrop to understand the workings of Section 12, Article VII — and not the other way around, that is, that this crisis is used as a deterrent to the complete disposition of a case involving the constitutional duty of the President. Indeed, even in the direst situation brought about by its declaration of martial law in Mindanao, the current administration has proven that it is more than capable of obeying court processes in times of national emergency. Evidently, the competence of the Executive branch of government in discharging its duties deserves more credit than merely assuming that filing a Comment in these trying times would be too burdensome.

Too, the insinuation made by some that requiring a Comment from the Executive is antithetical to the respect, civility, cordiality, and cooperation owed to a co-equal branch of government is completely misplaced and inapt. The Court should be motivated only by judiciousness and a desire for a comprehensive understanding of a case when it requires a party to file a Comment. Adding more meaning to such an order is an overstretch and totally unfair to the Court as the final arbiter of all disputes.

Indeed, there are instances when the Court disposes of a petition even without requiring a Comment from the other party. However, it is equally true that the Court can require a Comment first, especially in cases which call for a more thorough review — and I maintain that the present Petition belongs to this category. At the risk of being repetitious, it should be emphasized that this case is of first impression which necessitates a more threshed out interpretation by the Court of a Constitutional provision. The variance in interpretations and differences in opinions expressed by the members of the majority during the deliberations already highlights the need for a more thorough study aided by a Comment from the respondents, and maybe even oral arguments.

At this point, it is important to emphasize that while the government is composed of three separate and co-equal branches of government, the powers of each branch are not wielded in the same manner. Unlike legislative power and judicial power which are vested in institutions having collegial bodies, executive power is vested in only one person: the President. Hence, unlike other branches that would continue to function despite some physical challenges to one or some of its members, the Executive branch does not possess the same luxury. One of the three pillars of government therefore, and its ability to function especially in times of crisis, relies heavily in the continuing capability of the President to discharge his functions. The state of the President's health — which naturally determines or affects his ability to discharge his functions — is thus undoubtedly of public interest and significance. This is the raisond'etre of Section 12, Article VII. The provision exists because the Framers recognized that the public has a right to know whether the person in whom the continuity of one branch of government depends is still able to perform his functions.

Thus, I register the following points upon which I diverge from the majority opinion:

1. The Supreme Court must discharge its duty of construing "serious illness" in Section 12, Article VII as envisioned by the Framers. This necessary exercise of the Court's jurisdiction and the demands of due process foreclose the outright dismissal of the petition. I reiterate my position that the more prudent course of action would have been to require the respondents to file a Comment, which would have undoubtedly aided the resolution of matters of substance that the Court inevitably passed upon.

The Petition is correctly brought before the Supreme Court. First, the Court cannot now be heard to say that a lower court can issue a writ of mandamus addressed to the President. Second, a petition involving a constitutional provision not heretofore construed by the Supreme Court is surely an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. 5

The showing of a genuine issue of fact that can justify strict adherence to the doctrine is not met precisely because the respondents were not even made to Comment on the petition. The Court is also not unable to determine questions of fact and receive evidence, as it has previously done through submissions or in-camera sessions.

2. Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution is a self-executing provision and needs no implementing action from the Legislature. It cannot be superseded, as intimated by some members of the majority, by supposed contrary provisions in the Data Privacy Act or in Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016, and its allied issuances.

3. Section 12, Article VII is a positive duty on the part of the Office of the President (OP) to inform the public of the state of the President's health in case of serious illness. The OP is tasked with the initial determination of whether the state of facts warrant disclosure and is afforded the latitude for discretion only as to the manner of disclosure, while it is the Court that has the power and duty to construe what a "serious illness" is that triggers Section 12.

Therefore, the duty to inform the public is judicially enforceable by mandamus in case of noncompliance, unless: (1) it did not become operative at all — in the absence of a serious illness; or (2) some sort of disclosure has already been made — the determination of the means therefor is discretionary as borne by the deliberations. The Court's decision to dismiss the Petition without Comment from the respondents prevents any rational determination whether the facts obtaining fall within either of these scenarios.

4. The different positions taken, the variance in reasoning of the desired outcome given by the members of the majority during the deliberations — all highlight the need to rule clearly and definitively on this uncharted constitutional territory.

On these premises, I register my fundamental disagreement with the majority opinion in resolving to dismiss the case without requiring the respondents to file a Comment. I submit that the disposition by the Court through a Resolution, on a matter of great constitutional and political importance, will surely be argued in the future as having doctrinal weight when it ought to not have any. For this reason alone, the Court is called upon to dispose of it by decision, 6 which in turn requires affording both parties the opportunity to he heard.

On the other substantive matters ruled upon by the Court:

I.

The Court has the constitutional duty to construe the meaning of "serious illness."

The positive duty to inform the public of the state of the President's health only comes into play as soon as he is inflicted with a "serious illness." It is not suggested here that the public has a right to be informed about any and all illnesses that the President suffers from. It bears emphasis, as well, that the disclosure of a litany of what these serious illnesses are is different from the constitutional duty to disclose the President's "state of health." The wording of Section 12, Article VII itself is clear — in case of serious illness of the President, the public must be informed of the state of his health.

While Section 12, Article VII does not define what constitutes a "serious illness," the proponent of the provision in the Constitutional Commission opined that it should be one that "almost but not quite incapacitates the President for that period of the serious illness." 7 Differently stated, the scenario contemplated was "one where [the President] is not really incapacitated but seriously inconvenienced in the conduct of his urgent duties as President." 8

Nonetheless, despite these statements, the Framers did not intend to preempt or preclude the Court from defining what constitutes a "serious illness," and in the process, unnecessarily limit the operation of the provision. Instead, the Framers, in fact, expressly agreed during the deliberation that they were deferring to the Court as to what would constitute "serious illness":

MR. TINGSON:

Madam President, before Commissioner Monsod takes the rostrum, may I just add this for the record. Upon the request of Commissioner Ople, I went to our Medical Service and Dr. Fe Soriano, Chief of the Medical Service of our Constitutional Commission Secretariat, gave this opinion about serious illness. So for the record, may I read what she wrote, Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Commissioner Tingson will please proceed.

MR. TINGSON:

Dr. Fe Soriano, Chief of our Medical Service, said that serious illness means any condition that could cause imminent death or would incapacitate the person to the extent, for example, that his mental faculties would deteriorate.

I thought that that might be good for our record, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE:

Madam President.

THE PRESIDENT:

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE:

If the intention there is to put a definition of serious illness, I do not think the Commission or those who will interpret the Constitution should be bound by that particular opinion. We leave the matter to the Supreme Court to interpret it later.

MR. OPLE:

We intended to have nothing more than the persuasive weight of the definition, Madam President.

Thank you. 9

The foregoing highlights the justifiability of the issue — contrary to the position taken by the majority and some members of the Court that the present petition does not have an actual case or controversy, or that it raises a political question. The Framers of the Constitution clearly left to the Court the duty of defining when Section 12, Article VII becomes operative.

For this reason, I respectfully disagree with the submission made during the deliberations that the determination of what constitutes serious illness is "better left to a panel of medical or psychiatric experts."

The Court, in deciding petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage filed in accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code, does not side-step or otherwise avoid the matter of psychological incapacity simply because psychologists are in a better position to set the appropriate standards. Over time, the Court has developed its own notion of psychological incapacity that would warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage. Much in the same way, the Court's task to define the concept of serious illness is a legal, not medical or psychiatric, question. To be sure, the Court is asked to define the metes and bounds of Section 12, Article VII, by interpreting the meaning of "serious illness." In performing this duty, the Court's appreciation of the totality of circumstances is only for purposes of determining whether disclosure to the public is warranted. In any case, the Court is not precluded from inviting these medical or psychiatric experts as amici curiae to aid the Court in its interpretation of the provision.

Thus, with utmost respect to the majority, I strongly disagree with its decision to prematurely decide if this is or is not a time to determine the application and operation of Section 12, Article VII without, even requiring the respondents to first file a Continent, or otherwise listen to the full gamut of arguments and extensive discussion from the parties. The Court must not again shirk its duty, especially now that a petition has directly invoked the right guaranteed in the provision.

In the course of the deliberations for this case, different members of the majority actually raised differing views and contrary opinions on the circumstances within which Section 12 may apply. This is precisely because the Court has never been afforded the opportunity in the past to define the contours of Section 12, Article VII. I am thus totally nonplussed as to the seeming haste and alacrity to dismiss the Petition outright.

Moreover, I disagree with the additional supposition made during the deliberations that the Court ought to refrain from further hearing the present petition because it has already become moot. For the Court to declare that the controversy has become moot solely because the President had already narrated to the public the ailments he suffers from does not only unwarrantedly preempt the full breadth and depth of the President's duty to disclose a "serious illness" as may finally be defined by the Court in interpreting Section 12, Article VII, it also clearly signals an overly deferential attitude to a sitting President.

The mootness doctrine was raised during the deliberations on the assumption that the President has already done what the Constitution requires, i.e., inform the public of the state of his health. This conclusion was reached because the petition itself recognizes that in several previous instances, the President himself verbally admitted to suffering from certain diseases.

This, to me, puts the cart before the horse.

Admitting to experiencing certain diseases 10 and symptoms 11 does not automatically translate into a disclosure of the President's "state of health." A state of health presupposes more than mere "medical examination results," "just statements" or enumerations of existing maladies. Rather, it must be a complete picture of the health condition of the President, which includes a full assessment and interpretation of his existing serious illness.

Here, the Court still does not know for certain and has not been able to conclusively determine — again due to the absence of more extensive proceedings, such as a Comment or even oral arguments — (1) if these diseases may be considered "serious illnesses;" (2) if these diseases affect or hamper the President's discharge of his functions; and (3) if the public has already been sufficiently made aware of the effects of the diseases on the President.

In the same manner, requiring the petitioner to provide adequate evidence outside of news articles on the President's illnesses makes it virtually impossible for the public to invoke the application of the right. 12 During the deliberations, it was argued that relying on publicly-available sources such as news articles will result in either one of two things. On the one hand, it was argued that by relying on them, the petitioner runs the risk of mooting the petition, as the President is deemed to have complied with the duty. On the other hand, it was likewise argued that news articles provide scant basis for any action, as these are supposedly only speculative and "hearsay evidence, twice removed." 13 However, it would be absurd for the Court to deny the petition outright on either of these two bases in an action precisely initiated for the purpose of finding out whether there are sufficient grounds for the duty of the President to arise. As Justice Leonen opined in his Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea: 14

Certainly, petitioners should not be assumed to have access to confidential or secret information possessed by the respondents. Thus, their burden of proof consists of being able to marshal publicly available and credible sources of facts to convince the Court to give due course to their petition. For this purpose, petitioners are certainly not precluded from referring to news reports or any other information they can access to support their petitions. To rule otherwise would be to ignore the inherent asymmetry of available information to the parties, with the Government possessing all of the information needed to prove sufficiency of factual basis.

Again owing to its sui generis nature, these petitions are in the nature of an exercise of a citizen's right to require transparency of the most powerful organ of government. It is incidentally intended to discover or smoke out the needed information for this Court to be able to intelligently rule on the sufficiency of factual basis. The general rule that "he who alleges must prove" finds no application here in light of the government's monopoly of the pertinent information needed to prove sufficiency of factual basis.

As it is, a two-tiered approach is created where petitioners have no choice but to rely on news reports and other second-hand sources to support their prayer to strike down the declaration of suspension because of their lack of access to the intelligence reports funded by taxpayers. At this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the government to prove the constitutionality of the proclamation or suspension and it does this by presenting the actual evidence, not just conclusions of fact, which led the President to decide on the necessity of declaring martial law. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the majority cannot fault the petitioner for relying on news reports to substantiate his present claim to be informed of the state of the

President's health. Further contrary to the position put forth in the deliberations, there exists in the present petition a "live controversy" that does not make the petition moot. Specifically, there is here a pending question on whether the right given to the public under Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution — as well as the corresponding duty it imposes on the President-has already been fulfilled.

II.

Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution is self-executing.

During the deliberations, opinions were raised that Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision, and neither is it a justiciable or remediable matter for which a person may seek judicial compulsion from the Court. It was posited that Section 12, Article VII requires an enabling law or executive issuance in order to be enforced by judicial action.

I disagree.

The seminal case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS15(Manila Prince) has distinguished between a self-executing and a non-self-executing Constitutional provision, to wit:

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would 'give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.

The general rule, therefore, is that the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. Even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, later Chief Justice, agreed on this presumption. 16 He explained that the rationale for this general rule and presumption is not difficult to discern, because to hold otherwise would pave the way for Congress to easily ignore and nullify the mandate of the fundamental law ratified by the sovereign people. 17 This much was likewise recognized by the proponent, former Senator Blas Ople, in his explanation for inserting the proposed section in the Constitution, which is now Section 12, Article VII:

MR. OPLE: I think throughout history, there had been many recorded instances when the health of the President, or the emperor in Roman times, or the Chinese emperor in dynasties long past was concealed from the public. Generally, the wife conspires with others in order to conceal the leader's state of health. One effect of this has been on the necessary inputs to policy coming from Cabinet ministers which have been blocked from reaching the attention of the President in that state. This illness can occur during an awkward moment in the life of a nation when national survival ought to be secured in the face of a major threat short of, let us say, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus when Congress comes in in order to exercise a monitoring function and, perhaps, a remedial function. We have not yet, in this example, attained that level of the seriousness of the situation. And yet the national security might be at stake. The national survival can hang in the balance and, therefore, the right of the people to know ought to be included in this Article on the Executive, not only the right of the people to urgent access to a President in a state of illness, but especially those who deal with the safety and survival of the nation. The Cabinet minister in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces ought to have access to the President as commander-in-chief. The people as well should have access to this man in that kind of dubious state so that even in that critical and awkward moment in the fortunes of the national leader, we can be sure that the people have access to him for purposes of safeguarding the national security. 'That is the reason the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is also mentioned in the proposal. I think this is based on contemporary experience as well. And if we delegate this merely to a forthcoming legislature, there will arise situations or embarrassment considering that many who will compose this legislature will be very deferential towards those in power and may not even mention this at all in their agenda.

Therefore, I feel that there should be a constitutional cognizance of that danger, and the right of the people to know ought to be built into this Article on the Executive. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

A plain reading of Section 12, Article VII does not reveal any language which works against the foregoing presumption. To be sure, there is not the slightest indication in the language of Section 12, Article VII that it is referring to the legislature the enactment of any supplementary or enabling legislation. Rather, the language of Section 12, Article VII is mandatory, and a positive command that is complete in itself. 19

In Manila Prince, the Court reached a similar conclusion with regard to the second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which, as constructed, bears a parallel resemblance to Section 12, Article VII. 20 The Court therein held:

x x x From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi lus ibi remedium. 21 (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the Record of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals the deliberate intention of the Framers not to require future legislation for the enforcement of the right enshrined in Section 12, Article VII, which further strengthens its self-executory nature:

MR. GUINGONA:

Madam President, I was going to propose an amendment because, from the discussion, it would seem that there are many details that have to be filled in. Commissioner Ople mentioned about who should give the information, and Commissioner Suarez was talking about what kind of illness would fall within the perception of the proponent. So, I thought, if the distinguished proponent would accept, the details should be left to the Congress to determine by law, because we have no physician in this body, and perhaps the legislature would be able to provide the details. I agree fully with the principle or the concept expressed by the honorable proponent.

MR. OPLE:

I accept the amendment, and so the first sentence will now read: IN CASE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC SHALL BE INFORMED OF THE STATE OF HIS HEALTH AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.

Madam President, I think I have just changed my mind after an expert on medical matters came around. We are called upon to be more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate means to take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right to know about the presidency.

MR. GUINGONA:

Madam President, may I explain? I thought all along that the honorable proponent was thinking of a situation such as when recently there was an attempt on the part of the Executive not to inform the public. And now, we are going to entrust this obligation or duty . . .

MR. OPLE:

Madam President, we will leave something for people power to do. Maybe Commissioner Aquino can lead a march, if they are not satisfied with the information coming from the Office of the President.

THE PRESIDENT:

So, the proponent does not accept the amendment.

MR. OPLE:

Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT:

Is Commissioner Guingona also not insisting on his proposed amendment?

MR. GUINGONA:

No, Madam President. 22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The rejection of the proposed amendment requiring enabling legislation is a clear manifestation of the Framers' intention to place upon the Executive the duty of observing Section 12, Article VII, should the circumstances for its operation arise. It is a clear mandate to protect the right of the public to be informed of the President's state of health, in case of a serious illness. 23

The right of the public to be

The right of the public to information on the state of health of the President under Section 12, Article VII is a subset of the fundamental right to information on matters of public concern granted in Section 7, Article III of the Constitution. Reading these two provisions together is called for and unavoidable. The two provisions share the same subject matter, albeit Section 12, Article VII is more specific with the information on the state of health of the President. They also share the same purpose of granting the public the right to be informed. Sharing the same subject matter and purpose, Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III are clearly in pari materia, and as such, they are, as they ought to be, construed together.

In pari materia is the principle that "different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other." 24 To illustrate, in David v. Arroyo25 the Court declared Section 23, Article VI and Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution to be in pari materia, on the ground that they both relate to national emergencies. These sections read:

ARTICLE VI, SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

ARTICLE XII, SECTION 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

Though found in different parts of the Constitution, the Court held that Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause espoused in Section 23, Article VI. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Consequently, both sections must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers. 26

Likewise, that Section 12, Article VII should be interpreted together with Section 7, Article III finds support in the case of Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain. 27 The Court therein declared that the policy of public disclosure of transactions involving public interest under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution 28 was intended as a "splendid symmetry" to the right to information under the Bill of Rights. 29 The Court thus ruled that the policy of full public disclosure enunciated in Section 28, Article II complements the right to access to information of public concern in Section 7, Article III — the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. 30

Further, as regards the self-executing nature of Section 28, Article II, the Court examined the same also in light of Section 7, Article III:

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.

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The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. x x x 31

Parenthetically, the Court definitively ruled in Legaspi v. CSC32 that the fundamental right to information guaranteed under Section 7, Article III is a self-executing provision, notwithstanding the caveat in the last phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." The Court held:

[It] suppl[ies] the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id. at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one. 33 (Emphasis supplied)

This ruling was reiterated in the case of Gonzales v. Narvasa, 34 thus:

The right to information is enshrined in Section 7 of the Bill of Rights which provides that —

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution, this is a self-executory provision which can be invoked by any citizen before the courts. This was our ruling in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, wherein the Court classified the right to information as a public right and "when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right."

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Elaborating on the significance of the right to information, the Court said in Baldoza v. Dimaano that "[t]he incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times." The information to which the public is entitled to are those concerning "matters of public concern," a term which "embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public." (citations omitted)

There were observations made during the deliberations that Section 12, Article VII was, by deliberate design, not placed under Article III on the Bill of Rights but under Article VII on the Executive Department. This placement allegedly signals that the provision is not a fundamental constitutional right but rather, a sui generis responsibility falling within the sole discretion of the Executive, similar to the other essential prerogatives inherent to the Executive Department.

With utmost respect, I differ.

As already discussed, Section 12, Article VII in itself recognizes the right of the people to be informed of the state of the President's health concomitant to the clear and positive duty of the President to inform the public. This is further strengthened by the right to information under Section 7, Article III. That the former provision does not appear in the Bill of Rights is inconsequential. As held in Oposa v. Factoran: 35

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, Section 12, Article VII and Section 7, Article III, being undoubtedly complementary provisions, should be read together and interpreted to be self-executing provisions of the Constitution, which can be invoked as a matter of right.

The right to informational privacy

It was further raised during the deliberations that the President has a right to informational privacy, which protects against the disclosure of his state of health, and that therefore, Section 7, Article III does not apply to this matter. It was pointed out, specifically, that under the Data Privacy Act of 2012, information about an individual's health, including previous or current records, are considered sensitive personal information which are protected and cannot be processed except in certain cases.

I believe otherwise.

Indeed, as a rule, the processing of sensitive personal information and privileged information is prohibited under Section 13 of Republic Act (RA) No. 10173, otherwise known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012. As defined under the Act, processing refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon personal data including, but not limited to, the collection, recording, organization, storage, updating or modification, retrieval, consultation, use, consolidation, blocking, erasure or destruction of data. On the other hand, sensitive personal information includes personal information about an individual's health. 36

Section 13 of RA 10173, however, provides for exceptions. I submit that the exception under Section 13 (b) is applicable in this case:

SEC. 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. — The processing of sensitive personal information and privileged information shall be prohibited, except in the following cases:

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(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and regulations: Provided, That such regulatory enactments guarantee the protection of the sensitive personal information and the privileged information: Provided further, That the consent of the data subjects are not required by law or regulation permitting the processing of the sensitive personal information or the privileged information;

The information on the state of health of the President is inarguably a matter of public concern that falls within the general and specific subjects contemplated in Section 7, Article III and Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution, respectively. By Constitutional grant itself, the information is taken out of the exception on processing and disclosure of sensitive personal information. In other words, the Constitutional mandate under Section 12, Article VII is the strongest justification to process and disclose, notwithstanding the sensitivity of the information involved. As will be further discussed shortly, the limited application of Section 12, Article VII and the recognition on the lack of reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the President make Section 13 (b) of RA 10173 operative.

In the same manner, Executive Order (EO) No. 2, 37 which specifically operationalizes in the Executive Branch the people's Constitutional right to information and the State's duty to full public disclosure and transparency in the public service, provides certain exceptions in which access to information is not allowed. These exceptions were inventoried, pursuant to the directive under Section 4 of EO No. 2, through a Memorandum dated November 24, 2016 of Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea. 38 Among the exceptions is information of a personal nature, to which medical or health records are included. The basis for this exception is that the disclosure of such information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. But similar to RA 10173, the Memorandum also prominently carves out an exception to the exception:

4. Information deemed confidential for the protection of the privacy of persons and certain individuals as minors, victims of crimes, or the accused. These include:

a. Information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, personal information or records, including sensitive personal information, birth records, school records, or medical or health records.

Sensitive personal information as defined under the Data Privacy Act of 2012 refers to personal information:

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(2) about an individual's health, x x x

(3) issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not limited to, social security numbers, previous or current health records, x x x

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However, personal information may be disclosed to the extent that the requested information is shown to be a matter of public concern or interest, shall not meddle with or disturb the private life or family relations of the individual and is not prohibited by any law or regulation. Any disclosure of personal information shall be in accordance with the principles of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.

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(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The information on the state of health of the President during a serious illness falls squarely within the foregoing proviso. Again, there can be no serious denying that said information is a matter of public concern or interest. The Constitution characterizes it as such under certain conditions and thus obligates its ensuing disclosure.

True, the proviso likewise cautions that the disclosure shall not meddle with or disturb the private life or family relations of the individual. This proceeds from the right of an individual to be free from unwarranted intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 39 The right to be free from humiliation, however, is far outweighed by the public interest at stake and the paramount significance of knowing the present health condition of the Chief Executive of the land. As such, while the right to privacy guarantees an individual freedom from unwarranted publicity or interference by the public, this is understood to pertain only to matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned. 40 It cannot be gainsaid that the state of health of the President who suffers from a serious illness is a matter which the public is necessarily and rightly concerned about. The Constitutional duty to disclose, therefore, heeds the legitimate need of the public to be assured of having a President who is able to discharge the functions of the office despite his or her serious illness.

More importantly, a sitting President cannot validly claim a reasonable expectation of privacy to his medical and health records. The clear language of Section 12, Article VII of the Constitution removes this expectation and serves as notice of the nature, purpose, and extent of the right to information of the public to a President's state of health and his correlative duty to disclose. Whatever loss or constraints imposed on the President is justified by the underlying considerations of legitimate public interest. The Framers had weighed these competing interests of the President and the public and had found the latter's interest to be more deserving of protection. At the same time, by circumscribing both the right to information and the duty to disclose to only cases of a "serious illness," the Constitution does not intend to go beyond what is fair and necessary. Hence, any disclosure of personal information under Section 12, Article VII remains faithful to the proviso in the Memorandum of the Executive Secretary that it shall be in accordance with the principles of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality. 41

This calls to mind the case of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, et al., 42 (Nixon), which, although not on all fours with the present case, is persuasive and demonstrative of the import of balancing competing but equally significant rights and interests.

After the tenure of former President Nixon, the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act was enacted for the purpose of preserving, maintaining, and archiving Presidential records. Apart from the presidential privilege of confidentiality, President Nixon invoked his right to privacy over personal documents and communications co-mingled with those which were official. The US Supreme Court acknowledged that, "at least when Government intervention is at stake, public officials, including the President, are not wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity." It was quick to add, however, that President Nixon's claim of invasion of his privacy "cannot be considered in the abstract; rather, the claim must be considered in light of the specific provisions of the Act, and any intrusion must be weighed against the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of appellant's administration to archival screening. 43 The US Supreme Court thus concluded:

In sum, appellant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But the constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening. When this is combined with the Act's sensitivity to appellant's legitimate privacy interests, the unblemished record of the archivists for discretion, and the likelihood that the regulations to be promulgated by the Administrator will further moot appellant's fears that his materials will be reviewed by "a host of persons," we are compelled to agree with the District Court that appellant's privacy claim is without merit. 44 (Citations omitted)

In this jurisdiction, the Court in Morfe v. Mutuc 45 (Morfe) was confronted with a similar issue on the privacy of public officials. As in Nixon, the constitutionality of RA 3019, which includes a provision that all government officials must comply with the routine filing of a statement of assets and liabilities, was challenged. The disclosure of the required information was argued as an unlawful intrusion on a person's right to privacy. The Court rejected this view, holding that there is a "rational relationship" between the declared policy of the law to deter corrupt acts on the part of public officials, and the information to be disclosed — consequently placing the amounts and sources of a public officer's income outside the zone of his or her privacy. The declared policy of the State to ensure the honesty and integrity of officials outweighs the privacy interests over the required information. Morfe, therefore, demonstrates the Court's implicit recognition of the legitimacy of the public's interest over certain information concerning government officials, as long as it relates to the performance of their duty.

Indubitably, in this case, the substantial and overriding public interest and concern involved and the limited execution of the Constitutional duty to disclose justify the intrusion into the President's informational privacy over the state of his or her health.

III.

The duty of the President under Section 12, Article VII to disclose the state of his health in case of a serious illness is a ministerial duty.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right arising from a positive duty, Section 12, Article VII is judicially enforceable. Hence, contrary to the position expressed by the majority, I submit that this right is enforceable through an action for mandamus, in order to compel the President to perform the positive duty imposed upon him by this provision.

The Framers have clearly placed upon the OP the duty of informing the public of his state of health in case of serious illness, as seen from the following exchanges:

MR. NOLLEDO:

Will the proposed provisions apply if the President is absent because he claims to be writing a book?

MR. OPLE:

Yes, but we put the burden on him to tell a lie to the people in derogation of his duties in the Constitution.

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MR. RODRIGO:

For the record, would failure to comply with this constitutional mandate be considered culpable violation of the Constitution which is one of the grounds for impeachment?

MR. OPLE:

In the sense that a constitutional standard was violated, I think that is a perfectly censurable act. But I am not inclined to say at this point that it attains to the level of a culpable violation. (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the burden is placed on the President and a violation of this provision, while not considered as culpable to be a ground for impeachment, is nevertheless a "perfectly censurable act."

In this regard, some members of the majority made observations during the deliberations that the remedy against a Chief Executive who decides not to inform the public is not through the Court, but one which may be sought through "people power." This alludes to the Following exchanges between the Framers:

MR. OPLE:

I accept the amendment, and so the first sentence will now read: IN CASE OF SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PUBLIC SHALL BE INFORMED OF THE STATE OF HIS HEALTH AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.

Madam President, I think I have just changed my mind after an expert on medical matters came around. We are called upon to be more trusting with respect to the Office of the President that they will know what appropriate means to take in order to release this information to the public in satisfaction of the public's right to know about the presidency.

MR. GUINGONA:

Madam President, may I explain? I thought all along that the honorable proponent was thinking of a situation such as when recently there was an attempt on the part of the Executive not to inform the public. And now, we are going to entrust this obligation or duty . . .

MR. OPLE:

Madam President, we will leave something for people power to do. Maybe Commissioner Aquino can lead a march, if they are not satisfied with the information coming from the Office of the President.

THE PRESIDENT:

So, the proponent does not accept the amendment.

MR. OPLE:

Thank you. (Emphasis supplied)

While Commissioner Ople did mention people power, signaling political — and not judicial — recourse, the statement was made in the context of the people's dissatisfaction with the information coming from the President — meaning, the President had already discharged the burden which explanation is deemed unsatisfactory. As to the President's failure to discharge the burden, the Framers had already viewed this as a "perfectly censurable act," for which judicial recourse may be had.

Moreover, considering that this also involves the right to information, it is already settled in case law 46 that such right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as the present petition. At any rate, the omission from a Constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that the constitutional provision is not intended to be self-executing or that it is not, by itself, fully enforceable. 47

The office of the writ of mandamus is well-settled. It is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. 48 It lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary. 49 A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. 50

The Court in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay 51 (MMDA) held that the obligation to perform duties as defined by law, on the one hand, and how duties shall be carried out, on the other, are two different concepts. It expounded then that "while the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus."

As in the case with MMDA, the duty of the President to inform the public about the state of his health in case of a serious illness is a duty imposed by the Constitution and cannot be characterized as discretionary. A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform." 52 Here, in case of a serious illness, the Constitution does not give the President any discretion to forego the public disclosure of his state of health. There is simply no room for him to exercise any judgment on this score.

Indeed, the Framers intended to "leave the burden to the Office of the President to choose the appropriate means of releasing information to the public." 53 However, the intention meant just that — to choose the appropriate means of releasing information to the public. Simply put, the discretion left to the President is limited to this aspect, which is the determination of the manner of public disclosure. It does not go into the discretion as to whether the President may or may not disclose when there is a serious illness. In other words, the President is given the right to decide how the duty is performed, not if the duty is to be performed at all.

At this juncture, I likewise take exception to the suggestion made during the deliberations that the Constitutional Commission delegated to the OP the exclusive discretion to determine the substance of the access and information itself (e.g., would it include medical examination results, or medical bulletins, or just statements, agenda of the access, length and place of the access, persons allowed access). As previously pointed out, the Framers only delegated to the President the discretion to choose the appropriate means of releasing the information. The substance thereof is not subject to such discretion as it must adhere to what the Constitution mandates, which is the President's "state of health." To reiterate, a state of health presupposes more than mere "medical examination results," "just statements" or enumerations of existing maladies. On the contrary, the state of health must be a complete picture of the health condition of the President, which includes a full assessment and interpretation of his or her existing serious illness. To suggest otherwise defeats the purpose of the provision.

To further emphasize the above-mentioned intention to limit the discretion afforded the President, it is well to point out that the discussion by the Framers on the "appropriate means" sprung from the rejection of the original proposal that the information be made available to the public "through the minister of health or other appropriate authority." Since the President's health is a personal matter to some degree, the Framers agreed to dispense with requiring the Minister of Health or other appropriate authority to comply with the required disclosure, eventually leaving it to the President to determine the proper mechanism of informing the public. 54

The duty to disclose the state of the President's health must likewise be read in conjunction with the spirit of Section 12, Article VII, in that it was crafted to prevent the concealment of the President's serious illness, most especially in times of national crises. The thrust of this provision, according to the Framers, is to textualize in the Constitution the right of the public to be informed about the state of health of the President in case of a serious illness. Under pain of repetition, the illuminating explanatory note of former Senator Ople is worth re-quoting:

MR. OPLE: I think throughout history, there had been many recorded instances when the health of the President, or the emperor, in Roman times, or the Chinese emperor in dynasties long past was, concealed from the public. Generally, the wife conspires with others in order to conceal the leader's state of health. One effect of this has been on the necessary inputs to policy coming from Cabinet ministers which have been blocked from reaching the attention of the President in that state. This illness can occur during an awkward moment in the life of a nation when national survival ought to be secured in the face of a major threat short of, let us say, the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus when Congress comes in in order to exercise a monitoring function and, perhaps, a remedial function. We have not yet, in this example, attained that level of the seriousness of the situation. And yet the national security might be at stake. The national survival can hang in the balance and, therefore, the right of the people to know ought to be included in this Article on the Executive, not only the right of the people to urgent access to a President in a state of illness, but especially those who deal with the safety and survival of the nation. The Cabinet minister in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces ought to have access to the President as commander-in-chief. The people as well should have access to this man in that kind of dubious state so that even in that critical and awkward moment in the fortunes of the national leader, we can be sure that the people have access to him for purposes of safeguarding the national security. That is the reason the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces is also mentioned in the proposal. I think this is based on contemporary experience as well. And if we delegate this merely to a forthcoming legislature, there will arise situations or embarrassment considering that many who will compose this legislature will be very deferential towards those in power and may not even mention this at all in their agenda.

Therefore, I feel that there should be a constitutional cognizance of that danger, and the right of the people to know ought to be built into this Article on the Executive. (Emphasis supplied)

On a related note, the submission argued during the deliberations that the application of Section 12, Article VII is limited to only two instances: national security and foreign relations — and had the framers intended to include "public health emergency," they would have necessarily added the Secretary of Health to the list of Cabinet members who shall not be denied access to the President during such illness, must fail. The same fate holds true to the other suggestion that Section 12, Article VII may only operate when the President is inaccessible or incommunicado to the public, and there are reasonable and well-founded grounds to believe that national security and national survival are in real jeopardy.

A plain reading of Section 12, Article VII shows that no other condition is imposed by the Constitution on the public's right to be informed of the President's state of health as long as the President's illness is classified as serious. Whatever may be the current state of the country at such time is of no moment. That the Constitution mentions the Cabinet members in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces as persons who should not be denied access to the President during such illness is not a limitation of the situation to only threats to national security or foreign relations; rather, it should be interpreted as underscoring the significance of making sure that the President is still capable of governing.

There is also no discernible intention from the deliberations to confine the operation of Section 12, Article VII to these circumstances. The Framers' references to ensuring the nation's survival, when there is a major threat occurring at the same time that the President is suffering from a serious illness, is simply to guarantee the continuous access of the named officials to the President. By doing so, there is an assurance that the President receives uninterrupted and unfiltered information, which in turn, aids the President in making policy decisions while being seriously ill. 55

In the same vein, I respectfully disagree with the submission that for Section 12, Article VII to operate, the President, while suffering from a serious illness, must be inaccessible or incommunicado to the public, the Members of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Neither the text of the Constitution nor the Framers' deliberations support this.

Premising the operation of Section 12, Article VII on this circumstance presumes that the President's absence (or presence) is an invariable standard. However, it is not unheard of for a President to remain in the public eye while suffering from a serious illness. The President may also easily evade the disclosure of the state of his or her health by simply appearing in public or meeting with the cabinet, despite his or her affliction.

This leaves the President with unbridled discretion to comply with Section 12, Article VII — the situation that the Framers precisely sought to avoid by vesting the duty to disclose with a concomitant right of the public to the information. Clearly, the proposed requirement is an excessively narrow application of the provision that fails to consider other serious ailments, which are imperceptible, or which may be concealed from public view. 56 The prolonged absence of the President is therefore, at best, only circumstantial.

Evidently, it is not indispensable for the President to become inaccessible or incommunicado for the duty to disclose to arise. On the contrary, this provision contemplates a situation where, despite being afflicted with a serious illness, the President is nonetheless able to make important decisions through the Cabinet members in charge of national security and foreign relations, and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 57 This is further highlighted in the second sentence of Section 12, Article VII, which assures the access of these officials to the President that would otherwise be unnecessary if the President is fully incapacitated to perform the functions and duties of his office. For the same reasons, I also completely disagree with the suggestion that disclosure is necessitated only when the serious illness prevents the President from doing his job in a grave manner.

Reading Section 12 alongside Sections 8 and 11 of Article VII strongly bolsters the foregoing observation. Sections 8 and 11 of Article VII address the contingencies that may arise, depending on the severity of the illness and incapacity of the President to discharge the functions of the office.

If the President's serious illness escalates and renders the President temporarily unable to discharge the functions of the office, Section 11, 58 Article VII shall operate, in which case, the Vice-President is to assume the functions of the office as Acting President. The President may still re-assume the powers and duties of the office upon transmittal to the Senate President and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration that no such inability exists. But in the unfortunate event of the President's death or permanent disability, Section 8, 59 Article VII designates the Vice-President as the successor, to assume the office for the unexpired term. Thus, when read together, Sections 8 and 11 of Article VII reveal that the thrust on the public's right to information about the state of health of the President, afforded by Section 12, Article VII, is anchored further, if not more significantly, on the imperativeness of determining the ability of the President to govern in the face of a serious illness.

The President's capacity to govern is a matter of public interest, whether during ordinary times or in "an awkward moment in the life of a nation when national survival ought to be secured in the face of a major threat."60 The latter is precisely what confronts the country now — its continued survival given the gravity of a pandemic which affects not only the entire country but the whole world. It is a fair and reasonable requirement for the public to be informed of the state of health of the President when threats and emergencies affecting the country are present — including emergencies involving public health.

The wording of Section 12, Article VII itself as well as the intention of the Framers, imposes a positive duty and recognizes the right of the public to be informed. To interpret the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission as a grant to the President of the absolute choice between divulging and concealing a serious illness and, by extension, the state of the President's well-being, defeats the purpose of the provision and renders it wholly ineffective if not completely inutile. This is a dangerous path which should not be taken.

IN VIEW THEREOF, I DISSENT from the majority Resolution peremptorily dismissing the petition without observance of due process.

 

Footnotes

1. Official name and shortened version of the Corona Virus Disease 2019.

2. See Annex "A".

3. Annex "I"; While petitioner alleges in the instant petition that he filed the FOI Request after listening to the President's COVID-19 press conference on March 12, 2020, it appears from the FOI Request attached to the petition that the request was filed on March 11, 2020.

4. Entitled "Operationalizing in the Executive Branch the People's Constitutional Right to Information and the State Policies to Full Public Disclosure and Transparency in the Public Service and Providing Guidelines Therefor." (July 23, 2016).

5. Annex "J".

6. See Annexes "K", "L", "L-1".

7. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

8. Section 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

9. Annexes "B" to "F".

10.Padilla, et al. v. Congress of the Philippines, et al., 814 Phil. 344, 377 (2017), citing De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 737 (2010).

11.Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019, citing Lihaylihay v. Tan, G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018.

12.City of Davao v. Olanolan, 808 Phil. 561, 569 (2017), citing Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 701 Phil. 365, 386-387 (2013).

13.Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 207 (2010), citing Tangonan v. Paño, 221 Phil. 601, 610 (1985) and Gonzalez v. Board of Pharmacy, 20 Phil. 367, 375 (1911).

14.Pimentel III v. COMELEC, et al., 571 Phil. 596 (2008), citing Olama v. Philippine National Bank, 525 Phil. 424, 435 (2006).

15.Phil. Coconut Authority v. Primex Coco Products, Inc., 528 Phil. 365, 387 (2006), citing Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana, 486 Phil. 452, 469-470 (2004).

16.Id., citing Texon Manufacturing v. Millena, 471 Phil. 318, 324 (2004).

17. Petition, pp. 34-35; see RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 43 (July 30, 1986).

18.See RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 43 (July 30, 1986).

19. Petition, pp. 14-18.

20.Representative Lagman, et al. v. Hon. Medialdea, et al., 812 Phil. 179, 312 (2017), citing Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000).

LEONEN, J., dissenting:

1. Petition, pp. 2-3.

2.Id. at 3.

3.Id.

4. 720 Phil. 174 (2013) [Per J. Perez, En Banc].

5.Id. at 308.

6. A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC (2010).

7. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1.

8.See Ponencia, p.4.

9. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018, 863 SCRA, 1, 600 [Per J. Tijam, En Banc].

10. 41 Phil. 322 (1921) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].

11.Id. at 329-330.

12. Petition, p. 2.

13.Id. at 8.

14. Executive Department.

15. Petition, pp. 4-7.

16.Id.

17. CONST., art. VII, sec. 12.

18.The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 330 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

19.See CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (1).

20.Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, G.R. No. 221139, March 20, 2019, <http://elibraiy.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/l/65145> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

21.Id.

22.Aala v. Uy, 803 Phil. 36 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

23.Id. at 37.

24. 803 Phil. 36 (2013) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

25.Id. at 36-37.

26. G.R. No. 217158, March 19, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64970> [Per J. Jardeleza, En Banc].

27.Id.

28.Id.

29. 751 Phil. 301 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

30.Id. at 329-330.

31. Province of Batangas v. Romulo, 473 Phil. 806, 826-827 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].

32.The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 330 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

33.Aala v. Uy, 803 Phil. 36, 57 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

34.The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301, 332 (2015) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

35.Id.

36.See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 252 Phil. 264 (1989) [Per. J. Cortes, En Banc].

37.Roque, Jr. v. Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff, 805 Phil. 921, 939 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division]. Although the case involves a Petition to Cite for Indirect Contempt, it recognized the people's right to information on matters concerning public interest.

38.See CONST., art. III, sec. 7.

39. CONST., art. VII, sec. 12.

40. Declaration of Principles and State Policies.

41. Bill of Rights.

42. 234 Phil. 521 (1987) [Per J. Comes, En Banc].

43.Id. at 525.

44. 252 Phil. 264 (1989) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

45.Id.

46.Id. at 270-272.

47. 551 Phil. 1 (2007) [Per J. Garcia, En Banc].

48.Id.

49.Id. at 12-13.

50. (2006) 535 Phil. 687 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, En Banc].

51.Id. at 707-708.

52.Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521 (1987) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

53Id. at 534.

54. 243 Phil. 1007 (1988) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].

55.Id. at 1019-1019.

56.Estrada v. Desierto (2001) 406 Phil. 1 [Per J. Puno, En Banc].

57. 16 Phil. 534 (1910) [Per J, Johnson, First Division].

58.Id. at 573.

59.Id. at 578-580.

60. J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65820> [Per CJ. Bersamin, En Banc].

61. 229 Phil. 185 (1986) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

62.Id. at 187.

63. 249 Phil. 394 (1988) [Per Curiam, En Banc].

64.Id. at 400-401.

65. 406 Phil. 1 (2001) [J. Puno En Banc].

66.Id.

67.Id. at 78.

68. 522 Phil. 705 (2006) [Per J. Sandoval — Gutierrez, En Banc].

69.Id. at 763-764.

70. G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65820> [Per C.J. Bersamin, En Banc].

71.Id.

72.Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA International Corp., 788 Phil. 704, 754-755 (2016) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division] citing Senate v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 37 (2006) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

73. 314 Phil. 150 (1995) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].

74.Id. at 168.

75. 572 Phil. 554 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, En Banc].

76.Id. at 645.

77.Id.

78.Id.

79.In re Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees, February 14, 2012 (Notice).

80. 580 Phil. 422 (2008) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

81.Id. at 475.

82. 522 Phil. 1 (2006) [Per. J. Carpio-Morales, En Banc].

83.Id. at 42.

84.In re Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees, February 14, 2012 (Notice).

85.Id.

86. 272 Phil. 147 (1991) [Per CJ. Fernan, En Banc].

87.Id. at 169-170.

88. 795 Phil. 529 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

89.Id. at 570-571.

90. CONST., art. VII, sec. 12.

91. 582 Phil. 492 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].

92.Id. at 501-504.

93.Id. at 504.

94. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.

95. Rules of Court, Rules of Procedure, as Amended (April 8, 1997).

96.Association of Retired Court of Appeals Justices, Inc. v. Abad, Jr., G.R. No. 210204, July 10, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64363> [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].

97.Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 206 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

98.Id.

99.Lihaylihay v. Tan, G.R. No. 192223, July 23, 2018, <http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64362 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

100.Uy Kiao Eng v. Lee, 624 Phil. 200, 209 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

101.Id.

102. Petition, pp. 32-36.

103.Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521 (1987) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

104.Id. at 530.

105.Id. at 532.

106. Petition, pp.6-7.

107. Petition, Annex I. Dino's Request for Information Form was dated March 11, 2020. However, the attached letter request to the form was dated March 10, 2020.

108.Id.

109. Petition, Annex J. On the same date, petitioner sent a reply to the e-mail asking when will the records be available and what are the efforts being exerted to be able to have the requested information. (See Petition, Annex K).

110. Petition, Annex K (March 13, 2020); Annex L (April 1, 2020) and Annex L-1 (April 6, 2020).

111.People's Freedom of Information Manual, Office of the President, November, 25, 2016, sec. 11.

SECTION 11. Remedies in Case of Denial. A party whose request for access to information has been denied may avail of the remedy set forth herein.

11.1 Administrative FOI Appeal to the FOI Appeals Authority. The requesting party may file an appeal of the adverse or unfavorable action of the FDM [FOI Decision Maker] with the FOI Appeals Authority. The appeal shall be filed within fifteen (15) calendar days from the receipt of the notice of denial or fifteen (15) days from the lapse of the period to respond to the request.

11.2. The appeal shall be decided by the FOI Appeals Authority within thirty (30) working days from receipt of the appeal. Failure to decide within the thirty (30)-day period shall be deemed a denial of the appeal.

11.3. The denial of the appeal by the FOI Appeals Authority shall be considered final, and the requesting party may file the appropriate judicial action in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

112.People's Freedom of Information Manual, Office of the President, November, 25, 2016, sec. 10.

SECTION 10.10. Grounds for Denial. The FOI request may be denied based on the following grounds:

10.10.1. The office does not have possession or custody of the information requested:

10.10.2. The information requested falls under the Exceptions to FOI; or

10.10.3. The request is an unreasonable subsequent identical or substantially similar request from the same requesting party whose request has already been previously granted or denied by the [Office of the President]. (Emphasis supplied)

113. While Section 10.10 of the Manual expressly provides that an FOI request may be denied if the "office does not have possession or custody of the information requested," it must be noted that based on the MRO's reply, it is yet to give a conclusive action oil the request when the information sought for becomes available.

114. Petition, Annex J.

CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

1. Petition, pp. 41-42.

2. Resolution, pp. 3-4.

3.Id. at 4.

4.United BF Homeowners v. Sandoval-Gutierrez, 374 Phil. 18 (1999).

5.N.B.: See The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 751 Phil. 301-450 (2015), where the Court distinguished its role from other levels of the judiciary in relation to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, thus: "This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role." To my mind, this petition presents the novel questions of law that the Supreme Court reserves its attention for.

See also Gios-Sanar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications (G.R No. 217158, March 12, 2019), where it recognized the exceptions to hierarchy of courts, specifically "transcendental importance" as involving cases where there were no disputed facts and the issues involved were ones of law.

6. Under Ride 13, Section 6 (a) of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the Court shall adjudicate cases by decision "when the Court disposes of the case on its merits and its rulings have significant doctrinal values; resolve novel issues; or impact on the social, political, and economic life of the nation."

7. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

8. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

9. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

10. Buerger's Disease, Barrett's Esophagus, Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease, and Myasthenia Gravis, "spinal issues."

11. Daily migraines.

2. Resolution, pp. 4-5.

13.Id.

14. 812 Phil. 179 (2017).

15. 335 Phil. 82 (1997).

16. As aptly observed in Gamboa v. Teves, 668 Phil. 1 (2011).

17. Dissenting Opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno in Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, supra note 15.

18. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

19. See Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra note 15.

20. The second paragraph of Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution reads: "In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos."

21.Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra note 15.

22. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

23. In the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following discussion also took place:

THE PRESIDENT: At any rate, the thrust of the amendment is that at least the public should be informed.

MR. OPLE: Yes, Madam President. It is the public's right to know; besides, the safeguarding of our national survival and security can be irretrievably impaired if the access of those in charge of national security and foreign relations is cut off through confabulations in the household, so that the President is kept in a state of ignorance about a period of national danger. (Emphasis supplied)

24.David v. Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006).

25.Id.

26.Id.

27. 589 Phil. 387 (2008).

28. "SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest."

29.Province of North Cotabato v. GRRP, supra note 27.

30.Id.

31.Id.

32. 234 Phil. 521 (1987).

33.Id.

34. 392 Phil. 518 (2000).

35. 296 Phil. 694 (1993).

36. Section 3 (I) of RA 10173.

37. Operationalizing in the Executive Branch the People's Constitutional Right to Information and the State Policies to Full Public Disclosure and Transparency in the Public Service and Providing Guidelines Therefor (July 23, 2016).

38. Office of the President, Memorandum from the Executive Secretary, Re: Inventory of Exceptions to Executive Order No. 2 (s. 2016).

39. See Spouses Hing v. Choachuy, Sr., et al., 712 Phil. 337 (2013).

40.Id.

41. Section 18 of the IRR of the Data Privacy Act provides:

Section 18. Principles of Transparency, Legitimate Purpose and Proportionality. The processing of personal data shall be allowed subject to adherence to the principles of transparency, legitimate purpose, and proportionality.

a. Transparency. The data subject must be aware of the nature, purpose, and extent of the processing of his or her personal data, including the risks and safeguards involved, the identity of personal information controller, his or her rights as a data subject, and how these can be exercised. Any information and communication relating to the processing of personal data should be easy to access and understand, using clear and plain language.

b. Legitimate purpose. The processing of information shall be compatible with a declared and specified purpose which must not be contrary to law, morals, or public policy.

c. Proportionality. The processing of information shall be adequate, relevant, suitable, necessary, and not excessive in relation to a declared and specified purpose. Personal data shall he processed only if the purpose of the processing could not reasonably be fulfilled by other means."

42. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).

43. Emphasis supplied.

44.Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, et al., supra note 42.

45. 130 Phil, 415 (1968).

46.Legaspi v. CSC, supra note 32.

47. See Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, supra note 15.

48.Martinez v. Martin, 749 Phil. 353 (2014).

49.Segovia v. CCC, 806 Phil. 1019 (2017), citing Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 701 Phil. 365, 387 (2013).

50.Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, id.

51. 595 Phil. 305 (2008).

52.Id., citing Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004).

53. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.

54. "MR. ABUBAKAR: May I ask the proponent a few questions? Concerning the President or the Executive of any state, his health primarily does not only concern the nation but also his family and probably his own personal advisers and physician. Then, why should we subject the state of health of the President to another institution or entity which has no direct concern over his health and may not know the background of his illness?

MR. OPLE: Is the Gentleman referring to the Minister of Health or other appropriate authority?

MR. ABUBAKAR: Yes. He could be the Minister of Health in as far as the President views the health situation of the country and his people. But this is a personal matter concerning the health of the President. Like us, the Members of the Commission, we do have our personal physicians, and this is a matter between us and our own physicians. So, the state of health or analysis as to the actual condition of the President should be left to the President and his doctor.

MR. OPLE: Is Commissioner Abubakar suggesting that we eliminate the phrase "THROUGH THE MINISTER OF HEALTH OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AUTHORITY"?

MR. ABUBAKAR: Yes.

MR. OPLE: We accept the amendment, madam President.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT: With the elimination of the Minister of Health, who will then inform the public? I just want to clarify that.

MR. OPLE: Madam President, I think we will leave the burden to the Office of the President to choose the appropriate means of releasing information to the public." [R.C.C. No. 043, (July 30, 1986).]

55. "MR. OPLE: I think throughout history, there had been many recorded instances when the health of the President, or the emperor in Roman times, or the Chinese emperor in dynasties long past was concealed from the public. Generally, the wife conspires with others in order to conceal the leader's state of health. One effect of this has been on the necessary inputs to policy coming from Cabinet ministers which have been blocked from reaching the attention of the President in that state. x x x

xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE: Yes, Madam President. It is the public's right to know; besides, the safeguarding of our national survival and security can be irretrievably impaired if the access of those in charge of national security and foreign relations is cut off through confabulations in the household, so that the President is kept in a state of ignorance about a period of national danger." [R.C.C. No. 043, (July 30, 1986).]

56.N.B. When former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was hounded with persistent rumors regarding his failing health, he publicly appeared on television to remove doubts on his capacity to discharge the functions of his office. It was later found out that Marcos was suffering from lupus despite these public appearances. At that time, it is significant to note that there was no provision in the 1973 Constitution requiring the disclosure of the President's state of health in case of serious illness.

57. See Joaquin G. Herons, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 862 (2009 ed).

58. "SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until lie transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.

Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

59. "SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President."

60. R.C.C. No. 043, July 30, 1986.