De Guzman, Jr. v. People

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 232693-94. August 23, 2017.]

JOSE Q. DE GUZMAN, JR., petitioner,vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRPERSON OF SANDIGANBAYAN SEVENTH [7TH] DIVISION, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 23 August 2017 which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 232693-94 (Jose Q. De Guzman, Jr. vs. The People of the Philippines, Hon. Alexander G. Gesmundo, in his capacity as Chairperson of Sandiganbayan Seventh [7th] Division). — This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated March 20, 2017 2 and May 22, 2017 3 issued by the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division in SB-12-CRM-0127 to 0128. HEITAD

In 2004, a complaint was filed with the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, which essentially alleged that in October 2001, several employees 4 of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Tarlac Field Office conspired with Jose Q. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in giving him undue preference, benefit or advantage by processing and approving the loans of a total of 491 of De Guzman's borrowers, amounting to P241,053,600.00, under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, notwithstanding their knowledge that the said borrowers were neither qualified or under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac Field Office. 5

It was also alleged that the said GSIS employees, using the same modus, approved 53 borrowers of De Guzman's land development project called Teresa Homes, amounting to P52,107,000.00, despite their knowledge that the lots covered were intended for commercial purposes and by causing over-appraisal in the amount of P33,242,848.36 of the land and improvements offered as collaterals. 6

On September 15, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued a Joint Resolution, which found probable cause to indict De Guzman and the said employees of GSIS for violating Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. De Guzman's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Ombudsman in its Joint Order dated November 14, 2005. 7

Initially, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City. However, upon motion of GSIS, this was withdrawn for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan, pursuant to the Ombudsman's Order dated March 14, 2006. However, due to the delay that attended the remand of the case records, the two Informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on September 19, 2011. 8

On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding probable cause and directing the issuance of warrants of arrest of all the accused. On July 10, 2012, Amado Inocentes (Inocentes), one of the indicted GSIS employees, filed an Omnibus Motion (1) for determination of probable cause; (2) to quash the Information against him; and (3) to dismiss the case on the ground of violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases. Inocentes' Omnibus Motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated February 8, 2013. In due course, the accused posted their respective cash bonds and were arraigned. 9

Inocentes then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 205963-64 and entitled Inocentes v. People, assailing the denial of his Omnibus Motion. On July 7, 2016, the Court issued a Decision, 10 which granted the petition for certiorari of Inocentes. The Court opined that seven years had lapsed from the filing of the complaint with the Ombudsman until the filing of the Information with the Sandiganbayan; that the same is unreasonable and violates Inocentes' right to speedy disposition of his cases. 11 aDSIHc

On February 8, 2017, De Guzman filed a Motion to Dismiss, 12 citing the Decision of this Court in Inocentes v. People. He insisted that the cases against him should likewise be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine of the law of the case. He further argued that Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which essentially mandates that a favorable appeal by one of several accused affects all the accused, should apply in his case. 13

On March 20, 2017, the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division issued the herein assailed Resolution, 14 which, inter alia, denied De Guzman's motion to dismiss for being filed out of time and for lack of merit. The Sandiganbayan opined that: (1) the doctrine of the law of the case is not applicable to De Guzman's cases; 15 (2) De Guzman failed to raise his right to speedy disposition of cases against him at the earliest opportunity; 16 and (3) he is not similarly situated with Inocentes. 17 De Guzman sought a reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 20, 2017, 18 but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 19 dated May 22, 2017.

Aggrieved, De Guzman filed this petition for certiorari claiming that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the cases against him despite the Court's ruling in Inocentes v. People.

In sum, the issue presented to the Court for resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the cases against De Guzman.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is dismissed.

A petition for certiorari, such as the one before the Court, will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. 20 The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 21 In this case, there was no hint of whimsicality or gross and patent abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it denied De Guzman's motion to dismiss the charges against him. ATICcS

As aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, De Guzman will not benefit from the provisions of Section 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "[a]n appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter." Simply put, Section 11 (a) mandates that an appeal by one of several accused may benefit the other accused if the appeal is favorable and applicable to the rest of the accused.

In seeking the benefit of Section 11 (a), De Guzman points out that in Inocentes v. People, the Court ordered the dismissal of the criminal charges against Inocentes, who is one of the accused in the cases before the Sandiganbayan. As pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, the provision is specifically applicable to an appeal from a judgment or final order. The action brought by De Guzman before this Court is a special civil action for certiorari, not an appeal.

More importantly, the Court notes that De Guzman only raised his right to speedy disposition of the cases against him only in February 2017, after he was already arraigned and only after the Court has issued its ruling in Inocentes in July 2016, De Guzman had ample opportunity to raise his right to speedy disposition of cases as early as May 2012 when the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution finding probable cause to indict the accused in the case below. However, despite the numerous pleadings filed by De Guzman, he failed to invoke his right to speedy disposition of cases.

Unlike Inocentes who raised his right to speedy disposition of cases at the earliest opportunity, i.e., a couple of months after the Sandiganbayan's finding of probable cause, in his Omnibus Motion, which is essentially a motion to quash, De Guzman invoked his right five years after. His silence for five years amounts to a waiver of his right to speedy disposition of the charges against him. He was insensitive to the implications and contingencies of the projected criminal prosecution posed against him by not taking any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of the matter, which inaction conduces to the perception that the supervening delay seems to have been without his objection and, hence, impliedly with his acquiescence. 22

While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party's individual rights should not work against and preclude the people's equally important right to public justice. The delay in the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused, but the people as well. 23 Since De Guzman has completely failed to assert his right seasonably, it is only proper and equitable to give the parties, the accused and the people, fair opportunity to obtain, and for the court to dispense, substantial justice. ETHIDa

Moreover, the motion to dismiss filed by De Guzman with the Sandiganbayan is essentially a motion to quash the Information filed by the Ombudsman. It should be noted that a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases ousts the prosecution of its authority to file an Information, 24 which is a ground for the quashal of an Information under Section 3 (d) of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. A motion to quash the Information may be filed at any time before the accused enters his plea. 25

In this case, De Guzman has long entered his plea and is already participating in the proceedings for the presentation of the prosecution's evidence when he filed his motion to dismiss. Accordingly, De Guzman's motion to quash (in the guise of a motion to dismiss) is filed beyond the reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, the petition for certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Resolutions dated March 20, 2017 and May 22, 2017 issued by the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division in SB-12-CRM-0127 to 0128 are AFFIRMED." (Caguioa, J., on leave.)

Very truly yours,

MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-19.

2. Issued by the Sandiganbayan Seventh Division composed of Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo (now a Member of this Court) as Chairperson, and Associate Justices Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta and Zaldy V. Trespeses as Members; id. at 22-34.

3.Id. at 35-39.

4. The employees of the Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac Field Office, that were indicted are: Amado A. Inocentes, Branch Manager; Celestino Cabalitasan, Division Chief III; Ma. Victoria Leonardo, Property Appraiser III; and Jerry Balagtas, Senior General Insurance Specialist.

5.Rollo, p. 24.

6.Id.

7.Id.

8.Id. at 24-25.

9.Id. at 25.

10.Id. at 42-54.

11.Id. at 25.

12.Id. at 55-60.

13.Id. at 57-58.

14.Id. at 22-34.

15.Id. at 29-30.

16.Id. at 30-32.

17.Id. at 32-33.

18.Id. at 61-66.

19.Id. at 35-39.

20.See Beluso v. Commission on Elections, et al., 635 Phil. 436, 443 (2010).

21.Estrada v. Hon. Desierto, 487 Phil. 169, 182 (2004).

22.See Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 932 (2001).

23.See Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, 472 Phil. 869, 876 (2004), citing Guerrero v. CA, 327 Phil. 496, 510 (1996).

24.See People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 723 Phil. 444 (2013).

25. RULES OF COURT, Rule 117, Section 1.