THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 227898. March 12, 2018.]
MARCELINO S. DE BUQUE, JR., petitioner,vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC., AND SULFICIO O. TAGUD, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 12, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 227898 (Marcelino S. De Buque, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, Negros Navigation Co., Inc., and Sulficio O. Tagud, Jr.) — This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated April 19, 2016 and October 25, 2016, respectively, which dismissed the labor complaint of Marcelino S. De Buque, Jr. (petitioner) for being filed beyond the prescriptive period.
The Antecedents
Petitioner was employed by Negros Navigation Co., Inc., (respondent) on October 16, 1996 as an oiler on board one of its vessels, M/S San Lorenzo Ruiz.
On August 27, 2004, while the vessel was en route to Puerto Princesa, Palawan from Manila, petitioner figured in an accident while replacing a defective spare part in the vessel's engine. The said engine burst into flames and splattered oil over his face and body, causing him to suffer third degree burns on 60 to 65 percent of his body. Immediately upon reaching the port of Batangas, he was given medical attention. He was then transferred to the Philippine General Hospital to complete his treatment and underwent several operations fully paid for by respondent.
On October 13, 2005, the attending physician diagnosed petitioner as unfit to perform any kind of productive work due to his medical condition. Thus, on October 28, 2005, respondent dismissed petitioner from employment effective December 16, 2005 and paid him his separation pay, cash advances, medical allowances, disability benefits, and employees compensation benefits in the total amount of P1,243,785.00.
On September 21, 2005, petitioner filed a complaint (2005 Complaint) for disability benefits, illness allowance, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA) against respondent. However, pursuant to the Stay Order dated April 1, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 46, which had jurisdiction over the corporate rehabilitation case of respondent, the LA dismissed without prejudice the said complaint in an Order 3 dated July 27, 2006.
After the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings of respondent on February 6, 2010, petitioner filed another complaint for disability benefits before the LA, but the case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of interest to pursue the case. In lieu of the dismissal without prejudice, petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid separation pay, attorney's fees and damages on April 12, 2012, but the case was dismissed without prejudice for failure of petitioner to appear during the scheduled mandatory conference. Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion to revive and/or open the case on July 5, 2012, but subsequently amended his previous April 12, 2012 complaint, this time to include non-payment of service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. Hence, on August 2, 2012, petitioner filed the present amended complaint (2012 Complaint) for non-payment of service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, separation pay, burn injury, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondent. In his 2012 Complaint, petitioner contended that the vessel was not seaworthy and that respondent was negligent and failed to comply with the standard safety procedures.
The LA Ruling
In its Decision 4 dated December 18, 2013, the LA ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay the former service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and attorney's fees. According to the LA, while it was true that the cause of action accrued on December 16, 2005, and petitioner filed his complaint only in 2012, way beyond the prescriptive period, the belated filing of the complaint was through no fault on the part of petitioner as he was prevented from filing his complaint. As regards the claims of petitioner, the LA resolved that while it is undisputed that respondent had paid petitioner separation pay, Provident Fund and sickness benefits, the records are bereft of proof that respondent paid him service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and burn injury benefit. Thus, the LA ordered the award of service incentive leave and 13th month pay in favor of petitioner, but denied the grant of burn injury benefit for lack of basis. The LA found that petitioner was also entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the LA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering respondents Negros Navigation Company, Inc./Sulficio O. Tagud, Jr. as Chairman and CEO of Negros Navigation Co., Inc. to pay complainant Marcelino S. [De Buque], Jr. the amount of FIFTY NINE THOUSAND NINETEEN PESOS & 18/100 (P59,019.18) representing his service incentive pay, 13th month pay and attorney's fees.
Respondents Negros Navigation Company, Inc./Sulficio O. Tagud, Jr., are further ordered to pay complainant the amount of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00) as moral damages and TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) as exemplary damages.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Both parties filed their respective appeals to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In its Decision 6 dated September 1, 2014, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. It opined that petitioner's 2012 Complaint was already barred by prescription because it was filed beyond the three-year period within which to file a monetary claim from the time it accrued. 7 Citing Section 8 of A.M. No. 12-12-11 SC on the Rules of Procedure of Financial Rehabilitation, the NLRC determined that the stay order neither prevented petitioner from filing his claim nor did it stop the running of the prescriptive period. It emphasized that the issuance of the stay order did not affect petitioner's right to commence actions or proceedings in order to preserve ad cautelam his claim against respondent and it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period to file his claims. Otherwise stated, the NLRC resolved that the mere placing of respondent under rehabilitation proceedings did not stop the running of the statute of prescription.
Unconvinced, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC for dismissing his 2012 Complaint for being filed beyond the prescriptive period.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated April 19, 2016, the CA affirmed the ruling of the NLRC. It determined that the 2012 Complaint had already prescribed under Article 291 of the Labor Code, which directs that all money claims arising from employer-employee relationship should be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued. The CA opined that since the cause of action accrued on December 16, 2005, the date when petitioner was terminated from employment, he had three years from thereon to file a complaint. As the present complaint was filed only in 2012, the appellate court held that it was already time-barred. As regards the argument that the prescriptive period was tolled due to the stay order in view of the pendency of the corporate rehabilitation proceedings of respondent, the CA resolved that the rehabilitation proceedings did not toll the running of the prescriptive period. Borrowing the words of the NLRC, it pronounced that "mere placing of a company under rehabilitation proceedings would not stop the running of the statue of prescription or limitations." 8
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the ruling of the NLRC in dismissing the complaint for being filed beyond the prescriptive period. He submits that the petition was filed on time because the three-year prescriptive period was tolled by the stay order in the rehabilitation proceedings of respondent.
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the stay order tolled the running of the prescriptive period within which to file a labor complaint; and (2) whether petitioner is entitled to service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
I. The stay order tolled the running of.
The 2012 Complaint has not prescribed.
Art. 291 of the Labor Code directs that all monetary claims arising from employer-employee relationship must be filed within three years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, the filing of any monetary claims beyond the three-year period is deemed barred. 9 However, the law provides for grounds when the prescription of an action is interrupted. Found in Art. 1155 of the Civil Code, the law enumerates that (a) the filing of an action; (b) a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor; and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor toll the running of the prescriptive period. 10 Besides Art. 1155 of the Civil Code, Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A orders that all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under rehabilitation shall be suspended. 11 This rule uniformly applies to all claims of whatever nature, including labor claims. 12 The purpose of the indiscriminate suspension of all proceedings is to expedite the rehabilitation of the distressed corporation by enabling the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the rescue of the debtor company. 13 The present case is of no exception. Here, the 2005 Complaint was not only suspended, but was dismissed without prejudice, preventing petitioner to file his complaint.
The relevant complaints subject of the present petition are the 2005 and 2012 Complaints, which plead for different causes of action. Obviously, the 2005 Complaint claims for reimbursement of medical expenses because at the time it was filed, prior to petitioner's termination, his cause of action arising from his dismissal had yet to accrue; while the 2012 Complaint, on the other hand, seeks for money claims arising from petitioner's termination, i.e., service incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, and other damages.
First, as regards the 2005 Complaint, because it claims for reimbursement of medical expenses, petitioner has three years from the time of the accident, August 27, 2004, to file a complaint. Since the 2005 Complaint was filed as early as September 21, 2005, it was clearly filed on time. It is worthy to note, however, that since the stay order was issued as early as April 1, 2004, the LA should have abstained from resolving the case and directed petitioner to present his claim to the rehabilitation receiver, inasmuch as the stay order was effective and subsisted from issuance until the dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation or the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. 14
Second, anent petitioner's 2012 Complaint, the complaint subject of the instant case, contrary to the findings of the CA, this Court finds that it was filed on time. At the outset, as petitioner's cause of action accrued on December 16, 2005, the date of his termination, he only had until three years thereafter, or on December 15, 2008, to seek for the payment of money claims arising from such termination. But because of the suspension of the proceedings pursuant to the stay order of the rehabilitation court dated April 1, 2004, in view of Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which mandates that all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or associations under rehabilitation shall be suspended, the prescriptive period was tolled and it was only on February 6, 2010 when it started to run again upon the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. Thus, since at the time the cause of action accrued, the prescriptive period was still suspended and resumed only on February 6, 2010, petitioner had three years from thereon to file his complaint. Hence, as the 2012 Complaint was filed on August 2, 2012, the Court finds that it was filed on time.
The Court cannot accede to respondent's position that the rehabilitation proceedings does not interrupt the three-year prescriptive period. As explicitly stated in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora, 15 actions or claims against a corporation under rehabilitation proceedings are automatically suspended. Petitioner cannot be faulted for following the letter of the law. The suspension order and the subsequent dismissal shall enjoy presumption of validity and no litigant should suffer the consequences of the application of the law of the land. Indeed, the NLRC and CA are correct in citing Sec. 8 of the Rules of Procedure of Financial Rehabilitation that the issuance of a stay order does not affect the right of a party to commence actions or proceedings to protect its right against the debtor, who is under rehabilitation proceedings. At this juncture, it is worthy to clarify that the root cause of petitioner's predicament is the dismissal of his complaint through no fault of his own and that it was dismissed upon the stay order of the rehabilitation proceedings court, preventing him from pursuing his case in the interim. Thus, in his desire to adhere to the order, petitioner waited until the termination of the rehabilitation proceedings before pursuing his case again. Verily, he cannot be faulted for obeying the LA's ruling.
II. Petitioner is entitled to service
As regards the claim for service incentive leave, 13th month pay, and separation pay, this Court affirms the findings of the LA. While the records confirm that respondent has paid petitioner separation pay, Provident Fund, and sickness benefits, the records are bereft of proof that respondent has paid him service incentive leave and 13th month pay. 16 Having failed to dispute petitioner's right to service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay, this Court grants the same, computed as follows:
|
Service Incentive Leave Pay |
|
|
|
P15,000.00/26 days |
= |
P576.92 |
|
P576.92 x 5 days x 3 years |
= |
P8,653.80 |
|
13th Month Pay |
|
|
|
P15,000.00 x 3 years or 3 mos. |
= |
P45,000.00 |
|
|
|
P53,653.80 17 |
In relation to moral and exemplary damages, the Court denies such claims. A reading of the complaint reveals that petitioner's claim for moral and exemplary damages are quasi-delict in nature. 18 As it turns out, he anchors his claim for moral and exemplary damages on respondent's alleged negligence in allowing the vessel to sail despite not being seaworthy. Time and time again, this Court has clarified that jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations. 19 It is not the NLRC, but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. 20 Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi-delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Art. 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies with the regular courts — not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters. 21
Having compelled to litigate, the Court further finds the petitioner entitled to the award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the CA dated April 19, 2016 and October 25, 2016, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated December 18, 2013 is REINSTATED with the following modifications:
1. Service Incentive Leave — P8,653.80; and
2. Separation Pay — P45,000.00.
Attorney's fees are also imposed equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum, reckoned from the finality of this Resolution until full satisfaction, as per BSP Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 149-160; penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro with Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla, concurring.
2.Id. at 175-176.
3.Id. at 45-48.
4.Rollo, pp. 85-91; penned by Labor Arbiter Fatima Jambaro-Franco.
5.Id. at 90-91.
6.Rollo, pp. 105-111; penned by Commissioner Perlita B. Velasco with Commissioners Gerardo C. Nograles and Romeo L. Go, concurring.
7.Id. at 111.
8.Id. at 158.
9. LABOR CODE, Art. 291.
10. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1155.
11. Sec. 6 (c), P.D. No. 902-A, as amended.
12.Castillo v. Uniwide Warehouse Club, Inc., et al., 634 Phil. 41, 50 (2010) citing Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora, 543 Phil. 546 (2007).
13.Id. at 51.
14.Supra note 12 at 52; citing Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 558 Phil. 328 (2007).
15. 543 Phil. 546, 567 (2007).
16.Rollo, pp. 89-90.
17.Id. at 90.
18.Id. at 24-27.
19.Tolosa v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., 449 Phil. 271, 281 (2003).
20.Id. at 284.
21.Id. at 282.